Godewyn, Charles et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 19, 2019

14586588 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/586,588 12/30/2014 Charles Godewyn 1301-056U 9456
112025 7590 12/19/2019
Shutts & Bowen LLP
Steven M. Greenberg, Esq.
525 Okeechobee Blvd
# 1100
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
EXAMINER
LEAL, HECTOR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/19/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@crgolaw.com
patents@shutts.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CHARLES GODEWYN, ING-MARIE JONSSON,
and MARIA ZOLOTOVA

Appeal 2018-008204
Application 14/586,588
Technology Center 3600
Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JAMES R. HUGHES, and JOYCE CRAIG,
Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–18. See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as SugarCRM, Inc.
Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a calendar with customer relationship
management (CRM) Gantt chart integration. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for Gantt chart customer relationship management
(CRM) and calendar data integration in a CRM application, the
method comprising:
defining in a database of a CRM application multiple
different phases of multiple different pipelines for respectively
different target customers, each of the phases requiring a
specific number of days for completion;
associating in the database different tasks to be
performed in connection with different ones of the different
phases of different ones of the different pipelines;
displaying in a user interface of the CRM application a
Gantt chart of the different pipelines;
selecting a portion of the Gantt chart reflective of a date
range; and additionally displaying in the Gantt chart, selected
ones of the different tasks associated with ones of the different
phases of the selected portion.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act.
12–14.
Claims 1–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over the combination of Kimla et al. (US 2015/0066582 A1; published Mar.
5, 2015) (“Kimla”) and Defusco et al. (US 2013/0024452 A1; published Jan.
24, 2013) (“Defusco”). Final Act. 14–25.
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ANALYSIS
Rejection of Claims 1–18 Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is in error.
Appeal Br. 5–15.
To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive
arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant argues claims 1–18 as a group.
Appeal Br. 5, 15. Given our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we
decide the § 101 rejection of claims 1–18 based on representative claim 1.
Legal Standard
“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue
of law that we review de novo.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601
F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
The Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis of
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 217 (2014). In addition, the Office recently published revised
guidance for evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101,
specifically with respect to applying the Alice framework. USPTO, 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“Office Guidance”). If a claim falls within one of the statutory
categories of patent eligibility (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter) then the first inquiry is whether the claim is directed
to one of the judicially recognized exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural
phenomenon, or an abstract idea). Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. As part of this
inquiry, we must “look at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior
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art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded
subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d
1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Per Office Guidance, this first inquiry has two
prongs of analysis (i) does the claim recite a judicial exception (e.g., an
abstract idea), and (ii) if so, is the judicial exception integrated into a
practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Under the Office Guidance, if the
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, see infra, the
claim is patent eligible under § 101. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. If the claim is
directed to a judicial exception (i.e., recites a judicial exception and does not
integrate the exception into a practical application), the next step is to
determine whether any element, or combination of elements, amounts to
significantly more than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; 84
Fed. Reg. at 56. If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the
second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘“inventive
concept”’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted).
To summarize, under the current Office Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual for Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Office Guidance.
Step 1
Claim 1, as a method claim, falls within the process category of
§ 101. See Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54 (citing MPEP
§§ 2106.03, 2106.06).
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
The Examiner determined that claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea
of “generating rule-based tasks.” Final Act. 12; Ans. 4. Generating such
rule-based tasks can be performed by the human mind or with pen and
paper. The Office Guidance explains that “mental processes” include acts
that people can perform in their minds or using pen and paper, even if the
claim recites that a generic computer component performs the acts. See
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable
interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of
generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes
category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.”); see
also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented
steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from
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being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”), quoted in
Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14.
Consistent with Appellant’s description of the claims (Spec. ¶¶ 7–8),
we agree that the “defining,” associating,” and “selecting” steps recited in
claim 1 describe activities that can be performed in the human mind or
practicably with pen and paper. Each of the steps involves observation,
evaluation, judgment, or opinion. For example, “defining . . . multiple
different phases of multiple different pipelines for respectively different
target customers, each of the phases requiring a specific number of days for
completion” requires evaluation of possible phases and judgment as to
which phases to define. Similarly, “associating . . . different tasks to be
performed in connection with different ones of the different phases of the
different pipelines” requires evaluation of tasks and phases, as well as
judgment as to which tasks should be associated with which phases.
“Selecting a portion of the Gantt chart reflective of a date range” also
requires evaluation of possible date ranges and judgment as to which to
select. Moreover, the Specification describes that an end user mentally
integrates the tasks referenced in a Gantt chart visualization with the tasks of
a separate C&S component of the CRM system. Spec. ¶ 7.
The instant claims are similar to the claims in Erie Indemnity and
FairWarning, which were found to be drawn to abstract concepts. See
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (Claims involving “organizing and accessing records through the
creation of an index-searchable database” were “drawn to the abstract idea
of creating an index and using that index to search for and retrieve data.”);
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94, 1097
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(Fed. Cir. 2016) (Claims “drawn to the concept of analyzing records of
human activity to detect suspicious behavior” involve selecting information .
. . for collection [and] analysis . . .[which] does nothing significant to
differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes.”). Thus, the
“defining,” associating,” and “selecting” steps recited in claim 1 fall into the
mental process category of abstract ideas. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Moreover, the steps reciting “displaying” and “additionally
displaying” a Gantt chart could be performed by merely writing down and
showing such information—a step that can involve mere judgment and
logical reasoning. Cf. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that a recited step that utilized a map
of credit card numbers to determine the validity of a credit card transaction
could be performed entirely mentally by merely using logical reasoning).
Accordingly, the two “displaying” steps fall squarely within the mental
processes category of the agency’s guidelines and, therefore, recite an
abstract idea. See Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing exemplary
mental processes including observation and evaluation).
Because we agree with the Examiner that the claim recites an abstract
idea, we proceed to Prong Two of Step 2A to determine if the idea is
integrated into a practical application, in which case the claim as a whole
would not be “directed to” merely an abstract idea.
Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
Because we determined that claim 1 recites a patent-ineligible
concept, we next determine whether the recited judicial exception is
integrated into a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying
whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the
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judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the
exception into a practical application.
We use the term “additional elements” for claim features, limitations,
or steps that the claim recites beyond the identified judicial exception. See
Revised Guidance at 55 n.24. In claim 1, the additional elements include the
recited “CRM application,” “database,” and “user interface.”
We agree with the Examiner’s determination that none of the
additional limitations is sufficient to amount to significantly more than the
judicial exception because the additional computer elements “do not include
any requirement for performing the claimed functions of gathering,
analyzing, and displaying by use of anything but entirely conventional,
generic technology.” Final Act. 14; see also Ans. 4. The recited “CRM
application” is described generically in Appellant’s Specification as
“executing in the memory of the host computing system using the CRM
data.” Spec. ¶ 10. The Specification describes the recited “database”
generically as accessible by different client computers over a computer
communications network. Spec. ¶ 21. The Specification also describes the
recited “user interface” of the CRM application generically as “loaded into
memory and displayed” (Spec. ¶ 17) and “presented in a display of a
computer” (id. ¶ 21).
Because claim 1 merely implements the claimed method on general
purpose computers, performing normal data update and display functions,
the claimed systems, method, and medium do not reflect “an improvement in
the functioning of a computer.” Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55. Claim 1
is directed to “Gantt chart customer relationship management (CRM) and
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calendar data integration in a CRM application” (Claim 1), and thus do not
reflect “an improvement to other technology or technical field.” Id. at 55.
The claims do not require a particular machine or manufacture, and do not
transform an article to a different state. Id. Further, the claims merely link
the recited abstract idea generally to a networked computer environment,
and thus do no more than represent a drafting effort to monopolize the
abstract idea in a computer implementation. Id. As such, the abstract idea is
not integrated into a practical application.
Appellant’s argument that the claims “improve over the prior art” is
unavailing. See Appeal Br. 11 (citing Spec. ¶ 7). The novelty of any element
or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 188–89 (1981). Our reviewing court further guides that “[e]ligibility
and novelty are separate inquiries.” Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable
Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Affinity
Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that “[e]ven assuming” that a particular claimed feature was novel
does not “avoid the problem of abstractness”).
Furthermore, Appellant’s claim 1 is unlike the technology-based
integrations cited by Appellant. See Appeal Br. 10–12. Appellant’s claims
are not similar to the claims found eligible in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claims in
McRO—unlike the claims here—recited a “specific . . . improvement in
computer animation” using “unconventional rules” that related “sub-
sequences of phonemes, timings, and morph weight sets” to automatically
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animate lip synchronization and facial expressions for three-dimensional
characters that only human animators could previously produce. McRO, 837
F.3d at 1302–03, 1307–08, 1313–15. In McRO, “the incorporation of the
claimed rules” improved an existing technological process. McRO, 837 F.3d
at 1314.
In contrast, claim 1 does not improve an existing technological
process. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (distinguishing between claims wherein the focus of the claims is
on an improvement in computer capabilities and those that invoke a
computer as a tool). Here, the invention under appeal merely adapts to a
technological setting (comprising a generic CRM application, database, and
user interface) the concept of displaying an integrated report. Appellant does
not claim to have invented a new user interface, database, or any other
improvement in the computer technology underlying the claims. See BSG
Tech., LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“The claims do not recite any improvement to the way in which such
databases store or organize information . . . . an improvement to the
information stored by a database is not equivalent to an improvement in the
database’s functionality . . . the database serves in its ‘ordinary capacity’ of
storing . . . information.”). Considering claim 1 as a whole, then,
Appellant’s invention lacks a technical solution to a technical problem like
the claims in McRO and Enfish.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 merely implements
generic computer components to perform the recited functions. See Final
Act. 13; Ans. 5–6. The claims do not recite (i) an improvement to the
functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field (see MPEP
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§ 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial
exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular transformation of an
article to a different thing or state (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other
meaningful limitation (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Rather, claim 1 recites an abstract ideas as identified in Step 2A(i), supra,
and none of the limitations integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application.
Therefore, because the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical
application, we conclude that the claim is directed to the judicial exception.
Step 2B — “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, as we
conclude above, we proceed to the “inventive concept” step. For Step 2B we
must “look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in order to
determine ‘whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of
the ineligible subject matter’ to which the claim is directed.” Affinity Labs
of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353). We look to see whether there
are any “additional features” in the claims that constitute an “inventive
concept,” thereby rendering the claims eligible for patenting even if they are
directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Those “additional
features” must be more than “well-understood, routine, conventional
activity.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79.
The Examiner determined that the additional elements in claim 1
amount to no more than implementing the abstract idea with a computerized
system with generic computer components recited as performing generic
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computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional
activities. Final Act. 14.
Appellant argues that the language of claim 1 “expressly provides
how the concept of ‘Gantt chart CRM and calendar data integration in a
CRM application’ is achieved,” without foreclosing all possible methods for
achieving such integration. Appeal Br. 13; see also id. at 15.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive because preemption is not the
sole test for patent eligibility, and any questions on preemption in the instant
case have been resolved by the Examiner's Mayo/Alice analysis. As our
reviewing court has explained, “questions on preemption are inherent in and
resolved by the § 101 analysis,” and, although “preemption may signal
patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does
not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); cf. OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the
claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price
optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less
abstract.”).
Appellant does not direct our attention to anything in the Specification
that indicates the computer components perform anything other than well-
understood, routine, and conventional functions, such as looking up data in a
database, updating data, and displaying data on a user interface. See
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That
a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no
further specification—is not even arguably inventive”); In re TLI Commc’ns
LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 614 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (server that receives
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data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores
the digital images insufficient to add an inventive concept); Alice, 573 U.S.
at 225–26 (receiving, storing, sending information over networks
insufficient to add an inventive concept).
We determine that the claimed elements, viewed individually and as
an ordered combination, merely use well-understood, routine, and
conventional computer components and functions to implement operations
previously performed in existing rewards points programs. Because the
Specification describes the additional elements in general terms, without
describing the particulars, we conclude the claim limitations may be broadly
but reasonably construed as reciting conventional computer components and
techniques, particularly in light of Appellant’s Specification, as cited above.
See Berkheimer Memo2 § III.A.1; Spec. ¶¶ 10, 17, 21. We conclude claim 1
does not have an inventive concept because the claim, in essence, merely
recites various computer-based elements along with no more than mere
instructions to implement the identified abstract idea using the computer-
based elements.
Because the claims fail under both the Step 2A and Step 2B analyses,
we sustain the Examiner's § 101 rejection of independent claim 1 and
grouped claims 2–18, not argued separately with particularity.

