Graphic Communcations Local 554 (World Color Press)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 25, 1992

306 N.L.R.B. 844 (N.L.R.B. 1992)

844
306 NLRB No. 164
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 Our dissenting colleague contends that the complaint should be
dismissed because there is no evidence that an alleged condition
precedent of International approval was fulfilled, and thus there is
a failure of proof that the Respondent was obligated to execute the
agreement. We disagree. As the judge noted, ‘‘[t]he existence of a
requirement for international approval suggests a correlative duty of
due diligence on the part of a local to seek such approval or at least
to bring the contract to the attention of the international for its con-
sideration.’’ In our view, only after it has first been proven that the
negotiated agreement was promptly submitted to the International is
the question of International approval put in issue. In this regard, we
note that the Respondent has exclusive control of the means of sub-
mission of the contract to the International and is the party in pos-
session of the facts concerning that submission. For this reason, we
find that the burden of proving due diligence in the submission of
the agreement to the International may fairly be placed on the Re-
spondent. Here, despite completion of negotiations and agreement on
a contract, the Respondent made no showing that, in the next year
and one-half, it submitted the contract to the International for ap-
proval, or in any way even advised the International of the nego-
tiated terms of the agreement. Plainly, the Respondent has failed to
carry its burden. Hiney Printing Co., 262 NLRB 157 (1982), enfd.
733 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 1984), relied on by the dissent, is distin-
guishable. There, the respondent local’s president, Bockman, was in
telephone contact with the International’s president concerning the
contract negotiations, and the question of Bockman’s diligence in
presenting the completed contract to the International never arose.
Rather, the issues in Hiney were whether approval of the Inter-
national was required and, if so, whether the International in fact had
approved the contract. Accordingly, for the reasons the judge elabo-
rates, including his finding that the Respondent is estopped from
raising any failure to obtain International approval, we find that the
Respondent violated Sec. 8(b)(3).
3 We shall amend the judge’s Conclusions of Law and modify the
recommended Order to refer to the date the contract was submitted
to the Respondent for signature as April 18, 1990, rather than April
18, 1991.
Local 554, Graphic Communications International
Union, AFL–CIO and Salem Gravure, a Divi-
sion of World Color Press. Case 14–CB–7382
March 25, 1992
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND OVIATT
On May 9, 1991, Administrative Law Judge Walter
H. Maloney issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions, a brief in support of its ex-
ceptions, and a brief in opposition to the Charging Par-
ty’s exceptions. The General Counsel filed an answer-
ing brief to the Respondent’s exceptions, and the
Charging Party filed exceptions, a supporting brief,
and a response to the Respondent’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions1 and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and
conclusions3 and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law 5.
‘‘5. By failing and refusing to execute the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement prepared and presented to it
for signature on or about April 18, 1990, the Respond-
ent violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. The aforesaid
unfair labor practice has a close, intimate, and adverse
effect on the free flow of commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.’’
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Local
554, Graphic Communications International Union,
AFL–CIO, Salem, Illinois, its officers, agents, and rep-
resentatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order
as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
‘‘(a) Failing and refusing to execute the collective-
bargaining agreement presented to it for signature by
Salem Gravure, A Division of World Color Press,
about April 18, 1990.’’
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a).
‘‘(a) On request, execute forthwith the contract pre-
sented to it for signature by Salem Gravure, A Divi-
sion of World Color Press, about April 18, 1990.’’
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the ad-
ministrative law judge.
CHAIRMAN STEPHENS, dissenting.
Contrary to the judge and my colleagues, I find that
the General Counsel has failed to prove that by refus-
ing to execute the collective-bargaining agreement pre-
sented to it on April 18, 1990, the Respondent violated
Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. Specifically, I find that it
has not been established that the Respondent was obli-
gated to execute the agreement, because the agreement,
by its express terms, could not become binding without
the approval of the Respondent’s International presi-
dent, and there is no evidence that such approval had
been obtained.
The Respondent and the Employer negotiated a mid-
term modification to their collective-bargaining agree-
ment. The unit employees voted to accept the Employ-
er’s proposal. This proposal, drafted by the Employer,
contained the following statement: ‘‘The terms and
conditions of this Agreement are subject to review of
the International and the Agreement does not become
845GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS LOCAL 554 (WORLD COLOR PRESS)
1 The only evidence provided at the hearing concerning the Inter-
national approval requirement, other than the Employer’s contract
proposal, was the testimony of Hartwell, the Respondent Local’s
president, who stated that the contract had not been approved by the
International president. The judge discredited any testimony provided
by Hartwell that could not be corroborated (JD fn. 9). There was no
other testimony corroborating Hartwell’s statement regarding the
lack of International approval.
2 For the purpose of this decision, I assume that the provisions of
Sec. 8(d) of the Act, requiring parties to a collective-bargaining
agreement to embody the terms of such agreement in a written, exe-
cuted contract, apply here, where the parties have voluntarily agreed
to a midterm modification of their collective-bargaining agreement.
3 In its supplemental brief to the judge, the Employer attached as
an appendix to the brief an affidavit from Plant Manager Saxer stat-
ing that the parties had never considered International approval to be
a condition precedent to any agreement negotiated by the parties.
The judge reopened the record to admit the affidavit into evidence,
but concluded that such evidence does not relax the requirement of
International approval for the instant contract. The Respondent
excepts to the admission of the affidavit. I find merit to this excep-
tion. This affidavit did not warrant reopening the record, as it did
not constitute newly discovered evidence, nor was it unavailable at
the time of the trial. See Mack’s Supermarkets, 288 NLRB 1082 fn.
1 (1988). But even assuming that this affidavit was properly admit-
ted into evidence, I find that this evidence does not nullify the clear
language stating that International approval of this agreement was re-
quired.
a valid and binding document without the approval of
the International President.’’ The proposal also con-
tains a signature line for the president of the Respond-
ent’s International.
In its posthearing brief to the judge, the Respondent
argued that the International’s approval was a condi-
tion precedent to the validity of the contract, and as
there is no evidence that the International approved the
proposal, no 8(b)(3) violation could be found. The
judge noted that there was no evidence, and no party
contended, that the Respondent ever submitted the con-
tract proposal to the International for approval.1 Stating
that a requirement of International approval suggests a
correlative duty of due diligence on the part of a local
to submit the proposal to its International for consider-
ation, the judge specifically found that the Respondent
did not seek the approval of its International, and con-
cluded that the Respondent, having received the benefit
of its bargain (the Employer had implemented the pro-
posal and had agreed not to close the plant), was thus
estopped from asserting the lack of International ap-
proval as a basis for failing to execute the agreement.
In its exceptions, the Respondent argues that the
complaint should be dismissed because the General
Counsel never established that the condition precedent
of International approval had been fulfilled. Further,
the Respondent argues that the record does not support
the judge’s finding that the Respondent failed to sub-
mit the ratified contract to its International for ap-
proval. Contrary to the judge and my colleagues, I find
merit to the Respondent’s arguments.2
In Hiney Printing Co., 262 NLRB 157 (1982), enfd.
733 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 1984), the Board dismissed a
similar 8(b)(3) allegation involving the same Inter-
national approval clause as the one at issue in the in-
stant case. In Hiney, there was a failure of proof that
the union’s International had approved the contract,
and consequently the Board adopted the judge’s find-
ing that the union was not required to execute the
modification agreement. Thus, under Hiney, once it has
been established that International approval is a condi-
tion precedent to a valid and binding agreement, it is
the General Counsel’s burden to establish that the
agreement had been approved by the International.
As noted by the judge, the existence of the condition
precedent of International approval was established in
the instant case by the Employer’s contract proposal,
introduced into evidence by the General Counsel,
which contained clear language stating that Inter-
national approval was required. I find nothing in the
record indicating that, despite the presence of such
clear language, approval by the president of the Re-
spondent’s International was not actually required.3
Having established the existence of a condition prece-
dent, the General Counsel was thus required to show,
as part of his 8(b)(3) case, that the requisite approval
had been obtained. No such evidence of International
approval, however, was offered, and no such conten-
tion was made.
Despite the absence of any evidence that the agree-
ment had been approved by the Respondent’s Inter-
national, the judge nevertheless found that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(b)(3) by refusing to exe-
cute the document. The judge’s basis for finding a vio-
lation came from the judge’s finding that the Respond-
ent never submitted the agreement to its International
for consideration. The judge made this finding, how-
ever, not from any record evidence that the agreement
was not submitted to the International, but from the
lack of record evidence to the contrary. Having found
that the Respondent never submitted the agreement to
its International, the judge further found that the Re-
spondent was estopped under these circumstances from
asserting that the lack of International approval ex-
cused the Respondent from its obligation to execute
the contract.
846 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4 Unlike the judge and my colleagues, I find it unnecessary to ad-
dress the issue of whether the requirement of International approval
suggests a correlative duty of due diligence on the part of a local
to submit the agreement to its International for consideration. The
General Counsel has the burden of alleging and proving the exist-
ence of a violation of the Act. Therefore, assuming that a duty of
due diligence exists, and assuming that a breach of this duty is the
basis for finding a violation, the General Counsel would have to al-
lege and prove a breach of this duty if a violation is to be found.
In the instant case, the General Counsel introduced evidence, i.e., the
Employer’s contract proposal, that established the existence of the
requirement of International approval. The General Counsel did not,
however, allege or prove that the Respondent breached its duty of
due diligence by not submitting the proposal to its International.
Therefore, as there is no allegation, and no proof, that the Respond-
ent breached any duty of due diligence, no violation can be found
based on the breach of such a duty.
My colleagues contended that Hiney Printing Co., supra, is distin-
guishable because the evidence in that case established that the re-
spondent local discussed the contract negotiations with the president
of its International and the question of the respondent’s diligence in
submitting the completed contract to the International never arose.
In my view, this evidence does not make Hiney distinguishable. In
Hiney, the evidence established a requirement of International ap-
proval, and the General Counsel did not prove that the requisite ap-
proval had been obtained and did not allege or prove that the re-
spondent local failed to submit the contract to its International. In
the instant case, the evidence presented by the General Counsel es-
tablished a requirement of International approval. As in Hiney, there
is no evidence in the instant record that the requisite approval was
obtained, and there is no allegation or proof that the Respondent
failed to submit the contract to its International.
1 The principal docket entries in this case are as follows:
Charge filed by Salem Gravure, a Division of World Color Press
(Salem Gravure) against the Respondent on April 24, 1990; com-
plaint issued against the Respondent by the Regional Director for
Region 14 on May 24, 1991; Respondent’s answer filed on June 5,
1991; hearing held in St. Louis, Missouri, on January 15 and 16,
1991; briefs filed by the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and
the Respondent with me February 26, 1991, and supplemental briefs
requested by me filed on or before April 1, 1991.
2 I find that Salem Gravure, a Division of World Color Press is
a Delaware corporation, which maintains an office and place of busi-
ness in Salem, Illinois, where it is engaged in the business of maga-
zine printing. During a 12-month period, the Charging Party has pur-
Contrary to my colleagues, I disagree with the judge
that these circumstances give rise to an estoppel situa-
tion. First, there is nothing in the record supporting the
judge’s finding that the agreement was never submitted
to the Respondent’s International. More importantly,
however, I find that the judge incorrectly placed the
burden of proof on the Respondent in this case. The
primary question at issue here is whether the General
Counsel has established that the Respondent was obli-
gated to execute the agreement. Before the Respondent
need provide a defense to its failure to comply with an
obligation to execute the agreement, the General Coun-
sel must first provide evidence showing the existence
of such an obligation.
The evidence establishes that the agreement at issue
here contained a condition precedent, which under
Hiney, had to be fulfilled in order to obligate the Re-
spondent to execute the contract. There has been no
showing, however, that the condition precedent was
fulfilled. The General Counsel has thus failed to prove
that the Respondent was under any obligation to exe-
cute the contract. These circumstances do not give rise
to an estoppel situation, as the Respondent cannot be
estopped from asserting that the General Counsel did
not introduce record evidence sufficient to establish a
violation of Section 8(b)(3).4
Because the evidence establishes that the agreement
presented to the Respondent for execution on April 18,
1990, required International approval, and because it
has not been shown that the Respondent’s International
president approved the contract, I would find that there
is a failure of proof that the Respondent was required
to execute the contract presented to it on April 18,
1990. Accordingly, I would dismiss the complaint.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to execute the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement presented to us for signature
by Salem Gravure, a Division of World Color Press,
about April 18, 1990.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, execute forthwith the contract
presented to us for signature by Salem Gravure, a Di-
vision of World Color Press, on or about April 18,
1990.
LOCAL 554, GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS
INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL–CIO
Frenchette C. Potter, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Thomas D. Allison, Esq., of Chicago, Illinois, for the Re-
spondent.
James P. Mannion Jr., Esq., of St. Louis, Missouri, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Statement of the Case
WALTER H. MALONEY, Administrative Law Judge. This
case came on for hearing before me on an unfair labor prac-
tice complaint,1 issued by the Regional Director for Region
14, which alleges that the Respondent, Local 554, Graphic
Communications International Union, AFL–CIO (Union),2
847GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS LOCAL 554 (WORLD COLOR PRESS)
chased and received at its Salem, Illinois plant goods and materials
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points and places located
outside the State of Illinois. Accordingly, the Respondent is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the Act.
3 The transcript is noted and corrected.
4 The five job classifications covered by the contract involved in
this dispute are:
Grade A operator (bindery)
Grade B counter (bindery)
Grade C forklift operator (shipping and
receiving)
Grade D feeder (bindery)
Grade E general services - janitorial, etc.
5 Hartwell was replaced as union president in January 1991, just
a few days before the hearing in this case.
6 The old contract, as well as its proposed replacement, contained
more than substantive provisions conventionally arranged in separate
articles by subject matter. It also included a host of memoranda,
noted by the various dates on which they were agreed to, that were
appended as attachments and which constituted a part of the ongoing
collective agreement between the parties.
7 The 1988–1991 contract called for three wage increases in each
classification—one on the date of the execution of the contract and
the other two on the next two anniversary dates.
violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. More particularly, the
complaint alleges that, since April 20, 1991, the Respondent
has failed and refused to execute a written contract embody-
ing the terms and conditions of an agreement which was
orally concluded with Salem Gravure. The Respondent insists
that it is under no obligation to sign a contract with the
Charging Party because the parties failed to reach an under-
standing on several key points, that a document presented to
it for signature on or about April 20, 1991, did not correctly
set forth various oral understandings which had been
reached, and that the Respondent is under no obligation to
sign a written agreement because the total agreement was not
approved by its International Union, as required by the terms
and conditions of the contract. On these contentions the
issues were drawn.3
B. The Unfair Labor Practices Alleged
Charging Party Salem Gravure operates a large printing
plant in Salem, Illinois, where it prints all or part of several
nationally known magazines. It is part of an Illinois-based
chain of printing plants which operates similar establishments
both in that State and in adjacent jurisdictions. The Salem
plant employs about 900 employees who work on three shifts
in three different bargaining units. The pressroom employees
are represented by Local 780-C of the same International
with which the Respondent is affiliated. Photoengraving em-
ployees are represented by the Respondent in their own unit
and about 325 bindery and shipping and receiving employees
are represented by the Respondent in the bargaining unit
which is in issue in this case. Salem Gravure and the Re-
spondent have had a collective-bargaining relationship dating
back to 1976, covering bindery and shipping and receiving
employees. The collective-bargaining agreement ostensibly in
effect at the time the events in this case began to occur be-
came effective on September 11, 1988, and had an expiration
date of September 8, 1991.
On September 13, 1989, company officials, including Wil-
liam C. Feagans, the director of human resources for the en-
tire chain, and Salem Plant Manager Robert Saxer, called of-
ficials from all three bargaining units together at the plant
training room for a meeting. They told assembled union rep-
resentatives that the Company was facing huge financial
losses and, if substantial relief from the provisions of the
current contracts covering all three bargaining units was not
forthcoming, the Company would close the Salem plant on
April 1, 1990. On September 28, a second meeting was held
between management representatives and officials of both
locals at which time the same essential message was con-
veyed with the use of visual aids. No specific demands for
relief from existing contractual provisions were made but sta-
tistical information was provided outlining the dollar
amounts of relief needed in each department. It became
abundantly clear that what the Company was seeking was not
minor revisions in existing contracts but a wholesale substi-
tution of new contracts for the existing agreements which
covered each of the three units in the plant.4 The Company
also solicited suggestions and proposals from the unions in-
volved.
Substantive meetings were held with representatives of the
Respondent concerning the bindery-shipping and receiving
unit on October 10 and 12. Feagans and Saxer were the chief
company spokesmen. Former Union President Gerald
Hartwell, a longtime employee in the shipping and receiving
department, was the chief union spokesman.5 He was accom-
panied by a committee of employees composed of Marty
Williamson, Carroll Brown, William Gnaw, Betty Trammel,
Betty Young, and Robert Yount. The first actual proposal
given to union representatives was handed to Hartwell and
others at the October 12 meeting. Entitled ‘‘Revision-October
11, 1989,’’ the proposal was generated from the company
computer and used the text of the 1988 contract as its basic
format, deleting those portions of the 1988 agreement which
the Company wanted omitted and inserting in lieu thereof
new contract language on which it sought agreement. The
new matter was set forth in bold type to distinguish it from
portions of the existing agreement for which no revisions
were requested.6 The Company also gave the union rep-
resentatives a summary of changes, i.e., an extract from the
complete contract proposal of the new portions set forth in
boldface type. Company representatives testified that they
adopted the practice of presenting even initial proposals in
the form of actual contract language rather than merely dis-
cussing proposals in concept form because, in previous nego-
tiations, they had experienced difficulties with Hartwell in
getting his assent to language which had been drafted to
carry out agreements previously reached.
The changes that the Company sought were drastic. The
downward revision in the basic pay scales it requested in the
bindery and shipping department called for cuts up to $3.50
per hour when compared to third-year increases and imme-
diate reductions in wages which, in some instances, were
more than $1 an hour. Wage cuts were proposed to be made
in two stages.7 The largest cuts were in the less skilled and
lower rated classifications. The Company also wanted an in-
crease in the deductible figure in the health insurance plan
as well as changes in the level of benefits. It sought to elimi-
nate one of the paid holidays and a paid personal leave day.
It offered an increase in the size of life insurance policies
848 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
8 The Company has yet to make a second pay cut, although the
time for this revision, as set forth in the new agreement, has long
since passed.
from $14,000 to $20,000 but it sought to eliminate automatic
overtime for weekend work, i.e., time and a half for any Sat-
urday work and double time for any Sunday work. For this
provision in the existing contract, it wanted to substitute a
practice of what might be called a sliding workweek, mean-
ing that Saturday overtime would be paid only after an em-
ployee had completed 37-1/2 hours of work in that week and
Sunday overtime would be paid only after completing 45
hours of work in a given week. In addition to changes in the
economic package, the Company asked for revisions in the
language of the grievance and arbitration provision and a 5-
year contract, beginning on the date of the agreement, in
place of the current 3-year contract which had 2 additional
years to run.8
Two proposed changes generated most of the controversy
in this case. One involved the application of the new week-
end overtime proposal to certain specific fact situations
which were discussed during negotiations. To determine eli-
gibility for Saturday or Sunday overtime, the Company was
willing to give an employee credit for absences during the
week due to specific stated causes and to pay Saturday or
Sunday overtime, when those days were actually worked,
notwithstanding the fact that the employee had not completed
37-1/2 or 45 hours before the weekend day in question. Ab-
sences due to vacation, holidays, lack of work, bereavement,
and jury duty would, under the company proposal, not he
counted against an employee’s weekly work record in deter-
mining eligibility for weekend overtime. As discussed later,
questions arose as to the application of the provision involv-
ing absences due to ‘‘lack of work,’’ a term of art in the old
contract which was not defined but which had applicability
to situations unrelated to weekend overtime.
The Company also proposed to establish a work pool
made up of laid-off employees and others who might be
hired for the pool when insufficient numbers of laid-off em-
ployees were available. Under this proposal, when short term
vacancies might arise because of illness, vacation, or tem-
porary overloads, the Company could call on the services of
a person in the work pool rather than recall an employee
from layoff under the seniority provisions of the contract.
Such an employee would be employed at 75 percent of the
wage rate for the job to be filled and would receive no fringe
benefits. The issue which ultimately arose concerning the
work pool provision was whether it applied to work in the
shipping and receiving department or whether it was limited
solely to the bindery. Hartwell did not think that higher pay-
ing jobs should be filled by work pool personnel and argued
that employees in lower paying classifications should be al-
lowed to upgrade before work pool employees were hired,
leaving work pool employees to fill, for the most part, the
lower classifications temporarily vacated as a result of short-
term upgrading. The Company agreed to that request.
The Company then prepared another document, entitled
‘‘Revision—October 12, 1989,’’ a complete contract pro-
posal incorporating alterations in its original proposal result-
ing from the October 12 discussion, again with new matter
set out in boldface type. This document formed the basis for
further negotiations which took place on October 14. At that
time, company negotiators told union representatives that
suggestions made by the Union did not contain sufficient re-
lief to prevent the Company from closing the plant, as it had
originally stated it would do. The Company printed out an
extract of its proposal, as of October 15, and gave it to
Hartwell, along with 400–450 copies to be given to the
membership of his unit. A meeting of the membership had
been scheduled on Sunday afternoon, October 15, at which
time the documents were distributed. The employees rejected
the company proposal, reportedly by a vote of two to one.
During this same timeframe, employees in the other two bar-
gaining units had voted to approve new company proposals
which had been presented to their respective representatives.
On Monday morning, October 16, 1989, the Company
posted the following notice:
Last evening, October 15, we were advised by rep-
resentatives of Local 554-M that, even though Local
787-C and Local 554-P have ratified labor contract
modifications, Local 554-M has rejected modification
of labor contract terms that would avoid the closing of
the Salem Gravure plant and transfer work to other
plants.
The Company and Salem Locals negotiated dili-
gently and examined and exhausted all alternatives to
arrive at a reduction of costs which could save the
plant. We are disappointed that those efforts failed to
produce relief!
We will be directing efforts shortly to initiate the
phasedown of Salem Gravure leading to a final close-
down by April 1, 1990.
We have advised the Salem locals that we stand
ready, upon notice from them, to work out separation
agreements which would enable an orderly phasedown
of this facility upon completion.
A press release advising the public of the closedown decision
was sent to local news media.
Shortly thereafter, Respondent’s representatives ap-
proached Saxer and Feagans to suggest that additional nego-
tiations might be in order. Feagans agreed but told them that
the Company had to make a final decision soon. Another
bargaining session was held on October 17. At that time,
Stanley Eisenstein, the Union’s attorney, was present.
At this meeting, the parties discussed job bidding, wage
rates, weekend overtime, and other matters. Among the mat-
ters explored in some detail was the question of how and
when ‘‘lack of work,’’ as that term had been used at the
plant, would be credited to an employee’s workweek so as
to entitle him to Saturday and Sunday overtime. Among
other things, the Company agreed to delay for 1 year the im-
plementation of the new reduced rates for operators, who are
the highest ranking employees in the unit.
On the following day, the Company prepared another ex-
tract of changes representing the status of its proposal fol-
lowing the October 17 meeting. It made 400 or so copies and
gave them to Hartwell for distribution to the membership of
the unit. At a meeting of the unit on October 19, Hartwell
presented the company proposal. He testified that he made
no recommendation either to accept or reject it. The member-
ship voted to accept it and the Company was immediately
notified. On October 23, the Company put into effect all the
849GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS LOCAL 554 (WORLD COLOR PRESS)
provisions of its proposal, except for the wage rate differen-
tials which were scheduled to take effect at a later date. It
also announced that the plant would not close.
On November 7, a meeting of company and union rep-
resentatives was called to discuss a variety of matters. At this
meeting the question of upgrading from the bindery to the
shipping and receiving department came up. Feagans told
union representatives that it was not going to recall any laid-
off shipping and receiving employees to fill temporary va-
cancies before finding out if there were any lower rated bind-
ery employees who wanted a temporary upgrade. He an-
nounced that the Company would be posting bids for these
short-term openings. He also stated that the Company would
provide training for bindery employees who wanted these
temporary upgrades to shipping and receiving. The posting
took place on November 27. The notice, directed to all Class
‘‘D’’ employees, stated, in part:
Bids are being requested for Class ‘‘D’’ employees
wanting to upgrade into Class ‘‘C’’ in conjunction with
the newly organized work pool.
Under this provision, a Class ‘‘D’’ employee would
upgrade into a Class ‘‘C’’ position to cover for a sched-
uled time off and a Work Pool employee would be used
to replace the Class ‘‘D’’ employee. This would give
the Class ‘‘D’’ employee the opportunity to work at a
higher pay scale.
Interested employees will be provided with a two-
week accelerated training period to qualify as a Class
‘‘C’’ employee in all areas except the premium Class
‘‘C’’ positions.
Following the posting of this notice, Hartwell wrote
Feagans a letter, dated November 30. He stated that, after re-
viewing the final summary of changes given to the Union be-
fore the ratification vote, the Union had come to the conclu-
sion that ‘‘to implement a work pool under the conditions
spelled out in the Summary would be a violation of other
areas of the contract.’’ He specifically mentioned the senior-
ity provision, which required both layoffs and recalls by clas-
sification, and pointed out that the agreement called for clas-
sification seniority. He noted further that ‘‘both sides at the
bargaining table failed to notice this contradiction in lan-
guage.’’ He added that the plant had never experienced up-
grades, only permanent openings, in the Class ‘‘C’’ jobs and
that the Union had never agreed to allowing employees from
one area to fill better jobs in another work area. He asked
that the Company refrain from implementing the work pool
provision in the revised contract until the Company resolved
the Union’s concerns as noted in the letter.
On December 12, Feagans sent Hartwell a detailed re-
sponse to the November 29 letter. Hartwell had asserted that,
during negotiations, there had been an understanding between
the parties that the work pool language was only tentative
and that the parties would get together after the ratification
vote to work out final language. Feagans contradicted the
statement and pointed to work pool language in the final re-
vised summary which contradicted Hartwell’s assertion. He
denied that there was any conflict between language in the
seniority section and language in the work pool section. He
reminded Hartwell that both parties had a legal obligation to
execute a written contract embodying the agreement reached
in October before the ratification vote and noted that a meet-
ing for that purpose had been arranged for December 18.
On December 18, when the parties met, the Company pre-
sented Hartwell and the executive board of the Respondent
six copies of a complete draft of the revised agreement for
their signatures. Hartwell said that they would review the
draft and respond to the request for signatures. Early in Janu-
ary, another request was made to Hartwell to sign the draft.
He said he still needed additional time to review the docu-
ment. On January 22, 1990, Hartwell wrote Feagans a letter
raising some questions and objections concerning several
matters. It stated:
In reviewing the guidelines for Bindery work pool
employment, we have several questions that need to be
answered. Under rates of pay, we see a wage progres-
sion for new hires. We would like to know how this
could be when the contract calls for no wage progres-
sions. It states that they will all get 75% of the feeder
scale. We don’t have any employees at a new hire-in
rate.
The overtime rates on the work pool would only be
used for the 6th and 7th day when all other regular
overtime was filled under our present overtime proce-
dures. When we work on the weekends, it is to cover
only positions that would be filled by regular employ-
ees who are working that week only. Weekend over-
time is filled. We have not discussed changing our
overtime procedures.
Under fringe benefits, you have failed to notify us if
permanently laid off employees in the work pool still
have rights under the Cobra plan. We didn’t discuss
this in our bargaining session.
Under work opportunities, what happens if a pool
employee signs up for all three shifts and is not home
when the company calls the first time? How many
times will each employee be called?
As for the Notice about the Guidelines for the work
pool, the guidelines have to follow the agreement under
Article XV Work Pool in the contract and not at Salem
Gravure’s discretion. Under Article XV, any guidelines
would be a modification of the agreement and could
only be implemented if both sides agree. This is not
what the contract says. Your attempt to make up new
rules under the pretext that they are guidelines would
be a violation of what was agreed to under the contract
and the implementation of new rules without both sides
agreeing.
Under the provisions of the contract in the work pool
language, it does state that upgrades will be used before
any pool employees are used to fill open positions. The
‘‘E’’ classification openings will only be filled when
we reach an agreement that both sides can live with.
The present contract doesn’t explain how these posi-
tions will be filled and any change from the contract
would mean that the contract would have to be amend-
ed to implement the change.
We will not agree to any changes under the contract
unless it is by mutual agreement. If you wish to meet
and change the provisions under the work pool agree-
ment, we will be happy to do so as long as it is by mu-
tual agreement. The Company’s repeated abuse and vio-
850 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
9 At the hearing, Hartwell testified that he had never received a
copy of the April 18 revision. I discredit Hartwell’s statement, as
well as any other testimony he gave which cannot be independently
corroborated.
lation of our contract could be settled by an unfair labor
charge that the Company bargained in bad faith.
On the following day, he wrote Feagans another letter ad-
vancing more questions and objections on other subjects. On
January 30, Feagans provided Hartwell with a detailed reply
to what he characterized as ‘‘interpretational questions.’’
The joint standing committee, composed of representatives
of the two parties, met on February 6 and discussed other
differences of opinion, as well as pending grievances.
Hartwell raised the objection that an attrition clause applica-
ble to the shipping and receiving department had been omit-
ted from the draft submitted for signature. In a letter dated
February 6 to Hartwell, Feagans agreed that the clause was
missing from the document and asserted that the omission
was an oversight on the part of the Company in preparing
the document. He agreed that the clause should be included
in the executed copy of the agreement. He also pointed out
that certain problems of interpretation had been raised so he
attempted to set forth in his reply what he felt were the reso-
lutions to these disputes. Feagans suggested that, if the
Union and the Company agreed to these resolutions, they
could be reduced to writing and added to the contract draft.
Such items included the subjects of overtime, work pool,
laid-off shipping and receiving employees, and the grievance
and arbitration procedure.
On March 7, Feagans mailed the Union copies of a further
revised draft of the contract containing corrected language in
the grievance and arbitration section. It included the memo-
randum relating to attrition in the shipping and receiving sec-
tion. In a cover letter he asked Hartwell to sign the docu-
ment. On two occasions during March, Feagans again asked
Hartwell orally to sign. On March 19, Hartwell said that he
would not do so, whereupon Feagans informed him that the
Company was going to file an unfair labor practice charge.
On March 20, the Company filed an unfair labor practice
charge against the Respondent in Case 14–CB–7382, charg-
ing that the Union had violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act
by refusing to execute a copy of the agreement which the
parties had reached on October 19. After an investigation, the
Regional Office determined that the charge should be dis-
missed because it concluded that the document presented to
the Respondent in this case for signature did not reflect the
total agreement which had been reached in October. Specifi-
cally, the Regional Office found that the work pool provision
of the March 7, 1991, draft was so worded that it could
apply to the shipping and receiving department although, by
its terms, it was not specifically directed to that department.
The Region further found that the parties had not agreed that
the work pool provision should apply to that department and,
in the absence of such an agreement, a complaint was not
warranted because the Respondent could not be lawfully
compelled to sign something it had not actually agreed to.
On receiving the Regional Office’s response to the charge
filed in Case 14–CB–7382, the Company revised the contract
draft by inserting the following language in the work pool
section: ‘‘This Article, Article XV Work Pool, does not
apply to the Shipping and Receiving Department.’’ It sub-
mitted a complete contract document containing this revision
to Hartwell on the afternoon of April 18 with a letter which
read:
I am hand delivering to you this afternoon this letter
and revised Labor Agreement. This Labor Agreement is
identical to the agreement I gave you on or about
March 7, 1990, except one sentence has been added to
Article XV, in the work pool, which states, ‘‘This Arti-
cle, Article XV, Work Pool, does not apply to the Ship-
ping and Receiving Department.’’ This sentence should
resolve completely any concern you may have on the
application of Article XV Work Pool.
It is the purpose of this letter to request that GCIU
Local #554 execute this agreement. In order to provide
you time to review the agreement please respond in
writing to me, no later than 9:00 a.m., Friday, April 20,
1990 stating your decision on the execution of the
agreement. If we do not receive a response from you
by 9:00 a.m., Friday, April 20, 1990, we shall consider
this a refusal on your part to execute the agreement.9
The parties met briefly on the morning of April 20.
Hartwell handed Feagans a letter which read:
In response to your letter dated April 18, 1990, I would
like to commend you for your concerns for the prob-
lems we have over the open issues from our labor
agreement. You state in your letter that Local 554M is
refusing to execute any agreement. The Company has
executed the agreement whenever they feel the need is
appropriate. We believe language is clear and decise
[sic] and should be administered by its content and not
by interpretation. We have found errors in the copies of
the new contract that you have requested us to sign and
need a meeting to properly adjust these errors.
Feagans’ verbal response to Hartman’s letter was that any
disputes between the parties were merely interpretational and
should be submitted to an arbitrator.
Later in the day Feagans approached Hartwell at his work
station and told him that he needed a formal response from
the Union. Hartwell said that there were still some errors in
the contract. Feagans asked what the errors might be and
Hartwell said that he did not know because he had not
looked through the contract but his executive board was
going to do so. Feagans suggested that Hartwell and the
members of the union board sit down immediately and go
through the contract in detail so the board and Hartwell
could show him exactly where any errors might be. He even
offered to release employees from work so that they could
do so. Hartwell said that some of the executive board worked
the third shift and were not available. Feagans then suggested
going to the conference room and arranging a telephone con-
ference call with any union board members who were not at
the plant so they could discuss the contract with those who
were on the job. Hartwell refused and said simply that the
Union was not going to sign. On April 24, the Company
filed the charge in this case. The plant has remained open
and in full operation, notwithstanding the refusal of the Re-
spondent to execute a contract.
851GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS LOCAL 554 (WORLD COLOR PRESS)
10 NLRB v. H. K. Porter, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
C. Analysis and Conclusions
Section 8(d) of the Act requires all parties to a collective-
bargaining agreement to embody the terms of an oral agree-
ment into a written signed contract. While the Board cannot
compel the making of an agreement,10 once an oral under-
standing has been reached the Board can compel the execu-
tion of a written agreement. Parties to an existing contract
have no obligation to renegotiate a contract during the term
of that contract but, once they agree to do so, the same legal
obligation of incorporating oral understandings into a written,
signed document comes into play. Hospital Employees Dis-
trict 1199-C (Episcopal Hospital), 241 NLRB 270 (1979);
Pacific Coast Metal Trades Council (Lockheed Shipbuilding),
282 NLRB 239 (1986). In such instances, there is no neces-
sity that the conventional notice, required by Section 8(d) to
begin negotiations at the end of a contract term, be given to
state and Federal agencies or to the other contracting parties.
The fact that the parties may disagree as to the interpretation
or application of agreed-on language to a particular fact situ-
ation does not excuse compliance with Section 8(d). Dip-
lomat Envelope Co., 263 NLRB 525 (1982).
A great deal of argument was directed at the question of
whether the Respondent ever agreed to the upgrading of em-
ployees from the bindery to the shipping and receiving de-
partment (from the ‘‘D’’ classification to the ‘‘C’’ classifica-
tion) under the new work pool article and whether the failure
of the parties to reach an agreement on this point precludes
the Board from directing written adherence to the entire re-
vised contract which was presented to the Respondent on
April 18. This argument strikes me as being a revisitation of
the first charge which the Regional Office dismissed. The re-
vised contract language in the April 18 draft placed this issue
at an end by specifically excluding the shipping and receiv-
ing department from the provisions of the work pool article.
If, as Hartwell testified, the Respondent is still engaging in
such conduct, such matter is properly a question for an arbi-
trator under the grievance machinery, not for the Board.
How the ‘‘lack of work’’ exception to the new weekend
overtime provision applies when lack of work occurs on a
Saturday and an employee thereafter is called to work on
Sunday is a matter of contract interpretation. It is clear that
the parties agreed to the weekend overtime provision and that
they further agreed that the phrase ‘‘lack of work,’’ along
with military service, jury duty, and other absences should be
included in the contract as a means of fulfilling a workweek
requirement so as to bring about an entitlement for overtime
in lieu of hours actually worked. Like other matters of con-
tract interpretation, this question is one for an arbitrator, not
for the Board, since the parties agreed not only on concepts
but on actual contract language respecting weekend overtime
and that language was contained in the April 18 revision and
earlier drafts as well. Hartwell was not speaking truthfully,
either to the Board or his own membership, when he said
that the parties had merely agreed to a framework respecting
weekend overtime and that there would be additional nego-
tiations following ratification to hammer out the meaning of
the weekend overtime section in specific situations. He had
the actual language of the proposal in hand during the ratifi-
cation meeting and the language of that contract clause, to
the effect that changes could be brought about only by mu-
tual consent, flatly contradicts his assertions.
There is no doubt that the new contract, ratified on Octo-
ber 19 under threat of plant closure, was a bitter pill to swal-
low. By the Company’s own estimate, unit employees lost
nearly 25 percent of the value of a former contract which
had been concluded only a year before and was still in effect
until that time. It clearly appears that both Hartwell and his
executive board made up their minds that they simply were
not going to sign the new contract, come what may. Their
tactics from October 19 onward provide repeated illustrations
of this state of mind. The centerpiece of this strategy was to
engage in endless, ongoing negotiations even after their bar-
gain had been struck and they had been informed that the
plant would remain open in order to recoup some fragments
of what they had just lost. This strategy was supplemented
by endless assertions of unspecified errors in contract drafts
presented for signature. With regard to the April 18 final
draft, Hartwell claimed it was full of errors even before he
had read it. When he was asked to sit down and go over the
draft to point out the errors, he declined. Once the charge in
this case was filed, he had no other contact with the Com-
pany concerning the contract. Between the time of the filing
of the charge in this case and the hearing, 9 months had
elapsed but at no time during that lengthy interim did the Re-
spondent point out to the Company any specific deviation
between the language of the final draft and what it felt had
actually been agreed on in negotiations.
The Board has long held that parties in negotiations have
an affirmative duty to assist in reducing the terms of an oral
collective-bargaining agreement to writing. Kennebec Bev-
erage Co., 248 NLRB 1298 (1980); Diplomat Envelope,
supra. In this case, not only did the Respondent fail to make
any affirmative effort to provide an acceptable draft of an
agreement which did not contain the endless array of asserted
errors it continued to find. It went out of its way to frustrate
the efforts of the Company in drafting such an agreement,
repeatedly claiming newly discovered errors and then refus-
ing to spell out those errors so that they could be promptly
corrected. In the meantime the Respondent and its members
received their quid pro quo under the revised contract. The
Salem plant remained open and the Respondent’s member-
ship retained their jobs. These belatedly claimed errors were
also part of previous drafts the parties had discussed between
the date of the ratification and March 7, when the contract
draft giving rise to the first unfair labor practice charge was
mailed to Hartwell by Feagans. No protests were voiced by
the Respondent as to these items during this extended period
of time. Accordingly, the Respondent should be estopped at
this point from asserting, as a defense to the complaint, the
existence of any alleged errors in the April 18 draft which
it could have presented and ironed out a year ago and which
Hartwell was invited to bring to the Company’s attention
when Feagans spoke with him in mid-April 1990. Avoiding
a legal obligation to sign a written contract though a cat-and-
mouse game is not a practice which the Board should sanc-
tion and approve, and such has been the Respondent’s game
since the filing of the charge in this case and even before.
852 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
11 For this reason I requested and received supplemental briefs di-
rected to this point.
The Respondent’s final defense must be seriously ad-
dressed.11 It involves the interests, powers, and prerogatives
of persons not parties to this proceeding who were not di-
rectly involved in the negotiations at issue nor the events
which followed thereafter. The contract which the parties
signed in 1988, as well as every contract draft presented to
the Respondent throughout this controversy, contained the
following language:
INTERNATIONAL APPROVAL
1. The terms and conditions of this Agreement are sub-
ject to review of the International and the Agreement
does not become a valid and binding document without
the approval of the International President.
Such approval does not, however, under any cir-
cumstances make the International responsible for the
observance of this Agreement or of any breach thereof.
APPROVED BY: llllllllllllll
JAMES NORTON
International President
There is no suggestion that the International president ever
signed any of the drafts presented to the Respondent for sig-
nature nor is there any suggestion that any of the drafts, in-
cluding the April 18 draft, was ever submitted to the Inter-
national president for his approval. The Respondent contends
that such approval is a condition precedent to the validity of
the contract and that, without International approval, the Re-
spondent cannot be held to the terms of the contract nor
forced to sign it.
The Respondent correctly points out that the clause here
in question is identical in language to the one involved in
Hiney Printing Co., 262 NLRB 157 (1982), a case which
also involved midterm bargaining that resulted in substantial
givebacks from contract provisions which had been agreed
on only a short time before the employer came to the union
with a plea of poverty and a request for substantial relief. In
that case, both the Board and I held that approval of the re-
vised contract by the International was a condition precedent
to its effectiveness and that the local which had negotiated
a midterm giveback could not be compelled under the Act
to execute a new agreement in the absence of approval by
its International. Respondent urges adherence to the Hiney
rule in this case.
In addressing this question, I place no reliance on a proce-
dural contention that the Respondent should not be permitted
to raise the issue in its posttrial brief because it did not do
so either at the hearing or in its pleadings. Respondent had
no obligation to plead an affirmative defense. The Board’s
Rules and Regulations require only that an answer admit or
deny each allegation in a complaint and nothing more. In as-
serting a plea of limitations, the Board has required it be
mentioned by a respondent at the hearing, not merely in
posttrial memoranda or exceptions, because the Board re-
gards limitations under Section 10(b) of the Act as an affirm-
ative defense, not a jurisdictional matter. Other than limita-
tions, I know of no other matter which cannot be raised after
the hearing is closed if an adequate factual predicate has
been laid in the record, The question of whether a condition
precedent exists which must be fulfilled before the Respond-
ent is obligated to sign is an element of the General Coun-
sel’s case. It must be established by the General Counsel in
order to make out a violation of the Act and is not a proce-
dural defense. What is required of a respondent who relies
on such an argument is that the record compiled at the hear-
ing contain sufficient evidence to support the argument.
In this case, there is an adequate factual predicate in the
record to support the Respondent’s argument relating to the
requirement for International approval before the new con-
tract negotiated by the Respondent became final and binding.
That predicate was laid by evidence adduced principally by
the General Counsel from documents generated from the
Company’s own computer. Every complete contract or con-
tract proposal placed in the record, starting with the 1988–
1991 agreement and going through the April 18, 1990 final
draft, contained the above-quoted language relating to the ne-
cessity for approval by the International president. Hartwell
mentioned the failure of the International president to ap-
prove the final draft as one of the errors which should pre-
clude the Board from ordering his signature on the final
draft. This contention was voiced during his testimony at the
hearing when he was examined by his attorney and before
cross-examination began. The General Counsel and the
Charging Party claim that they were not put on notice during
the hearing that this question was a live issue in the case and
argue that the Respondent should be precluded now from
raising the question in its posttrial brief. What occurred at
the hearing is that the General Counsel and the Charging
Party did not appreciate the full import of the evidence they
were placing in the record because the Respondent did not
make a loud argument at the time concerning the meaning
and effect of these documents. This does not prevent the Re-
spondent from doing so later on. In its supplemental memo-
randum, the Charging Party attached an affidavit given by
Saxer concerning the attention or lack of attention paid to
this clause by the parties in past negotiations. I am reopening
the record to admit this affidavit into evidence and have read
and considered its contents. Saxer’s testimony does not
squarely address some critical points.
The thrust of Saxer’s statement is that, in all the time the
parties have dealt with each other, starting in 1976, the
Union has never submitted a contract to its International for
ratification and has never informed the Company that agree-
ment to any contract was ever conditioned on such approval.
The fact that the Respondent may not have insisted on Inter-
national approval as a condition of its own approval during
previous contract negotiations in no way precluded it from
doing so during the midterm negotiations which took place
in October 1989. Moreover, the Charging Party is in a poor
position to say that the Union never placed it on notice in
1989 that it was conditioning local agreement on approval by
the International when the evidence of such notice comes
from the data bank in the Company’s own computer system.
Bold and uncategorical language requiring International ap-
proval glares forth from every contract draft which the Com-
pany prepared and tendered to the Respondent. The Board
simply cannot blink at such language and pretend it is not
there. Any relaxation of the requirement for International ap-
proval must stem from some other consideration.
853GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS LOCAL 554 (WORLD COLOR PRESS)
12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
No one contends that, in the year and a half which had
elapsed since the membership of the Respondent Local rati-
fied the final Company proposal on October 19, the Re-
spondent ever submitted the ratified contract proposal to its
International or that the International even had knowledge of
its existence. There is certainly nothing in the record which
remotely suggests that this ever occurred. Yet, as with the
other so-called errors on which the Respondent now relies to
avoid an order directing it to sign the final revised draft, the
Union and its membership have received the benefit of their
bargain, namely the continued operation of the Salem plant.
However, the Respondent has changed its announced position
by letting the April 1, 1990 deadline pass without closing the
plant. The existence of a requirement for International ap-
proval suggests a correlative duty of due diligence on the
part of a local to seek such approval or at least to bring the
contract to the attention of the International for its consider-
ation. Whether, for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at
all an International may thereafter refuse to approve is not
a question in this case because the International was never
asked.
The dilatory tactic of the Respondent in failing to seek
International approval, obtaining the benefit of its bargain,
and then asserting the failure of the International to approve
the contract as a basis for failing to execute the agreement
gives rise to an estoppel situation. Accordingly, on the basis
of the facts and circumstances of this case, I conclude that
the Respondent has been estopped from asserting this de-
fense, even though it might have made telling use of this
contract requirement had it acted in a timely fashion. Ac-
cordingly, I conclude that, by failing and refusing to execute
the draft of a contract presented to it by the Charging Party
on April 18, 1990, the Respondent has violated Section
8(b)(3) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Salem Gravure, a Division of World Color Press is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
2. The Respondent, Local 554, Graphic Communications
International Union, AFL–CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All bindery, shipping and receiving, and general serv-
ices department employees, and all stock coordinators, ware-
house clerks, production and mail clerks, and dispatchers em-
ployed by the Respondent at its Salem, Illinois plant, exclu-
sive of pressmen, photoengravers, office clerical employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a
unit appropriate for collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times material, the Respondent has been the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees
employed in the unit described above in Conclusion of Law
3.
5. By failing and refusing to execute the collective-bar-
gaining agreement prepared and presented to it for signature
on or about April 18, 1991, the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(3) of the Act. The aforesaid unfair labor practice has a
close, intimate, and adverse effect on the free flow of com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I will recommend to the Board that it
be required to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes and
policies of the Act. I will recommend to the Board that the
Respondent be directed to execute the contract presented to
it for signature by the Company on or about April 18, 1991,
and that it be required to post the usual notice informing its
members of their rights and of the results in this case.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended12
ORDER
The Respondent, Local 554, Graphic Communications
International Union, AFL–CIO, Salem, Illinois, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to execute the collective-bar-
gaining agreement presented to it for signature by the Charg-
ing Party on or about April 18, 1991.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, execute forthwith the contract presented to
it for signature by the Charging Party on or about April 18,
1991.
(b) Post at its Salem, Illinois office copies of the attached
notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’13 Copies of said notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after
being duly signed by Respondent’s authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent upon receipt thereof, and
shall be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that copies of the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 14 signed
copies of the aforementioned notice for posting by Salem
Gravure, if it is willing, in places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Copies of the notices to be furnished
to the aforesaid Regional Director shall, after being signed
by the Respondent as indicated, be returned forthwith to the
Regional Director for disposition.
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.