Graphic Communications Local 735-S (Quebecor Printing Hazleton)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 17, 1999

330 N.L.R.B. 32 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 32
Graphic Communications International Union Local
735-S (Quebecor Printing Hazleton, Inc.) and
Patrick Quick. Case 4–CB–7981
November 17, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND BRAME
On September 14, 1998, Administrative Law Judge
William G. Kocol issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions, to which the General Counsel
and the Charging Party filed separate answering briefs.
The Charging Party filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, the Respondent filed an answering brief, and the
Charging Party filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Graphic Communications
International Union Local 735-S, Hazleton, Pennsyl-
vania, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take
the action set forth in the Order.

William Slack and Patricia Garber, Esqs., for the General
Counsel.
Ira H. Weinstock, Esq. (Ira H. Weinstock, P.C.), of Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, for the Respondent.
W. James Young, Esq. (National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation, Inc.), of Springfield, Virginia, for the Charging
Party.

1 The judge found, and we agree for the reasons set forth by him,
that the Charging Party resigned union membership by his March 1997
letter to the Union. The letter, which was inadvertently misquoted by
the judge, provides:
As a non-member of Local 735-S working in the [Employer’s] bar-
gaining unit, I am being forced to have deducted from my pay an
amount equivalent to full member dues. To the extent I may be re-
quired to pay anything to Local 735-S to work at Quebecor, I do not
want to pay more than is legally required. Specifically, I do not want
to pay, if at all any more than the “financial core” minimum required
to the support of the Union’s admimistration [sic] of the [contract].
Please advise me in writing 1) what that “financial core” minimum
amount is which the Union contents [sic] I am required to pay, and 2)
the basis for the Union’s calculation in that regard.
2 The judge correctly recommended that the Respondent reimburse
the Charging Party only for the personal expenses he actually incurred
in defending against the lawsuit filed by the Respondent, contrary to the
exceptions of the Charging Party. See Food & Commercial Workers
Locals 951, 1036, & 7 (Meijer, Inc.), 329 NLRB 730 (1999).
We shall amend the judge’s recommended remedy to provide that
interest be computed in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for the
Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM G. KOCOL, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on July 21, 1998. The
charge was filed October 9, 1997,1 and the complaint was is-
sued January 30, 1998. The complaint alleges that Graphic
Communications International Union Local 735-S (Respon-
dent) violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening
Patrick Quick with legal action, and thereafter initiating legal
action against Quick, because he did not pay dues to Respon-
dent as a condition of employment. The complaint also alleges
that Respondent unlawfully retained dues deducted from
Quick’s wages. Respondent filed a timely answer that admitted
the filing and service of the charge, jurisdiction, labor organiza-
tion status, the agency status of Thomas Obzut, the appropri-
ateness of the unit, the existence of a collective-bargaining
agreement covering the unit employees, and the fact that Quick
was employed in the unit. Respondent denied the remaining
allegations of the complaint.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and Respondent,2 I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Quebecor Printing Hazleton, Inc. (the Employer), a corpora-
tion, is engaged in the business of publishing telephone directo-
ries at its facility in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, where it annually
sells and ships goods valued in excess of $50,000 from its facil-
ity directly to points located outside the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Respondent admits and I find that the Employer
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that Respondent is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Overview
A main issue in this case is the proper interpretation of a un-
ion-security clause contained in the collective-bargaining
agreement between Respondent and the Employer. The clause
at issue reads:

It is agreed that new employees shall be required as a condi-
tion of continued employment to apply for a membership in
the Union upon completion of the probationary period or on
the effective date of the Agreement, whichever is later.

This clause has been in the contract at all times material to this
proceeding; it covers a unit of all full-time and regular part-
time production and maintenance employees of the Employer at
its Hazleton, Pennsylvania facility. Quick has been an em-
ployee in that unit at all times material. In the late 1960s Quick
had been president of Respondent.
1 All dates are in 1997 unless otherwise indicated.
2 The General Counsel’s unopposed motion to correct transcript is
granted and received in evidence as G.C. Exh. 23. The General Coun-
sel’s brief was particularly well supported with appropriate legal au-
thority.
330 NLRB No. 11
GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS LOCAL 735-S (QUEBECOR PRINTING HAZLETON) 33
B. Quick Joins and then Resigns
Quick was hired by the Employer’s predecessor in August
1993 and became a member of Respondent after his 90-day
probationary period. At the time he was hired he signed a dues-
authorization form that authorized the deduction of a specified
amount of money for “union dues” and it limited revocations of
the authorization to no sooner than 1 year from the date of the
authorization or the termination date of the contract, whichever
occurred sooner, and then only upon 10 days’ written notice.
After the Employer assumed the business Quick signed another
dues-checkoff authorization.
On August 23, 1996, Quick prepared and signed two docu-
ments. The first document referred to a quote supposedly given
at the Harvard School of Business concerning the importance of
human assets in a business. It also contained Quick’s thoughts
concerning how a union should treat its members. The letter
ended “Therefore due to the fact that the above does not seem
to be the purpose of this Union, I therefore submit the follow-
ing resignation.” The next document began “I, Patrick D.
Quick, do hereby resign” from Respondent. It then listed the
reasons for Quick’s decision. It ended “I HEREBY RESIGN.”
Quick gave the documents to employee Charlie Allen.3 Allen
took the documents and said that he would give them to the
chief shop steward. Quick also gave a copy of the letters to
Jack Butler, the Employer’s director of human resources.
However, Quick continued to have dues deducted from his
paycheck.
In March, Quick prepared and sent to Thomas Obzut, Re-
spondent’s treasurer-secretary, the following letter:

As a non-member of Local 735-S working in the [Em-
ployer’s] bargaining unit, I am being forced to have deducted
from my pay an amount equivalent to the full member dues.
To the extent that I may be required to pay anything to Local
715-S to work at [the Employer] I do not want to pay more
than is legally required. Specifically, I do not want to pay if at
all the “financial core” minimum required to support the Un-
ion’s administration [of the contract]. Please advise me in
writing 1) what the “financial core” minimum amount is
which the Union contents [sic] I am required to pay, and 2)
the basis for the Union’s calculation in that regard.

On March 11, Respondent received this letter.
On March 24, Obzut sent a letter to Quick that acknowl-
edged receipt of his letter and gave information concerning
financial core membership. It explained that he would receive
a rebate of a specified amount from the time he requested to
become a financial core member and thereafter “as long as you

3 Quick identified Allen as the “bindery steward.” Allen was not al-
leged in the complaint as an agent of Respondent, and Respondent’s
counsel objected to the testimony concerning Allen’s agency status on
the grounds that he was surprised and had no knowledge of Allen. The
General Counsel then moved to amend the complaint to allege Allen as
an agent of Respondent. I indicated that I was inclined to grant the
motion to amend the complaint, but that on request, I was also inclined
to grant Respondent additional time to prepare to meet the new allega-
tion even if that meant that we had to resume the hearing at some date
in the future. The General Counsel then withdrew the motion to amend
the complaint. Thus, I do not conclude that Allen was an agent of
Respondent.
remain a member of” Respondent.4 Dues continued to be de-
ducted from Quick’s pay. On April 13, Quick sent Respondent
a letter that requested a financial justification for Respondent’s
calculations of the percentage of dues owed by financial core
members and objecting to the notion that he would have to pay
full dues and then receive a portion thereafter as a rebate. On
May 19, Obzut sent Quick a letter that began “This to advise
you that that I have received your letter stating your wish to
become a non-member of the Union. You further explained
your wish to become a financial core member of the Union.”
The letter then pointed out the advantages of union membership
that Quick would lose should he become a financial core sup-
porter, as opposed to a full member, of the Union. It stated, “I
strongly urge you to reconsider your decision to resign from the
Union. However, if I do not hear from you again, I will assume
that your resignation is effective . . . .” After this letter Re-
spondent continued to receive and collect dues from Quick’s
paycheck. On June 2, Quick sent yet another letter to Respon-
dent. This letter began “As you know I have previously re-
signed my membership in [Respondent] . . . .” The letter pro-
tested the continued deduction of dues from his paycheck and
requested that this cease. The letter ended “Effective (10) days
from now I revoke my dues check off form I previously may
have signed several years ago.” Respondent received this letter
on June 6. About 10 days later, dues were no longer deducted
from Quick’s paycheck.
However, on June 10, Obzut sent Quick a letter that ac-
knowledged receiving Quick’s most recent letter. This letter
stated that as a past president of Respondent, Quick knew that
Pennsylvania was not a right-to-work State and that if he
wished to continue to work for the Employer then, pursuant to
the contract, he would have to pay dues. On July 23, Obzut
sent Quick another letter that informing him that since he no
longer wished to use the checkoff procedure, he had the right to
do so. The letter continued:

Let me inform you that as long as you are a member of [Re-
spondent] you are obligated to pay Union dues. . . . I suggest
you contact me within ten days after receiving this notice as
that [sic] we can discuss how you are going to pay your dues.
Let me also advise you that you are now in arrears for three
weeks in June and three weeks in July.

Of course, Quick responded with his own letter that stated:

Your letter of July 23, totally misses the point of my letter to
you of June, 1997. I am not required to pay money to a union
in order to work at [the Employer] not by checkoff, not oth-
erwise. This is my right under federal law. Similarly, you
also incorrectly state “that as long as you are a member of
[Respondent] you are obligated to pay Union dues.” But I am
not a member of [Respondent]; as you well know, I have long
since resigned my membership in [Respondent]. Therefore,
your statement that I am “in arrears” is also wrong.

On August 11, Obzut sent Quick a letter that read:

I have just received your letter stating that Federal Law
forgives you, your requirement to pay Union Dues. I
strongly suggest you check the law again. Federal Law
4 The General Counsel does not allege or contend that Respondent
acted unlawfully concerning its response to Quick’s assertion of finan-
cial core limits on his payment of dues.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 34
mandates that as long as you work in a Union shop you
must pay Dues.
If I do not hear from you concerning your Dues (you
are now in arrears) I will take Legal action against you for
the collection of your Union Dues.
I am giving you ten days from the date of this notice to
contact me so we can rectify this matter.

On September 8, Obzut sent another letter to Quick that ad-
vised him of the amount of dues and period of time that he was
in arrears in payment of union dues. The letter again stated that
if Quick did not pay his dues legal action would be taken to
collect them. On September 30, Respondent filed a civil com-
plaint against Quick in the local district court in Hazleton,
Pennsylvania, concerning Quick’s failure to pay dues. This
cause of action was removed by Quick to Federal court, where
the complaint was dismissed on the grounds that the cause of
action was preempted by the complaint in this case. No appeal
has been taken from that dismissal.
C. Analysis
The General Counsel contends that Respondent unlawfully
threatened to take legal action, and then did file and maintain a
lawsuit, against Quick because he did not pay union dues. The
General Counsel also contends that Respondent unlawfully
accepted and retained union dues deducted from Quick’s
wages. Except pursuant to a lawful union-security provision in
a collective-bargaining agreement, an employee cannot be
compelled to pay dues to a union. Put differently, an employee
can be required to pay such dues only if the employee voluntar-
ily is a member of the union or is covered by a lawful union-
security provision that requires payment of such dues. Pattern
Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985); NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
I turn first to examine the facts to determine whether Quick
voluntarily agreed to pay dues to Respondent. As described
above, Quick did in fact voluntarily join Respondent. How-
ever, by at least March Quick clearly disclosed to Respondent
his intent to resign from membership in Respondent and in the
May 19 letter Respondent acknowledged Quick’s intent to re-
sign. Section 7 and Section 8(b)(1)(A) guarantee to employees
the right to resign from membership of a labor organization.
Pattern Makers, id. I conclude that Quick, by his conduct,
ended his membership in Respondent when he clearly ex-
pressed his intent to resign. E. I. DuPont Newport Local 9 (Du
Pont & Co.), 300 NLRB 1165, 1166 (1990). Moreover,
Quick’s letters to Respondent concerning his desire to become
a financial core “member” necessarily carried with it the notion
that he was effectively resigning as a full member and thus no
longer would be willing to voluntarily pay dues. Carpenters
Local 470 (Tacoma Boatbuilding Co.), 277 NLRB 513 (1985).
I thus reject Respondent’s contention that Quick failed to indi-
cate an intent to resign until some later time.
I have also concluded that Quick signed a dues-authorization
form. However, the Board has held that when an employee
resigns from membership in a union, the dues-checkoff authori-
zation automatically ceases to be operative and does not serve
as an independent promise to pay dues to a union, at least in the
absence of a lawful union-security clause that requires the
payment of dues as a condition of employment. Electrical
Workers IBEW Local 2088 (Lockheed Space Operations), 302
NLRB 322 (1991); Woodworkers (Weyerhauser Co.), 304
NLRB 100 (1991). The language in the checkoff form signed
by Quick applies to “union dues” and does not explicitly state
that he is undertaking an obligation to continue to pay dues in
the absence of any other obligation to so. Baltimore Sun Co.,
302 NLRB 436 (1991). Thus, I conclude that Quick resigned
from membership in Respondent, thereby extinguishing any
voluntary obligation to pay dues, and that the checkoff form
that he signed did not serve as a separate source for any volun-
tary obligation to pay such dues.
I turn now to determine whether Quick was obligated to pay
dues to Respondent pursuant to a lawful union-security agree-
ment. In ascertaining the obligations of employees under such
a provision, the Board looks only to the express language of the
agreed on contractual provision. Steelworkers (Asarco, Inc.),
309 NLRB 964 (1992); Communications Workers (Pacific
Bell), 295 NLRB 196 (1989); Machinists District Lodge 727
(Lockheed-California Co.), 266 NLRB 12, 17 (1983); Jack
Watkins, G.M.C., 203 NLRB 632, 635 (1973). Because the
penalty for employees who fail to pay dues under a lawful un-
ion-security provision may be discharge, this rule serves the
valid purpose of assuring that employees may determine their
obligation and avoid the penalty of discharge without fear that
there are unwritten qualifications added to the express contrac-
tual provisions. I thus reject Respondent’s argument that the
past practice between it and the Employer concerning this pro-
vision is at all relevant to how a reasonable employee would
interpret the language of the provision. Because of the unique
nature of union-security provisions, those provisions must be,
to the extent possible, self-explanatory and not dependent on
extrinsic evidence for their meaning.
The language of the union-security provision in this case is
set forth above. By its own terms it requires only that employ-
ees “apply for membership” in the Respondent on the comple-
tion of the employee’s probationary period or on the effective
date of the contract, whichever is later.5 It does not require that
employees maintain membership in, or pay dues to, Respondent
as a condition of employment. It fails to give notice to employ-
ees of any obligation that would restrict their right to resign
from Respondent and cease paying dues. I conclude that the
contractual language in this case does not require that employ-
ees continue to pay dues to Respondent, as a condition of em-
ployment, after they have applied for membership but thereafter
have resigned from membership.
Respondent argues in its brief that the Employer’s rendered
aid and assistance to Quick and that this matter is relevant be-
cause it shows the Employer’s illegal attempt to invalidate the
union-security provision as recognized by the parties’ past
practice. Yet, Respondent concedes that the Board has rejected
the argument that because an employer may violate the Act a
union is also free to violate the Act. Roofers Local 81 (Beck
Roofing), 294 NLRB 285 (1989), enfd. 915 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.
1990). I conclude that there is no credible evidence to support
Respondent’s assertion that the Employer, through Quick, at-
tempted illegally to invalidate the union-security provision.
This is so because I have concluded above that it is Respon-
dent’s interpretation of that provision, and not Quick’s interpre-
tation, which is incorrect. In any event, the record clearly
shows that Quick’s desire to resign from membership preceded

5 The General Counsel has expressly disavowed any intent to raise
the legality of contractual language that requires “membership” in a
labor organization. Thus, I do not pass on the issues raised in cases
such as Bloom v. NLRB, 153 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1998).
GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS LOCAL 735-S (QUEBECOR PRINTING HAZLETON) 35
any assistance from the Employer and was not caused by such
assistance. I thus reject this argument.
It follows from the preceding findings that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by continuing to accept dues deducted
from Quick’s wages after he had resigned from membership in
Respondent and in the absence of a union-security provision
requiring such payment of dues. Lockheed Space Operations,
supra at 330. Respondent’s unlawful conduct began April 10,
the start of the 10(b) period in this case, and continued until on
or about June 12, as alleged in the complaint. Teamsters Local
667 (American Freight), 303 NLRB 694, 699 (1991). It is also
well settled that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act when it threatened Quick with legal action if he failed to
pay dues. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 396 (Central Tele-
phone Co.), 239 NLRB 469 (1977). Respondent’s lawsuit
against Quick to collect dues raises considerations expressed by
the Supreme Court in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB, 461
U.S. 731 (1983). However, it is clear that the lawsuit was for
an objective that was illegal under the Act and therefore the
principles of that case do not preclude the finding of an unfair
labor practice in this case. Id. at 737–738 fn. 5. I conclude that
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by filing and
maintaining the lawsuit against Quick for collection of dues in
the absence of a lawful union-security provision requiring the
payment of dues and after he had resigned from membership in
Respondent. Professional Assn. of Golf Officials, 317 NLRB
774 (1995). Respondent attempts to distinguish this case by
pointing out that in that case there was no union-security provi-
sion while in the instant case there is such a provision. I am not
persuaded. The critical point is that in this case the provision
does not compel the continued payment of dues to Respondent
as a condition of employment after employees have resigned
from membership.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Employer is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act by:
(a) Accepting and retaining dues deducted from the wages
of Patrick Quick in the absence of a lawful union-security that
requires the payment of such dues and after Quick resigned
from membership in Respondent.
(b) Threatening to take legal action against Quick if he did
not pay dues to Respondent under the circumstances described
above.
(c) Filing and maintaining a lawsuit against Quick for the
collection of dues under the circumstances described above.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent un-
lawfully accepted and retained dues from Quick’s wages, I
shall order Respondent to make him whole for all monies de-
ducted from his wages as union dues beginning April 10, 1997,
with interest. Having found that Respondent unlawfully filed
and maintained a lawsuit against Quick for the collection of
dues, I shall order Respondent to withdraw and dismiss that
lawsuit to the extent that it has not done so. I shall further order
Respondent to reimburse Quick for any expenses he incurred in
defending the lawsuit. Professional Assn. of Golf Officials,
supra. Finally, it appears that Respondent does not maintain an
office at which a notice could be posted. I shall therefore order
Respondent to mail the notice to all unit employees employed
by the Employer at any time since the onset of the unfair labor
practices in this case until the time the notices are mailed. Id.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended6
ORDER
The Respondent, Graphic Communications International Un-
ion Local 735-S, Hazleton, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents,
and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Accepting and retaining dues deducted from the wages
Patrick Quick or any other unit employee of the Employer after
the employees have resigned from membership in Respondent
and in the absence of a union-security provision that requires
the payment of such dues.
(b) Threatening to take legal action against Quick or any
other unit employee of the Employer for the collection of dues
after the employees have resigned from membership in Re-
spondent and in the absence of a union-security provision that
requires the payment of such dues.
(c) Filing and maintaining a lawsuit against Quick or any
other unit employee of the Employer for the collection of dues
after the employees have resigned from membership in Re-
spondent and in the absence of a union-security provision that
requires the payment of such dues.
(d) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make Patrick Quick whole for all moneys deducted from
his wages as union dues beginning April 10, 1997, with inter-
est.
(b) Withdraw and dismiss the lawsuit filed against Quick for
the collection of union dues, to the extent that the lawsuit has
not already been finally dismissed or withdrawn.
(c) Reimburse Quick for any expenses he incurred in de-
fending the lawsuit described above.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make avail-
able to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary
to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, mail a copy
of the attached notice marked “Appendix”7 to all employees in

6 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Mailed by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Mailed Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 36
the unit who were employed by the Employer at its Hazleton,
Pennsylvania facility at any time from the onset of the unfair
labor practices found in this case until the date the notices are
mailed. The notice shall be mailed to the last known address of
each of the employees after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative.
(f) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies
of the notice for posting by the Employer, if willing, at all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT accept or retain union dues deducted from the
wages of Patrick Quick or any other unit employee employed
by Quebecor Printing Hazleton, Inc., after the employees have
resigned from membership in Graphic Communications Inter-
national Union Local 735-S and in the absence of a union-
security provision that requires the payment of such dues.
WE WILL NOT threaten to take legal action against Patrick
Quick or any other unit employee employer by Quebecor Print-
ing Hazleton, Inc., for the collection of union dues after the
employees have resigned from membership in Graphic Com-
munications International Union Local 735-S and in the ab-
sence of a union security provision that requires the payment of
such dues..
WE WILL NOT file and maintain a lawsuit against Patrick
Quick or any other unit employee employed by Quebecor Print-
ing Hazleton, Inc., for the collection of union dues after the
employees have resigned from membership in Graphic Com-
munications International Union Local 735-S and in the ab-
sence of a union-security provision that requires the payment of
such dues..
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce
you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL make Patrick Quick whole for all moneys deducted
from his wages as union dues beginning April 10, 1997, with
interest.
WE WILL withdraw and dismiss the lawsuit filed against Pat-
rick Quick for the collection of union dues, to the extent that
the lawsuit has not already been finally dismissed or with-
drawn.
WE WILL reimburse Patrick Quick for any expenses he in-
curred in defending the lawsuit described above.

GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL UNION
LOCAL 735-S