Gregory Manning et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJan 26, 20212020002966 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 26, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/403,722 04/12/2006 Gregory P. Manning 05-7139 9912 63710 7590 01/26/2021 INNOVATION DIVISION CANTOR FITZGERALD, L.P. 110 EAST 59TH STREET (6TH FLOOR) NEW YORK, NY 10022 EXAMINER HENRY, THOMAS HAYNES ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3715 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/26/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): lkorovich@cantor.com mcatarino@cgolaw.com patentdocketing@cantor.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte GREGORY P. MANNING, JOSEPH C. NOVIELLO, and HOWARD W. LUTNICK Appeal 2020-002966 Application 11/403,722 Technology Center 3700 Before MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, WILLIAM A. CAPP, and NATHAN A. ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judges. ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 4, 5, 8–11, 14–20, 22–25, and 27–31. See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as CFPH, LLC. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-002966 Application 11/403,722 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claims 16 and 27 are independent claims and are reproduced below with emphasis added: 16. A method comprising the steps of: by computer of a computer-implemented electronic market, providing a secondary market for buying and selling contest entries of a multi-stage contest, the multi-stage contest having a plurality of stages, each stage causing a portion of a plurality of contest entries that are eligible to win the multi-stage contest before a stage to become ineligible to win the multi-stage contest after the stage, except for the last stage, the remaining eligible entries proceeding to the next stage of the multi-stage contest, the multi-stage contest having at least one winning contest entry from among the contest entries that remain eligible after the last of the plurality of stages; by computer of the computer-implemented electronic market, as a result of completion of at least one of the plurality of stages of the contest, the computer-implemented secondary market providing marking as ineligible computer-maintained records of for buying and selling of contest entries of the multi- stage contest that become ineligible as a result of the stage; for entries that remain eligible after the completed at least one of the plurality of stage, offering computer-implemented secondary market providing support for trading of remaining-eligible entries after change in eligibility or value of entries after the stage; causing a portion of the eligible contest entries to become ineligible to win the multi-stage contest at each of the plurality of stages comprises performing a first type of selection process; and determining at least one winning contest entry from one or more contest entries remaining eligible after the plurality of stages comprises a second type of selection process different from the first type of selection process. Appeal 2020-002966 Application 11/403,722 3 27. A method comprising the steps of: by computer of a computer-implemented electronic market, selling a plurality of contest entries eligible to win a multi-stage contest to a plurality of contestants, each contest entry being defined at least by one or more distinct identifiers, rules of the multi-stage contest providing that: at each of a plurality of stages in the multi-stage contest, one or more determinations are made regarding at least one of the distinct identifiers defining at least a portion of the contest entries, the one or more determinations causing a portion of the eligible contest entries that are eligible to win the multi-stage contest before a stage to become ineligible to win the multi-stage contest after the stage; except for the last stage, the entries remaining eligible after the stage proceeding to the next stage of the multi-stage contest, the multi-stage contest having at least one winning contest entry from among the contest entries that remain eligible after the last of the plurality of stages; by computer of the computer-implemented electronic market trading system, as a result of completion of at least one of the plurality of stages of the contest, marking as ineligible computer-maintained records of entries of the multi-stage contest that become ineligible as a result of the stage; for providing programmed support for a secondary market for buying and selling entries of the multi-stage contest that change value and eligibility as the stages of the contest progress and that remain eligible after the completed at least one of the plurality of stage, offering computer-implemented secondary market and the electronic trading system, and providing programmed support for trading of remaining-eligible entries after change in eligibility or value of entries after the stage; determining an award for each of the at least one winning contest entry based at least on the revenues received from selling the plurality of contest entries; determining at least one winning contest entry from one or more contest entries remaining eligible after the plurality of Appeal 2020-002966 Application 11/403,722 4 stages comprises providing a competition between contestants associated with the one or more contest entries that remain eligible after the plurality of stages to determine at least one winning contest entry. REJECTION Claims 4, 5, 8–11, 14–20, 22–25, and 27–31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2. Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis 4, 5, 8–11, 14–20, 22– 25, 27–31 101 Eligibility OPINION Appellant contends the Examiner failed to follow proper procedures in rejecting the pending claims as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Appeal Br. 6. In particular, Appellant contends the Examiner failed to make a prima facie showing that the claims are directed to an abstract idea because the Final Office Action cites only CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Id. According to Appellant, CyberSource dealt with claims directed to detecting credit card fraud which is unlike the present claims, which Appellant describes as “include[ing] elements such as entries into a multi-stage contest, markings of ineligibility and a secondary market for buying and selling.” Id. Appellant also contends the Final Office Action fails to include both a limitation-by- limitation analysis and a claims-as-a-whole analysis. Id. at 6–7. Further, Appellant argues that “[a] proper consideration of the claims would identify that the claims present a nonconventional arrangement that is significantly more than an abstract idea.” Id. at 8. Appeal 2020-002966 Application 11/403,722 5 We disagree with Appellant. The Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014). In addition, the Office has published revised guidance for evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically with respect to applying the Alice framework. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Office Guidance”).2 If a claim falls within one of the statutory categories of patent eligibility (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter) then the first inquiry is whether the claim is directed to one of the judicially recognized exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. As part of this inquiry, we must “look at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257–58 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Per the Office Guidance, this first inquiry (“Step 2A”) has two prongs of analysis: (i) does the claim recite (i.e., set forth or describe) a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea such as a mental process), and (ii) if so, is the judicial exception integrated into a practical application. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see also MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A). Under the Office Guidance, if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, see infra, the claim is patent eligible under § 101. Office 2 The Office Guidance, as well as guidance set forth in the Berkheimer Memorandum, have been incorporated into the latest revision of the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2103–2106.07(c) (9th ed., Rev. 10.2019, June 2020). Appeal 2020-002966 Application 11/403,722 6 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55; see also MPEP § 2106.04(d). If the claim is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., recites a judicial exception and does not integrate the exception into a practical application), the next step (“Step 2B”) is to determine whether any element, or combination of elements, amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; see also MPEP § 2106.05. Here, we conclude Appellant’s claims recite an abstract idea, specifically, a fundamental economic principle. More specifically, Appellant’s claims generally describe providing a multi-stage contest and providing a secondary market for contest entries. This is consistent with the Examiner’s characterization of the claims as a whole (Final Act. 2; Ans. 3)3 and with Appellant’s characterization of the claims (Appeal Br. 6; accord, e.g., Spec. 3–4, 6–8). The italics added to claims 16 and 27 above highlight the recited concepts of providing a multi-stage contest and a secondary market for contest entries. In particular, claim 16 recites “providing a secondary market for buying and selling contest entries of a multi-stage contest,” performing a 3 To any extent we describe the abstract idea slightly differently than the Examiner, the Examiner’s characterization of the idea is not erroneous. “An abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The level of abstraction an examiner uses to describe an abstract idea need not “impact the patentability analysis.” Apple, 842 F.3d at 1241. That is true here. Regardless of the level of generality used to describe the abstract idea recited, the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Cf. Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Although not as broad as the district court’s abstract idea of organizing data, it is nonetheless an abstract concept.”). Appeal 2020-002966 Application 11/403,722 7 first type of selection process causing a portion of entries to become ineligible to win the contest at each stage, electronically marking entries as ineligible, “offering computer-implemented secondary market providing support for trading of remaining-eligible entries after change in eligibility or value of entries,” and “determining at least one winning contest entry” with a second type of selection process. Similarly, claim 27 recites “selling a plurality of contest entries,” causing a portion of entries to become ineligible at each of a plurality of stages, marking as ineligible computer-maintained records of entries, “providing programmed support for a secondary market for buying and selling entries,” “offering computer-implemented secondary market and the electronic trading system,” “providing programmed support for trading of remaining-eligible entries,” determining an award, and “determining at least one winning contest entry” by providing a competition between contestants. Consistent with the Office Guidance and case law, we conclude that the claimed concept of providing a multi-stage contest and a secondary market for contest entries recites a fundamental economic principle—i.e., one of the certain methods of organizing human activity set forth in the Office Guidance—and, thus, an abstract idea. See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(B); see also In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (determining claims directed to a method of playing a dice game and wagering on the game were drawn to an abstract idea); In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816, 818–19 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (describing a new set of rules for conducting a wagering game as a fundamental economic practice); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (determining a new method of price Appeal 2020-002966 Application 11/403,722 8 optimization was a fundamental economic concept); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding that tracking financial transactions to determine whether they exceed a pre-set spending limit was “not meaningfully different” from other ideas found to be abstract involving certain methods of organizing human activity); Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (determining that claims directed to managing a game of bingo to recite a method of organizing human activity and thus an abstract idea) (unpublished). Because we agree with the Examiner that each of claims 16 and 27 recites an abstract idea, we next determine whether the claims integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see also MPEP § 2106.04(d). To determine whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, we identify whether there are “any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and evaluate those elements to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception into a recognized practical application. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Here, we find the additional limitations do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. More particularly, the claims do not recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state Appeal 2020-002966 Application 11/403,722 9 (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Rather, the additional elements recite, inter alia, that the abstract idea is performed by a generically recited computer. See Final Act. 3; Ans. 4. Contrary to Appellant’s argument that the claims “present a nonconventional arrangement that is significantly more than an abstract idea” (Appeal Br. 8), the limitations describing the multi-stage contest and secondary market for contest entries do not impart patent eligibility but instead merely recite using a generic computer to implement rules for the multi-stage contest and the secondary market for contest entries. Appellant does not cite, and we do not find, anything in claim 16 or claim 27 or in Appellant’s Specification that amounts to a technological improvement. For at least these reasons, claims 16 and 27 do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Because we determine the claims are directed to an abstract idea or combination of abstract ideas, we analyze the claims under step two of Alice (i.e., step 2B of the Office Guidance) to determine if there are additional limitations that individually, or as an ordered combination, ensure the claims amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77–79). As stated in the Office Guidance, many of the considerations to determine whether the claims amount to “significantly more” under step two of the Alice framework are already considered as part of determining whether the judicial exception has been integrated into a practical application. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; see also MPEP § 2106.04(d)(I). Thus, at this point of our analysis, we determine if the claims add a specific limitation, or combination of limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the Appeal 2020-002966 Application 11/403,722 10 field, or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities at a high level of generality. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; MPEP § 2106.05(II). Here, Appellant’s claims do not recite specific limitations (alone or when considered as an ordered combination) that are not well-understood, routine, and conventional. “[T]he invocation of ‘already-available computers that are not themselves plausibly asserted to be an advance . . . amounts to a recitation of what is well-understood, routine, and conventional.’” Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (distinguishing cases in which claims were found to recite patent-eligible improvements to computer functionality); see Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in order for a machine to add significantly more, it must “play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly”); see also MPEP § 2106.05(b). Each of Appellant’s independent and dependent claims generically recites a computer and functions performed by the computer and/or a human (e.g., selling a contest entries, determining some entries are ineligible at a plurality of stages, providing a secondary market for eligible entries, determining an award, and determining at least one winning entry). Appellant makes no meaningful argument to the contrary. Moreover, to the extent that Appellant is relying upon claim elements that are part of the identified abstract idea, as addressed above, Appellant does not rely upon “additional elements” in attempting to establish Appeal 2020-002966 Application 11/403,722 11 significantly more than the identified abstract idea. “It has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 889 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). See also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90) (a finding that the claims are novel and nonobvious in light of an absence of evidence does not conflict with the Examiner’s conclusion under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because “a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea”); Trading Techs. Int’l v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d at 1093 (“The abstract idea itself cannot supply the inventive concept, ‘no matter how groundbreaking the advance.”’) (quoting SAP, 898 F.3d at 1171). Accordingly, having considered the Examiner’s rejection in light of each of Appellant’s arguments, we find no error in the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 16 and 27. Appellant does not separately address any dependent claims, and we find no error in the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 4, 5, 8–11, 14, 15, 17–20, 22–25, and 28–31 for the same reasons discussed above. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 4, 5, 8–11, 14–20, 22– 25, 27–31 101 Eligibility 4, 5, 8–11, 14–20, 22– 25, 27–31 Appeal 2020-002966 Application 11/403,722 12 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation