Granite City Journal, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 22, 1982

262 N.L.R.B. 1153 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

GRANITE CITY JOURNAL
Granite City Journal, Inc. and St. Louis Newspaper
Guild, Local 47, TNG, AFL-CIO-CLC. Cases
14-CA-15056 and 14-RC-9416
July 22, 1982
'DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN VAN DE WATER AND
MEMBERS JENKINS AND HUNTER
On November 18, 1981, Administrative Law
Judge Arline Pacht issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions' and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, 2 find-
ings,3 and conclusions 4 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt her recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Granite City
Journal, Inc., Granite City, Illinois, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order.
I No exceptions were filed to the Administrative Law Judge's dismiss-
al of the allegations that Respondent's president and publisher, Sanders,
interrogated and threatened employee Reilly on May 8, 1981.
We hereby correct several inadvertent errors in the Administrative
Law Judge's Decision. Thus, employees Tina Hamilton and Lets Jones
were hired on May 5, not May 7, and Hamilton resigned on May 26, not
May 23. In the Conclusions of Law and Remedy sections of her Deci-
sion, the Administrative Law Judge cited calender year 1980 rather than
1981. We find that none of the foregoing inadvertent errors affects the
propriety of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision on the merits.
s Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing her find-
ings.
4 Chairman van de Water and Member Hunter disavow the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's discussion of Respondent's discharge of three super-
visors and do not rely on these discharges as a basis for our issuing a
bargaining order.
Member Jenkins would, like the Administrative Law Judge, find the
impact of these discharges on employees to be an additional factor war-
ranting the bargaining order herein.
262 NLRB No. 140
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARLINE PACHT, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was heard in St. Louis, Missouri, on September 21, 1981.
The charge in Case 14-CA-15056 filed on June 11, 1981,
as subsequently amended, alleges violations of Section
8(aXl) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act). An election was held on June 25, 1981, to which
timely objections were filed by the St. Louis Newspaper
Guild, Local 47, TNG, AFL-CIO-CLC (hereinafter
called the Union). Thereafter, the Regional Director for
Region 14 issued a supplemental decision and order,
order directing hearing, and order consolidating cases,
thereby consolidating Cases 14-CA-15056 and 14-RC-
9416 for hearing. The remaining unresolved objection to
the election alleges conduct coextensive with the unfair
labor practices in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the complaint.
Respondent denies that it engaged in any unlawful con-
duct.
The parties were given full opportunity to appear, to
introduce evidence, and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
Subsequently, briefs were filed by counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel (hereinafter the General Counsel) and Re-
spondent which have been carefully considered. Upon
the entire record in the case and from my observation of
the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Granite City Journal, Inc., herein called Respondent,
is an Illinois corporation with offices in Granite City, Il-
linois, where it is engaged in the publication, sale, and
distribution of newspapers. During the 12 months ending
May 30, 1981, a representative period, Respondent, in
the course and conduct of its business operations, re-
ceived gross revenues in excess of $200,000 from the
publication and distribution of its newspapers of which
revenues in excess of $50,000 were from advertising
agencies for nationally advertised and sold products
which agencies are located outside the State of Illinois.
In accordance with Section 102.20 of the Board's Rules
and Regulations, and Respondent's admission, I find that
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and in
a business affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
It is admitted and found that the St. Louis Newspaper
Guild, Local 47, TNG, AFL-CIO-CLC, is a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ISSUES
In substance, the consolidated complaint alleges in
paragraphs 5A-S that, between the date the election peti-
tion was filed and the date of the election, Respondent
engaged in various forms of conduct such as threatening
employees with loss of employment, work opportunities,
and discharge; creating the impression that the employ-
ees' union activities were under surveillance; soliciting
grievances and interrogating employees concerning their
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
union sentiments; implying that it would not negotiate
with the Union; and soliciting employees to report on
the union activities and sentiments of other employees in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Paragraph 6 of the complaint further alleges that Re-
spondent made the conditions of Tina Hamilton's em-
ployment intolerable, causing her termination, and did so
because its employees joined, supported, or assisted the
Union and in order to discourage them from engaging in
such activities in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act.
The General Counsel seeks the traditional remedies;
that is, a cease-and-desist order and reinstatement and
backpay for the discriminatee. In addition, he urges that
a bargaining order is needed in this case to remedy the
coercive effects of Respondent's numerous unfair labor
practices, under the standards articulated in N.L.R.B. v.
Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), rehearing
denied 396 U.S. 869.
I111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
The events giving rise to the instant proceeding oc-
curred in the context of an organizational drive begin-
ning on April 29, 1981,1 during which almost all of Re-
spondent's clerical, circulation, and editorial employees
signed union authorization cards. Pursuant to a petition
for an election filed by the Union on May 4, an election
was conducted on June 25, which resulted in six votes
for the Union, seven against, and five ballots cast by per-
sons deemed ineligible to vote by the Regional Director.
B. Acts of Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
The Granite City Journal's publisher and president,
Rod Sanders, apparently did not learn about the cam-
paign until May 5 when an article in another newspaper
announced that the Union had filed a petition for an
election. From the date forward, Sanders embarked on a
search-and-destroy mission aimed at rooting out any
union support among the newspaper's staff.
Evidence of Sander's antipathy to the Union was over-
whelming and uncontradicted. 2 On the day that Sanders
learned of the Union's petition, he told news editor, Wil-
liams, that he felt betrayed, as if he had been stabbed by
20 knives, and that the Donnelly family (holder of 100
percent of the stock in the chain newspapers which in-
cluded the Granite City Journal) would never permit a
union to invade the shop.
C. May 7. Paragraphs 5A-E of the Complaint
On May 7, the day after Tina Hamilton and Leta
Jones were hired as advertising salespersons, Sanders
called them into his office and, after making reference to
a newspaper article discussing the Union's organization
campaign at the Journal, said he could not understand
I Hereinafter, unless otherwise specified, all dates refere to 1981.
2 Sanders was terminated on August 13, under circumstances which
necessitated police assistance. He was succeeded by Daniel Donnelly,
who since July 3 had served as advertising director. Because of the
manner in which Sanders was fired, Respondent alleges it was unable to
obtain his appearance at the instant hearing.
why the employees were doing this for he believed he
had good rapport with them. He assured the women that
his door was always open to them if they had any prob-
lems. He also mentioned that, although he had hired ad-
ditional staff members in anticipation of merging the
Granite Journal with another newspaper, the advent of
the Union had compelled him to put those plans aside.
He further mentioned that two "big wheels" were pri-
marily responsible for promoting the Union, but did not
state whom he had in mind. In the same conversation, he
told Jones and Hamilton that the only persons who
would remain were those who wanted to work for the
paper, but that their jobs were not in jeopardy. He also
advised them that some of the Journal's major business
accounts which were being handled by Advertising Man-
ager David Wachter and advertising salesman Michael
Hildebrand would be opening up and that they should
closely observe whomever they were accompanying on
calls so that they could learn how to handle their ac-
counts. 3
In determining whether statements attributed to Sand-
ers support the unfair labor practices alleged in para-
graphs 5A-E of the complaint, it is important to view
them in context, and to bear in mind that they were di-
rected to the two most recent, and therefore most vul-
nerable, members of Respondent's workforce. Whether
taken in their entirety or in isolation, Sanders' remarks
were intimidating and coercive. When Sanders told the
women that the paper was overstaffed and that plans to
acquire another newspaper had to be shelved because of
the Union's entry on the scene, there could be little
doubt that he intended and did convey a threat of lost
employment or work opportunities. Respondent contends
that Sanders simply made a straightforward announce-
ment of a business decision. Respondent's argument does
not persuade for Sanders' comment was not a reasoned
prediction based on objective facts demonstrating prob-
able consequences outside the employer's control. See
N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Company, supra, 395 U.S. at
617, 619, his was not free speech protected by Section
8(c) of the Act but an unadorned warning of adverse
consequences designed to discourage the employees from
engaging in collective activity.
Sanders' remarks that the only people who would con-
tinue with the paper were those who wished to work
there, coupled with allusions to several large accounts
opening up, were neither ambiguous nor lost on his lis-
teners. Hamilton and Jones understood his message quite
well: those who supported the Union would be terminat-
ed. Hamilton transmitted Sanders' message to Hilde-
brand, who as the principal union activist on the staff,
surely did not keep the information to himself. There are
few threats taken more seriously by employees than
those which affect job security. See N.L.R.B. v. Jamaica
Towing, Inc., 630 F.2d 208, 212-213 (2d Cir. 1980). Ac-
cordingly, threats such as Sanders' are condemned by
Section 8(a)( ) of the Act. Respondent submits that
Sanders' reference to "big wheels" cannot be construed
I Hildebrand had been instrumental in arranging the first organization-
al meeting between the Union's business agent and five other employees.
Wachter had attended this meeting.
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GRANITE CITY JOURNAL
as creating an impression of surveillance for he did not
mention who these big wheels were and, in any event,
could have obtained such information legitimately from
the supervisors who attended the first organizational
meeting on April 29. Respondent ignores the fact that
Sanders learned of the union campaign from a newspaper
article, not from his supervisors. More importantly,
whatever the source of his information, Sanders' state-
ment was made in connection with accounts opening up
and jobs being available only to those who wanted to
remain. Thus, there was implicit in his reference to "big
wheels" a threat of possible future retaliation. Within this
framework, Sanders' statement was calculated to give
the impression of unlawful surveillance.
Under ordinary circumstances, an employer's state-
ment to new employees that his door is always open
could be viewed as fairly innocuous. Here, however,
there was no showing that Sanders customarily main-
tained an open-door policy or at any previous time solic-
ited complaints from individual employees. Given the
entire thrust of Sanders' remarks, and bearing in mind his
future efforts to pry information from these same em-
ployees, I cannot view his invitation as anything but an
attempt to solicit complaints during the sensitive period
when the Union was attempting to establish itself as the
bargaining representative for the employees, and thereby
undermine support for the Union. See Associated Milk
Producers, Inc., 255 NLRB 750 (1981).
Similarly, it could be argued that Sanders' questioning
Hamilton about her union sympathies was so offhand as
to be a mere expression of curiosity. However, in light of
all the attendant circumstances-the newness of the per-
sonnel involved, the timing of the query-just after the
Union's petition was filed, and the fact that this was the
first in a series of interrogations, I find that the question
was coercive and therefore violative of Section 8(a)(l).
D. May 8: Paragraphs 5F-H of the Complaint
On May 8, Sanders called Michael Reilly, county re-
porter and formerly sports editor,4 into his office and
stated, "I guess I really don't have to ask where you
stand do I?" to which Reilly responded, "No, you
don't." Sanders then launched an antiunion diatribe, ac-
cusing unions of having outlived their purpose, and being
communistic. He railed that he would not permit a union
to organize the newspaper and tell him how to run it
thereby destroying what he had been attempting to
achieve. Implying that he was fearful of losing his job,
he said he would do whatever was necessary to save his
career. Although Reilly attempted to assuage him, point-
ing out that matters could be resolved without hostility,
Sanders persisted in his views and concluded the meeting
by accusing the reporter of participating in conduct
which was ruining his life.
Although Sanders' conversation with Reilly illustrates
the dimensions of his union animus, I do not find that his
statements as alleged in paragraphs 5F and H constitute
unfair labor practices. For instance, Sanders' assumption
4 Reilly was uncertain of the date that he ceased functioning as sports
editor. However, the record shows that Richard Bloom succeeded him in
that position on April 27, 2 days before Reilly signed the Union's authori-
zation card.
that he knew where Reilly stood vis-a-vis the Union was
more rhetorical than informational as alleged in para-
graph 5F of the complaint. See N.L.R.B. v. Marsellus
Vault & Sales, Inc., 431 F.2d 933, 937 (2d Cir. 1970).
Further, I find nothing in the record which supports
paragraph 5H that during this conversation Sanders
threatened Reilly with unspecified reprisals. However,
Sanders' assertion that he would not permit a union to
tell him how to run his business is a different matter.
Given the vehemence of his opposition to the Union, it is
reasonable to translate this comment into a warning that
he would resist bargaining. See Mark J. Leach d/b/a
Mark J. Leach Electrical Contractors, 251 NLRB 1100,
1109 (1980).
E. May 12-22.: Paragraphs I-N
On May 12, Sanders again spoke privately to Jones
and Hamilton and asked them to provide him with infor-
mation about what was occurring in the office. On or
about this date, Hamilton complained to Sanders that she
was not receiving adequate training, mentioning in par-
ticular that, on one occasion, when she was accompany-
ing Hildebrand on his business calls, he left her waiting
in the car for 30 minutes while he visited an attorney's
office. She also told Sanders that Hildebrand suggested
that he could include visits on her worksheets which, in
fact, were not made.
On May 14, Union Business Agent Steinke met with
virtually all of the employees after work. He again ex-
plained that the purpose of the membership cards was to
designate the Union as their collective-bargaining repre-
sentative as well as to obtain an election.
On arriving home after the meeting, Jones learned that
Sanders had telephoned her. On returning his call, Sand-
ers asked if she had attended the meeting and which of
the other employees had been there. He then reported on
what various employees had said and asked her to verify
his information. For example, he asked whether it was
true that Hildebrand had posed questions the entire eve-
ning, and particularly probed her as to what Crider,
Wachter, and Gibson had said. He concluded by asking
if there were anything more she would like to add.
Over the next several weeks, Sanders called both
Jones and Hamilton at their homes frequently. As Jones
recalled, his inquiries during the calls were focused on
finding out what others might have said about him.
On May 15, Sanders also called Hamilton at her home
and asked her to observe whether Hildebrand was accu-
rately reporting calls on his worksheets. Several days
later, Sanders assigned Hamilton to work with Hilde-
brand on a permanent basis and again urged her to keep
tabs on him and to determine whether his reports were
precise. For the balance of that week, Sanders tele-
phoned Hamilton at home and persisted in inquiring
whether Hildebrand was falsifying any entries on his
worksheets although Hamilton assured Sanders he was
not. Hamilton disclosed Sanders' requests to Hildebrand.
Extended discussion and analysis of Sanders' state-
ments is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that he was
guilty of the conduct alleged in paragraphs 5I through N
of the complaint.
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In defense to the allegation in paragraph 51 that Sand-
ers solicited employees to engage in unlawful surveil-
lance, Respondent submits that Sanders simply was re-
sponding as any prudent business man would to informa-
tion about Hildebrand's unprofessional conduct. Howev-
er, it would be naive to regard Sanders' request as if it
were made in a vacuum ignoring Hildebrand's role as the
Union's principal inhouse proponent. When taken togeth-
er with Sanders' earlier insinuation that several of Hilde-
brand's accounts would become available, made before
any adverse comments about the salesman had come to
Sanders' attention, these requests for surveillance plainly
were aimed at obtaining any information which could be
used to purge Hildebrand from Respondent's ranks be-
cause of his union activity. As such, Respondent was en-
gaged in conduct which is proscribed by Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. See Maywood. Inc., 251 NLRB 979, 985
(1980).
The allegations in paragraphs 5J, K, and L stem from
the May 14 telephone conversation between Sanders and
Jones which took place after the union meeting on the
same evening. In asking Jones' opinion of the Union and
its business agent, Sanders was engaged in prohibited in-
terrogation. By describing what had occurred at the
meeting, Sanders again left the unmistakable impression
that he had engaged in surveillance. See Hoover Indus-
tries, 240 NLRB 593, 606 (1979). And by urging Jones to
confirm what had occurred and to report any additional
information, Sanders was engaged in the rankest sort of
interrogation.
F. May 23: Paragraphs Q-S of the Complaint
On May 22, Jones accused Hamilton of having warned
other employees to avoid her because she was spying on
them for Sanders. Although Hamilton denied doing so, a
serious argument ensued. At the end of the workday,
Jones quit.
The next morning, Sanders invited Hamilton to ac-
company him while he ostensibly made business calls. In-
stead, he drove aimlessly around town for 1-1/2 hours
questioning Hamilton about her contretemps with Jones.
Sanders first asked Hamilton if she had in fact told her
coworkers that Jones was an informer and again queried
her as to whether Hildebrand was doctoring his work-
sheets. He then warned that her job was in jeopardy and
moments later asked her to supply him with information
about the activities of other employees.
Hamilton called her supervisor, Wachter, at the end of
the day and resigned, explaining that she could no longer
withstand the pressures that Sanders was imposing, by
insisting that she spy on her fellow employees.
There can be no doubt that when Sanders warned
Hamilton that her job was at stake and linked this threat
with another request to engage in surveillance of her co-
workers, Sanders was continuing a course of unlawful
conduct which began on the day he learned of union ac-
tivity at the Journal.
As culpable as Sanders was of the many unlawful acts
ascribed to him, I find no support in the record for the
allegation in paragraph 5S that he interrogated Hamilton
concerning the union sentiments and activities of other
employees. In asking Hamilton whether she had in-
formed other staff members that Jones was serving as his
spy, Sanders seemed more interested in finding out how
he was regarded by the employees than in probing their
union sentiments.
G. June I and 2. Paragraphs O-P
A day or so after Jones quit, Sanders called, urging
her to return and promising that the atmosphere would
be more relaxed. Despite these promises, when Jones re-
sumed working on June 1, Sanders asked her to accom-
pany Wachter on his business calls and to familiarize her-
self with his accounts. The next day, Sanders telephoned
her to ask whether Wachter was falsifying his timesheets.
These phone inquiries continued on virtually a daily
basis although Sanders had no legitimate business reason
to put Wachter under surveillance. During one of these
calls, Sanders mentioned that it was unlawful for him to
solicit information. Notwithstanding this acknowledg-
ment, he asked if there were anything she wished to tell
him. Jones resigned again on June 7.
Disregarding his assurances to Jones that she would
return to a less stressful situation, he sought to pry infor-
mation from her and directed her to spy on Watcher,
whom he apparently suspected of being involved in
union activity. By so doing, Sanders again was trying to
use Jones as his instrument in an unlawful cause in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1).
Jones' refusal to spy for Sanders did not deter him. On
June 8, three supervisors, Williams, Wachter, and Reilly,
each of whom had signed union authorization cards,
were terminated by Sanders. 5 The reason which Sanders
assigned for the terminations was patently pretextual:
they had failed to report employee morale problems to
him.
H. Hamilton's Constructive Discharge
As described above, in the weeks following her hire,
Hamilton received incessant phone calls from Sanders
during which he interrogated her about her own union
sympathies and entreated her to spy on her coworkers.
Finally, on May 23, he accused Hamilton of causing
Jones to suffer a nervous breakdown by alienating her
from other employees and then threatened to discharge
her. Hamilton quit less than a month after she was em-
ployed because, as she testified, she no longer could cope
with the pressures Sanders was imposing upon her.
The Board has held that where an employee elects to
quit because an event or requirement imposes upon him
"an onerous or burdensome choice between remaining in
employment or acceding to his employer's request and
such event is generated by an employer's union animus"
a termination under such circumstances will be regarded
as a constructive discharge. John Dory Boat Works. Inc.,
229 NLRB 844, 850-851 (1972).
In the present case, although Sanders' persistent re-
quests to Hamilton initially were designed to interfere
with the union activities of those upon whom she was to
spy, it was she who became the first victim of his unlaw-
I Shortly before that date, Reilly had resumed his position as sports
editor.
1156
GRANITE CITY JOURNAL
ful conduct. For a number of weeks, Hamilton withstood
the almost daily pressures Sanders created. However, on
May 23, these pressures reached a crescendo. Hamilton
reasonably could infer from Sanders' comments that he
had become suspicious of her own union predilections
and was conditioning her continued employment on her
willingness to spy on her fellow employees. The choice
which Sanders' offered would have been intolerable to
the most resilient of employees. Given these options, it
cannot be said that Hamilton relinquished her post vol-
untarily; rather, she was driven away. Indeed, her resig-
nation may be viewed as a means of protesting Sanders'
unlawful conduct. See Fidelity Telephone Company, 236
NLRB 166, 175 (1978). Accordingly, I conclude that Re-
spondent constructively discharged Hamilton in violation
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
I. The Union's Card Majority
In Gissel Packing Co., Inc., supra at 614, the Supreme
Court sanctioned reliance on authorization cards as an
indicia of employee support and as a basis for issuance of
a bargaining order where there was a showing that the
Union had attained a majority and, thereafter, the em-
ployer engaged in unfair labor practices which "have the
tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the
election process." Accordingly, it is necessary to deter-
mine next whether the Union enjoyed the support of a
majority of employees in the bargaining unit on or
before the date that it filed its petition for an election.
By May 7, the date on which Respondent became
aware of the Union's organizational drive and com-
menced a countercampaign of its own, only 3 of the 18
employees in the bargaining unit had not signed the dual-
purpose cards which admittedly served as both member-
ship applications and designations of the Union as the
employees' bargaining representative.
Respondent argues that all but four of the cards are
tainted and may not be relied on to establish the Union's
majority. I disagree and find that the Union had more
than majority support when it filed the petition for an
election.
At the outset, Respondent submits that four of the
cards signed at the April 29 meeting with the Union's
business agent must be discounted because they were
signed in the presence of two supervisors, Wachter and
Reilly. Wachter was, by stipulation, a supervisor within
the meaning of the Act. However, limited supervisory
involvement in organizational activity is insufficient to
vitiate the validity of a union's card majority unless there
is a showing of substantial supervisory intervention de-
signed to intimidate those who sign. See La Mousse, Inc.,
259 NLRB 37 (1981). No such showing was made here.
Further, the record establishes that Reilly had been a
sports editor until April 27, but on the date he signed a
card was a statutory employee included in the bargaining
unit. Therefore, neither Reilly's card nor the cards which
he solicited from Alice Gibson and Georgeann McGee
are invalid.
Charlotte Crider was a director of the corporation in
name only, exercising no managerial or supervisory func-
tions. Thus, she, too, was properly included in the bar-
gaining unit. She claimed, however, that Steinke did not
read the membership card at the April 29 meeting and
that she was led to believe it was to be used to obtain an
election. James DeCourcey and Michael Carty also
stated that they signed cards without reading them and
on the assurance of employees Hildebrand and Jones that
they were to be used to seek an election.
Crider may not have recalled that Steinke read the
card at the meeting, but other employees did. Moreover,
it is unlikely that an experienced business agent like
Steinke would have failed to explain the card's purposes.
Therefore, I credit Steinke's account and conclude that
Crider signed the card after being adequately apprised of
its potential uses. Further, Respondent acknowledged
that the cards are clear and unambiguous on their face. It
is difficult to believe that employees working for a news-
paper, an occupation which presumably calls for a
degree of literateness, would ignore or fail to appreciate
the contents of the cards they were signing. What is
more, these three employees attended a union meeting on
May 14 at which the purpose of the card again was ex-
plained. In light of these factors, I decline to discount
the cards of Crider, DeCourcey, or Carty.
Pam Moran testified that she initially understood she
was signing a membership card in the Union, but then
was somewhat confused when Hildebrand told her it was
for an election. It was apparent from Moran's testimony
that she was willing to designate the Union as her bar-
gaining agent prior to Hildebrand's remarks, and, if any
doubt as to the card's purpose lingered, it was cured by
the explanation Steinke offered at the May 14 meeting
which she attended.
Only one challenged card bearing the signature of em-
ployee Randy Hillis was not properly authenticated, and
therefore will be excluded from the cards relied upon to
support the Union's claimed majority. Accordingly, I
conclude that on May 7, 1980, the Union had validly
signed cards from 14 of the 18 employees then in the
unit.
J. A Bargaining Order Is Warranted
The final question which remains is whether Respond-
ent's unfair labor practices in the aggregate warrant issu-
ance of a remedial bargaining order. Even where, as
here, an election has been held, it may be set aside and a
bargaining order granted where objectionable conduct
has invalidated the proceeding, and the effects of that
conduct cannot be disspelled by traditional remedies. 7
Applying the principles set forth in Gissel, I conclude
that "The possibility of erasing the effects of past prac-
tices and of ensuring a fair election . . . is slight and that
employee sentiment once expressed through cards
would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining
order .... " Id. at 614-615.
Respondent argues that, if it committed unfair labor
practices, they were so insignificant as to have no delete-
rious effect on the election process. Respondent would
be correct if only a few isolated incidents of improper
conduct occurred. But that was not the case here.
6 Irving Air Chute Company. Inc., 149 NLRB 627 (1964); American Dis-
play Manufacturing Co., Inc., 259 NLRB 21 (1981).
7 N.LR.BR -. Gissel Packing Ca.. supra at 614,
1157
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Within 2 days after the union campaign commenced,
well over a majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit signed authorization cards. As soon as Respondent's
president learned of the Union's support, he began
waging a campaign to interfere with the employees' free
choice. Throughout the next month, Sanders engaged in
repeated acts of interrogation, threatened employees with
a loss of job opportunities and discharge, created the im-
pression of surveillance, pressured employees to spy on
one another, and, finally, badgered an employee to quit.
Less than 2 months after the organizational drive began,
the Union lost the election by two votes.
Respondent attempts to minimize the impact of its un-
lawful practices by pointing out that Sanders' attack was
waged directly upon just a few employees. However, in
a small shop like the Journal, where the employees en-
joyed an informal working relationship, Sanders' conduct
could hardly remain secret.
If there was any employee who failed to receive Re-
spondent's message directly, no doubt remained when
three supervisors who were supportive of the Union
were discharged shortly before the election, for reasons
which hardly disguised the true antiunion motive
prompting them. The abrupt departure of the supervisors
could not have gone unnoticed and had to leave incalcu-
lable wounds upon those who remained.
Respondent further urges that because Sanders was the
sole malfeasor and was replaced by a new president, a
cease-and-desist order is all that is required. However,
Respondent is not absolved of responsibility for Sanders'
acts by virtue of his discharge. s Surely, the Donnelly
family, owners of the newspaper chain of which the
Granite City Journal is a member, was aware that a
union election was pending. It is inconceivable that they
were not advised at least as to when and why three su-
pervisors were summarily terminated. In light of the
abundant evidence of Sanders' wrongdoing, if Respond-
ent wished to disassociate itself from his actions, it could
have taken such steps as issuing reassurances to its em-
ployees publicly condemning his practices or offering re-
instatement to the employees wrongly discharged. The
Supreme Court's reasoning as to why a bargaining order
may be needed even where an employer's unfair labor
practices have ceased is particularly apt here:
[A] bargaining order is designed as much to remedy
past election damage as it is to deter future miscon-
duct. If an employer has succeeded in undermining
a union's strength and destroying the laboratory
conditions necessary for a fair election, he may see
no need to violate a cease and desist order by fur-
ther unlawful activity. The damage will have been
done, and perhaps the only fair way to effectuate
employee rights is to reestablish the conditions as
they existed before the employer's unlawful [con-
duct].9
Damage has been done. Respondent's conduct did un-
dermine the Union's majority status and negated the pos-
sibility that a free and fair election could be held under
the requisite laboratory conditions. There is no other ex-
' Respondent offered no explanation for Sanders' termination.
9 Gissel Packing Co.. supra, 395 U.S. at 612.
planation for the abrupt change of mind of those employ-
ees who supported the Union at the end of April and
then voted against the Union less than 2 months later.
In addition, Respondent submits that there has been
substantial turnover among its employees, suggesting that
the issuance of a bargaining order would deprive the
current work force of its right to exercise a free choice
through the election process. The record is unclear as to
the precise number of employees originally in the bar-
gaining unit who subsequently were transferred, promot-
ed, discharged, or quit. However, it appears that a core
of employees who were part of the Union's initial major-
ity remain in Respondent's employ and have not sought
to withdraw their membership-authorization cards. Even
assuming there was evidence of significant turnover,
Board precedent dictates that I give it little or no
weight. Justak Brothers and Company, Inc., 253 NLRB
1054 (1980). To take such a factor into account would
merely afford "an added inducement to the employer to
indulge in unfair labor practices in order to defeat the
union in an election. He will have as an ally, in addition
to the attrition of union support inevitably springing
from delay in accomplishing results, the fact that turn-
over itself will help him, so that the longer he can hold
out the better his chances of victory will be." Justak
Brothers, supra, quoting N.L.R.B. v. L. B. Foster Co., 418
F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 990
(1970). In sum, I conclude that, in light of the nature and
number of Respondent's unfair labor practices, the elec-
tion should be set aside and that a bargaining order
should issue retroactive to May 7 to remedy the unfair
labor practices found herein.' °
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following employees of Respondent constitute a
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of the Act:
All employees employed by Granite City Journal,
Inc. at its Granite City, Illinois, facility, including
office clerical, advertising, inside circulation and ed-
itorial employees, excluding professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
4. Commencing on or about May 4, 1980, and continu-
ing thereafter, the Union was designated by a majority of
Respondent's employees in the above-described unit as
their exclusive bargaining representative within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
lo Where, as here, the Union has made no demand for bargaining, the
Board has tied the effective date of the order to the date on which the
employer initiated its campaign of unfair labor practices, if on that date
the Union had majority support. Rodewoy Inn of Las Vegas, 252 NLRB
344, fn 3 (1980). The record shows in the present case that the Union
attained majority status no later than May 4, the date it filed its election
petition, and that Respondent's unlawful conduct commenced on or
about May 7.
1158
GRANITE CITY JOURNAL
5. Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by coer-
cively interrogating employees concerning their union
activities or sentiments, or the union activities or senti-
ments of other employees; creating the impression that
the employees' union activities were under surveillance;
soliciting grievances from employees; implying that it
will not negotiate with the Union; soliciting employees
to inform on the union activities of their coworkers; and
threatening employees with discharge, loss of employ-
ment or work opportunities for engaging in union activi-
ties.
6. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by constructively discharging employee Tina Hamil-
ton on May 26, 1980.
7. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by engaging in the conduct described in paragraphs
5F, H, and S of the complaint.
8. By its violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act, as summarized above, Respondent has engaged in
objectionable conduct as averred in Objection I and has
thereby invalidated the election conducted on June 25,
1980, and prevented a free and fair reelection. Therefore,
to best serve the purposes of the Act, is required to rec-
ognize and bargain with the Union as of May 7, 1980,
the date on which Respondent embarked on a course of
conduct which interfered with, coerced, and restrained
its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed
under Section 7 of the Act.
The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the purposes and policies of the
Act. Because Respondent committed numerous unfair
labor practices as found herein, I also shall recommend
that Respondent cease and desist from in any manner in-
terfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act and bargain upon request with the employees' desig-
nated collective-bargaining representative, St. Louis
Newspaper Guild, Local 47, TNG, AFL-CIO-CLC.
In addition, Respondent will be required to offer Tina
Hamilton immediate and full reinstatement to the job of
which she was unlawfully deprived, or, if such job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position with-
out prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privi-
leges previously enjoyed. Further, Respondent will be
ordered to make Hamilton whole forthwith for any loss
of pay she may have suffered by reason of her discharge
on May 26, 1980, to the date of Respondent's offer to re-
instate her, less any net earnings during that period, cal-
culated in accordance with the Board's formula set forth
in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with
interest as called for in Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977).
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER "
The Respondent, Granite City Journal, Inc., Granite
City, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees with discharge, loss of em-
ployment, or work opportunities or otherwise threaten-
ing to discriminate against any employee for engaging in
union activities.
(b) Coercively interrogating employees concerning
their union membership, activities, or sentiments or those
of other employees; or requesting employees to report on
the union activities of others.
(c) Giving employees the impression that their union
activities are under surveillance.
(d) Suggesting that employees present their grievances
for resolution.
(e) Warning employees that, if they choose to be rep-
resented by a bargaining representative, Respondent will
not negotiate with it.
(f) Harassing any employee in an attempt to compel
the employee to report on the union activities of fellow
employees.
(g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed them under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Tina Hamilton immediate and full reinstate-
ment to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to
a substantially equivalent position of employment, with-
out prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privi-
leges previously enjoyed, and make her whole for any
loss of earnings incurred by her as a result of her unlaw-
ful termination, with interest thereon to be computed in
accordance with the formula set forth in Florida Steel
Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977), and Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
(b) Recognize and, upon request, bargain collectively
and in good faith with St. Louis Newspaper Guild,
Local 47, TNG, AFL-CIO-CLC, as exclusive repre-
sentative of the employees in the bargaining unit de-
scribed below, with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, and, if an under-
standing is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement. The appropriate unit is:
All employees employed by Granite City Journal,
Inc. at its Granite City, Illinois, facility, including
office clerical, advertising, inside circulation and ed-
itorial employees, excluding professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
Ad In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes
1159
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post as its Granite City, Illinois, facility copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 14, after being duly signed by Respondent's rep-
resentative, shall be posted by it immediately upon re-
ceipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply therewith.
" In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to
present evidence and state their positions, the National
Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has or-
dered us to post this notice.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To organize themselves
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain as a group through a representative
they choose
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
To refuse to do any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with dis-
charge, loss of employment or work opportunities,
or otherwise discriminate against any employee for
engaging in union activities.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees
as to their union sympathies or activities, or those
others, nor ask employees to report on the union ac-
tivities of their coworkers.
WE WILL NOT give employees the impression
that their union activities are under surveillance.
WE WILL NOT suggest that employees present
grievance to us for resolution.
WE WILL NOT warn employees that if they
choose to be represented by a bargaining repre-
sentative we will not negotiate with it.
WE WILL NOT harass any employee in an attempt
to compel that employee to report on the union ac-
tivities of other employees.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with
the right of our employees to engage in organiza-
tional or collective activity or to refrain from such
activities.
WE WILL offer Tina Hamilton immediate and full
reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job, with-
out prejudice to her seniority or other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed; and WE WILL make
her whole for any loss of earnings she may have
suffered by reason of our discrimination against her,
plus interest.
WE WILL, upon request, recognize and bargain
with St. Louis Newspaper Guild, Local 46, TNG,
AFL-CIO-CLC, as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the bargaining unit described
below, with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement. The appropriate unit is:
All employees employed by Granite City Jour-
nal, Inc. at its Granite City, Illinois, facility, in-
cluding office clerical, advertising, inside circula-
tion and editorial employees, excluding profes-
sional employees, guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
GRANITE CITY JOURNAL, INC.
1160