2 “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter
Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP,
Inc.)” at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018) (explaining that a specification that describes
additional elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional elements
are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe
the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can
show that the elements are well understood, routine, and conventional).
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Rejection of Claims 1–18 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
We have reviewed the § 103(a) rejection of claims 1–18 in light of
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this
decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any
other arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to make, in the
Briefs are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of error. We agree with and
adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings of facts and conclusions as set
forth in the Answer and in the Action from which this appeal was taken. We
provide the following explanation for emphasis.
With respect to independent claim 1, Appellant contends the
Examiner erred because the cited portions of Kimla and Defusco do not
teach or suggest a “Gantt chart,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 17.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. Appellant refers to
definitions of “Gantt chart” that appeared in previous prosecution
documents, but did not include the definitions and related arguments in the
Appeal Brief. See id. Rule 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c) requires that an appeal brief
set forth arguments and the basis therefore, with citations of the statutes,
regulations, authorities and parts of the record relied upon. According to the
rule,
[i]t is essential that the Board be provided with a brief fully
stating the position of the appellant with respect to each ground
of rejection presented for review in the appeal so that no search
of the Record is required in order to determine that position.
Thus, the brief should not incorporate or reference previous
responses.
MPEP § 1205.02 (R-08.2017, Jan. 2018).
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Considering the record before us, Appellant defines “Gantt chart” in
the Specification as “a type of bar chart that illustrates a project schedule by
showing the start and finish dates of the various terminal elements and
summary elements of a project.” Spec. ¶ 6. Applying Appellant’s definition,
the Examiner found that Kimla teaches or suggests a Gantt chart. Ans. 11–
12 (citing Kimla Fig. 4D, ¶¶ 31, 72, 79). The Examiner also found that
Defusco teaches a Gantt chart. Ans. 12–13 (citing Defusco Figs. 6, 11, 24).
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. Appellant argues that
that “Kimla does not disclose a series of horizontal lines that show an
amount of work done in certain period of time in relation to the amount
planned for those periods.” Reply Br. 7. Appellant makes a similar argument
regarding Defusco. Id. at 9. The plain language of claim 1, however, does
not require a series of horizontal lines that show an amount of work done in
certain period of time in relation to the amount planned for those periods.
Nor has Appellant persuaded us that the broadest reasonable interpretation3
of “Gantt chart” includes such requirements. Therefore, Appellant has not
persuaded us that the Examiner’s interpretation of the term “Gantt chart” is
overly broad, unreasonable, or inconsistent with Appellant’s Specification.
Nor has Appellant persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s findings that the
combination of Defusco and Kimla teaches or suggests the recited “Gantt
chart.”

3 As an initial matter of claim construction, we give the claim its broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “In the patentability context, claims
are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretations . . . limitations are
not to be read into the claims from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988
F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
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For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
finding that the combination of Defusco and Kimla teaches or suggests the
disputed “Gantt chart” limitation, as recited in claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejection of
independent claim 1, as well as the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejection of
independent claims 7 and 13 and dependent claims 2–6, 8–12, and 14–18,
argued as a group with claim 1. See Appeal Br. 16.
DECISION
We affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1–18.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis/References Affirmed Reversed
1–18

101 Eligibility

1–18
1–18

103(a) Defusco, Kimla 1–18
Overall Outcome: 1–18
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED