Google Inc.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 31, 20212020005440 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/646,909 07/11/2017 Eric M. Lunt 16113-0966002 4200 26192 7590 03/31/2021 FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. PO BOX 1022 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022 EXAMINER HOAR, COLLEEN A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3621 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/31/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PATDOCTC@fr.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ERIC M. LUNT and BRENT HILL ____________ Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,9091 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges. FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examinerâs decision to reject claims 2â22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). SUMMARY OF DECISION We reverse and enter a new ground of rejection (37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)). 1 âAppellantâ refers to âapplicantâ as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies âGoogle LLCâ as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 2 THE INVENTION Appellant states that its invention relates to â[a] system and method for managing advertisements in a syndicated feed.â Spec. 13. Claim 2, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 2. A method, comprising: receiving, by one or more computers, requests from a user device for a content item to populate a content item slot of an electronic content element of a web page; while content of the electronic content element is less than a threshold age, identifying the content item slot as an unexpired content item slot; when content of the electronic content element exceeds the threshold age, identifying the content item slot as an expired content item slot; responding to each of the requests based on a status of the content item slot when the request is received, including: providing a blank content item to populate the content item slot without requiring the user device to render the blank content item for the requests that are received when the content item slot is identified as an expired content item slot; and providing a different content item that is selected based on characteristics of the user or user device rather than the blank content item for the requests that are received when the content item slot is identified as an unexpired content item slot. Appeal Br. 11 (Claims Appendix). THE REJECTION The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability: Jacobs US 2001/0034763 A1 Oct. 25, 2001 Huber US 2005/0137958 A1 June 23, 2005 Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 3 The following rejections are before us for review. Claims 2â22 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Huber, or in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Huber in view of Jacobs. ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)/102(b) REJECTION Each of independent claims 2, 9, 16, and 22 recites, in pertinent part, and in one form or another, while content of the electronic content element is less than a threshold age, identifying the content item slot as an unexpired content item slot; when content of the electronic content element exceeds the threshold age, identifying the content item slot as an expired content item slot. The Examiner found that Huber discloses this limitation at: âabstract; Fig. 10, 1014, Fig. 20, 2006, 2008; Fig. 21, 2016; Fig. 23, 2300; Fig. 24, 2400, 2418; and âabstract; Fig. 20, 2002, 2006, 2008; Fig. 25, 2501, 2501; Fig. 27, 2702; Para 94.â Final Act. 3. The Examiner also explains: The blank advertisement is defined as âThe typical blank advertisement consists of a single pixel that is not readily viewable by the user and not readily clicked on by the user. In other embodiments, an expiration message is passed to the user rather than a blank ad. For the purposes of this document, the term âblank adâ encompasses images not perceivable or barely perceivable by a user and expiration messages. [Para 40] of Spec. Ans. 5â6. Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 4 Appellant argues: In other words, advertisers can select available blank spaces in a program, e.g., those spaces that are not already occupied by advertisements, as the spaces in which they present their advertisement. There is no suggestion of any of Huberâs blank spaces as being expired, and no discussion of the age of the spaces, as discussed in more detail below. Appeal Br. 4. Based on the foregoing, Huberâs blank spaces are simply spaces that are available for purchase by advertisers to present content. (See at least Huber at [0087], [0101], [0128]). In contrast, the claims of the present application specify that âwhen content of the electronic content element exceeds the threshold age, identifying the content item slot as an expired content item slotâ and âproviding a blank content item to populate the content item slot without requiring the user device to render the blank content item for the requests that are received when the content item slot is identified as an expired content item slot,â as recited in claim 2 (emphasis added). The claims of the present application provide the blank content item when the content item slot is identified as an expired content item slot. Appeal Br. 5â6. We agree with Appellant. At best, paragraph 94 of Huber discloses: â[t]he identified object or blank space (within the video stream) may be compared to objects, classes of objects or blank spaces listed as attributes within the aforementioned database. Once a matching actual object or blank space is found, an appropriate embedded ad is chosen and applied to the embedded ad space within the video stream.â But, this disclosure states nothing about using a threshold age to filter content. Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 5 The Specification describes âthreshold ageâ as essentially an expiration date for the advertisement: Using the determined age of the data item, a determination is made whether to render the advertisement. [Block 245] For example, the system could determine whether the data item is older than a threshold age. If the data item is not older than a threshold age, then the advertisement could be selected and retrieved from the advertisement database and provided to the userâs reader for rendering. [Block 250] Any tracking of the distribution for evaluation or billing purposes could then take place. [Block 225 and 260]. Spec. ¶ 49. In paragraph 101, Huber discloses advertiser attributes which âare defined as any actual object or categories of objects that are associated with the advertiser, or âblank space.ââ But these attributes only tie a product associated with the advertiser, e.g., â[i]f the system of the present invention finds a pizza advertiser in the list of advertisers, an embedded ad is painted onto the identified pizza box, at which time the viewer may click on the embedded ad and order a pizza.â Huber ¶ 101. Nothing in the attributes lists of characteristics discloses or suggests a content threshold age, let alone determining âwhile content of the electronic content element is less than a threshold age, identifying the content item slot as an unexpired content item slot.â Therefore, we will not sustain the anticipation rejection of independent claims 2, 9, 16, and 22 based on Huber. Because claims 3â8, 10â15, and 17â21 depend from claims 2, 9, and 16, and because we cannot sustain the rejection of claims 2, 9, and 16, the rejection of the dependent claims likewise cannot be sustained. Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 6 Concerning Jacob, cited by the Examiner in the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection in combination with Huber, we agree with Appellantâs statement that: Jacobs refer[s] to â[t]he amount of time the ad window should be blank before the ad is displayed,â and â[t]he amount of time the ad window should be blank after the ad is displayed,â (Jacobs at 0138), which has nothing to do with evaluating the age of the âelectronic content element of a web pageâ for purposes of identifying an content item slot as expired. Appeal Br. 7. Therefore, we will not sustain the obviousness rejection of independent claims 2, 9, 16, and 22 based on Huber in view of Jacobs. Because claims 3â8, 10â15, and 17â21 depend from claim 2, 9, and 16, and because we cannot sustain the rejection of claim 2, 9, and 16, the rejection of the dependent claims likewise cannot be sustained. 35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION â NEW GROUND (37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)) We reject claims 2â22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 based on our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. An invention is patent eligible if it claims a ânew and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.â 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: â[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideasâ are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Intâl, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Courtâs two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217â18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 7 Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75â77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is âdirected to.â See id. at 219 (âOn their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.â); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (âClaims 1 and 4 in petitionersâ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.â). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219â20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594â95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as âmolding rubber productsâ (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); âtanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting oresâ (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267â68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that âa claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.â Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (âWe view respondentsâ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.â). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim âseeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 8 of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.â Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (âIt is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.â). If the claim is âdirected toâ an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where âwe must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an âinventive conceptâ sufficient to âtransformâ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.â Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). âA claim that recites an abstract idea must include âadditional featuresâ to ensure âthat the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].ââ Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). â[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.â Id. In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (âGuidanceâ).2 âAll USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.â Id. at 51;3 see also October 2019 Update at 1. 2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the âOctober 2019 Updateâ) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf). 3 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 9 Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (âStep 2A, Prong Oneâ); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)â(c), (e)â(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (âStep 2A, Prong Twoâ).4 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52â55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not âwell-understood, routine, conventionalâ in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. PROCEDURE (âMPEPâ) § 2106.04 and also supersedes all versions of the USPTOâs âEligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas.â See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (âEligibility-related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.â). Accordingly, Appellantâs arguments challenging the sufficiency of the Examinerâs rejection will not be addressed to the extent those arguments are based on now superseded USPTO guidance. 4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54â 55. Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 10 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52â56. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that âthe âdirected toâ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether âtheir character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.ââ Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an âabstract ideaâ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335â36. In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a âdirected toâ two prong test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim âappl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.â Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP §§ 2106.04â2106.05. The Specification states: One common assumption that advertisers make is assuming that distributing ads through syndicated feeds is the same as distributing ads through a web site. This assumption is wrong because of the different way that end users view web sites and feeds. At a given point in time, all users see the same version of a web page at the same time. That is, the content of a particular web page is set at a particular point in time. Accordingly, advertisers can control the location of their advertisement on the web page and can control the time when the advertisement can be viewed. Spec. ¶ 7. Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 11 Advertisers do not want to pay forâor want to pay less forâadvertisements that are placed at the bottom of feeds or that are in less desirable locations within a feed. With current technology, however, there is no way to determine whether an advertisement is viewed at the top of a feed or at the bottom of a feed. This leaves advertisers with difficulty in determining how much they should pay for advertising in feeds and difficulty in determining whether their advertising campaigns are effective. Finally, inserting ads that will not be viewed by readers consumes valuable bandwidth and tends to clutter feeds, resulting in reader dissatisfaction. Accordingly, a system and method are needed to better manage advertising within feeds. Spec. ¶ 11. Claim 2 recites in pertinent part: receiving . . . requests from a user⊠for a content item to populate a content item slot . . .; while content of the . . . content element is less than a threshold age, identifying the content item slot as an unexpired content item slot; when content of the . . . content element exceeds the threshold age, identifying the content item slot as an expired content item slot; responding to each of the requests based on a status of the content item slot when the request is received, including: providing a blank content item to populate the content item slot without requiring the user⊠to render the blank content item for the requests that are received when the content item slot is identified as an expired content item slot; and providing a different content item that is selected based on characteristics of the user ⊠rather than the blank content item for the requests that are received when the content item slot is identified as an unexpired content item slot. Accordingly, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 2 recites a way of replacing expiring advertising content with a different advertising content item based on characteristics of a user in substitution for otherwise Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 12 blank content. Managing spaces on a substrate otherwise occupied by advertising is a mental process because such items as, matching, content with content, and time with length of advertisement campaign, mimic human thought processes of selecting certain information over others, i.e., evaluation, and creating perhaps with paper and pencil, graphic data interpretation perceptible only in the human mind. See In re TLI Commcâns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (characterizing collecting information, analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, and presenting the results of collecting and analyzing information, without more, as matters within the realm of abstract ideas). Thus, under the first prong, claim 2 recites the patent-ineligible judicial exception of a mental process. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. In addition, claim 2 recites selecting âdifferent content . . . based on characteristics of the user,â which constitutes targeted advertising which is an abstraction. See Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (tailoring content, such as targeted advertising, based on user information), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1596 (2017). Hence, claim 2 is also directed to advertising, marketing or sales activities, which are ones of certain methods of organizing human activity that are judicial exceptions. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Turning to the second prong of the âdirected toâ test, claim 2 only requires a âuser device.â5 Claim 9 is the most deviceâintensive claim, and 5 Although the claim 2 recites âa web page,â a web page is not a device but rather is data representing a document displayed only as so long as a Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 13 only generically recites, âone or more computers including an expiration analyzer module and a content item selector module.â These components are described in the Specification at a high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 22â20, 32, and Figs. 1 and 3. The Specification at paragraph 32 states that, âthe individual modules illustrated in Figure 3 generally represent software modules and the functionality performed by the software modules.â Software itself is not a device, it is data or rules, which are abstract. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these most basic computer components and/or of a system so integrate the judicial exception as to âimpose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.â Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exceptions of a mental process and a certain method of organizing human activity. That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be limited to content substitution, does not make them any less abstract. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362â63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (âAnd that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.â). Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that the claims are directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claims must include an âinventive conceptâ in order to be patent eligible, i.e., there must be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim transitory signal carrying the document data is energized. Absent such a signal, there is no display and hence no web page. Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 14 in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217â18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72â73). Concerning this step, we find that the claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. â[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.â Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer to retrieve, select, and apply decision criteria to data and modify the data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrievalâone of the most basic functions of a computer. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. The Specification spells out different generic equipment and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of information access under different scenarios. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 22â20, 32, and Figs. 1and 3. Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225â26. Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellantâs claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (receiving/responding/providing) and storing is equally generic and Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 15 conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission was abstract); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commcâns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional. The remaining method claims merely describe process parameters. We conclude that the method claims at issue are directed to a patent- ineligible concept itself. As to the structural claims (9â15), they are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has long âwarn[ed] . . . againstâ interpreting § 101 âin ways that make patent eligibility âdepend simply on the draftsmanâs art.ââ Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72). As a corollary, the claims are not directed to any particular machine. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW We conclude the Examiner did err in rejecting claims 2â22 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 103(a) and 102(b). We enter a new ground of rejection for claims 2â22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal 2020-005440 Application 15/646,909 16 DECISION SUMMARY The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 2â22 is reversed. A new ground of rejection is entered for claims 2â22. Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed New Ground 2â22 102(b) Huber 2â22 2â22 103(a) Huber, Jacobs 2â22 2â22 101 Eligibility 2â22 Overall Outcome 2â22 2â22 This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides â[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.â 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that Appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new rejection: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the Examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the Examiner. . . . (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. . . . No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). REVERSED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation