GREE, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 29, 2021

2021000345 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 29, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/418,239 06/08/2015 Satoshi Tanaka 447959US 9708 22850 7590 06/29/2021 OBLON, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. 1940 DUKE STREET ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314 EXAMINER BUSCH, CHRISTOPHER CONRAD ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3681 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/29/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): OBLONPAT@OBLON.COM iahmadi@oblon.com patentdocket@oblon.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte SATOSHI TANAKA _____________ Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JAMES R. HUGHES, and CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges. COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 8, 11, 15–17, and 20–27. Claims 1–7, 9, 10, 12–14, 18, 19, 28, and 29 are canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2020). According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Gree, Inc., having an address in Tokyo, Japan. See Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Invention Embodiments of the claimed subject matter relate to “a target advertisement distribution system, a target advertisement distribution method in the system, and a target advertisement distribution program.” Spec. ¶ 1. Representative Independent Claim 8 8. A system, comprising: a terminal that includes a local storage; a processing server that connects to the terminal; and a database server that stores a plurality of web pages that include a first web page of a first domain and a second web page of a second domain, wherein the terminal is configured to: store, upon access of the second web page by the terminal, second attribute information in the local storage in association with the second domain of the second web page, access the first web page of the first domain and execute an advertisement delivering program embedded in the first web page that causes the tem1inal to obtain first attribute information from the database server and send an advertisement delivery request and the first attribute information to the processing server, the first attribute information relating to user information of a user of the terminal, Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 3 the processing server is configured to: receive the advertisement delivery request and the first attribute information from the terminal, obtain, in response to receiving the advertisement delivery request, the second attribute information of the second domain from the terminal, the second attribute information having been stored in the local storage, the second domain being different from the first domain, and send the first attribute information and the second attribute information to the database server, and the database server is configured to: determine identification information of an advertisement based on the first attribute information and the second attribute information, merge the first attribute information and the second attribute information to generate combined attribute information, send the combined attribute information to the processing server for storage in the local storage, and send the identification information to the terminal, wherein, based on the identification information, the advertising delivering program being executed on the terminal generates a URL, retrieves Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) based on the generated URL, and executes the HTML to display an advertisement on the first web page. Appeal Br. 14–15 (Claims App.). Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 4 Rejection 2 Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis 8, 11, 15–17, 20–27 101 Eligibility ISSUES AND ANALYSIS We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence presented. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are forfeited or waived.3 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis in our analysis below. 2 The Examiner indicates that the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) has been withdrawn. Final Act. 5. Therefore, this rejection is not before us on appeal. 3 See In re Google Technology Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (some internal citation omitted): It is well established that “[w]aiver is different from forfeiture.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)) (additional citations omitted). The two scenarios can have different consequences for challenges raised on appeal, id. at 733–34, and for that reason, it is worth attending to which label is the right one in a particular case. Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 5 Rejection A of claims 8, 11, 15–17, and 20–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 USPTO 35 U.S.C. § 101 MPEP Guidance In January and October of 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101.4 We note the USPTO current eligibility guidance is found in the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (revised June 2020) of the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (“MPEP”), and particularly within Sections 2103 through 2106.07(c). Accordingly, all references to the MPEP throughout this Decision are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated. Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5 4 See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”) and USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”). “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; October 2019 Update at 1. 5 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by: (1) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (2) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)(II). Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 6 MPEP § 2106, Step 2A, Prong One The Judicial Exception Under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas are defined as follows: (1) Mathematical concepts – mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations (see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection I); (2) Certain methods of organizing human activity – fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions) (see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection II); and (3) Mental processes – concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion) (see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection III). Under Step 2A, Prong One, the Examiner concludes that claim 8 recites a method of organizing human activity, as defined under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection II: “As noted in the Final Office Action dated 2/6/20, the claims are directed to the abstract idea of identifying and distributing targeted ads based on information about users and webpages, which is aptly categorized as a method of organizing human activity (i.e. advertising and marketing activities).” Ans. 3 (emphasis added). Appellant disagrees, and contends: “The Examiner’s Answer ignores Appellant’s claims as a whole and overly simplifies Appellant’s claims as a method of advertising.” Reply Br. 2. Appellant urges that “the combined features of Appellant’s claims enable sharing and displaying data from Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 7 different domains. Appellant submits that the term ‘advertising’ in Appellant’s claims [does] not negate the technologically advantageous features that result from Appellant's claims.” Id. We conclude that all claims 8, 11, 15–17, and 20–27 recite advertising features that are categorized under certain methods of organizing human activity – i.e., fundamental economic principles or practices including “advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations” as defined under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection II. Moreover, we determine that the recited claim 8 function of “determine identification information of an advertisement based on the first attribute information and the second attribute information” (emphasis added) could be performed alternatively by a person as a mental process, as defined under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection III. Specifically, the identification determination involves evaluation of the attribute information to identify an advertisement, which is a mental process—“examples of mental processes include . . . evaluations” (id.). MPEP § 2106.04(a) guides that “[i]f the identified limitation(s) falls within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas, it is reasonable to conclude that the claim recites an abstract idea in Step 2A Prong One.” In such case, “[t]he claim then requires further analysis in Step 2A Prong Two, to determine whether any additional elements in the claim integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, see MPEP § 2106.04(d).” MPEP § 2106.04(a). Because we conclude that all claims 8, 11, 15–17, and 20–27 recite an abstract idea, as identified above, under Step 2A, Prong One, we proceed to Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 8 Step 2A, Prong Two, in which we apply the guidance set forth under MPEP § 2106.04(d).6 Step 2A, Prong Two Under MPEP § 2106.04(d), Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application Limitations that are indicative of integration into a practical application under MPEP § 2106.04(d) include: 1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical field — see MPEP § 2106.05(a); 2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine — see MPEP § 2106.05(b); 3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing — see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and 4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(e). In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of integration into a practical application include: 1. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea — see MPEP § 2106.05(f); 2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and 6 We note that each dependent claim includes all the limitations of the claims from which it depends. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(d). Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 9 3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use — see MPEP § 2106.05(h). See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(I) (Describing Step 2A, Prong Two). Additional Limitations Applying the USPTO guidance under MPEP § 2106.04(d), we consider whether there are additional elements set forth in the claims that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The Examiner finds that the judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds and concludes: the claims merely use a computer as a tool to perform the abstract idea(s), and generally link the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment (e.g. the internet) . . . the claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the additional elements, when considered both individually and as an ordered combination, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Final Act. 4. (emphasis added). In order to be patent-eligible, the element[s] additional to the identified abstract idea must amount to more than “an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer” to render the claim patent- eligible. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 573 U.S. 208, 223 (2014) Here, the Specification supports the Examiner’s finding that the claims amount to nothing more than instructions to apply the identified abstract idea on a generic computer. See Final Act. 3, last paragraph. Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 10 In particular, we note that claims 8, 11, 15–17, and 20–27 recite functions or steps that are intended to be implemented by a computer that is described generically in the Specification. For example: The mobile phone 4 includes a smart phone and a feature phone, and serves as a mobile phone to be operated on an operating system such as Android (Registered Trademark} and iOS (Registered Trademark), for example. In addition, although the mobile phone 4 is shown in the present embodiment, the terminal may be a computer. The computer includes a general desktop computer as well as a mobile computer, a laptop computer, and a tablet type terminal, and the like. Spec. ¶ 30 (emphasis added). But merely adding generic hardware and computer components to perform abstract ideas does not integrate those ideas into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223 (The “mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). A further indication that the claim amounts to no more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer is found where a claim recites only the idea of a solution or outcome, lacking details as to how the computer reaches that solution or outcome. See Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding the claim limitation “maintaining state” described only “the effect or result dissociated from any method by which maintaining the state is accomplished”); see also McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The abstract idea exception prevents patenting a result where ‘it matters not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished.’” (quoting O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 11 (1854)) (emphasis added)). In view of the above analysis, we determine that Appellant’s claims 8, 11, 15–17, and 20–27 amount to no more than mere instructions to implement the identified abstract idea on a computer. See MPEP § 2106.05(f). Extra- or Post-Solution Activities Under MPEP § 2106.05(g) “[T]he prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or [by] adding ‘insignificant post[-]solution activity.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–12 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981)). Here, we find independent claim 8 recites one or more additional limitations that are extra-solution activities the courts have determined to be insufficient to transform judicially excepted subject matter into a patent- eligible application. See MPEP § 2106.05(g). For example, we conclude at least the claim 8 functions that receive information, store information, and display information are merely the gathering, storing, and conveying of data, respectively. As such, these limitations recite insignificant extra-solution activities. See buySAFE v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). We note that similar limitations of commensurate scope are recited in remaining independent claims 25 and 27. Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 12 MPEP § 2106.05(a) — Improvement to the Functionality of a Computer or Other Technology or Technical Field. Applying the guidance under MPEP § 2106.05(a), we consider whether there are any claimed improvements to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field. Appellant cites to paragraphs 45–47 of the Specification, and contends: Appellant submits that the combined features of claim [8] are directed to a practical application in which a client terminal executes a program embedded on a first web page that causes the terminal to generate a URL to retrieve HTML, where the HTML is executed to display an advertisement on the first web page based on first and second attribute information from different domains. Appellant submits that these technological features are clearly integrated into a practical application of a targeted advertising distribution system. Appeal Br. 9–10. In further support, Appellant urges that “[t]hese features are an improvement over prior targeted advertising distribution systems, and result in significantly improved websites, which are analogous to the improved interface disclosed in the above example. (See, e.g., Specification ¶¶ 9, 13).” Appeal Br. 11 (emphasis added). However, Appellant’s claims are silent regarding any recited interface, nor has Appellant advanced any substantive, persuasive arguments explaining how Appellant’s claims are otherwise analogous to the graphical user interface (GUI) claim reproduced as Example 37 of the USPTO guidelines, as cited by Appellant on page 10 of the Appeal Brief. Further, Appellant does not provide any substantive, persuasive arguments explaining how paragraphs 9 and 13 of the Specification support the claimed Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 13 subject matter, such that Appellant’s claims integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. To the extent that Appellant’s system of claim 8 merely automates a manual approach to target advertisements to intended recipients (see, e.g., Spec. ¶ 13), we note that the “‘mere automation of manual processes using generic computers’ . . . ‘does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology,’” Trading Techs. Int’l v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Appellant additionally cites to DDR Holdings and urges that “the claims provide a technological solution to a problem that was created by the need to improve advertising distribution systems rather than applying known methods that existed prior to the usage of advertising distribution systems.” Appeal Br. 13. However, we do not agree with Appellant that this is a case involving patent-eligible subject matter, as was the case in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In DDR, instead of a computer network operating in its normal, expected manner by sending a website visitor to a third-party website via a clicked advertisement, the claimed invention generated and directed the visitor to a hybrid page that presented: (1) product information from the third party, and (2) the visual “look and feel” elements from the host website, thus retaining the visitor at the original website. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1258–59. Given this particular Internet-based solution, the court held that the claimed invention did not merely use the Internet to perform a business practice known from the pre-Internet world, but rather was necessarily Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 14 rooted in computer technology to overcome a problem specifically arising in computer networks. Id. at 1257 (emphasis added). That is not the case here. In fact, the term “network” is only recited twice in Appellant’s claims, in dependent claim 17 (“The system of claim 8, wherein the processing server and the database server are remotely connected to each other via a network”), and in dependent claim 20 (“the database service is configured to send the combined attribute information to the processing server via the network.”) (emphasis added). But we conclude claims 17 and 20 do not recite any purported improvement in network technology. Nor has Appellant identified any language in Appellant’s claims 8, 11, 15–17, and 20–27 that specifically overcomes a problem arising in the generic “network” recited only in Appellant’s dependent claims 17 and 20, such as was the case with DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257 (emphasis added). Without more, we are not persuaded that merely sending the “combined attribute information to the processing server via the network” (claim 20) serves to improve the network in any structural or functional manner. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that the subject claims in DDR are distinguishable from Appellant’s claims on appeal. See Ans. 9. We emphasize that “[it] is the claims that measure the invention.” See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (citations omitted); In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (“[T]he name of the game is the claim.”). For the aforementioned reasons, we find Appellant has not persuasively shown that the claims before us on appeal solve a problem that “is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 15 problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks,” as the court held in DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257 (emphasis added). Therefore, on this record, we find Appellant does not advance any substantive arguments explaining how the claimed generic computer components aid the method, the extent to which the computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method to improve the recited generic computer components. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). Accordingly, on this record, we find that independent claim 8 does not recite an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). Remaining independent claims 25 and 27 recite similar limitations of commensurate scope, and therefore do not remedy the aforementioned deficiency of claim 8. MPEP § 2106.05(b), 2106.05(c) Appellant does not advance any arguments explaining how the method claims on appeal are: (1) tied to a particular machine under MPEP § 2106.05(b) or (2) transform an article to a different state or thing under MPEP § 2106.05(c). Arguments not timely made are forfeited. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). MPEP § 2106.05(e) Meaningful Claim Limitations The Examiner finds Appellant’s dependent claims “merely provide additional non-structural (and predominantly non-functional) details that fail to meaningfully limit the claims or the abstract idea(s).” Final Act. 4–5 (emphasis added). Regarding all claims 8, 11, 15–17, and 20–27 on appeal, Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 16 the Examiner further finds the additional elements “do not add a meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because they would be generic computer functions in any computer implementation.” Ans. 9 (emphasis added). But Appellant advances no arguments in either Brief traversing the Examiner’s findings under MPEP § 2106.05(e). Because Appellant does not advance any substantive, persuasive arguments explaining how the judicial exception is applied or used in some meaningful way, as described under MPEP § 2106.05(e), on this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. Accordingly, under Step 2A, Prong Two (MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h)), we conclude that all claims 8, 11, 15–17, and 20–27 do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The Inventive Concept – Step 2B As set forth under MPEP § 2106.05(d)), only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well- understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field; or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d. 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) We note Berkheimer was decided by the Federal Circuit on February 8, 2018. On April 19, 2018, the PTO issued the Memorandum titled: “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 17 Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)” (hereinafter “Berkheimer Memorandum”).7 The Berkheimer Memorandum provided specific requirements for an Examiner to support with evidence any finding that claim elements (or a combination of elements) are well-understood, routine, or conventional. In particular, the Examiner must find, and expressly support a rejection in writing, with one or more of the following: 1. A citation to an express statement in the specification or to a statement made by an applicant during prosecution that demonstrates the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s). . . . 2. A citation to one or more of the court decisions discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s). 3. A citation to a publication that demonstrates the well- understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s). . . . 4. A statement that the examiner is taking official notice of the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s). . . . Berkheimer Memorandum at 3–4. Here, under Step 2B, the Examiner finds that “pursuant to the requirement under Berkheimer, the following citations are provided to demonstrate that the additional elements amount to activities that are well- understood, routine, and conventional. See MPEP 2106.05(d).” Final Act. 5 (emphasis added). The Examiner cites to a number of Federal Circuit cases in support. Id. 7 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo- berkheimer-20180419.PDF. Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 18 The Examiner additionally takes Official Notice that it was “well- understood, routine, and conventional to execute html associated with a URL (link), and subsequently display the webpage associated with said URL.” Final Act. 5 (emphasis added). Thus, the Examiner provides Berkheimer evidence under categories two and four of the four types of factual evidence acceptable under the Berkheimer Memorandum at 3–4. See Final Act. 5. However, Appellant does not specifically traverse any of the Berkheimer evidence provided by the Examiner, in the Appeal Brief, or in the Reply Brief. Therefore, on this record, we are not persuaded that Appellant’s claims do more than simply append well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1151 (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”) (emphasis omitted). Moreover, because Appellant does not advance substantive, persuasive arguments regarding any claimed non-conventional and non- generic arrangement of known computer components, we find no inventive concept under Step 2B in any purported ordered combination of these limitations. We find Appellant’s claims are unlike the claims considered by the court in BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), in which the court found “an inventive concept . . . in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” 827 F.3d at 1350 (emphases added). In light of the foregoing, we conclude that each of Appellant’s claims 8, 11, 15–17, and 20–27, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent- Appeal 2021-000345 Application 14/418,239 19 ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, and does not include an inventive concept. Therefore, on this record, we sustain the Examiner’s Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of all claims 8, 11, 15–17, and 20–27 on appeal.8 CONCLUSION By applying the Director’s 2019 Revised Guidance and October 2019 Update, as now set forth under MPEP Sections 2103 through 2106.07(c), we conclude that all claims 8, 11, 15–17, and 20–27, as rejected by the Examiner under 35 U.S.C. § 101, are not directed to patent-eligible subject matter. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 8, 11, 15–17, 20–27 101 Eligibility 8, 11, 15–17, 20–27 FINALITY AND RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED 8 Based upon Appellant’s arguments, we decide the appeal of Rejection A under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 8, 11, 15–17, and 20–27 based upon representative claim 1. To the extent Appellant has not timely advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are forfeited. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).