Google LLCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 3, 20212020001978 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 3, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/628,093 02/20/2015 Eileen Margaret Peters Long 0715150.320-US1 4979 104433 7590 08/03/2021 Byrne Poh LLP/Google LLC 11 Broadway Ste 760 New York, NY 10004 EXAMINER ALMANI, MOHSEN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2159 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/03/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): info@byrnepoh.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte EILEEN MARGARET PETERS LONG, JONATHAN FRANKLE, WILL CHAMBERS, JIA WU, CHARLES THOMAS CURRY, MATTHIAS HEILER, RUBEN SIPOS, CHRISTOPHER KENNETH HAULK, ANGELA YU-YUN YEUNG, and INGRID KARIN VON GLEHN ___________ Appeal 2020-001978 Application 14/628,093 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, JAMES B. ARPIN, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges. STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3–10, 12–19, and 21–27, all of the pending claims. Appeal Br. 3.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Google LLC. Appeal Br. 3. 2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed August 26, 2019); the Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed March 14, 2019), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed November 7, 2019); and the Specification (“Spec.,” filed February 20, 2015). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s findings and Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to these documents. Appeal 2020-001978 Application 14/628,093 2 We affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE The claimed devices, computer-implemented methods, and methods relate to “methods, systems, and media for presenting search results.” Spec. ¶ 1. The Specification describes a need to provide parental control of a child’s access to inappropriate content by providing parents with the ability to limit a child’s ability “to view results from search queries that may result in mature content (e.g., violent content, sexual content, profanity, drug use, etc.).” Id. ¶ 2. Thus, “[i]n some embodiments [of the invention], . . . mechanisms . . . can receive a search query from a user device, and can determine if the search query is to be blocked based on information related to search results retrieved in connection with the search query.” Id. ¶ 28. “In some embodiments, in response to determining that the search query is not to be blocked, the mechanisms can identify a subset of search results to be presented.” Id. ¶ 30. As noted above, claims 1, 3–10, 12–19, and 21–27 are pending. Claims 1, 10, and 19 are independent. Appeal Br. 15 (claim 1), 17–18 (claim 10), 20 (claim 19) (Claims App.). Claims 3–9 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1, claims 12–18 depend directly or indirectly from claim 10, and claims 21–27 depend directly from claim 19. Id. at 15–22. Claim 1, reproduced below with a disputed limitation emphasized, is illustrative. 1. A method for presenting search results, comprising: receiving text corresponding to a search query entered on a user device; determining whether a content rating score associated with the search query is below a predetermined threshold value, Appeal 2020-001978 Application 14/628,093 3 wherein the predetermined threshold value is determined based on a number of words included in the search query and wherein the score is calculated by: identifying a first plurality of search results retrieved using the search query, wherein each search result in the first plurality of search results is associated with one of a plurality of content ratings classes; determining, for each search result in the first plurality of search results, a weight, wherein the weight is determined based on a popularity of the search result; and calculating the content rating score that is a proportion of search results associated with at least one of the content ratings classes among the first plurality of search results, wherein the proportion of search results associated with at least one of the content ratings classes is calculated using the weight associated with each search result; in response to determining that the content rating score is below the predetermined threshold value, identifying a second plurality of search results to be presented based on the search query; and causing the second plurality of search results to be presented on the user device. Id. at 15 (emphases added). Each of independent claims 10 and 19 recites limitations corresponding to the disputed limitations of claim 1. Id. at 17– 18, 20. REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following references: Name3 Reference Published Filed Rose US 5,870,740 Feb. 9, 1999 Sept. 30, 1996 Dutta US 2002/0078045 Al June 20, 2002 Dec. 14, 2000 Parthasarathy US 2012/0150850 Al June 14, 2012 Dec. 8, 2010 3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only. Appeal 2020-001978 Application 14/628,093 4 Name3 Reference Published Filed Johnson US 2016/0110460 Al Apr. 21, 2016 Oct. 21, 2014 The Examiner rejects:4 a. claims 1, 3–8, 10, 12–17, 19, and 21–265 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Parthasarathy, Rose, and Dutta (Final Act. 4–9); and b. claims 9, 18, and 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Parthasarathy, Rose, Dutta, and Johnson (id. at 9–12). We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light of the contentions and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). The Examiner and Appellant focus their findings and contentions on claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 11–13; Ans. 3–9); so do we. Arguments not made are forfeited.6 Unless otherwise indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office Action and the Answer as our 4 A rejection of claims 1, 10, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (Final Act. 2– 3) is withdrawn. Ans. 3. 5 Although omitted from the listing of rejected claims appearing at page 4 of the Final Action, claims 25 and 26 are encompassed within this rejection as detailed in the Examiner’s narrative at pages 8–9. 6 See In re Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“We interpret the Patent Office to be arguing that Google’s failure to raise its lexicography arguments, inadvertent or not, compels a finding of forfeiture.”); 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018) (“Except as provided for in §§ 41.41, 41.47 and 41.52, any arguments or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be refused consideration by the Board for purposes of the present appeal.”). Appeal 2020-001978 Application 14/628,093 5 own and add any additional findings of fact for emphasis. We address the rejections below. ANALYSIS As noted above, the Examiner rejects claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings of Parthasarathy, Rose, and Dutta. Final Act. 4–9. In particular, the Examiner finds Parthasarathy teaches or suggests the majority of the limitations recited in claim 1. Id. at 4–6 (citing Parthasarathy ¶¶ 19– 21, 24, 35, 40, 42, 43, 50, Fig. 3B (item 380)). The Examiner finds, however, “Parthasarathy does not specifically disclose the predetermined threshold is based on a number of words included in the search query,” as recited in claim 1. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted). Nevertheless, the Examiner finds Rose teaches or suggests this missing limitation (the “disputed limitation”). Id. (citing Rose, 4:28–54). The Examiner further finds: Parthasarathy, ¶ 2 discloses that “when determining whether a search query is intended to produce adult content, the search query may be analyzed to determine whether the search query is associated with adult content”; it would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to combine the applied references for disclosing the predetermined threshold is based on a number of words included in the search query because analyzing a query for determining the query length and using the query length as a threshold is very well known in the art and doing so would further provide for assigning weight to a long or a short query for retrieving relevant documents (Rose, col. 4, ll. 28- 54.). Id. (emphasis added, bolding omitted). Acknowledging the combination of Parthasarathy and Rose is still deficient in that it “does not specifically disclose the weight is determined Appeal 2020-001978 Application 14/628,093 6 based on a popularity of the search result,” the Examiner finds Dutta teaches or suggests this missing, but non-disputed, limitation. Id. (citing Dutta ¶ 55 (emphasis omitted)). The Examiner reasons one skilled in the art would have had reason to modify Parthasarathy to include Dutta’s weighting factor “because doing so would provide for a well-known alternative which depends on a design choice for ranking the search result and selecting from the ranked search result for further processing.” Id. at 6–7. Therefore, the Examiner finds that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Parthasarathy, Rose, and Dutta to achieve the method recited in claim 1. Id. Appellant contends the Examiner fails to show that, when properly interpreted, Rose teaches the disputed limitation of determining whether a content rating score associated with the search query is below a predetermined threshold value, wherein the predetermined threshold value is determined based on a number of words included in the search query. Appeal Br. 11. According to Appellant, Rose describes an information retrieval system wherein, rather than a threshold value, a ranking score of a document is increased based on a query length, “such that ‘the contribution of coordination to the relevance-ranking score is greater for short queries than for long queries.’” Id. at 12 (quoting Rose 4:28–39). Appellant agues, as follows: Appellant respectfully submits that the Examiner is improperly interpreting the “predetermined threshold value” recited in Appellant’s claim 1 as a mere score. In particular, Appellant respectfully submits that a threshold value, as clearly indicated in Appellant’s claim 1, is a value to which a different score is compared (“in response to determining that the content rating score is below the predetermined Appeal 2020-001978 Application 14/628,093 7 threshold value,” as recited in Appellant’s claim 1) to determine if a particular action is to occur (“identifying a second plurality of search results to be presented based on the search query,” as recited in Appellant’s claim 1). Therefore, Appellant respectfully submits that the score described in Rose is simply not “a threshold value,” as recited in Appellant’s claim 1, because the score described in Rose is not a value to which a different score is compared. Id. at 12–13. Thus, according to Appellant, “at most, the combination of Parthasarathy and Rose describe increasing a score by an amount dependent on a query length, not determining whether a score is below a value, where the value itself is determined based on a number of words included in the search query.” Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner responds, a configurable threshold value in Parthasarathy influences a selection of the same document in response to a query; the value that is calculated based on a number of words included in the search query in Rose also influences a selection of the same document based on the query length/a number of words included in the search query: col. 6, ll. 45–47, “If the query length is short, and the coordination level is high, then the boost to the relevance- ranking score is high”, col. 6, ll. 54–56, “If the query length is long, and the coordination level is high, then the boost to the relevance-ranking score is low”. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art to use the technique of calculating a value based on the number of words in a query and use the value as the configurable threshold to which a different score is compared in Parthasarathy to achieve the predictable result of influencing the selection of a document in search results for presentation. Ans. 6–7 (emphasis added). We agree with the Examiner. Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of Examiner error. Parthasarathy discloses selectable threshold settings used to determine Appeal 2020-001978 Application 14/628,093 8 whether search results include adult content with corresponding degrees of confidence. See, e.g., Parthasarathy ¶ 40. Although Rose discloses increasing a search result score based on query length, rather than decreasing a threshold value to which the score is compared; we agree with the Examiner that, in view of Parthasarathy’s thresholds, one skilled in the art would have had reason to modify Parthasarathy’s threshold values to take into account query length as taught by Rose. Thus, Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because it fails to address the Examiner’s finding that selection of documents based on query length as taught by Rose in combination with Parthasarathy’s threshold selection based on safety settings teaches or suggests the disputed limitation requiring determining a threshold value based on a number of words included in the search query. That is, Appellant’s argument improperly attacks the Rose reference individually when the rejection is based on the combined teachings of Parthasarathy and Rose. “Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.” In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)). For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting independent claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings of Parthasarathy, Rose, and Dutta; and we sustain that rejection. Further, Appellant does not challenge the obviousness rejections of independent claims 10 and 19 or of dependent claims 3–9, 12–18, or 21–27, separately. See Appeal Br. 13. Thus, we also sustain the rejections of those claims. DECISION 1. The Examiner does not err in rejecting: Appeal 2020-001978 Application 14/628,093 9 a. claims 1, 3–8, 10, 12–17, 19, and 21–26 as obvious over the combined teachings of Parthasarathy, Rose, and Dutta; and b. claims 9, 18, and 27 as obvious over the combined teachings of Parthasarathy, Rose, Dutta, and Johnson. 2. Thus, on this record, claims 1, 3–10, 12–19, and 21–27 are not patentable. CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 3–10, 12–19, and 21–27. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3–8, 10, 12– 17, 19, 21–26 103 Parthasarathy, Rose, Dutta 1, 3–8, 10, 12–17, 19, 21–26 9, 18, 27 103 Parthasarathy, Rose, Dutta, Johnson 9, 18, 27 Overall Outcome 1, 3–10, 12– 19, 21–27 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation