General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Parma Division

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 14, 1982

261 N.L.R.B. 934 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Parma Divi-
sion and Charles Hamrick. Case 8-CA-13779
May 14, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN VAN DE WATER AND
MEMBERS FANNING AND HUNTER
On June 17, 1981, Administrative Law Judge
Leonard M. Wagman issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and Re-
spondent filed a brief in opposition to the General
Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the complaint be, and it hereby
is, dismissed in its entirety.
I The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings
made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established
policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with re-
spect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant
evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry
Wall Products. Inc., 91 NLtRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F. 2d 362 (3d Cir.
1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re-
versing his findings.
In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's findings, we find it unnec-
essary to pass on his reliance on Midwest Precision Castings Company, 244
NLRB 597 (1979).
2 Chairman Van de Water concurs in the dismissal of the complaint,
but regrets that Agency talent and scarce Board funds were wasted in
the litigation of this previously settled matter Thus, as set forth in the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision, grievances were filed concerning
the discharges which are the subject of this proceeding, and a settlement
was concluded between Respondent and the Union. The settlement pro-
vided for the reinstatement without backpay of all three employees and
the entry of 2 weeks' disciplinary layoffs on their personnel records In
the Chairman's view, formal processing through the Board's complaint
and hearing of settled cases of this kind severely hampers the Board's
ability to reduce its mounting backlog of unresolved matters.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LEONARD M. WAGMAN, Administrative Law Judge:
This proceeding was heard before me at Cleveland,
Ohio, on December 15, 16, and 17, 1980,' pursuant to
complaint issued on June 8. The complaint, issued by the
Regional Director for Region 8, alleged in essence, that
Respondent General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet
Parma Division, violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C.
Sec. 151, et seq. ), herein called the Act, by discharging
employees Charles Hamrick, Phillip Miles, and Joseph
McAdams because they engaged in union activity. Re-
spondent, by its timely answer, denied having committed
the alleged unfair labor practices.
Upon consideration of the entire record, the demeanor
of the witnesses as they testified, and the post-trial briefs
received from the General Counsel and Respondent, I
make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCI.USIONS
I. THE RESPONI)ENT 'S BUSINESS
From the pleadings, I find that Respondent is a Dela-
ware corporation, whose main office is in Detroit, Michi-
gan. Respondent also admits that its Parma, Ohio, plant,
which is involved in this case, annually manufactures and
ships directly to points outside of Ohio, automobile parts
valued in excess of $50,000. From these facts, I find that
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II1. THE I.ABOR ORGANIZATION INVOI.ViED
The complaint alleged, the answer admitted, and I find
that the Union, Local #1005, International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, UAW, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
111. THE Al I.I.GEI) VIOI.ATIONS OF SECTION 8(A)(3)
AND (I) OF THE ACT
A. Background Facts and Issues
At all times material to this case, the Union has been
the recognized exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the 4,500 to 4,700 production and mainte-
nance employees at Respondent's Parma, Ohio, Chevro-
let plant. These same employees have at all times materi-
al to this case been covered by a national collective-bar-
gaining agreement between General Motors Corporation
and the Union's parent International, and by a local
agreement between the Union and Respondent.
At the time of the unfair labor practices in this case,
Charles Hamrick, Phillip Miles, and Joseph McAdams
were classified as hourly employees at Respondent's
Parma plant and were also elected union officials. They
did not perform the production or maintenance work as-
signed to their respective classifications.
Hamrick was a shop committeeman. Miles and Mc-
Adams were district committeemen. Both positions were
full-time jobs. Hamrick's responsibility included oversee-
ing the activities of district committeeman, resolving
grievances at the second step, and participating in the
l Unless otherwise stated, all dates refer to 1980.
261 NLRB No. 133
934
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
third step of grievances and in local contract negotia-
tions.
Shop committeeman Hamrick was a member of the
Union's negotiating committee which submitted its de-
mands to Respondent on or about August 3, 1979. He re-
mained a member of that committee through the remain-
der of 1979 and until March 1980.
District committeemen Miles and McAdams each serv-
iced a group of 150 to 200 employees. They represented
their constituents at the first step of the grievance proce-
dure, attempted to resolve disciplinary matters, and
checked for safety and maintenance problems on behalf
of the Union and the bargaining unit employees in their
respective groups.
The setting of this case, Respondent's Parma plant,
consists of three separate manufacturing facilities: press
metal, engine, and prop shaft. Press metal and engine are
located in the main building. The prop shaft facility is
housed in a separate building located approximately one-
half mile away.
Respondent affords committeemen more freedom of
action than it allows to rank-and-file employees. Thus,
shop committeemen and district committeemen in the
course of their duties are free to travel between the two
buildings and outside the Parma plant without challenge
from Respondent's security personnel. In contrast, rank-
and-file employees are carefully checked for passes if
they travel between the two buildings or leave the
Parma plant during their worktime. Further, unlike the
committeemen who are free to fix their own half hour
lunch and rest periods, the rank-and-file employees have
lunch and rest periods designated by Respondent.
In March, Respondent discharged the three union
committeemen for attempting to defraud it of wages.
The complaint alleged, and the answer denied, that Re-
spondent thereby discriminated against the three employ-
ees because of their union activity and thereby violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
More specifically, the issues raised by these discharges
are whether the discharges ran afoul of the Act because
Respondent was motivated by hostility toward the union
activity of one or more of the alleged discriminatees, or
because imposition of the discharges represented a
stricter enforcement of plant rules against the three em-
ployees only because they were union committeemen.
B. The Discharge
On Monday, March 3, shop committeeman Hamrick
was scheduled to work on the Parma plant's second shift
from 2:30 p.m. to 11 p.m. Unlike the rank-and-file em-
ployees, committeemen did not have assigned lunch peri-
ods. Thus, Hamrick, on that date, took his normal half
hour lunch period at his discretion. Hamrick together
with district committeeman Phillip Miles, left the plant in
Hamrick's car at 7 p.m. and drove a short distance to
Fonti's Lounge. When the two arrived, they found
fellow employee Joseph McAdams, a union district com-
mitteeman on the second shift. Shortly thereafter, about
7:40 p.m., shop committeeman Kenneth Wiechec, who
was scheduled for the same shift, arrived.
The four committeemen remained at the lounge until
10:30 or 10:40 p.m. At that time, committeemen Miles
and Hamrick departed for Respondent's plant in Ham-
rick's car. McAdams returned to the plant in his own
car. Wiechec left Fonti's, but did not return to the plant
that night. Upon their return to the plant, about 10:45
p.m., Hamrick, Miles, and McAdams resumed their
duties. They finished their respective shifts, punched
their timecards, and left the plant.
Prior to March 3, Dennis Puntel, a labor relations rep-
resentative employed by Respondent at its Parma plant,
had on several occasions experienced difficulty contact-
ing shop committeeman Hamrick during the latter's
shift.2 On that date, Puntel told his superior, Labor Rela-
tions Supervisor William Marsh that he suspected that
Hamrick was leaving the plant for extended periods.
Marsh instructed Puntel to "find out more information
about this."
Puntel immediately arranged for surveillance of Ham-
rick's automobile. On the evening of March 3, Puntel,
labor relations representative Kenneth Schultz, and a
plant security officer, lieutenant Roger Pearson, stationed
themselves in their own vehicles in Respondent's parking
lot, watching Hamrick's car. Thereafter, Puntel, Schultz,
and Pearson followed Hamrick's car to Fonti's Lounge.
They remained outside Fonti's until Hamrick and his
companions departed. Puntel, Schultz, and Pearson ob-
served the comings and goings of committeemen Ham-
rick, Miles, and Wiechec, as well as McAdams' depar-
ture from Fonti's Lounge. They also observed Hamrick,
Miles, and McAdams as they returned to the plant.3
During the second shift on March 4, Labor Relations
Supervisors Tom Barnes and William Marsh interviewed
shop committeeman Wiechec regarding his absence from
the plant during the previous day's second shift.4 After
Wiechec listened to the allegations against him, he ad-
mitted that he had not returned to the plant on the previ-
ous evening and had not punched out his timecard. Wie-
chec denied that he intended to defraud Respondent. He
also said that he had intended to reveal his unauthorized
departure from the plant. Wiechec was not disciplined.
On that same day, at approximately 5 p.m., Barnes and
Marsh interviewed committeeman Miles. Miles told
Marsh and Barnes that earlier that day, he had told his
2 The General Counsel urged me to reject Dennis Puntel's testimony
because he could not provide the specific dates or other details regarding
his difficulties in contacting Hamnck and was evasive. However. as
Puntel impressed me as being a frank witness, who provided as much in-
formation as his poor memory would allow, I have credited his testimo-
ny
:' My findings regarding the surveillance are based upon Puntel's and
Pearson's testimony.
This interview as well as similar interviews accorded employees
Hamrick, Miles, and McAdams were referred to in testimony as "76(a)
interviews." This reference is to paragraph 76(a) of the collective-bar-
gaining agreement between General Motors Corporation and the Union's
parent, the UAW. which provides:
When a suspension, layoff or discharge of an employee is contem-
plated, the employe, where circumstances permit, will be offered an
interview to allow him to answer the charges involved in the situa-
tion for which such discipline is being considered before he is re-
quired to leave the plant All employe who, for the purpose of being
interviewed concerning discipline, is called to the plant, or removed
from his work to the foreman's desk or to an office, or called to an
office, may, if he so desires, request the presence of his Distnct
Committeeman to represent him during such interview
935
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
supervisor of the previous evening's extended absence.
Barnes and Marsh spoke of his lengthy visit to Fonti's
Lounge on the previous evening. Miles admitted being
absent from the plant "for personal reasons." Marsh and
Barnes concluded by warning Miles that he was subject
to disciplinary action.
Later in the same shift, Marsh and Barnes interviewed
committeeman McAdams. Marsh and Barnes confronted
McAdams with their account of his activities on the pre-
vious evening. McAdams admitted that he had been
absent from the plant on personal business. He asserted
that prior to the interview he had advised his supervisor
that his time for the previous shift should be reduced in
light of his unauthorized 3-1/2-hour absence on Monday
evening.5 Marsh and Barnes warned McAdams of possi-
ble disciplinary action.6
Respondent excused Hamrick from work on March 4,
for union business. Hamrick did not work on March 5
and 6, because his wife and child were ill. On the after-
noon of Wednesday, March 5, Hamrick telephoned labor
relations representative John Laman at Respondent's
plant. Hamrick stated his intention to be absent that day
and Thursday. He expressed uncertainty about Friday
giving as reason the illness of his wife and child. Ham-
rick also disclosed that he had overextended his lunch on
Monday. Laman inquired as to what time Hamrick had
returned from Fonti's. Hamrick answered "some time
before 1 :00." 7
Soon after Hamrick returned to work on March 7,
Labor Relations Supervisor Barnes notified him that Re-
spondent suspected that he had violated shop rules and
had committed "possible fraud." Hamrick accepted
Barnes' offer of an interview. Later that same day, Labor
Relations Supervisors Barnes and Marsh interviewed
Hamrick, who stated that he was out of the plant for 3-
1/2 hours on the evening of March 3, for "personal" rea-
sons. When asked why he had not told his supervisor
about his absence when he returned to the plant that
evening, Hamrick responded that he had been in a hurry
to get to the bathroom and then anxious to leave quickly
because his child was ill. Barnes or Marsh discussed
Hamrick's conduct in terms of the shop rules and fraud.
Hamrick challenged management's fraud contentions by
pointing out that he had reported his 3-1/2-hour absence
to Labor Relations Representative Laman on March 5.
Before the interview concluded, Respondent's repre-
sentatives notified Hamrick that he was subject to disci-
pline. 8
On March 11, Miles and McAdams each received a
discharge notice entitled "Report of Disciplinary
Action," signed by Labor Relations Supervisor Marsh.
Miles' discharge notice gave the following explanation:
5 McAdams was an acting shop committeeman on Monday, March 3
During that shift, Respondent's labor relations office, which supervised
all shop committeemen, also supervised him.
6 My findings regarding the interviews of Wiechec, Miles. and McA-
dams are based upon Supervisor Barnes' testimony.
7 I based my findings regarding Hamrick's absences on March 4, 5, and
6, and his report to Laman upon Hamrick's testimony
8 My findings regarding Hamrick's interview are based upon his and
Supervisor Barnes' testimony.
You are being discharged for your fraudulent at-
tempt to obtain pay for time on 3/3/80 when you
were off the Company premises and not at work.
You were observed leaving the plant at approxi-
mately 7:01 P.M. Later, at approximately 10:39
P.M., you were observed by three (3) members of
Management as you exited the Fontis [sic] Lounge
at 6365 Pearl Road. Thereafter, at approximately
10:45 P.M., you reentered the plant via the Old
South entrance. You rang your time card out at
11:30 P.M.
McAdams' discharge notice gave a similar explanation
of Respondent's action. On March 12, Hamrick received
a discharge notice with an explanation couched in terms
similar to the above-quoted language.
The three committeemen filed grievances concerning
their discharges. Respondent and the Union concluded a
settlement under which the three were reinstated without
backpay and with a 2-week disciplinary layoff entered on
their respective work records. Respondent reinstated the
three committeemen on April 21. However, Respondent
entered a 2-week disciplinary layoff on their records.
There is evidence of management hostility toward
Hamrick. I find from Miles' undenied testimony that
during the week of March 4, Marsh, in conversation,
stated in substance that but for Hamrick's involvement,
Miles and McAdams would have been charged only
with violation of shop rule 11,9 and would have received
only reprimands for their absences on March 3. At the
end of April, Respondent's assistant personnel director,
Don Durbin told McAdams, that had he not been in-
volved with "a certain individual" on March 3, Respond-
ent would not have discharged him, and that but for
McAdams, Miles and Hamrick would not have been re-
instated.to I credit Miles' undenied testimony that early
in May, Marsh again said that because of Hamrick,
Miles' punishment had been severe.
Respondent's records and credited testimonyi" show
application of shop rule 11 to incidents of unauthorized
absences including instances where the offender did not
punch out his timecard until the end of his shift. One of
the latter incidents occurred on July 6, 1979. On that
date, two supervisors observed Miles lunching at a pizze-
ria near the plant for 70 minutes, 40 minutes more than
Respondent permits. That day, as on March 3, Miles re-
turned to the plant, finished his shift, and then for the
first time punched out. He did not report his excessive
absence to his supervisor.
9 Shop rule II prohibits employees from leaving a department or plant
without permission.
0' My findings regarding Durbin's remarks are based upon McAdams'
testimony. Durbin's denial that he made these remarks was given with
hesitation after he had testified that he did not remember. In contrast,
McAdams gave his testimony in a full and forthright manner.
' According to Donald Hadsall, director of personnel services, Chev-
rolet Central office, if an employee leaves the plant without authorization
and clocks out, shop rule II applies. If an employee leaves the plant
without authorization and claims wages for the period of his unauthor-
ized absence, he or she would be guilty of violating shop rule I and of
fraud. However, Hadsall asserted that this latter misconduct "is all viola-
tive of shop rule #11." Assistant Personnel Director Durbin substantially
corroxborated Hadsall's testimony.
936
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
In its "Report of Disciplinary Action," Respondent
found Miles guilty of violating shop rule 11, "Leaving
own department or the plant during working hours with-
out permission." In the same report, the statement of
misconduct was as follows:
You are being given a disciplinary layoff of the bal-
ance of the shift plus one (1) day for the violation
of shop rule 11 as noted above. You were observed
by members of management being out of the plant
from 7:35 PM until approximately 8:10PM on this
date 7-6-79. Your scheduled lunch period is 7:00
PM until 7:30 PM.
Absent was any charge of attempted fraud.
Respondent's treatment of shop rule 11 violations by
rank-and-file employees differed from the treatment ac-
corded the alleged discriminatees in this case. On five
occasions between October 25, 1974, and December 20,
1978, both dates inclusive, Respondent issued five reports
of disciplinary action against employee Marshall Wil-
liams involving his unauthorized departures from the
plant during his working hours. Each time, Respondent
charged him with violating shop rule I1. In one instance,
he received a disciplinary layoff for the balance of the
shift. In the other four instances, his disciplinary layoffs
were for the balance of the shift plus I or 3 days.
On April 11, General Supervisor Miller and plant se-
curity lieutenant Pearson saw second shift, rank-and-file
employee Marshall Williams leave the plant at 7 p.m.,
enter Mel's Chevy Tavern, and remain there for 54 min-
utes. Miller and Pearson observed Williams leave the
tavern and return to the plant where he arrived at 7:58
p.m. On April 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, and 23, while under sur-
veillance by Pearson and Miller, Williams left the plant
and took lunch periods of excessive lengths without au-
thorization. On April 30, Williams for the first time, re-
ceived a report of disciplinary action covering the last
six incidents which stated:
You are being issued a disciplinary layoff of the bal-
ance of the shift plus two (2) weeks for your aggra-
vated violation of Shop Rule #11. On each of the
aforementioned dates you were observed by mem-
bers of Management leaving the plant, entering
and/or exiting the Anchor Inn Bar and thereafter
reentering the plant. In each instance, you were out
of the plant for an extended period of time and sub-
sequent [sic] rang your time card out at approxi-
mately 11:30 PM. This resulted in your time card
reflecting that you had been at work for the entire
shifts. Your pattern of improper conduct represents
a blatant violation of the specified shop rule.
Reports from plant security lieutenant Pearson show
that on April 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, and 22, he and
members of plant management observed production em-
ployee William Cusick taking excessively long lunch pe-
riods and returning to the plant. Although Respondent
imposed no discipline on Cusick, Labor Relations Super-
visor Marsh testified that Cusick should have been disci-
plined for these violations.
Respondent imposed written reprimands against em-
ployees Thomas E. Dunnington and Jack E. Hinerman
for their respective violations of shop rule 11 in Novem-
ber 1979. In December 1979, Respondent issued a writ-
ten reprimand to James J. Burkart for violating shop rule
11, when he absented himself from the plant without au-
thorization for I hour and 36 minutes after the expiration
of his half hour lunch period. There was no showing that
any rank-and-file employee was ever discharged for a
violation of shop rule 11, or for attempting to defraud
Respondent as part of such a violation.
In September 1979, shop committeeman Gregorekt 2
engaged in the practice of leaving the plant during his
shift, without authorization, to coach the Union's softball
team, returning and punching his timecard out at the end
of his shift. Upon learning of this practice, Respondent
discharged Gregorek for attempted fraud. Following a
grievance proceeding, Gregorek was reinstated. Donald
Hadsall, director of personnel services for General
Motors Corporation's Chevrolet division, conceded that
Hamrick, Miles, and McAdams were the only employees
with otherwise clean records, who were ever discharged
at Respondent's Parma plant for fraud, after extending a
lunch period beyond the authorized limit on one occa-
sion.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
The General Counsel contends first that the record
shows that "protected conduct was a 'motivating factor
in the Respondent's decision"' (G.C. br., p. 3) to dis-
charge Hamrick, Miles, and McAdams.' 3 The General
Counsel also urges that even if the evidence of unlawful
motive is insufficient, I should find that Respondent has
a "dual standard of discipline" which is "inherently de-
structive of employee rights" (G.C. br., p. 9),14 because
it discriminates against the Union's committeemen. 5
Therefore, according to the General Counsel, the appli-
cation of the stricter standard of work rule enforcement
against Hamrick, Miles, and McAdams violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Respondent urges that the
General Counsel has not shown that protected activity
was "a motivating factor in the decision to discharge
Hamrick, Miles, and McAdams. (Resp. br., p. 8)." Re-
spondent also argues that it did not apply a stricter
standard to them; but that if I disagree with that conten-
tion, enforcement of a high standard against the Union's
committeemen was warranted (Resp. br., p. 30). For the
reasons stated below, I find that Respondent's conduct
did not violate the Act.
In Wright Line, the Board held that the General Coun-
sel has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing
that conduct protected by the Act was "a motivating
12 In 1978, Respondent found that Gregorek had left the plant without
authorization, returned and clocked out at the end of his shift. After dis-
charging him for that conduct, Respondent reinstated him after grievance
negotiations with Ihe International Union (UAW), as part of the settle-
ment of Ciregorek's grievance, and agreed that it would not condone
such conduct in the future.
13 See Wright Line, a Division of Wright Line, Inc. 251 NLRB 1083
(1980).
4 See N.LR.B. v. Great Dane Trailers. Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967).
's See, eg, Owens Corning Fiberglas Co., 236 NLRB 479, 480 (1978)
937
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
factor" in an employer's decision to discharge or disci-
pline an employee. Once the General Counsel has made
the required showing, the burden shifts to the employer
to demonstrate that it would have taken the same action
even if the employee had not engaged in protected con-
duct. If the employer does not sustain this burden, its
conduct will be found to be violative of the Act. Id. at
1089.
Applying the teaching of the Board's decision in
Wright Line, I find that the General Counsel did not
make a prima facie showing that the protected activities
of Hamrick, Miles, or McAdams were a motivating
factor in Respondent's decision to discharge them. The
General Counsel does not contend that either Miles' or
McAdams' activities as district committeemen played
any part in Respondent's decision to discharge them or
Hamrick. Instead, it is urged that they were caught in
the trap designed to remove Hamrick, who, in his roles
as shop committeeman and member of the Union's nego-
tiating team, had provoked Respondent to the point of
unlawful discrimination.
The evidence does not show that the hostility mani-
fested by Labor Relations Supervisor Marsh and Assist-
ant Personnel Director Durbin in their remarks to Miles
and McAdams to the effect that they suffered discharge
only because they were with Hamrick on March 3, arose
because of Hamrick's union activity. The record does not
show any linkage between the hostile remarks and Ham-
rick's participation in contract negotiations or his other
union activity. For these remarks did not include any
reference, express or implied, to either Hamrick's partici-
pation in contract negotiations or to his performance as a
shop committeeman. Nor was there any other showing
that Marsh, Durbin, or any other member of Respond-
ent's management ever threatened reprisals because of
Hamrick's union activity, or otherwise showed displeas-
ure because of his union activity. In short, the General
Counsel has not shown that Respondent was hostile
toward Hamrick because of his protected union activity.
The absence of this major element defeated the General
Counsel's effort to show that an unlawful motive precipi-
tated the three discharges in this case.
Nor does the record sustain the General Counsel's fur-
ther position that Respondent's treatment of Hamrick,
Miles, and McAdams was inherently destructive of their
8(a)(3)'6 protected right to hold union office, for I find
that the evidence does not show that Respondent en-
forced its plant rules more stringently against them be-
cause of their status as the Union's committeemen.
Under well-settled Board law, an employer's discharge
of an employee solely because he or she holds a union
office, or solely because of his or her performance of the
duties of that office, is violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act. E.g., General Motors Corporation, 218 NLRB
472, 477 (1975), enfd. 535 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir. 1976).
Accord: N.L.R.B. v. The Gates Rubber Co., 493 F.2d
249, 250 (6th Cir. 1974). The Board has recognized that
16 Sec. 8(aX3) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer:
[the] discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage mem-
bership in any labor organization ....
such discrimination would effectively discourage other
employees from seeking or holding union office. General
Motors, supra, at 477. However, the holding of union
office does not protect an employee from discharge for
violation of shop rules, where the employer "has acted
purely in disinterested defense of shop discipline...."
American Ship Building Co. v. N.L.R.B., 380 U.S. 300,
311 (1965). See also Midwest Precision Casting Company,
244 NLRB 597, 599 (1979).
Here, Respondent discharged committeemen Hamrick,
Miles, and McAdams because they punched their respec-
tive timecards out at the end of their respective work pe-
riods on March 3, and thus, claimed entitlement to wages
for their unauthorized absences. Their companion, dis-
trict committeeman Wiechec escaped punishment be-
cause he did not return to the plant and punch his time-
card out.
The imposition of the discharges was substantially
harsher punishment than Respondent had inflicted on
employees guilty of similar misconduct, prior to or since
March 3. However, Respondent imposed the discharges
after substantiating its suspicion that Hamrick had been
abusing his privileged status in like fashion. Finding that
Miles and McAdams engaged in similar misconduct in
Hamrick's company, Respondent felt obliged to punish
them with the same rigor they applied to Hamrick. Re-
spondent's sentiment in this regard was reflected in
Marsh's and Durbin's subsequent remarks to Miles and
McAdams explaining that they had suffered such harsh
punishment because they were caught with Hamrick.
Respondent reasonably expected Hamrick and the
other committeemen to be available during their shifts to
assist in resolving labor relations problems on the pro-
duction floor. To achieve its purpose, Respondent grant-
ed Hamrick and his colleagues a special status. Respond-
ent relieved them of their usual production or mainte-
nance tasks, but paid them their usual wages for solving
grievances and helping to maintain the industrial peace at
the Parma plant. Further, Respondent granted the shop
and district committeemen freedom of movement denied
to the rank-and-file employees. This privilege was in fur-
therance of Respondent's attempt to enable the commit-
tee to accomplish their labor relations tasks.
In 1978, Respondent saw the possibility that commit-
teemen would abuse their status. In September of that
year, Respondent discovered that shop committeeman
Gregorek had abused his privileges by absenting himself
during his shift, without authorization, returning, and
then clocking out at the end of his shift, Respondent dis-
charged him for attempted fraud. In the negotiations
leading to Gregorek's reinstatement, Respondent ob-
tained the UAW's agreement not to condone such con-
duct. Later, when confronted with the possibility that
shop committeeman Hamrick was also abusing his privi-
leges, Respondent quickly investigated and found him
doing so on March 3, 1980.
In light of the union committeemen's special status,
which made it relatively difficult for management to
locate them, Respondent could lawfully treat their unau-
thorized absences and their failure to record such ab-
sences on their timecards as more serious offenses than
938
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
similar misconduct by rank-and-file employees. I find,
therefore, that Respondent discharged Hamrick, Miles,
and McAdams in the interest of shop discipline, and did
not thereby violate Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.' 7
17 Contrary to the General Counsel. I find that the Board's decision in
General Motors Corporation, Delco Air Conditioning Division, 244 NLRB
729 (1979), does not provide governing precedent here. In that case, the
Board found that the employer resorted to a pretext when it discharged
Robert Mullins, a union shop committeeman, and that the real reason was
"to put a stop to his union activities ... ' Id at 732 In reaching these
findings, the Board looked to the disparity between the discharge im-
posed upon Mullins and the discipline imposed upon other employees for
the same misconduct, evidence of management hostility toward Mullins'
activity as a shop committeeman, including a threat of discharge, man-
agement's attempt to condition his reinstatement, first upon his causing
another shop committeeman to withdraw two pending grievances,
second, upon the union's agreement to a change in the method of select-
ing employees for overtime, and, finally, upon Mullins' resignation as
committeeman Mullins rejected each of the conditions and remained dis-
Accordingly, I shall dismiss the complaint in its entire-
ty.
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue
the follovwing recommended:
ORDER' t
It is ordered that the complaint herein be, and it
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
charged As the facts in the instant case do not shosu the presence of all
unlawfill motive. I find it to he clearly distinguishable from General
Motors Corporation. Delco .ir Conditioning Diviion, supra
Is In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall he deemed waived fior all purposes
939