General Tire & Rubber Company, The

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 23, 1982

262 N.L.R.B. 1248 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The General Tire & Rubber Company and Local No.
496 of International Union Allied Industrial
Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 26-CA-
8205
July 23, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
ZIMMERMAN
On October 28, 1980. Administrative Law Judge
J. Pargen Robertson issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, both Respondent
and the General Counsel filed exceptions and sup-
porting briefs. The Respondent also filed an an-
swering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge, as clarified below, and to adopt his recom-
mended Order.
Respondent argues in its brief that it discharged
the 37 probationary employees solely for legitimate
and substantial business considerations; i.e., lack of
work resulting from the large inventory which Re-
spondent had built up in anticipation of a strike. In
support of its position, Respondent contends that
its decision to terminate the probationary employ-
ees was made prior to the employees' decision to
strike and during the period in which Respondent
had reached a tentative agreement, later rejected
by the rank and file, with the union bargaining
committee. Respondent further argues that its dis-
charge of the probationary employees was fully in
accord with the provisions of the collective-bar-
gaining agreement which, under Respondent's in-
terpretation, provides that new employees may be
terminated for losing any time, for any reasons,
during their 60-day probationary period.
We believe that the Administrative Law Judge
properly rejected these arguments as insufficient
under the standard set forth in N.L.R.B. v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), and recently
applied by the Board in Freezer Queen Foods, Inc.,
249 NLRB 330 (1980).
In Great Dane, supra, the Supreme Court held
that employer conduct which was "inherently de-
structive" of Section 7 employee rights "bears its
own indicia of intent" and requires no proof of an-
tiunion motivation for a finding of an unfair labor
practice. Id. at 33-34. Under such circumstances,
262 NLRB No. 166
the Board may find a violation even where the em-
ployer introduces evidence that its conduct was
motivated by legitimate business considerations. Id.
However, where "the adverse effect of the discrim-
inatory conduct on employee rights is 'compara-
tively slight,' an antiunion motivation must be
proved to sustain the charge if the employer has
come forward with evidence of legitimate and sub-
stantial business justifications for the conduct." Id.
at 34.
Despite Respondent's multiple and shifting de-
fenses, the record in this case clearly establishes
that Respondent was not motivated by any legiti-
mate and substantial business concerns in discharg-
ing the probationary employees who honored the
union picket line.
First, we note that Respondent continued to op-
erate its plant during the strike and its own wit-
nesses testified that work was available at that time
for approximately 100 employees. Only four per-
manent employees and four probationary employ-
ees crossed the picket line and returned to work.
Indeed, Respondent stated that its delay in the
mailing of the termination notices was occasioned
by the fact that the strike had forced clerical em-
ployees to work in the factory and prevented them
from engaging in their regular duties. Respondent's
own witnesses thus contradicted its assertion that
the probationary employees were discharged solely
for lack of work.
Second, we note that Respondent did not termi-
nate all probationary employees. Instead. Respond-
ent terminated only those probationary employees
who observed the union picket line. The only dis-
tinction between the probationary employees who
were discharged and the probationary employees
who were retained was that the former were en-
gaged in the protected activity of honoring the
strike, whereas, the latter were not, and any deci-
sion based on such a distinction is inherently de-
structive of employee rights under the Act.
Lastly, Respondent's argument that its conduct
was sanctioned by the language of its collective-
bargaining agreement, which Respondent interprets
as allowing the discharge of probationary employ-
ees who are absent from work because of a lawful
strike, must be rejected as inconsistent with the
rights granted to those employees under Section 7
and protected by Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act.
See Freezer Queen Foods, Inc., supra.
Accordingly, we are in full agreement with the
Administrative Law Judge's findings and conclu-
sion that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act by discharging its probationary em-
ployees who honored the strike and by thereafter
refusing to reinstate them.
1248
THE GENERAL TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, The General
Tire & Rubber Company, Fort Smith, Arkansas, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the actions set forth in the said recommended
Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
J. PARGEN ROBERTSON, Administrative Law Judge:
This case was heard before me on June 9 and 10, 1980,
in Fort Smith, Arkansas. The charge was filed on De-
cember 19, 1979, and amended on January 23, 1980. The
complaint issued on February 12, 1980, alleges violations
of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. It is alleged that
The General Tire & Rubber Company (herein Respond-
ent) violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening an employee
that Respondent would terminate probationary employ-
ees who honored the Union's picket line. The complaint
also alleges that Respondent discharged 37 employees
during the existence of an economic strike in violation of
Section 8(aX1) and (3) of the Act.
Upon the entire record, my observation of the wit-
nesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by
General Counsel and Respondent, I hereby make the fol-
lowing:
FINDINGS'
A. The Alleged Discharges
General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated the
Act by discharging 37 probationary employees because
of their involvement in an economic strike.
The evidence demonstrates that Respondent and Local
No. 496 of International Union Allied Industrial Workers
of America, AFL-CIO (herein the Union, or the Charg-
ing Party), were parties to several collective-bargaining
agreements from the years prior to 1979. Pre-1979 con-
tracts were negotiated and executed several months
before the preceding agreement was set to expire. Those
early negotiations prevented Respondent from having to
build a "strike bank." Uncontested evidence proved that
Respondent was required, by its customers, to build an
I Neither the allegations regarding commerce nor the status of the
Charging Party is in dispute. The complaint alleged, Respondent ad-
mitted, and I find that at all material times herein. Respondent at its place
of business located in Fort Smith, Arkansas, where it is engaged in the
manufacture of gaskets, annually sold and shipped from that Fort Smith
facility products, goods, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 direct-
ly to points outside the State of Arkansas and annually purchased and
received at its Fort Smith facility products, goods, and materials valued
in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Arkansas.
Respondent admitted and I find that, at all times matenal herein, it was
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2). (6),
and (7) of the Act. The complaint alleged. Respondent admitted, and I
find that the Union is now, and has been at all times material herein, a
labor organization within the meaning of Sec 2(5) of the Act.
inventory immediately before the expiration of Respond-
ent's collective-bargaining agreements for the purpose of
being able to continue to supply those customers in the
event of a strike-the so-called "strike bank."
Even though, before 1979, Respondent had been able
to avoid building a strike bank through successful early
negotiations, in 1979 the Union did not agree to engage
in early negotiations pursuant to requests made by Re-
spondent. Therefore, since the collective-bargaining
agreement was set to expire on November 1, 1979, Re-
spondent started beefing up its work force in early Sep-
tember for the purpose of establishing a strike bank. In
accordance with the contract provisions, those employ-
ees became probationary employees.2
Respondent was successful in substantially establishing
its "strike bank" by the end of October 1979. In anticipa-
tion of the Union agreeing to a contract,3 Respondent,
during October 31 and November 1, 1979, prepared
"change of status" notices which were to serve as termi-
nation notices to all of its probationary employees and
layoff notices to a substantial number of its permanent
employees.4
Respondent points out that completion of the strike
bank resulted in a lack of work necessitating the dis-
charges and layoffs.
However, before Respondent effectuated the termina-
tions and layoffs, it was notified on November I that the
employees had rejected ratification of the proposed con-
tract and were commencing a strike.5 No further action
was taken at that time to notify any employees that they
were either terminated or laid off because of lack of
work.
Shortly after the strike commenced on November 1,
eight employees-including four permanent employees"
and four probationary employees-crossed the picket
line and reported to work. Those eight employees were
permitted to work.
Around November 9, two more probationary employ-
ees 7 offered to return to work. Respondent advised those
employees that they could not return to work.
Respondent did not hire any new employees after the
strike commenced.
On November 12 or 13, Respondent mailed the change
of status notices, which it had prepared on October 31
through November 1, to all the probationary employees"
a The contract, which expired on November 1, 1979, provided a 60-
day probationary period for new hires.
3 Respondent was advised by the negotiating committee that the) were
going to recommend ratification of the proposed contract to the employv-
ees.
4 Respondent's policy was to terminate rather than lay off probation-
ary employees. Therefore, rehired probationary employees were treated
as new hires except in instances where a probationary employee was re-
hired within 30 days. The contract provided that probationary employees
discharged due to lack of work would, when rehired within 30 days of
their discharge, be credited with all days worked from their original date
of hire.
I The parties stipulated that the strike occurred because of the employ-
ees' failure to ratify the contract.
a Permanent employees-those not in their probationary period, were
usually referred to as "regular" employees.
Only one such employee, Danny Farrar, was identified by name.
a However, no permanent (regular) employees were notified of a layoff
during the existence of the strike. The layoff notices prepared during the
Continued
1249
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
other than the four probationary employees who had
continued to work during the strike. Respondent thereby
discharged 37 probationary employees. 9 The termina-
tions were retroactive to November 2, 1979.
The strike eventually ended when the parties agreed
upon a collective-bargaining agreement in December
1979. When the strike ended, the four probationary em-
ployees who worked during the strike had, by virtue of
their continuing to work, completed their required 60-
day probationary period and had become permanent em-
ployees.
During the first week after the strike ended Respond-
ent recalled striking employees on an "as-need basis"
without regard to seniority. Thereafter, striking employ-
ees were recalled on the basis of seniority.' ° Because of
their seniority, the four former probationary employees
who had worked during the strike were laid off I week
after the strike ended, due to lack of work. "
Conclusions
The Board recently considered a question similar to
the one presented here, in the case of Freezer Queen
Foods, Inc., 249 NLRB 330 (1980). In reaching its deci-
sion in Freezer Queen, the Board applied tests from
N.LR.B. v. Great Dane Trailers Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
The Board found that the administrative law judge was
correct in concluding that the respondent in Freezer
Queen coerced and discriminated against striking proba-
tionary employees. However, the Board indicated it was
also necessary under Great Dane supra to consider
whether the employer had proffered "a substantial and
legitimate business end" as justification for its actions.
I have determined that Respondent's actions herein
had the effect of coercing and discriminating against
striking probationary employees. The facts amply dem-
onstrate that Respondent's actions in discharging the pro-
bationary employees were inherently destructive of Sec-
tion 7 rights.
Even though change of status forms were prepared
before the strike, those forms were prepared with a mind
toward discharging all 41 probationary employees and
laying off a number of permanent employees. However,
that fact was not conveyed to any of the employees until
after the strike commenced-around November 12 or 13
when 37 probationary employees were actually terminat-
ed.
Respondent pointed out that its failure to notify the
probationary employees of their discharge was merely an
oversight caused by the chaos resulting from the sudden
strike. However, in that regard I note that the four pro-
bationary employees' 2 who crossed the picket line and
October 31 through November I period for permanent employees were
destroyed and never mailed to any of the permanent employees.
9 Respondent's former industrial relations manager testified that Re-
spondent went ahead and terminated those 37 probationary employees in
order to permit them to receive unemployment compensation benefits.
io There is no allegation of unlawful conduct regarding the recall of
strikers.
I The layoff of those four former probationary employees is not al-
leged as a violation.
"2 Those employees were Benjamin Jones, Robert McClury. Debra
Long, and Timothy Wilkerson.
continued to work from the strike's inception were never
terminated. 3 Therefore, only those 37 probationary em-
ployees who honored the picket line were terminated on
November 12 or 13.
Moreover, two probationary employees who had been
honoring the picket line sought authority to return to
work around November 9. Those two employees were
advised that they could not return to work.
Therefore, the circumstances lead to the inescapable
conclusion that the 37 probationary employees were no-
tified of their termination around November 12 or 13, be-
cause they observed the picket line and engaged in the
strike from its inception.
Secondly, in accord with the Board's mandate in
Freezer Queen Foods, I shall consider whether Respond-
ent "proffered 'a substantial and legitimate business end'
as justification for its actions." In that regard, evidence
reflected that Respondent determined to go ahead and
mail the change of status forms notifying the 37 employ-
ees of their termination around November 12 or 13, be-
cause it came to its attention that those employees were
being deprived of an opportunity to collect unemploy-
ment compensation benefits.' 4
Additionally, Respondent, in its brief, argues that the
37 probationary employees were actually terminated pur-
suant to its prestrike (October 31 and November 1) deci-
sion. Respondent contends that decision was based solely
on there being insufficient work to continue employing
the probationary employees. However, I find that argu-
ment is not supported by the facts. It is true enough that
on October 3! Respondent anticipated terminating sever-
al employees, including all the probationary employees,
due to lack of work. However, those employees were
not terminated at that time. The strike ensued. Following
the strike, there was work available and those employ-
ees, including probationary employees, who did not ob-
;-orve the strike continued their employment. Therefore,
when the decision to terminate the remaining probation-
ary employees was finally effected on November 12 or
13, the former nondiscriminatory basis for Respondent's
actions no longer existed.
Respondent also points out that by missing work fol-
lowing the November I strike, those employees breached
a condition of their probation and were, therefore, termi-
nated. In that regard, Respondent points to contractual
language indicating the probationary period "must be a
continuous period on the active payroll," and points out
that its policy was to terminate probationary employees
who lost time for any reason. That argument was similar
to the one argued in Freezer Queen Foods, supra, where it
was rejected by the Board. A different holding would
place probationary employees in the untenable position
of being unable to participate in a strike without risk to
their employment status.
'3 Those employees (fn. 12, supra) were laid off I week after the strike
ended because of lack of sufficient work and because of their short term
seniority. One, Debra Long, continues to be classified as a "regular" em-
ployee. The other three have since voluntarily terminated their employ-
ment.
" However, no similar justification was offered to justify Respondent's
refusal to permit two probationary employees from returning to work
around November 9.
1250
THE GENERAL TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
I find that the evidence does not establish that Re-
spondent based the discharges on substantial and legiti-
mate business ends which would justify action, which is
inherently destructive of Section 7 rights.' 5
Therefore, having found that Respondent has failed to
establish a legitimate and substantial business objective
for its conduct, and having found that such conduct co-
erced and discriminated against striking probationary em-
ployees, I hereby find that Respondent violated Section
8(aX)() and (3) of the Act by terminating 37 probationary
employees on or about November 12 or 13, 1979. 16
B. The Alleged 8(a)(1) Violation
Peggy Hicks testified that she is employed by Tempo-
rary Employment Company of Fort Smith. During Sep-
tember or October 1979, while employed by Temporary
Employment, she was assigned to Respondent to per-
form clerical duties in the purchasing office. According
to Hicks, she was at Respondent for 8 days.
Hicks testified that approximately a week before the
strike at Respondent, she asked Lynn Simmerman' 7 if "a
person on probation, if they refused to walk across the
picket line, what would happen to them?" According to
Hicks, Simmerman immediately answered, "They would
be fired, period."
Lynn Simmerman denied that she had such a conver-
sation. Moreover, Simmerman testified that the term
"fired" is one that she is careful not to use-instead she
would say either "terminated" or "discharged." Howev-
er, according to Simmerman, she used none of those
terms with Hicks. In fact, she testified that she never dis-
cussed probationary employees with Hicks.
Peggy Hicks testified that another person-Debbie
Rogers, the purchasing clerk-was present during her
conversation with Simmerman. However, Rogers was
not called to testify.
I was impressed with the testimony of Lynn Simmer-
man. She was originally called as a 611(c) witness by
General Counsel. It appeared to me that she endeavored
to answer General Counsel's questions candidly. There-
fore, I find that I am unable to discredit her denial of the
alleged 8(a)(1) conversation. On that basis, I find that
General Counsel has not proved that Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(1) as alleged.
I' See Freezer Queen Foods Inc.. supra: N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane Trail-
ers, Inc., supra.: National Seal, Division of Federal-Mogul Bower Bearings.
Inc., 141 NLRB 661 (1963), enforcement denied 336 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1964).
it Respondent offered evidence that probationary employees beginning
with the hiring of employee Karen Slavens around October 1, 1979, were
told during their employment interview that the work was temporary. In
view of the events that followed and the fact that the collective-bargain-
ing agreement did not provide for "temporary employees." I have deter-
mined that Respondent's advice that the work was temporary to those
employees does not affect my decision herein. Respondent treated all
those employees as probationary employees, and there was no evidence
which demonstrated that any of those employees would not have been
permitted to continue working if they had ignored the November 1
strike.
J7 In its brief, Respondent admitted Simmerman was a supervisor.
However, Respondent contended that Simmerman's supervisory authori-
ty was limited to the interviewing and hiring of new employees. The evi-
dence supports Respondent's position in that regard.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent, The General Tire & Rubber Company,
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Local No. 496 of International Union Allied Indus-
trial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent, by discharging and thereafter refusing
to reinstate"' its employees named in Appendix A (at-
tached hereto) because of its employees' strike activities,
has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
4. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(l) of the
Act by threatening an employee that Respondent would
terminate probationary employees who honored the
Union's picket line.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of
the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom, and to take certain affirmative ac-
tions designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. My
recommended order will require Respondent to offer the
employees named in Appendix A reinstatement to their
former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exists, to substan-
tially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their se-
niority or other rights and privileges.'9 I shall further
recommend that Respondent be ordered to make the em-
ployees listed in Appendix A herein, whole for any loss
of earnings they may have suffered as a result of the dis-
crimination against them from the time of their dis-
charge,2 0 and that it post appropriate notices. Loss of
backpay should be computed and interest thereon shall
be added in the manner proscribed in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, (1950), and Florida Steel Corpo-
ration, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).21
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following:
is In view of the evidence indicating that at the time of the hearing
Respondent, because of insufficient work, had not reinstated all of its per-
manent employees following the November 1979 strike, it would, of
course, not be necessary, and Respondent would not be justified on the
basis of this Order, to actually reinstate any of the discriminatees herein
out of order of their seniority.
19 In that regard, see fn. 18, supra. If necessary, it may be determined
in compliance proceedings whether any or all of the 37 discriminatees
herein would, on the basis of factors not violative of the Act, be in a
layoff status. If so, Respondent in lieu of reinstatement, should be re-
quired to place those particular discriminatees on a recall list without
prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges.
20 Abilities and Goodwill. Inc. 241 NLRB 27 (1979) Backpay, which
should run from November 9 for the two employees that attempted to
return on that date and from November 12 or 13 for the remaining 35
employees, would be tolled during periods when the employees would be
laid off for reasons not violative of the Act
21 See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.. 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
1251
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER2 2
The Respondent, The General Tire & Rubber Compa-
ny, Fort Smith, Arkansas, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging its employees and refusing to reinstate
them because of their strike activities.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed to be necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Offer to the employees listed on Appendix A
herein immediate and full reinstatement to their former
jobs or, if those job no longer exist, to a substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority
or other rights and privileges; or if those employees
would, because of factors not violative of the Act, be in
a layoff status, to positions of recall, without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights and privileges.
(b) Make the employees named in Appendix A herein
whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a
result of the discrimination against them in the manner
set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary or useful to aid in the determination of
the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(d) Post at its Fort Smith, Arkansas, facility copies of
the attached notice, marked "Appendix B." 23 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 26, shall be duly signed by Respondent's au-
thorized representative and posted immediately upon re-
ceipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous, places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director of Region 26, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps have been taken to comply therewith.
22 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
a2 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX A
Sherman Hicks Joy Willhite
Connie Hobson
Sharon Mailand
Bonnie Brown
Sharon Marr
Willie Russell
Viola Coble
Ronald L. North
Terry Bradberry
Lisha Lee
Betty Spears
Willa Lucas
Elizabeth Atchley
Carmen Johnson
Ruby M. Poole
Elizabeth Foster
Glenda Roberts
Randy Martin
Betty Rogers
Carol Mayes
Carol Harris
Danny Farrar
Deborah Dodson
Sandra Barnett
Patricia Tompkins
Richard Griffin
Ronald Lucas
Evelyn Lucille Austin
Terry Turner
Karen Slavens
Janice Roberts
Carl Wise
Michael Warren
Lisa Horn
Billy Sattazahn
Gilberta Dominguez
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discharge our employees because
they engage in strike activity on behalf of Local
No. 496 of International Union Allied Industrial
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner in-
terfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in
exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL offer immediate and full reinstatement
to:
Sherman Hicks
Connie Hobson
Sharon Mailand
Bonnie Brown
Sharon Marr
Willie Russell
Viola Coble
Ronald L. North
Terry Bradberry
Lisha Lee
Betty Spears
Willa Lucas
Elizabeth Atchley
Carmen Johnson
Ruby M. Poole
Elizabeth Foster
Glenda Roberts
Randy Martin
Betty Rogers
Sandra Barnett
Patricia Tompkins
Richard Griffin
Ronald Lucas
Evelyn Lucille Austin
Terry Turner
Karen Slavens
Janice Roberts
Carl Wise
Michael Warren
Lisa Horn
Billy Sattazahn
Gilberta Dominguez
Joy Willhite
Carol Mayes
Carol Harris
Danny Farrar
Deborah Dodson
to their former jobs or, if their jobs no longer exists,
to substantially equivalent jobs, without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights and privileges; or if
they would be in a layoff status due to factors not
violative of the National Labor Relations Act, be
1252
THE GENERAL TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
placed in line for reinstatement, without prejudice
to their seniority or other rights and privileges.
WE WILL make whole the above-named employ-
ees for any loss they may have suffered by reason
of our discrimination against them, with interest.
THE GENERAL TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
1253