Granite State Joint Board

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 31, 1970

187 N.L.R.B. 636 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

636 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Granite State Joint Board , Textile Workers Union of
America , Local 1029 , AFL-CIO i (International
Paper Box Machine Company) and Felix Radziew-
icz, Maurice K. Kimball , II and Paul R. Marquis,
Eugene Collard , Hazen R. Johnson , Peter Makris,
Sr. and Joseph M . Kerrigan, Esq. Cases
1-CB-1460 (1-2), 1-CB-1504 (1-4), and
1-CB-1534
December 31, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS BROWN
AND JENKINS
On June 4, 1969, Trial Examiner Milton Janus
issued his Decision in the above-entitled Case
1-CB-1460(1-2), finding that the Respondent had not
engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and recommending that the complaint be
dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached
Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General
Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and a brief in support thereof. The Respon-
dent filed an answering brief.
On July 3, 1969, the General Counsel filed a motion
with the Board to reopen the record in Case
1-CB-1460(1-2), alleging that the Union had under-
taken to implement its threat to fine the Charging
Parties, which the Trial Examiner found was not
violative of the Act, by filing formal charges against
Radziewicz and Kimball for crossing its picket line at
their place of employment at International Paper Box
Machine Company (herein called the Company). The
Respondent filed a brief in opposition to the General
Counsel's motion. On October 22, 1969, the Board
issued an Order granting the General Counsel's
motion to reopen the record and remanded the
proceeding to the Trial Examiner "... for the
purpose of permitting the parties to present evidence
of conduct occurring after the close of the hearing and
bearing directly upon the conduct alleged in the
complaint."
In the interim, on June 24 and September 3, 1969,
charges were filed against the Union in Case
1-CB-1504(1-4) and Case 1-CB-1534, on the basis of
which a consolidated complaint, with notice of
hearing, was issued against the Union on October 20,
1969. The complaint alleged that the Union violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening to fine,
i Herein called the Union or the Respondent
2 The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied as, in
our opinion , the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the
positions of the parties
3 Booster Lodge No. 405, International Association of Machinists and
imposing fines, and seeking judicial enforcement of
such fines against certain named employees of the
Company who had resigned from the Union and had
returned to work during the Union's strike against the
Company. On November 10, 1969, pursuant to
motion made by the General Counsel, the Trial
Examiner consolidated all these cases and, on
November 20, 1969, conducted a hearing in the entire
consolidated proceeding.
On April 8, 1970, Trial Examiner Milton Janus
issued his Supplemental Decision in the above-enti-
tled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it
cease and desist therefrom as set forth in the attached
Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision. Thereafter,
the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examin-
er's Supplemental Decision and a brief in support
thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearings and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in this proceeding, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions with the following modifications.2
The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the
Charging Parties, having effectively resigned from the
Union before they crossed its picket line at their place
of employment, were not subject to the Union's
discipline for their postresignation conduct. The Trial
Examiner therefore correctly concluded that the
Union, by fining its former members, the Charging
Parties herein, for conduct engaged in by them after
their resignations from the Union and by seeking
judicial enforcement of such fines, violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. In so finding, however, we rely
upon the rationale more fully explicated in The Boeing
Company,3 which issued after the Trial Examiner's
Supplemental Decision herein.4
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (The Boeing Company), 185 NLRB No 23
i We agree with the Trial Examiner that the matter of the
reasonableness of the Union 's fines is an immaterial consideration herein,
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO,
Local Lodge No 504 (Arrow Development Co), 185 NLRB No. 22
187 NLRB No. 90
GRANITE STATE JOINT BOARD
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner ' s Supplemental
Decision and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Granite State Joint Board , Textile Workers Union of
America, Local 1029, AFL-CIO, its officers , agents,
and representatives, shall take the action set forth in
the Trial Examiner 's Recommended Order, as so
modified:
1. Delete paragraph 1(a) of the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order and substitute the following:
"(a) Imposing fines, or seekingjudicial enforcement
of such fines , against former members for crossing its
picket line at International Paper Box Machine
Company after they had resigned from the Union."
2. Add the following new paragraph 2(b), and
reletter present paragraphs 2(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and
(g) as paragraphs 2(c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h),
respectively:
"(b) Reimburse or refund to any employees named
in Appendix A who may have paid fines under the
circumstances described in paragraph 1(a) of the
Order the amount, if any, of said fines plus interest
thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum." 5
3. In footnote 8 of the Trial Examiner ' s Supple-
mental Decision , substitute "20" for "10" days.
4. Substitute the attached Appendix B for the
Trial Examiner 's Appendix B.
MEMBER BROWN , dissenting:
For reasons stated in my separate opinion in Booster
Lodge No. 405, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (The Boeing
Company), 185 NLRB No . 23, I would find no
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act in these
cases and would dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
5 Booster Lodge No 405, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (The Boeing Company), supra, in 3
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT fine former members of this
Union for crossing our picket lines at International
Paper Box Machine Company after they have
resigned from the Union, nor will we try to collect
such fines by suing them in the courts.
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce our former
members in the exercise of rights guaranteed to
them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended.
WE WILL rescind the fines we have imposed
against the persons named below, change our
records to show that we have rescinded these fines,
637
and take all necessary action in the courts of New
Hampshire to withdraw and give up all claims for
collection of such fines.
Alonzo Bealand
Roger Bernier
Marcel Berube
Jean Boutin
Eugene Collard
Robert Depontbriand
Leonard Desjardins
Leo Dubois
Aurel Duval
Bernard Francis
Roger Gagne
Adrian Gagnon
Clovis Gamache
Robert Guerrette
Hazen Johnson
Maurice Kimball
Armand Levesque
Peter Makris
Paul Marquis
Ronald Maynard
William Mayo
Franklyn McAlister
Roland Michaud
John Nadeau
Felix Radziewicz
Emilien Riendeau
Robert Roy
Zennie Runowicz
Alfred Theriault
Henry Tremblay
Gerald Tyler
WE WILL reimburse the above nonmembers
for any fines they may have paid to us for working
behind our picket line at International Paper Box
Machine Company plus interest at the rate of 6
percent per annum.
GRANITE STATE JOINT
BOARD, TEXTILE
WORKERS UNION OF
AMERICA, LOCAL 1029,
AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions may be directed to the Board's
Office, 20th Floor John F. Kennedy Federal Building,
Cambridge & New Sudbury Streets, Boston , Massa-
chusetts 02203, Telephone 617-223-3330.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MILTON JANUS, Trial Examiner : Charges were filed by
Felix Radziewicz and Maurice K. Kimball, II, on
December 9, 1968 , against Granite State Joint Board,
Textile Workers Union of America , Local 1029 , AFL-CIO,
638 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
referred to hereafter as the Respondent or the Union. A
complaint based thereon was issued by the Regional
Director for Region 1 on January 29, 1969, and an
amendment thereto on February 12. The complaint, as
amended, alleges that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act by threatening employees of International Paper
Box Machine Company, who were claiming to no longer be
members of the Union with excessive fines if they failed to
support its strike against the Company and/or attempted to
resign from the Union, and by threatening employees with
bodily harm and property damage if they failed to support
its strike.' Respondent's answer denies the material
allegations of the complaint.
I conducted a hearing in this matter at Nashua, New
Hampshire, on March 25, 1969. Briefs have been received
from the General Counsel and the Union, and have been
fully considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1. JURISDICTIONAL FACTS
International Paper Box Machine Company is a New
Hampshire corporation with its principal place of business
at Nashua, N.H., where it is engaged in the manufacture
and sale of automatic paper box making and gluing
machines. During a representative 12-month period
preceding the issuance of this complaint, the Company
received material valued in excess of $50,000 from points
directly outside New Hampshire, and shipped products
directly to points outside that State valued in excess of
$50,000. I find that the Company is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Granite State Joint Board , Textile Workers Union of
America , Local 1029, AFL-CIO, admits, and I find , that it
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Factual Background
The Union has represented the production and mainte-
nance employees of the Company for more than 20 years.
Pursuant to a strike vote, the employees went on strike
September 20, 1968, over economic issues upon the
expiration of the latest agreement. The strike was still
i The pertinent language of the statute reads as follows Sec 8(b) it
shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein,
2 Two witnesses for the Respondent, Pitarys, a vice president of the
International Union and manager of the Granite State Joint Board, and
Arel, who was recording secretary of Local 1029 in September 1968,
testified that the motion as offered and adopted was to the effect that the
fine be $2000 or any amount determined by the Union The official
minutes of the meeting, kept by Arel, were not offered by Respondent I
current in late March 1969 when this hearing was held.
Although the plant remained open, the only employees at
work were supervisors, clerical, office, and technical
employees, and three or four employees in the bargaining
unit who were not union members. About 160 employees
remained on strike, honoring a token picket line which kept
the main gate of the plant under surveillance.
The motion to strike the Company was voted on at a duly
called meeting of union members the Saturday before
expiration of the contract. Practically all the members were
in attendance, and they assented to the strike by a standing
vote, with only one member dissenting. The following
Saturday, a day or two after the inception of the strike,
another union meeting was held to discuss organization and
tactics. A rank-and-file member proposed a motion that
anyone aiding or abetting the Company or its officials
during the strike be subject to a $2,000 fine.2 The motion
was adopted unanimously without debate.
Radziewicz and Kimball decided independently in
November that they would abandon the strike and return
to work for the Company. Knowing of the Union's vote
that members who aided the Company during the strike
could be fined $2,000, each believed that he could avoid the
possible effects of the fine motion by resigning from the
Union. Radziewicz sent a letter of resignation to the Union
on November 5, and Kimball on November 25. Within a
day or so of the receipt of each resignation, Pitarys,
manager of the Granite State Joint Board, sent each of
them a letter, substantially identical , saying that he was
surprised at the attempt to resign, that they were not
familiar with the provisions and procedures they were
required to adhere to when they chose to become members,
and that they were still considered to be members in good
standing, required to abide by the Union's rules and
regulations. Further, Pitarys' letters went on to say, "In the
event you have any thought that your action removes you
from your obligation as a union member, or that you have
the right to cross the picket lines, let me caution you that
you will be subject to a fine of $2,000 as per the unanimous
action taken by the local union."
After getting the letter from Pitarys, Kimball spoke to a
supervisor of the Company, and asked him if it was true
that the Union could fine him. The supervisor said he could
not tell him what the Union could do, and Kimball then
made no attempt to return to work for the Company.
Radziewicz did go back to work secretly for the Company
for 3 days around Thanksgiving, but after Pitarys called
him by phone a number of times, and referred to his letter
cautioning him about a $2,000 fine, Radziewicz decided not
to work behind the picket line .3 The Union has taken no
action against Radziewicz or Kimball by way of charges or
note, moreover, that the letters of Pitarys to Radziewicz and Kimball
mention only a $2,000 fine, referring neither to the possibility of a larger or
a smaller fine I shall consider , in my later discussion , that the amount of
the fine which Radziewicz and Kimball thought the Union could impose
on them was a flat $2,000
' Radziewicz also testified that Pitarys threatened him in one of these
conversations that if he went back to the plant the next working day, the
pickets would be watching for him, and that Pitarys would not be
responsible for what might be done to him or to his car . Pitarys flatly
denied making any threat of physical harm or damage to Radziewicz I
credit Pitarys
GRANITE STATE JOINT BOARD 639
proceedings for the purpose of fining them or imposing any
other type of discipline. It is clear that Kimball, at least,
whatever his intentions might have been with respect to
working behind the picket line when he attempted to resign,
took no overt action about abandoning the strike.
The bargaining agreement which expired September 20,
1968, had provided that employees who were union
members on its effective date 3 years earlier, or who joined
the Union during its term, were to remain members in good
standing. The agreement had also provided that the
Company would deduct union dues and initiation fees from
the wages of any employee who authorized it to do so in
writing. Radziewicz had been a member of the Union since
1960, while Kimball had joined it in December 1967, some
7 months after his employment with the Company. Each
had signified his intention tojoin by signing an application
for membership which included an authorization to the
Company to deduct his initiation fees and dues. The
combined application for membership and checkoff
authorization read as follows:
I, the undersigned hereby accept membership in
Textile Workers' Union of America, AFL-CIO, and do
hereby authorize and direct
INTERNATIONAL PAPER BOX MACHINE
COMPANY, NASHUA which is my employer, to
deduct from my wages the membership dues including
initiation fees, in the amount fixed pursuant to the
Constitution and the By-Laws of my Local Union and
to pay over same to the Union or its designated agent
pursuant to the provisions of any current or future
collective agreement.
This authorization shall remain in effect until
revoked by me and shall be irrevocable for a period of
one year from the date hereof or until the termination
date of any applicable collective agreement, whichever
occurs sooner; unless I revoke it by sending written
notices to my Employer and the Local Union by
registered mail, only during a period of ten days
immediately succeeding the termination date of any
applicable collective agreement or yearly period, it shall
be automatically renewed as an irrevocable checkoff
from year to year, until duly revoked as herein
provided.
The combined application and dues checkoff authoriza-
tion card does not set out a procedure by which a union
member may resign . It does, of course, permit revocation of
the dues checkoff authorization within the time periods
specified in Sec . 302(c)(4) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, as amended, but the language provides for
no more than that-it is completely silent on when or if the
Union will recognize a resignation as effective.' The
authorization card thereby mirrors what the constitutions
and by-laws of the Textile Workers Union of America, the
Granite State Joint Board, and Local 1029 already provide
for--that a member may not voluntarily withdraw from the
Union except by leaving the industry, in which case he may
4 Under the maintenance of membership provision of the last expired
agreement , a union member who had revoked his checkoff authorization in
a timely fashion, that is within the 10-day period following his anniversary
of acquiring membership would still be obligated to remain a member in
obtain a withdrawal card. Death, presumably, provides the
only other means of exit from the Union.
The Union also attempted to show that Kimball had in
effect revoked his letter of resignation by accepting a
Thanksgiving turkey from it after his letter to the Union.
The evidence as to whether Kimball accepted one of the
Union's turkeys is unclear, but even if he had, I would not
consider it to be a meaningful retraction of his attempt to
resign.
Analysis and Conclusions
The Supreme Court held in N.L. R. B. 'v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Company, 388 U .S. 175, 87 S. Ct 2001, that
the Union in that case had not violated Sec. 8 (b)(1)(A) of
the Act by seeking judicial enforcement for a fine of $100
imposed on a member who had engaged in strike -breaking
activities . In Scofield v. N. L. R. B., 394 U.S. 423, 89 S. Ct.
1154, (April 1 , 1969) the Court held that a union rule
imposing a ceiling on payments for incentive work was
valid and could be enforced through collection of
reasonable fines without violating Sec. 8(b)(1)(A).
The Court's opinions in these two cases were obviously
intended to illuminate a broader area than that under direct
consideration . A brief statement of the general principle
involved is given in Allis-Chalmers, at 388 U .S. 195:
Thus this history of congressional action does not
support a conclusion that the Taft-Hartley prohibitions
against restraint or coercion of an employee to refrain
from concerted activities included a prohibition against
the imposition of fines on members who decline to
honor an authorized strike and attempts to collect such
fines. Rather , the contrary inference is morejustified in
light of the repeated refrain throughout the debates on
Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and other sections that Congress did not
propose any limitations with respect to the internal
affairs of unions, aside from barring enforcement of a
union 's internal regulations to affect a member's
employment status.
There are as yet no decisions of the Board in which it has
worked out the implications of Allis-Chalmers and Scofield.
Specifically, among the unanswered questions are the two
presented here : ( 1) is it critical, in determining whether a
union has violated Sec . 8(b)(1)(A) that the amount of the
fine is "unreasonable", and under what circumstances does
it become unreasonable ; and (2) is it critical , for purposes
of the same determination, that membership in the union
was in some sense involuntary.
1. Reasonableness of the fine: It is clear from both Alhs-
Chalmers and Scofield that the Court considered the
amount of the fines for which judicial enforcement was
sought in those cases as reasonable . There are scattered
references throughout the two opinions that the reasonable-
ness of the fine , at least when judicial enforcement was
sought, was a factor in deciding whether a violation would
be found. But there are other parts of the two opinions
where the absence of a reference to reasonable fines might
good standing for at least the remaining term of the agreement Failure to
retain good standing by payment of his union dues could result in his
discharge at the Union 's request of the Company, under Sec 8(a) (3) of the
Act
640 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
lead one to conclude that the amount of the fine was
beyond the scope of the Board's inquiry.5
However, since I assume that the Court did not
knowingly refer to the reasonableness of a fine without
intending it to have some significance, an attempt must be
made to fit the concept into the context of the Court's
actual holdings. It must again be noted, in preface, that the
Court held the fines as enforced by the state courts in Allis-
Chalmers and Scofield as reasonable, and that court
enforcement of a fine is the final stage of a fine proceeding.
The preliminary stages recognized by the opinions, through
which a union's fine motion may proceed, are as follows:
(1) the passage of the motion in an approved manner, or the
prior existence of a union rule with or without a prescribed
penalty; (2) notification to a member of the union action or
existing rule; (3) imposition of a fine in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in the Landrum-Grif fin Act; 6 and (4)
enforcement, either judicially or through the union's own
internal machinery.
Notification, meaning a cautionary announcement to
strikebreakers that their offense might be punishable by a
fine, is found by the Court in Allis-Chalmers, supra at 192,
footnote 30, not to be an unfair labor practice at least under
the proviso, if not under the body of Sec 8(b)(1), primarily
because no inference can be drawn from the notification
that court enforcement would be the means of collection.
It would thus seem that even a "threat" or "caution" of an
unreasonably large fine to employees whom the Union
believed to be ready to engage in strikebreaking would not
be a violation, unless perhaps, court enforcement was also
threatened. Although such a notification may be given
before the imposition of a fine, it is only the latter which is,
assuming the Union's compliance with Sec. 411(a)(5) of the
Landrum-Griffin Act, efficacious. Until the prescribed
procedure has been followed, a cautionary announcement
to a possible offender that a fine may be imposed is not, it
seems to me, any more an unfair labor practice than the
fine motion itself. There is no hint in either of the Court's
opinions that promulgation of a valid union rule and a
prescribed penalty, even though "unreasonable", would
constitute a violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A).
I need not therefore decide in this case whether the
imposition of a $2,000 fine would have been unreasonable
per se; whether the surrounding circumstances might affect
a determination as to the reasonableness of a fine; 7 or
whether court enforcement of an imposed fine in such
amount would be an unfair labor practice. I find here that
the notification to the potential strikebreakers, Kimball and
Radziewicz, of the Union's fine motion, of which they were
already aware, and the explicit warning that they would be
subject to a $2,000 fine was not an unfair labor practice.
This does not, however, necessarily dispose of the case.
5 Eg Allis-Chalmers v. N.LR.B, 388 U.S 175 at 191-192 "Cogent
support of an interpretation of the body of Sec 8(b)(1)(A) as not reaching
the imposition of fines and attempts at court enforcement is the proviso to
Sec. 8(b)(I) , At the very least it can be said that the proviso preserves
the rights to unions to impose fines, as a lesser penalty than expulsion, and
to impose fines which carry the explicit or implicit threat of expulsion for
nonpayment" It would seem that if a union may expel a member for
violation of a union rule without first fining him, then the amount of a fine
for which expulsion may later be sought is immaterial
6 Pub. L 86-257, 73 Stat. 522, 29 U S C Sec 411 et seq Sec 411 (a)(5)
reads "Safeguards against improper disciplinary action - No member of
2. The Resignations: The General Counsel contends that
a union's right to impose a reasonable fine on a member for
failing to support its strike does not extend to a threat to
fine an employee who has resigned his membership,
without regard to the reasonableness of the fine. The main
thrust of the Respondent's argument is that Kimball and
Radziewicz could not resign when they attempted to do so,
that they are still union members, and that the Board does
not have the authority "to passjudgment on the penalties a
Union may impose on a member." 8 The Union argues,
however, that if Kimball and Radziewicz had in fact
resigned, and if the Pitarys letters were a threat, they were
nevertheless not coercive within the meaning of Sec.
8(b)(1)(A) because the obligations of membership, no
matter how severe, simply do not apply to nonmembers.
The Supreme Court's opinions in Allis-Chalmers and
Scofield make occasional references to "full membership"
but they appear to relate to the problem of an employee
obligated under a union-security provision to become a
union member who chooses not to assume the responsibili-
ties of full membership but to satisfy his financial
obligations by paying the equivalent of the initiation fee
and the monthly dues. There is, however, a statement in
Scofield which speaks more directly on the issue of a
union's right to fine a member who seeks to resign. It reads
as follows (89 S. Ct 1154 at 1158):
Under this dual approach, Sec. 8(b)(1) leaves a union
free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a
legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress
has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably
enforced against union members who are free to leave the
union and escape the rule. [Emphasis supplied. ]
The quoted language does not refer to the conditions
governing resignations, such as whether a member must
comply with internal union regulations as to their time and
manner, or whether a resignation need be accepted at all if
the union makes no provision for voluntary resignations
while still employed in the industry.
There are, however, certain statutory and Board princi-
ples which are of help in determining the rights and
obligations of unions toward employees who seek to resign
their union membership. There is first, of course, the
proviso to Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) which enjoins impairment of a
union's right to prescribe its own rules as to the acquisition
or retention of membership. There are also those Board
cases which hold that a union violates Sec. 8(b)(2) if it seeks
the discharge for nonpayment of dues of an employee who
has resigned at a time when a union security, or
maintenance of membership, clause was not in effect, or
who has resigned at any time from a union which does not
any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled or otherwise
disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization unless
such member has been (A) served with written specific charges, (B) given a
reasonable time to prepare his defense. (C) afforded a full and fairhearing."
r Such surrounding circumstances might be the duration of the strike
and what the employee might have earned if he had gone back to work
despite the imposition of the fine, as compared with the amount of the fine
8 The quotation is from the Board's decision in the Wisconsin Motors
case l45 NLRB 1097, 1104, enforced by the Supreme Court sub nom
Scofield v NLRB, supra
GRANITE STATE JOINT BOARD 641
provide by its constitution or bylaws for any effective
method of resignation.9 These cases certainly hold that a
union cannot prevail against an otherwise valid charge of
violating Sec. 8(b)(2) by invoking the proviso to Sec.
8(b)(1)(A). Even the Paulding case on which Respondent
relies, (N. L. R. B. v. International Union, Automobile Workers
etc, 320 F.2d. 12), does not go so far as to hold that a union
which provides no effective method of resignation may
continue to treat employees who attempt to resign, as
members thereafter. See the caveat in this opinion at 320
F.2d 12, 15-16, "Needless to say, as we indicated in a prior
opinion between these same parties; `it may be that . .
there is a limit of reasonableness beyond which a union
may not go' in structuring its internal regulations "
In the instant case, when Kimball and Radziewicz
resigned, there was no contractual provision in effect which
required them to remain members, nor did the union's
constitution allow them any free period in which to revoke
their membership. But the Union has not sought to affect
their job security in any manner. It has, at most, threatened
to take steps to impose a fine if they should cross its picket
lines. There are, however, intimations in the pertinent cases
that resignation from a union is a right protected by Sec. 7
of the Act, embodying a public policy to which the proviso
of Sec 8(b)(l)(A) must be subordinated.10
I aim led to conclude from the cases cited in footnote 10
that Kimball and Radziewicz effectively resigned despite
their "contract of membership" with the Union which
forbade their resignations.
To return then to the basic question already posed. If
Kimball and Radzrewrcz were no longer members of the
Union when Pitarys sent them his warning letters, can the
Union be said to have violated Sec. 8(b)(1) thereby? It can
be said with a kind of blinkered logic that nonmembers
cannot be coerced by a threat to impose a fine based on
failure to fulfill the obligations due only of a member. It is
true, however, only if the nonmember can divine what the
Board and the courts may decide in his particular case
years later. Faced with the immediate risk in having to
decide what the Union might be able to do, it is not
surprising that Kimball and Radzrewrcz decided to forego
their Sec. 7 right to work during the strike rather than face
the potential risk of a heavy fine.
However, the issue of whether the Pitarys letters were
intimidating in fact is yet dependent on the primary issue of
whether the letters constituted restraint or coercion within
the meaning of Sec. 8(b)(1). If it is not restraint or coercion
to caution members about a possible fine, it is certainly no
more violative to caution nonmembers.
I have previously concluded that the Pitarys letters went
no further, and accomplished no more than the fine motion
did, and since a fine motion or other valid union rule
against strikebreaking is not in itself a violation, further
notification of its passage or existence either to members or
nonmembers is also not a violation. The Union did not
impose fines on Kimball or Radziewicz, in compliance with
the procedures required by Sec. 411(a)(5) of the Landrum-
Griffin Act, nor did it seek either internal or external
enforcement of its valid fine motion. It is thus unnecessary
for me to decide whether it is the imposition or the
enforcement of an excessive fine which violates Sec 8(b)(1).
It is also beyond the scope of my inquiry whether $2,000 is a
reasonable amount for a fine, or at what stage, either
imposition or enforcement, it becomes unreasonable.
I shall recommend dismissal of the complaint in its
entirety
On the basis of the foregoing findings and analysis of the
facts, I made the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Paper Box Machine Company is
engaged in commerce and in activities affecting commerce,
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Granite State Joint Board , Textile Workers Union of
America, Local 1029, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
3. The Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor
practices as alleged in the complaint.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It is hereby recommended that the complaint be
dismissed in its entirety.
9 Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 751 etc (The Boeing Company)
173 NLRB No 71, Local Union No 621, United Rubber etc Workers,
(Atlantic Research Corporation) 167 NLRB 610, In 1, international Union,
United Automobile etc Workers, (John i Paulding, Inc) 142 NLRB 296, 137
NLRB 901. set aside in N L R B v international Union, etc 320 F 2d 12
(C A I), 130 NLRB 1035, enfd N L R B v International Union, etc, 297
F 2d 272, (C A 1), Newspaper Guild of Buffalo, Local #26, 118 NLRB
1471, Marlin Rockwell Corporation, 114 NLRB 553, New Jersey Bell
Telephone Company, 106 NLRB' 1322, enfd 215 F 2d 835 (C A 2)
10 Marlin Rockwell Corporation, 118 NLRB 553, 559-562, Communica-
tions Workers of America v N L R B 215 F 2d 835 at 838, (C A 2)
enforcing New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, 106 NLRB 1322
TRIAL EXAMINER'S SUPPLEMENTAL
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MILTON JANUS, Trial Examiner: On June 4, 1969, I issued
a Decision in Case 1-CB-1460(1-2) recommending dis-
missal of the complaint against the Respondent, Granite
State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union of America,
Local 1029, AFL-CIO, (referred to hereafter as the Union).
The reason for my recommendation of dismissal was that,
in my opinion, the holdings of the Supreme Courtin Allis-
Chalmers v. N.L.R B., 388 U S. 175, and in Scofield v.
N.L.R.B., 394 U.S. 423, required a finding that Section
8(b)(I)(A) was not violated by the Union's warning the
Charging Parties, Radziewicz and Kimball, that they would
be subject to fines if they engaged in strikebreaking. I also
held in my Decision that Radziewicz and Kimball could
resign from the Union at any time in the absence of
provision in the Union's constitution or bylaws for
resignation at specified intervals, and that the resignations
they had submitted to the Union were effective.
The General Counsel filed exceptions to my Decision on
June 26, 1969. Two days earlier, on June 24, charges had
been filed against the Union in Case I-CB-1504(1-4) by
the individuals named in the caption, charging a violation
of Section 8(b)(1)(A) by the Union's threats to fine them if
they crossed the Union's picket line at the International
642 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Paper Box Machine Company plant where the Union was
on strike.
On July 3, 1969, the General Counsel filed a motion with
the Board to reopen the record in Case 1-CB-1460(1-2),
alleging that the Union had filed formal charges against
Radziewicz and Kimball for crossing its picket line at the
Company's plant , thereby going beyond its previous
warnings to them which I had found not to be violative of
the Act.
On September 3, 1969, Peter Kerrigan , an attorney, filed
a charge in Case 1-CB-1534 on behalf of 23 named
individuals , employees of the Company , alleging that the
Union had fined them for crossing its picket lines and had
brought suit in a state court to collect the fines which it had
imposed.
On October 20, 1969, the General Counsel ordered Cases
1-CB-1504 (1-4) and 1-CB-1534 consolidated for hearing,
and issued his complaint in that consolidated proceeding
alleging that the Union had violated Section 8 (b)(l)(A) by
threatening to impose fines, by fining and by seeking
judicial enforcement of such fines against employees of the
Company who had resigned from the Union and had
returned to work during the Union's strike against the
Company.
Two days later , on October 22, the Board granted the
General Counsel 's motion to reopen the record in Case
1-CB-1460( 1-2) and remanded it to me to take evidence as
to conduct which occurred after the close of the hearing in
that case and which bore directly on the conduct alleged in
that complaint . Thereafter , on October 24, the General
Counsel filed a motion with me to consolidate the
remanded case with the two cases which he had previously
consolidated and on which he had issued a new complaint.
I issued an Order granting the General Counsel 's motion,
on November 10, 1969, and reaffirmed it on November 14,
after the Union 's request for reconsideration. A hearing
was thereafter held on the entire consolidated proceeding
on November 20, 1969, at Nashua, New Hampshire.' The
Union filed a brief after the hearing which I have
considered . I have also considered later communications
from both the Union and the General Counsel advising me
of certain recently issued Trial Examiner 's Decisions
supporting their respective positions.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses , I make the following:
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT
The essential facts here are not in dispute, and at the risk
of some repetition, I will summarize what is already set out
in my original Decision as a prelude to a description of the
events which have taken place since then.
The last bargaining agreement between the Company
and the Union expired September 20, 1968, and on that
date the Union began an economic strike which was still in
force on the date of the latest hearing, November 20, 1969.
Almost the entire working force were members of the union
under a maintenance-of-membership provision in the last
contract, and all the union members went out on strike. The
strike vote had been unanimously adopted, and a motion to
fine anyone who aided the employer during the strike in the
amount of $2,000 was adopted at a union meeting with only
one dissenting vote.
Radziewicz and Kimball sent letters of resignation to the
Union in November 1968 and the Union quickly replied,
advising them that their purported resignations were
ineffective, that they were still members subject to the
Union's rules, and cautioning them that they were subject
to a fine of $2,000 if they insisted on going back to work
during the strike. Kimball did not attempt to return to
work, while Radziewicz, who had gone back to work for a
few days, then decided not to continue working behind the
picket lines.
On these facts, I held in my original Decision that neither
the fine motion, passed by the membership at the inception
of the strike, nor the Union 's letters to Radziewicz and
Kimball on receipt of their resignations constituted
imposition of a fine within the meaning of Sec. 411(a)(5) of
the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. 401 et seq., and that it
was therefore unnecessary for me to decide whether a
$2,000 fine, if it had been imposed, would have been
unreasonable. I went on to find that since the Union's
constitution did not provide for voluntary resignations
under any circumstances or at any particular time,
Radziewicz and Kimball were free to resign whenever they
chose. Resignation from a union was, I found, a right
protected by Sec. 7 of the Act.2 I recommended dismissal of
the complaint since I found no violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) by the Union warning the two Charging Parties
that they might be fined for crossing its picket line at the
Company's plant.
What follows is a recital of the events occurring after
June 4, 1969, the date of my Decision. As soon as the
Company was notified of that Decision, it sent letters to all
the striking employees (Resp. Exh. 3) advising them that my
Decision meant that employees who resigned from the
Union could not be fined, and that they were therefore free
to cross the picket line and return to work.
A few days later, the Union responded to the Company's
invitation to the strikers to return to work with a letter (G.
C. Exh. 2) to its members, warning them that the Supreme
Court had upheld a union's right to fine anyone engaged in
strikebreaking, and that charges would be brought against
anyone doing so. It urged them not to be misled by the
Company.
Shortly before my Decision was issued, a third employee,
Hazen Johnson, resigned. After the Decision, beginning on
June 6, 1969, and for some months following, there were
many more resignations, totalling 31 altogether. (Their
names are listed in Appendix A.) After resigning, they
returned to work for the Company, crossing the picket lines
to do so. While they had been out on strike, many of these
31 had obligated themselves in a written statement to the
Union, to reimburse it for the premiums which the Union
would pay to keep their group insurance policies current.
Many of them also accepted cash payments from the Union
while they were striking.
I By arrangement at the hearing an exhibit number, G.C. Il, was 2 My reason for considering the resignation problem at all was in
reserved for later submission by Mr. Kerrigan, the attorney for the connection with the arguments of both parties on whether a nonmember
Charging Parties. It is now part of the official record of the case. can be restrained or coerced by a threat to fine him.
GRANITE STATE JOINT BOARD 643
After they returned to work , the Union sent each of the
31 a letter charging him with misconduct by crossing its
picket line , and requesting him to appear at a hearing at a
specified time to answer the charge None of them appeared
as requested The Union then notified each of them that a
hearing had been held , and that a fine had been imposed on
him amounting to a day's pay for each day worked Some
time later , the Union sent each of them a letter informing
them that it had not yet heard from them about paying their
fines, and threatening them with legal action to collect it
None of them paid the fine imposed , and the Union then
filed a suit and writ of attachment against each in the New
Hampshire state courts The suits claim a specific amount
due the Union as a result of the defendant 's contract of
membership in the Union and, where applicable a second
count based on its claim for moneys advanced on their
behalf for insurance premiums However , the amount
claimed is in all cases greater than the specific sums alleged
to be due and owing For example , the action brought
against Eugene Collard is for $1,400 in the first count and
$195 14 in the second , while the total amount claimed is
$2,000
Contentions, Analysis , and Conclusions
The General Counsel has already filed exceptions to my
Decision in the original proceeding and stands by the
contentions raised then, that the Union's letters to
Radziewicz and Kimball after their resignations in
November 1968 are threats to impose excessive fines and
are in themselves violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) As to the
imposition of fines on the 31 Charging Parties now involved
in the consolidated proceeding , and the suit for judicial
enforcement of these fines , the General Counsel argues, in
the alternative ( 1) that the 31 all effectively resigned from
the Union and that a threat to fine, or the imposition of a
fine in any amount , on nonmembers of a union is restraint
or coercion of their Section 7 right not to remain a member,
but assuming , however , that their resignations may have
been ineffective for some reason, so that they were still
members when the Union fined them , then in that event,
the fine of a day's pay for each day worked is excessive,
since its effect is to force them to quit working for the
Company This latter argument is based on the General
Counsel's contention, already made in the first proceeding,
that the Allis -Chalmers and Scofield cases should be
construed to mean that the imposition of an unreasonable
or excessive fine is a violation of Section 8(b)(I)(A)
The Union' s basic arguments , like that of the General
Counsel , center on the resignations It argues that some or
all of the resignations were ineffective, but that even if the
31 employees did in fact resign , the obligations they
assumed when they went out on strike must be fulfilled and
if not fulfilled , the Union has a right to require satisfaction
from them by the imposition and collection of fines
First, as to the ineffectiveness of the resignations The
Union relies on the combined membership application and
dues checkoff authorization which each of the 31 agreed to
(set out in my original Decision ), arguing that the 10-day
period after the expiration of the collective -bargaining
agreement within which dues checkoffs could be revoked
was also intended as the allowable period for resignations
from the Union It makes the point that it has in fact
accepted resignations during that interval despite the
silence of its constitution or bylaws on the procedure or
period for voluntary resignations It argues from there that
it did in fact provide a procedure and an allowable interval
within which resignations could be made and accepted as
effective I find the argument unpersuasive No employee
could be expected to know from the combined membership
application and authorization form that the method to be
used for revoking his checkoff authorization (sending a
registered letter to his employer and to the Union) was also
meant to provide a method of resigning from the Union An
employee might well intend to remain a union member but
choose not to have his union dues checked off by his
employer, so that revocation of the authorization does not
imply resignation from the Union Also, an employee
concerned about his right to resign would certainly expect
to be bound by what the Union's basic charter says or does
not say on the subject , and should not be required to guess
at what the Union's intentions were from an ambiguously
expressed form designed for other purposes altogether
Other arguments advanced for the ineffectiveness of the
resignations are also unpersuasive since they are based on
the proposition that the procedures to be followed for
resignation are the same as those to be followed for
revocation of the dues checkoff authorization They relate
to the fact that some of the resignations were not sent by
registered mail or were sent by telegram One resignation,
that of employee Desjardins , was unsigned In fact,
however, his letter gives his name and clearly expresses his
intent to resign As for those employees who resigned by
ordinary mail or by telegram, I find that their resignations
became effective upon receipt of their communications to
the Union since no other form of communication was
obligatory
The Union also points to actions taken by employees
after their resignations , which it considers inconsistent with
an intent to resign Thus, one employee may have received
a strike benefit payment from the Union in the week in
which he resigned , while other employees are said to have
received insurance benefits after resigning In both cases, it
appears that the benefits received accrued before the
resignations and are therefore not inconsistent with an
effective resignation
Finally, the Union argues that it should not be compelled
to accept or honor resignations from employees who did so
to please the Company which had falsified the meaning of
my original Decision in order to induce their resignations I
find nothing improper in the Company 's letter of June 5,
1969 (Resp Exh 3), which advised all employees that my
Decision meant that they could resign voluntarily at any
time in the absence of restrictions on that right imposed by
the Union's constitution or bylaws That is the fair import
of what I said , and I see nothing coercive or false in the
Company's passing on that information If it induced
employees to resign , it was because they freely decided to
do so
For all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons given in
644 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
my original Decision in more detail, I find that the 31
employees here involved effectively resigned from the
Union during the strike 3
Assuming, arguendo, that the resignations were effective,
the Union argues that it nevertheless had the right to
impose fines on the Charging Parties for working during the
strike It points out that they had joined the Union
voluntarily, without the compulsion of a union-security
provision in the bargaining agreement, and that in
accepting membership voluntarily, they bound themselves
to adhere to the course of action freely voted on by the
Union's membership Thus, the argument goes, although
the Charging Parties may choose to withdraw from the
Union, they may not thereby avoid their obligation to
accept the decision of the membership and to continue
supporting the strike Each member was induced to strike
by the mutual commitment of all the other members to do
the same , and by returning to work during the strike the
Charging Parties have breached their agreement with their
fellow members Judicial enforcement of a fine imposed for
breaking a strike, it is argued, is in harmony with the
national labor policy of protecting the right to strike
The logic of the Union's argument requires the conclu-
sion that a resignation of a union member has only a
prospective effect, so that decisions made by the Union
before the resignation continue to bind the former member
who now seeks to repudiate the collective decision he once
accepted It is an argument that cannot be lightly brushed
aside, since it is based on the proposition common in the
law, that one cannot escape one's freely accepted
obligations when the going gets tough However, for more
compelling considerations I must reject the Union's
argument
Section 7 of the Act protects equally the right to engage,
and the right not to engage , in concerted activities including
strikes The same Section also protects the right to resign
from a union 4 just as it does the right to join one When an
employee joins a union he assumes both rights and
obligations with respect to it To say that his obligation (in
this case , to stay out on strike) continues even after he has
effectively resigned would postpone to some indefinite date
beyond his control his right not to strike Further, since
their right to attend union meetings , to vote, and to
influence the union's future course of action as to the strike,
ended with their resignations I believe that their obligations
to the union to support the strike must end then too 5
This is not to say, however, that monetary obligations of
a member to his union which are based on an express or
implied contract between them, may not survive the
member's resignation 6 In the category of possible monetar-
y obligations due the Union by the Charging Parties are the
premiums for group insurance policies which the Union
advanced on their behalf, and the strike benefits which they
received while they remained on strike The suits brought
by the Union in the state courts clearly seek reimbursement
9 See the cases cited in In 9 of the original Decision
a Nex Jersey Bell Telephone Company 106 NLRB 1322 1324 enfd sub
nom Communications Workers of America C/O v N L R B 215 F 2d 835
(C A 2) and Marlin Rockwell Corporation 114 NLRB 553 559-562
5 Scofield v N L R B 394 U S 423 at 430 Under this dual approach
Sec 8(b)(I) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which
reflects a legitimate union interest impairs no polic\ Congress has
for the insurance premiums and possibly also for the strike
benefits The question whether the Charging Parties are
liable for these sums, and the determination of the actual
amounts due are matters over which a state court would
have jurisdiction since they are based on usual contract law
principles, not involving interpretation of the National
Labor Relations Act However, any part of the sums sued
for which are attributable to the fines imposed by the
Union on the Charging Parties after their resignations is, in
my opinion, not collectible through resort to the state
courts, because the Union would thereby be in violation of
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
The remaining contentions which the Union makes can
be disposed of briefly First, it argues that the Charging
Parties failed to exhaust their internal union remedies even
to the extent of failing to appear at the union trials in order
to claim that they had effectively resigned But exhaustion
of internal remedies would only be required of union
members, whereas here all the Charging Parties had
resigned before the Union filed charges against them
Consequently, they were under no obligation to explain or
defend their resignations at a union hearing
Finally, the Union argues that the fines imposed, a day's
pay for each day worked, were not unreasonable I express
no opinion on whether the reasonableness of a union fine
determines the legality of its imposition on members, nor
on whether the amounts sought here are in fact reasonable,
since in my opinion, the Union's imposition of a fine in any
amount on nonmembers and its attempt to seek judicial
enforcement therefor, are violations of Section 8(b)(1)(A)
THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth above,
occurring in connection with the Respondent's activities
described in section I of my original Decision, have a close,
intimate and substantial relation to trade, traffic and
commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce
THE REMEDY
As I have found that the Respondent has violated Section
8(b)(I)(A) of the Act, I will recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom , and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act
Specifically, I will recommend that the Union rescind the
fines it has imposed on the 31 persons named in Appendix
A, change its records to reflect such rescission , take all
necessary action , in the New Hampshire courts where it is
seeking judicial enforcement of its suits against these 31
persons , to withdraw and give up its claims for the fines it
has imposed , and notify the said 31 persons that it has done
all the foregoing
imbedded in the labor laws and is reasonably enforced against union
members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule This seems
to me to mean that a union member must be free to escape the rule
totally in its retrospective as well as its prospective effects
B Communications Workers of America C/O v N L R B 215 F 2d 835,
838 (C A 2)
GRANITE STATE JOINT BOARD 645
On the basis of the foregoing findings and analysis of the
facts, I make the following additional:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
4. The Respondent has restrained and coerced the 31
persons named in Appendix A, all of whom had effectively
resigned their memberships in the Respondent, in the
exercise of their right to resign said memberships and of
their right not to strike against their employer, by imposing
fines on them through its internal procedures, and by
seekingjudicial enforcement of such fines.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Furnish the Regional Director signed copies of such
notice marked Appendix B for posting by International
Paper Box Machine Company, in places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notices,
on forms provided by the Regional Director shall, after
being duly signed by an authorized representative of the
Respondent, be returned forthwith to the Regional
Director for disposition by him.
(g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Supplemental
Decision and Recommended Order what steps it has taken
to comply herewith.8
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in this consolidated case, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, I recommend that Granite State Joint
Board, Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1029,
AFL-CIO, its officers, agents and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Fining or seekingjudicial enforcement of fines against
former members of the Union.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing
its former members in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the fines imposed against the 31 persons
named in Appendix A.
(b) Change all pertinent records to reflect the action
taken to rescind such fines.
(c) Take all necessary action in the courts of the State of
New Hampshire where judicial enforcement for collection
of the fines imposed against the persons named in
Appendix A has been brought, to withdraw and give up all
claims for said fines.
(d) Notify the persons named in Appendix A that it has
taken the actions which have been ordered above.
(e) Post in conspicuous places at its offices and meeting
halls, and other places where notices to its members are
customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked
Appendix B.7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 1, shall, after being duly
signed by an authorized representative of Granite State
Joint Board, Textile Workers Union of America, Local
1029, AFL-CIO, be posted immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
T In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 10246 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided by Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes . In the event
that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "POSTED BY ORDER OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR relations board" shall be changed to read
"POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD"
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read. "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX A
Alonzo Bealand
Roger Bernier
Marcel Berube
Jean Boutin
Eugene Collard
Robert Depontbriand
Leonard Desjardins
Leo Dubois
Aurel Duval
Bernard Francis
Roger Gagne
Adrian Gagnon
Clovis Gamache
Robert Guerrette
Hazen Johnson
Maurice Kimball
Armand Levesque
Peter Makris
Paul Marquis
Ronald Maynard
William Mayo
Franklyn McAlister
Roland Michaud
John Nadeau
Felix Radziewicz
Emilien Riendeau
Robert Roy
Zennie Runowicz
Alfred Theriault
Henry Tremblay
Gerald Tyler
[Appendix B omitted from publication,]