General Fabrications Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 5, 1999

328 N.L.R.B. 1114 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1114
General Fabrications Corp. and Sheet Metal Workers
International Association of Northern Ohio Lo-
cal Union No. 33, AFL–CIO. Cases 8–CA–29443,
8–CA–29444, 8–CA–29445, 8–CA–29446, 8–CA–
29507, 8–CA–29520, 8–CA–29591, 8–CA–29728,
8–CA–29756, 8–CA–29820, and 8–RC–15667
August 5, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND HURTGEN
On September 17, 1998, Administrative Law Judge
George Carson II issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent and the General Counsel each filed exceptions
and a supporting brief. The General Counsel and the
Charging Party each filed answering briefs to the Re-
spondent’s exceptions. The Charging Party filed an an-
swering brief to the Respondent’s exceptions. The Re-
spondent filed a reply brief to the General Counsel’s and
the Charging Party’s answering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions2
and to adopt the recommended Order.

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
The Respondent also contends, inter alia, that the judge improperly
credited one part, but discredited another part, of employee Gerald
Rahm’s testimony. We note, however, that “nothing is more common
in all kinds of judicial decisions than to believe some and not all” of a
witness’ testimony. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749,
754 (2d Cir. 1950).
The judge found that Supervisor Mike Belch told employee Pitts that
“the doors would not be opened if the Union came in, that the company
would shut down,” in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1). However, as the date
for this conversation is not established, it cannot be determined if it was
made within the critical period. Thus, it cannot be used to support the
Union’s Objection 25 regarding threats of plant closure. We neverthe-
less sustain the Union’s Objection 25 based on the unlawful threat of
plant closure made by the Respondent’s president, Chester (Chet) Bo-
raski during a mid-November 1997 conversation with employees Rahm
and Terry Trushell.
2 The judge’s conclusions of law stated that the Union has been the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative in the appropriate unit
since December 4, 1997, and that by refusing to recognize and bargain
with the Union since that date the Respondent has violated Sec. 8(a)(5).
However, the judge inadvertently failed to find that the Union had
claimed majority status, and requested recognition and bargaining on
December 4, 1997. Union Organizer Matthew Oakes testified, without
contradiction, that on December 4, 1997, he and Business Agent
George Reising spoke with the Respondent’s president, Boraski, and
tried to hand him a letter which he refused to take. Oakes testified that
he then read the letter to Boraski and explained to him “that we repre-
sented a majority of his employees, and we were requesting voluntary
recognition.” Boraski referred them to his attorney. The letter, which
was submitted into evidence, advised Boraski that the Union repre-
sented the majority of the Respondent’s employees and requested rec-
ognition and bargaining.
The Respondent has excepted to the judge’s recom-
mendation that a Gissel3 bargaining order be issued. It
asserts that this remedy would be inappropriate because
the “Union remains a very viable presence at the Com-
pany and most assuredly can obtain a fair rerun election.”
We find no merit in the Respondent’s arguments.
In Gissel, the Supreme Court “identified two types of
employer misconduct that may warrant the imposition of
a bargaining order: ‘outrageous and pervasive unfair
labor practices’ (‘category I’) and ‘less extraordinary
cases marked by less pervasive practices which nonethe-
less still have the tendency to undermine majority
strength and impede the election processes’ (‘category
II’).”4 The Supreme Court stated that in fashioning a
remedy in the exercise of its discretion in category II
cases, the Board

can properly take into consideration the extensiveness
of an employer’s unfair [labor] practices in terms of
their past effect on election conditions and the likeli-
hood of their recurrence in the future. If the Board
finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past
practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun)
by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is
slight and that employee sentiment once expressed
through cards would, on balance, be better protected by
a bargaining order, then such an order should issue.5

In agreeing with the judge that a Gissel bargaining or-
der should be issued, we find, for the reasons set forth
below, that the Respondent’s course of misconduct, both
before and after the election, falls at least into category
II. The Respondents’ unfair labor practices clearly dem-
onstrate that the holding of a fair election in the future
would be unlikely and that the “employees’ wishes are
better gauged by an old card majority than by a new elec-
tion.”6
Because this case falls at least within category II, we
have, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Gissel, ex-
amined the extensiveness of the Respondent’s unfair
labor practices and the likelihood of their recurrence in
the future. In this regard, we observe that the unfair la-
bor practices committed in this case include “hallmark”
violations such as the discharge, layoff, and suspension
of employees who engaged in union activity during the
organizational campaign, as well as threats of job loss,
plant closure, and futility in the event of a union victory.7

3 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
4 Charlotte Amphitheater Corp. v. NLRB, 82 F.3d 1074, 1078 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (quoting Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613–614).
5 395 U.S. at 614–615.
6 82 F.3d at 1078.
7 The term “hallmark violations” has been used to describe unfair la-
bor practices that are highly coercive and have a lasting effect on elec-
328 NLRB No. 166
GENERAL FABRICATIONS CORP. 1115
The Respondent also committed numerous other serious
and pervasive unfair labor practices: more closely moni-
toring union supporters, threatening not to excuse the
absence of a union supporter, restricting union supporters
from talking to other employees, harassing and interro-
gating union supporters, and threatening loss of benefits
and stricter enforcement of company rules.
The coercive effect of the Respondent’s misconduct
cannot be denied. These serious violations, which di-
rectly affected the entire unit, began almost immediately
after the Respondent learned of employees’ union orga-
nizing activity and in one instance continued even after
the election. In this small unit of approximately 31 em-
ployees, the Respondent unlawfully discharged, laid off,
or suspended seven union supporters prior to the elec-
tion, six almost immediately upon learning of the exis-
tence of union activity. This conduct “goes to the very
heart of the Act”8 and is not likely to be forgotten. “Such
action can only serve to reinforce employees’ fear that
they will lose employment if they persist in union activ-
ity.”9 The impact of this action was magnified by its
proximity to the onset of the Union’s organizational ef-
fort. This conduct by the Respondent sent employees
“the unequivocal message that it was willing to go to
extraordinary lengths in order to extinguish the union
organizational effort.” Id. It is reasonable to infer that
such a message will have a lasting effect on the unit em-
ployees’ exercise of their right to organize. Id.
The severity of the misconduct is compounded by the
involvement of high-ranking officials.10 The Respon-
dent’s unfair labor practices emanated from the highest
level officials, with many attributable to the Respon-
dent’s general manager and its owner/president. For
example, on November 4, 1997, shortly after several
employees had signed authorization cards, the Respon-
dent’s owner and president, Chester Boraski, told em-
ployees, inter alia, that employees who were dissatisfied
working for the Respondent should seek work elsewhere
and that he would not build future projects at the San-
dusky facility in the event of a union victory. General
Manager Robert Garba confirmed Boraski’s statement
and also threatened loss of work if the workers proved
“[un]reliable.” Both sets of remarks clearly violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1). In a meeting held shortly thereafter, Boraski
held up the keys to the plant and threatened to close or
move the plant in the event of a union victory. In mid-
January 1998, Boraski made another statement implying
that the employees’ organizational efforts would be fu-
tile. “When the antiunion message is so clearly commu-
nicated by the words and deeds of the highest levels of

tion conditions. See NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, 632 F.2d 208, 212–213
(2d Cir. 1980).
8 NLRB v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (4th Cir. 1941).
9 Consec Security, 325 NLRB 453, 454 (1998).
10 Id. at 454.
management, it is highly coercive and unlikely to be for-
gotten.”11
Although the unlawfully discharged and laid-off em-
ployees are entitled to reinstatement and backpay, these
remedies would not, in our view, erase the coercive ef-
fects of the Respondent’s antiunion conduct. The rein-
stated employees would not likely again risk incurring
the Respondent’s wrath and another period of unem-
ployment by resuming their union activities.
The Respondent’s misconduct continued even after the
election, when the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
by interrogating employee Gerald Rahm regarding
whether he had given an affidavit to the Union in support
of its election objections and directing him to refuse to
do so if asked. An employer’s continuing hostility to-
ward employee rights in its postelection conduct “evi-
dences a strong likelihood of a recurrence of unlawful
conduct in the event of another organizing effort.” Gar-
ney Morris, Inc., 313 NLRB 101, 103 (1993), enfd. 47
F.3d 1161 (3d Cir. 1995).
In this case, there is no claim that a Gissel order is not
warranted because of the passage of time between the
Gissel order and the unfair labor practices which justified
it, or because of the intervening turnover of employees
and management. These issues which have concerned
some courts in denying enforcement of our Gissel or-
ders12 are not present here. There has been a relatively
short time period between the unfair labor practices and
the issuance of this Order, and there is no evidence of
any substantial turnover of management or employees,
other than that caused by the Respondent’s unlawful dis-
charge of several union supporters.13 Indeed, the Re-
spondent does not even argue that changed circum-
stances preclude the issuance of a bargaining order.14
11 Id. See Electro-Voice, 320 NLRB 1094, 1096 (1996); America’s
Best Quality Coatings Corp., 313 NLRB 470, 472 (1993), enfd. 44 F.3d
516 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 515 U.S 1158 (1995).
12 For example, the District of Columbia Circuit has stated that to
justify the imposition of a Gissel bargaining order, the Board must:
find that a bargaining order is necessary at the time it is issued and
support its finding with a “reasoned explanation that will enable the
reviewing court to determine from the Board’s opinion (1) that it
gave due consideration to the employees’ section 7 rights, which are,
after all, one of the fundamental purposes of the Act, (2) why it con-
cluded that other purposes must override the rights of the employees
to choose their bargaining representatives and (3) why other reme-
dies, less destructive of employees’ rights, are not adequate.”
Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1998)(emphasis in original), quoting NLRB v. Charlotte Amphitheater,
82 F.3d at 1078 (citations omitted).
13 “It would defy reason to permit an employer to deflect a Gissel
bargaining order on the ground of employee turnover when that turn-
over has resulted from the employer’s unlawful discharge[s].” NLRB v.
Balsam Village Management Co., 792 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1986).
14 The District of Columbia Circuit made clear in Charlotte Amphi-
theater that the burden is on a respondent to bring to the Board’s atten-
tion evidence of changed circumstances that would mitigate the need
for a bargaining order. Thus, the court stated that before issuing a
bargaining order, “the Board has no affirmative duty to inquire whether
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1116
In concluding that a Gissel order is warranted, we have
examined its appropriateness under the circumstances
existing at the present time and we have considered the
inadequacy of other remedies. See, e.g., Flamingo Hil-
ton-Laughlin v. NLRB, 148 F.3d at 1173. Further, as
discussed below, we have given due consideration to the
employees’ Section 7 rights, another concern expressed
by some courts.15
In Gissel, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
advanced by the employers that a bargaining order is a
punitive remedy that “needlessly prejudices employees’
Section 7 rights.” 395 U.S. at 612. The Court stated that
a bargaining order not only deters “future misconduct,”
but also remedies “past election damage.” Id. The Court
reasoned as follows:

If an employer has succeeded in undermining a union’s
strength and destroying the laboratory conditions nec-
essary for a fair election, he may see no need to violate
a cease-and-desist order by further unlawful activity.
The damage will have been done, and perhaps the only
fair way to effectuate employee rights is to re-establish
the conditions as they existed before the employer’s
unlawful campaign.33 There is, after all, nothing per-
manent in a bargaining order, and if, after the effects of
the employer’s acts have worn off, the employees
clearly desire to disavow the union, they can do so by
filing a representation petition. For, as we have pointed
out long ago, in finding that a bargaining order in-
volved no “injustice to employees who may wish to
substitute for the particular union some other . . . ar-
rangement,” a bargaining relationship “once rightfully
established must be permitted to exist and function for
a reasonable period in which it can be given a fair
chance to succeed,” after which the “Board may, . . .
upon a proper showing, take steps in recognition of
changed situations which might make appropriate
changed bargaining relationships.” [395 U.S. at 612–
613 (quoting Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702,
705–706 (1944).]
_________________________
33 It has been pointed out that employee rights are affected
whether or not a bargaining order is entered, for those who desire
representation may not be protected by an inadequate rerun elec-
tion, and those who oppose collective bargaining may be preju-
diced by a bargaining order if in fact the union would have lost an
election absent employer coercion. [Citation omitted.] Any ef-
fect will be minimal at best, however, for there “is every reason
for the union to negotiate a contract that will satisfy the majority,
for the union will surely realize that it must win the support of the
employees, in the face of a hostile employer, in order to survive
the threat of a decertification election after a year has passed.”
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elec-
tions Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev.
38, 135 (1964).

employee turnover or the passage of time has attenuated the effects of
earlier unfair labor practices.” 82 F.3d at 1080.
15 See fn. 12, supra.

This passage clearly shows that in approving the
Board’s use of the bargaining order remedy in category I
and II cases, the Gissel Court explicitly took into account
the rights of employees both who favored and opposed
union representation. The Court stated that if an em-
ployer’s unfair labor practices have the tendency to un-
dermine a union’s majority strength and destroy election
conditions, then “the only fair way to effectuate em-
ployee rights” is to issue a bargaining order.16 In these
circumstances, the interests of the employees favoring
unionization are safeguarded by the bargaining order.
The interests of those opposing the union are adequately
safeguarded by their right to file a decertification petition
pursuant to Section 9(c)(1) of the Act. On the other
hand, if the facts of a case fall within category III, i.e.,
the employer committed only “minor or less extensive
unfair labor practices” with only a “minimal impact on
the election machinery,” then a bargaining order may not
issue, notwithstanding the fact that a majority of employ-
ees signed authorization cards in support of the union.
395 U.S. at 615.
In sum, the Gissel opinion itself reflects a careful bal-
ancing of the employees’ Section 7 rights “to bargain
collectively” and “to refrain from” such activity. There-
fore, if a bargaining order has been adequately justified
under the Gissel standards, then we respectfully submit
that due consideration has been given to the employees’
Section 7 rights consistent with the concerns expressed
by the District of Columbia Circuit.
Accordingly, for all these reasons, we agree with the
judge that a Gissel bargaining order is an appropriate and
necessary remedy in this case.17
16 The Court observed, 15 years earlier, in Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S.
96, 103 (1954), that the Act placed “a nonconsenting minority under
the bargaining responsibility of an agency selected by a majority of the
workers.” Thus, the statute itself subordinates the rights of the minority
to those of the majority. See Sec. 9(a) of the Act.
17 Our dissenting colleague would not grant a bargaining order at this
time, but would reserve judgment on the Gissel bargaining order until
after the election results in the representation case are known. Further,
he would consider granting such an order only in the event the union
lost the election. It is, however, well settled that the Union is entitled to
both a bargaining order and a certification of representative in the event
the revised tally of ballots shows that it won the election. See, e.g.,
A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil, 309 NLRB 480 (1992), enfd. in relevant part 28 F.3d
103 (2d Cir. 1994); Dlubak Corp., 307 NLRB 1138, 1177 (1992), enfd.
5 F.3d 1488 (3d Cir. 1993); Eddyleon Chocolate Co., 301 NLRB 887,
892 (1991); Marion Center Supply, 277 NLRB 262 fn. 2 (1985); Re-
gency Manor Nursing Home, 275 NLRB 1261 fn. 5 (1985); Gordons-
ville Industries, 252 NLRB 563, 604 (1980); Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 239
NLRB 1044, 1045 (1978); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 230
NLRB 766 (1977); Pope Maintenance Corp., 228 NLRB 326, 348
(1977).
Demi’s Leather Co., 321 NLRB 966 (1996), on which our dissenting
colleague relies, is not inconsistent with these cases. The Board, in the
particular circumstances of that case, merely postponed a determination
as to whether a bargaining order was appropriate until after the election
issues were resolved but made it clear that the case was to be trans-
ferred back to the Board after the issuance of a revised tally of ballots.
There is no suggestion in Demi’s Leather that the results of the election
GENERAL FABRICATIONS CORP. 1117
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, General Fabrications Corp.,
Sandusky, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in that Order.
IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that Case 8–RC–15667 is
severed from Cases 8–CA–29443, 8–CA–29444, 8–CA–
29445, 8–CA–29446, 8–CA–29507, 8–CA–29520, 8–
CA–29591, 8–CA–29728, 8–CA–29756, and 8–CA–
29820, and that it is remanded to the Regional Director
for Region 8 for action consistent with this Decision.

MEMBER HURTGEN, concurring and dissenting in part.
My colleagues have issued a Gissel bargaining order.
I would not do so at this time.
In Gissel, 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969), the Supreme
Court approved the Board’s use of the bargaining order,
in certain circumstances. The Court’s language was as
follows:

If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the ef-
fects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or
a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though
present, is slight and that employee sentiment once ex-
pressed through cards would, on balance, be better pro-
tected by a bargaining order, then such an order should
issue.

Id. at 614–615.
Thus, a Gissel order is based on a finding that a fair
election (here a rerun) cannot likely be held. In the in-
stant case, there may be no rerun election at all. In the
election of January 20, there were 13 votes cast for, and
14 votes against, the Union. There were four challenged
ballots. The challenges to all of these ballots are now
overruled. These ballots include ballots of three of the
discriminatees. Thus, there is at least a reasonable possi-
bility that the Union has won the election, a certification
of the Union will issue and no new election will be held.
In addition, Gissel orders are reserved for those cases
where the employer’s unfair labor practices “have in fact
undermined a union’s majority.”1 As discussed above,
the Union here may have retained its majority status in
the election.
In sum, it may well be that the extraordinary remedy of
a Gissel bargaining order is not required. More impor-
tantly, in light of the Gissel language, such an order is
wholly inappropriate at the present time.2

would have any bearing on the Board’s final determination as to
whether a bargaining order should be granted. By contrast, our dissent-
ing colleague states that he will consider the propriety of the bargaining
order remedy only “if the Union has lost.”
1 See DTR Industries v. NLRB, 39 F.3d 106, 112 (1994).
2 See Demi’s Leather Corp., 321 NLRB 966, 967 (1996).
Thus, I would reserve judgment on the Gissel bargain-
ing order until after the election results in the representa-
tion case are known.3
My colleagues seek to distinguish Demi’s Leather, su-
pra. The effort is unsuccessful. As in that case, I am
simply not passing on the Gissel issue at this time. As in
that case, the instant case should be returned to the Board
after the issuance of a revised tally of ballots. As indi-
cated above, if the Union has lost, I would then decide
the Gissel issue.
To the extent that other cases (all pre-Demi’s Leather)
are inconsistent with Demi’s Leather, I would follow
Demi’s Leather. It is based upon the aforementioned
language of Gissel. That is, the Supreme Court contem-
plated that Gissel orders could be issued in cases where
the election has not yet been held or in cases where the
union lost the election and that election is being set aside.
The Court did not contemplate a Gissel order where the
Union wins the election and is certified.

Paul C. Lund, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Timothy C. McCarthy, Esq., for the Respondent.
Richard P James, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE CARSON II, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was heard in Port Clinton, Ohio, on June 8 through 12, 1998,1
pursuant a consolidated complaint that issued on May 6, 1998.2
The complaint, as amended, alleges various violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act and the discriminatory treatment of two
employees and the termination of five employees in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The suspension and termination of a
sixth employee is alleged as a violation of both Section 8(a)(3)
and (4) of the Act. The complaint requests that the remedy
include a bargaining order and alleges violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act as a result of Respondent’s refusal to recog-
nize the Union and two unilateral changes. On May 13, 1998,
the Regional Director issued an order that directed a hearing on
objections and challenged ballots in Case 8–RC–15667 and
consolidated that case for hearing with the unfair labor practice
cases. Respondent’s answer denies all violations of the Act.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel, Respondent, and the Charging Party, I
make the following
3 If the Union has lost the election, I would then decide the issue of
whether to hold a second election or issue a Gissel order.
1 All dates are 1997 unless otherwise indicated.
2 The charges in Cases 8–CA–29443, 8–CA–29444, 8–CA–29445,
and 8–CA–29446 were all filed on November 5. The charge in Cases
8–CA–29443 was amended on April 24, 1998; the charge in Case 8–
CA–29507 was filed on November 28 and was amended on December
29; the charge in Case 8–CA–29520 was filed on December 4 and was
amended on April 24, 1998; the charge in Case 8–CA–29591 was filed
on January 7, 1998; the charge in Case 8–CA–29728 was filed on
March 10, 1998, and amended on April 24, 1998; the charge in Case 8–
CA–29756 was filed on March 18, 1998, and the charge in Case 8–CA–
29820 was filed on April 8, 1998, and amended on April 24, 1998.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1118
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, General Fabrications Corp., a corporation,
is engaged in the design, fabrication, and installation of spray
washers, dry-off ovens, bake ovens, paint booths, conveyers,
and other related systems at its facility in Sandusky, Ohio, at
which it annually purchases and receives goods valued in ex-
cess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the State of
Ohio. The Respondent admits, and I conclude and find, that it is
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The Respondent admits, and I conclude and find, that Sheet
Metal Workers International Association of Northern Ohio,
Local Union No. 33, AFL–CIO (the Union) is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
General Fabrications Corp., the Respondent, is the family
business of Chester (Chet) Boraski who established it in 1982.
His wife Carol serves as personnel director. During 1997, his
daughter worked part time, although the record does not iden-
tify her position. Respondent operates out of two buildings,
referred to as plant 1 and plant 2. In October, approximately 8
unit employees worked in plant 1 and approximately 16 worked
in plant 2. An additional seven unit employees regularly per-
formed installation work in the field. Employees who regularly
worked at the plants would, on occasion, be sent into the field.
Plant 1, the smaller building, contains the electrical depart-
ment where electrical panels necessary to operate the equip-
ment fabricated in plant 2 are constructed. Plant 1 also contains
the shearing machine, which cuts metal, and the breaking ma-
chine, which bends the metal to prescribed specifications. Plant
1 is also where panels for the ovens are built. In October, eight
employees regularly worked in plant 1 including three electri-
cians and one helper, the operator of the shearing machine, the
operator of the breaking machine, and two oven panel builders.
The office of Electrical Engineering Manager Arnold Kath is
located in plant 1.
Plant 2, the larger building, is the fabrication facility where
the metal pieces are welded together to make washer tanks,
paint booths, and ovens. The 16 employees who perform this
work are classified as welder/fabricators and laborers. Respon-
dent’s top managers, other than Kath, had offices located in
plant 2. In 1997, this included President Boraski, General Man-
ager Robert Garba, Plant Manager Mike Tyree, and Shift Su-
pervisor Mike Belch.
In late October, employee Frank Mikolay contacted the Un-
ion. On October 29, Union Organizer Matt Oakes held a meet-
ing that was attended by employees Mikolay, Davin Jones, Ed
Collins, James Roberts, Chris Wade, and Terry Trushell. All
the employees except Trushell signed union authorization
cards. The employees were given union literature to read and to
distribute to their fellow employees. On October 31, Oakes
conducted a second union meeting. This meeting was attended
by employees Mikolay, Bryan Cloud, John Johnson, Ron
Fields, Jeremiah Pitts, Bill Harvey, and Bill Montgomery. All
of the employees signed union authorization cards, with the
exception of Mikolay who had signed a card on October 29.
The employees were given union literature to read and to dis-
tribute to their fellow employees.
B. Supervisory Status of Kyle Perkins
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that Kyle Per-
kins was a supervisor. Perkins was introduced as the supervisor
of the short-lived second shift in October, and the record re-
flects that he issued documents purporting to be warnings to
second-shift employees on October 30 and November 11 and
14. Upon the termination of second shift, sometime before
Christmas, Perkins became a leadman on first shift. Although
he retained a key to the office, there is no probative evidence
that Perkins exercised any supervisory authority after the sec-
ond shift was discontinued. Since all of the threats attributed to
him occurred when Perkins was a leadman on first shift, it is
unnecessary for me to address his authority on second shift.
C. Knowledge of Union Activity
The union literature distributed at the October 29 and 31
meetings was distinctively colored and included fliers printed
on red, yellow, and green paper. On October 30, Davin Jones,
who worked in plant 2, gave copies of the literature he had been
given at the October 29 meeting to fellow employees including
Freeman Hunter and an employee he identified as Thomas,
presumably electrician Thomas Searcy. Searcy normally
worked in plant 1 but, at that time, was performing electrical
work in plant 2. Searcy’s receipt of literature from Jones on
October 30 is not inconsistent with his thereafter, on November
4, asking fellow electricians Fields and Johnson whether they
had attended any union meetings. Jones also talked to other
employees, including Jeremiah Pitts and Gerald Rahm, urging
them to come to the next meeting. He placed the remaining
literature on his welding machine, in plain view, with his weld-
ing helmet. During the course of the day, employee Terry
Trushell, who had attended the union meeting but who had not
signed an authorization card, spoke with General Manager Bob
Garba. As they were talking to each other, Trushell and Garba
were looking directly at Jones. On this same day, Boraski,
Garba, Plant Manager Tyree, and Supervisor Mike Belch met
together in the lunchroom. When the meeting concluded, they
all came down the stairs and walked around the floor in plant 2.
On October 30, in plant 1, Ed Collins distributed literature to
electrician Ron Fields and electrician helper Bryan Cloud. He
left the remaining leaflets on his toolbox which was located at
the end of the long table upon which he worked. James Roberts
gave leaflets to electrician John Johnson and shearing machine
operator Bill Harvey. He placed the remaining leaflets in his
lunchbox.
I do not credit Boraski’s uncorroborated testimony that he
first learned of the union organizational activity on or about
November 5 or 6, when Plant Manager Garba brought some
union literature to him. Garba, who testified on behalf of Re-
spondent and is Respondent’s general manager, was not asked
to confirm either that this transaction had occurred or the date
upon which Boraski claimed it had occurred. Garba did not
deny conversing with employee Trushell and looking at Jones
while doing so. None of the managers involved in the lunch-
room meeting on October 30, who thereafter walked throughout
the plant, denied either the meeting or their subsequent conduct.
Neither Tyree nor Belch was asked when he became aware of
the employees’ union organizational activities. Neither Tyree
nor Belch denied observing the union literature that Jones had
placed on his welding machine on October 30.
GENERAL FABRICATIONS CORP. 1119
Boraski acknowledged being a “hands on” manager, regu-
larly walking through both plants. Several times he referred to
Respondent being a “small company,” and he testified that
supervisors reported anything out of the realm of every day
business to him. Employees confirmed that managers and su-
pervisors were regularly on the floor in plants 1 and 2.
I find that the open union activity of employee Jones in plant
2 came to Respondent’s attention on October 30. Thereafter, on
either October 30 or 31, Respondent became aware of the open
union activity of Collins and Roberts in plant 1. Jones was dis-
charged on October 30, a Thursday. Collins and Roberts were
permanently laid off on Monday, November 3.
D. The November 4 Meeting and Alleged Threats
Respondent held a meeting of its employees on November 4,
at which they were addressed by Boraski and General Manager
Garba. Boraski, whom I do not credit, testified that he held the
meeting after he had received unsolicited telephone calls on
four or five occasions, beginning in late September and con-
tinuing until November 3. In two of these, he said he only heard
cuss words, no threats were made. He testified that the caller
was a male and that he suspected he was an employee, although
he could not identify his voice. In one of the earlier calls, he
states the caller threatened to “kick his ass.” In a call a week or
10 days prior to November 3, he testified that the caller referred
to seeing that he was “still working late,” and asked, “[A]ren’t
you scared to be there?” On November 3, he testified that the
caller referred to Carol Boraski walking around the plant and
stated that “they’re gonna get me and my family.”
Boraski’s remarks, which were taped by Mikolay, are as fol-
lows:

Gentlemen, I don’t know what’s going on. I’m not in a
very good mood this morning. Number one, I was up late
last night and early this morning. I probably only got a
couple hours of sleep. Myself and my family have been
threatened, and I’m going to tell you right now I will not
succumb to any threats from anybody. I apologize to the
employees who are here that shouldn’t be here, who are
here everyday, work hard, trustworthy, dependable, please
accept my apology. When you hired in, whoever inter-
viewed you, you said that you would work, you wanted
the job, that you would work, be here every day, work
hard, we said that we would pay you this much, you said
fine, we said fine. This is what you call an at will em-
ployment. That at will employment is that you can leave at
any time, and we can dismiss you at any time. In the past
eight to eleven months our attendance is the worst in San-
dusky, our work ethic had dropped after a lot of years, you
older people know what I’m talking about. If you don’t
want to work here the front door is right there and down-
stairs. If you don’t want to work here and you want an-
other job see me. I will help you find a job. I’ve got many
contacts in Sandusky. I’ll be more than happy to help you
get another job. But I will not succumb to a threat of any
kind or from anybody. We got new projects, orders for
projects. These projects will not be built in Sandusky,
Ohio, as of this point in time, they will not. Any future or-
ders will not be built in Sandusky, Ohio. I will not suc-
cumb to a threat of any kind from anybody.
MIKOLAY: What kind of threat are you exactly talking
about Chet?
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: I’m confused here Chet, what
exactly is going on?
BORASKI: I don’t know what’s going on, the only thing
I know is that it’s got to stop I will not bring another pro-
ject into this plant at all until the following improves:
Number one, the person or persons who are making the
threats to myself and my family come see me. That’s
number one. Those of you know, that’s number one.

Following these remarks, Boraski commented upon the need
to improve attendance, productivity, and trustworthiness and
dependability, referring to a cash shortage in the candy box.
Candy was dispensed on the honor system from a box instead
of being vended from a machine. Following Boraski’s remarks,
Garba addressed the employees. He began his remarks by stat-
ing that is was a shame that “we can’t have a box of candy bars
laying around.” He continued stating:

What happens here I guess depends on what every-
body in this room does. Whether the work is brought in
here or if we all have jobs. I want to work here, I’ve got
over ten years in this company. I want to stay here, I want
to retire from this company. I don’t know how everyone
else feels, but that’s important to me, stability.
MIKOLAY: Hold on real quick, I got something I’d like
to bring up real quick. We’re not going to be bringing no
more jobs in here?
GARBA: No.
MIKOLAY: So we’re shutting down? That’s is that what
you’re basically saying?
GARBA: That depends on everybody here. That de-
pends on how—depends on how productive we are, ah,
how reliable we are.

I do not credit Boraski’s testimony that the foregoing re-
marks were made in response to alleged physical threats he had
supposedly received. In addition to his unconvincing testimony
regarding the alleged physical threats, Boraski never informed
the employees that the purported threats related to potential
physical harm or that they were made by telephone. Mikolay
asked what kind of threat he was talking about, but Boraski did
not respond to him. His failure to state the nature to the alleged
threats that he had purportedly received, coupled with his
threats not to build any more projects in Sandusky, indicate that
Boraski was responding not to physical threats, but to an eco-
nomic threat. Following the meeting, Mikolay went to Bo-
raski’s office and again asked him about the threats. Boraski,
without referring to the threats, asked Mikolay “who made
[him] the spokesman.” He then noted that he might have made
a mistake by letting Mikolay, who had been injured, return to
work on light duty. Mikolay told Boraski that it was he who
had called the Union. Boraski told Mikolay to go back to work.
Boraski did not state that the Union was not the threat he was
talking about. Boraski’s questioning Mikolay as to who made
him the spokesman reveals that Boraski was not expecting an
individual confession to telephone calls; he was expecting a
representative of an institution, the Union. He was surprised
that it was Mikolay, and he asked who had made Mikolay the
spokesman.
The conclusion that Boraski was referring to a threat of un-
ionization is confirmed by examination of his remarks. There
would be no reason for Boraski to refer to employees’ dissatis-
faction with their wages if an unidentified person had stated
that he was going to “kick” or “get” Boraski. He did not testify
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1120
that the person who allegedly called him made any remark
connecting wages to the alleged threat to “get” him. Despite the
absence of any mention of wages in regard to the alleged
threats, Boraski informed employees that “we said that we
would pay you this much, you said fine, we said fine.” A physi-
cal threat would not prompt a comment about wages. I can find
no explanation, other than an economic threat, for that com-
ment followed by the pointed statement, “This is what you call
an at will employment. . . . If you don’t want to work here the
front door is right there and downstairs.”
Boraski told the employees three separate times that he
would not succumb to a threat of any kind from anybody. Not-
withstanding his announced refusal to succumb to any threats,
he advised the employees that no current or future orders would
be build in Sandusky, an action that would contradict his vow
not to succumb to any threats, assuming that the threats were
physical rather than economic. If Boraski had received physical
threats to which he would not succumb, Respondent would
continue to conduct business as usual, with the possible addi-
tion of some sort of plant security. The announced intention not
to build future orders at the Sandusky plant is inconsistent with
Boraski’s vow not to succumb to physical threats. It is, how-
ever, a consistent response if Boraski were responding to what
he perceived as an economic threat, and his reference to wages
confirms that he perceived the threat to be economic. Boraski
stated that his family had been threatened. Rather than succumb
to the threat of unionization of the business at which his family
worked, Boraski would remove all work from the unit, thereby
depriving the Union of its organizational objective.
The complaint alleges that Boraski’s remarks gave employ-
ees the impression that their union activities were under surveil-
lance. Consistent with this, the General Counsel and the Charg-
ing Party note this alleged violation in their briefs; however, no
convincing argument in support of a violation is set forth. I am
unable to reconcile an alleged impression of surveillance with
the contention that Respondent became aware of employee
union activity as a result of open conversations and the display
of distinctively colored union literature in the plant on October
30 and 3l. Accordingly, I shall recommend that this allegation
be dismissed.
The complaint further alleges that Boraski’s suggestion that
employees who were dissatisfied working for Respondent
should seek work elsewhere violated the Act. The Board has
consistently held that suggestions that union supporters who are
dissatisfied with their terms and conditions of employment seek
work elsewhere violate the Act. Tualatin Electric, 312 NLRB
129, 134 (1993). Boraski’s reference to employee dissatisfac-
tion and specific directions to the plant door conveyed a clear
message: Employees who supported the Union should quit. In
so doing, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Boraski’s threat not to build current or future projects at Re-
spondent’s Sandusky facility constituted a threat of loss of
work and, as also alleged in the complaint, impressed upon the
employees the futility of seeking union representation and,
therefore, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Garba’s confirmation that Boraski was not going to bring
any further work into the plant, together with his response that,
whether Respondent shut down depended upon how “reliable”
the employees were, constituted threats of loss of work and
closure in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
E. Alleged Discrimination Against Specific Employees
1. Davin Jones
a. Facts
Davin (D.J.) Jones was Respondent’s highest paid
welder/fabricator. He was hired at $11.50 an hour on Septem-
ber 15. At a meeting in late September, Boraski complimented
the employees upon their work, advised that business was quite
good, that this was the time to “buy a car.” He specifically
complimented Jones, stating, “I wish I had three or four more
guys like you, D.J.”3 Jones moved his family to Ohio from
Michigan the last weekend in September. Although employees
had been requested to work overtime that Saturday, Jones had
explained his situation to Garba who removed him from the
schedule. On Thursday, October 30, Supervisor Belch asked
Jones if he could work over, and Jones responded that he could
not, reminding Belch that he had spoken with him earlier, that
October 30 was his wife’s birthday. Near the end of the shift,
Belch told Jones that Garba wanted to speak with him. Jones
went to Garba’s office. Garba told Jones: “I’m going to have to
terminate you.” Jones asked what he was being terminated for,
and Garba responded, “Absenteeism.” Jones asked how that
was possible since his wife dropped him off and picked him up
every day. Garba mentioned leaving early, and Jones noted that
he had never left a regular shift without permission from a su-
pervisor and that, when working on Saturday, when no supervi-
sors or foreman was present, he left with other employees.
Jones was shown no document. Jones had no prior disciplinary
or corrective action with regard to either performance or atten-
dance.
Jones returned the next day to get his tools. He saw Boraski
and asked to speak with him. They spoke in Boraski’s office.
Jones questioned how he could be discharged for poor atten-
dance, noting that his wife brought him to work and that any
time he needed to leave early he had obtained permission.
Boraski responded, “You should have thought about that be-
fore—before this happened.” Jones asked, “[B]efore what hap-
pened.” Boraski did not respond.
General Manager Garba testified that it came to his attention
that Jones had, on a Saturday in October, left work early.
Thereafter, he did not specify when, he took it upon himself to
review Jones’ timecards. Garba acknowledged that he does not
normally review employee timecards. The review revealed that
on Saturday, October 11, and Saturday, October 18, Jones had
worked 4, not 8 hours. Garba did not check the timecards of
any other employees who had worked those Saturdays. At the
hearing, Respondent offered some, but not all, timecards of
employees who had worked on those Saturdays. Garba asserted
that he noticed that Jones left on October 11 since only three
employees worked, Jones, Gerald Rahm, and Mike Griggs.
This was incorrect since employee Joe Theriault was also pre-
sent. Theriault filled out a report dated October 11 noting that
Rahm was late. Griggs, a leadman and the ranking employee,
did not report Jones for leaving early, although leadmen did
document attendance as reflected by a report from Griggs on
October 18 that Rahm reported late and a report from Leadman
Matt Stookey on September 23 that Rahm left early. There is
no document reflecting that Jones’ departure after 4 hours on

3 Boraski acknowledges stating, “[W]e need three or four people like
we hired.” I credit the testimony of Jones, Collins, Roberts, Fields, and
Pitts that Boraski mentioned “D.J.”
GENERAL FABRICATIONS CORP. 1121
October 11 or 18 was improper. After terminating Jones, Garba
prepared a memorandum dated October 31 upon which he lists
Jones alleged attendance derelictions. In addition to the pur-
ported early departures on October 11 and 18, that document
reflects one instance of arriving late by 3 minutes on September
25, leaving 33 minutes early on September 20, 5 minutes early
on September 26, and 30 minutes early on October 14. No
document reflects that any of the foregoing were unexcused. At
the hearing, Garba incredibly testified that Jones missed an
entire day of work on October 25; however, he neglected to
include this date on the list he prepared on October 31. No list
was shown to Jones on October 30. Although Garba testified
that he consulted with Boraski before terminating Jones, Bo-
raski did not testify to any such consultation.
Boraski testified that he was unaware of any termination for
absenteeism when the employee had not missed a complete day
of work. Documentary evidence reflects two prior terminations
for poor attendance in 1997. Greg Willis, who had been hired
on July 8, was discharged on August 4 after missing 2 days of
work, leaving early once, and reporting late on three occasions.
The file of Mark Milner, who was also hired on July 8, initially
reflected that he quit on July 18. The “quit” notation has lines
marked through it and the word “discharged” has been written
in. Carol Boraski testified that her assistant recorded all cessa-
tions of employment as quit, “she put that on all of them;”
however, this testimony is incorrect since the document regard-
ing Willis clearly states “discharge” in the same handwriting as
the “quit” on Milner’s document. Carol Boraski confirmed that
she changed Milner’s record several weeks after the event oc-
curred, and she acknowledged that she had no personal knowl-
edge of the situation. Milner’s timecard does not reflect that he
reported to work on July 18. The document prepared by his
supervisor reflects that it was prepared a 7 a.m. on July 18, and
that Milner was “missing work all the time.” Assuming this was
a discharge, it occurred after a 3 hour unexcused tardy on July
17 and failure to report at all on the day of discharge, July 18.
b. Analysis and concluding findings
In assessing the evidence under the analytical framework of
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981). I find that Jones did engage in union activity and
that Respondent became aware of that activity, possibly by a
report from employee Trushell, and certainly through observa-
tion of the leaflets that Jones placed on his welding machine.
Confirmation of Respondent’s knowledge is established by the
circumstances surrounding the discharge. The November 4
threats by Boraski and Garba establish animus. I find that the
General Counsel has carried the burden of proving that Re-
spondent’s animus towards employee union activity was a sub-
stantial and motivating factor in the discharge of Jones.
Respondent’s discriminatory motivation is confirmed by the
timing of the termination and Garba’s false testimony that
Jones failed to work on Saturday, October 25, a date that he did
not record on his postdischarge memorandum. Electronic Data
Systems Corp., 305 NLRB 219 (1991); Adco Electric, 307
NLRB 1113, 1128 (1992); Associacion Hospital del Maestro,
291 NLRB 198, 204 (1988). Supervisor Belch was unaware of
any intent to discharge Jones; he had asked him to work over-
time on October 30. The failure of Garba to speak with Jones’
supervisor or to confront Jones regarding any specific date
establishes the absence of a meaningful investigation. K & M
Electronics, 283 NLRB 279, 291 (1987). Jones had received no
discipline for misconduct or absenteeism at any time during his
tenure of employment. No document reflects that any absence
was unexcused. Jones was shown no document, and Garba did
not prepare his list until the following day. Jones credibly testi-
fied that, on the occasions that he left a regular shift, he had
permission from Garba. Whenever he left early on Saturday, he
left with other employees. The ranking employees who worked
on Saturday, including Griggs on October 11, never reported
that any action taken by Jones was improper.
Boraski was unaware of any employee terminated without
missing an entire day of work. Employee Willis, in less than a
month, missed 2 complete days of work and had a continuous
tardiness problem. Even accepting the questionable records
relating to employee Milner, he was 3 hours late 1 day and was
terminated the following day when he did not report at all.
Jones attendance had been perfect over the 2 workweeks fol-
lowing October 18. No supervisor ever spoke with Jones re-
garding any occasion he purportedly left early for the simple
reason that he had permission to leave on each occasion. The
record establishes Jones did not improperly leave work early on
either October 11 or 18. Garba falsely testified that Jones
missed work on October 25, a date he did not place on his
memorandum.
A complete Wright Line analysis is applicable in dual motive
cases. When the reason given for an action is either false, or
does not exist, the General Counsel’s prima facia case is unre-
butted, thus, there is no need for further analysis. Limestone
Apparel Corp., 255 NLRB 722 (1981). I find that absenteeism,
the reason advanced by Respondent for the discharge, was false
and a pretext for terminating Jones because of his union activ-
ity. Respondent, by terminating Davin Jones because of his
union activity, violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Ed Collins and James Roberts
a. Facts
Ed Collins began working for Respondent on December 23,
1996. He applied for the job in response to a newspaper adver-
tisement for welder/fabricators. Collins had previously worked
at the Sterling Foundry for 11 years, from which he had been
laid off in 1990. At the time he applied for work with Respon-
dent, Collins presented three certificates reflecting his training
as a welder. He was not asked to take a welding test. Initially,
Collins worked in plant 2, fabricating wash tanks. On April 21,
he was made leadman over oven panel fabrication and trans-
ferred to plant 1.
James Roberts began working for Respondent on June 9. He
had formerly been a foreman at Sandusky Cabinets, but was
laid off. He was initially assigned to the shearing machine and
then assigned to oven panel fabrication with Collins.
Oven panel production is dependent upon the availability of
the materials needed to fabricate the panels. Both Collins and
Roberts confirmed that their work was directly dependent upon
the parts provided to them by the employees who operated the
shearing and breaking machines. At no time were either Collins
or Roberts warned or counseled regarding their work. Specifi-
cally, there is no evidence that anything was ever said to them
regarding a need to produce more panels than they were pro-
ducing from the materials being provided to them. A few
months before their permanent layoff, Boraski had requested
that Collins and Roberts build a test panel that was different
from the panel Respondent normally built. Boraski commented
to Collins that customers had complimented him upon the qual-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1122
ity of Respondent’s panels and directed that panels continue to
be built according to Respondent’s prior specifications. A form
dated August 19, reflecting a pay raise to $9.25 an hour for
Roberts, includes employee comments. Roberts noted that the
panel builders could not get the channels broken, a function
performed by the operator of the breaking machine. On a simi-
lar form, the operator of the breaking machine, Ron Barron,
commented upon a need for new dies and maintenance on ma-
chines. Baron was a long-term employee in whom Respondent
placed great confidence as reflected by Respondent’s request-
ing him to be present when newer employees were being coun-
seled regarding misconduct.
On October 30, Collins and Roberts gave union literature to
the electricians. Collins left literature on his worktable. On
November 3, Supervisor Belch told Collins and Roberts not to
make any panels. At the end of the day, Garba called Collins
and Roberts to his office and stated that, due to rising cost,
Respondent was going buy panels from a supplier and that they
were laid off permanently. Respondent had never before ef-
fected a permanent layoff.
Respondent began building oven panels in 1994. There was
no quota, but Plant Manager Tyree expected between 12 and 15
panels a day per employee. Boraski testified that he was dissat-
isfied with the number of panels being produced and that he
discussed this with Garba. Notwithstanding his alleged dissatis-
faction, Boraski did not discuss the situation with Collins, Rob-
erts, or Barron. Boraski did not review any documents relating
to panel production, despite the evidence that each employee,
on a daily basis, filled out a yellow card reflecting what he was
working upon as well as any “down time” and the reason. In-
credibly, Boraski asserted that he did not even know that this
document existed.
Although Boraski testified that he and Garba made the deci-
sion to cease producing oven panels, Garba did not testify to
having any input into the decision. Garba testified that, in Oc-
tober, he and Boraski noted a decrease in the number of panels
being produced and that, as a result of this, a decision was
made to monitor the production level. As already noted, Bo-
raski professed ignorance regarding the existence of the yellow
production cards. Garba did not testify to the manner in which
any purported monitoring of production was carried out, and
the record does not establish that there was any monitoring. The
employees, in addition to the yellow cards, filled out a sheet
reflecting the total number of panels produced each day, but
there is no evidence that these were reviewed in October. Even
if they had been, that report would be of limited use since, as
already noted, panel production was dependent upon parts
produced by the operators of the shearing and breaking ma-
chines. The absence of evidence of monitoring leads me to find
that Garba was not telling the truth when he testified that a
decision was made to monitor panel production since I am sat-
isfied that he would have carried out Boraski’s instructions if
such instructions had been given. Garba did not testify to any
discussion of the results of any alleged monitoring, a conversa-
tion that would certainly have taken place if there had been any
monitoring.
Boraski testified that oven panel production was discontin-
ued because of cost. No documents reflecting cost were re-
viewed at the time of the decision, and no documents reflecting
cost were produced at the hearing. Boraski, when examined
regarding the alleged economic basis for the decision to elimi-
nate production of oven panels, incredibly asserted that he was
unable to separate the component costs of an oven. The ovens
that Respondent fabricates can cost up to $100,000.
On October 23, Collins had submitted an application for va-
cation at Christmas. It was approved by Garba and Tyree and
states that, at the time of the request, Collins did not have a
sufficient number of hours to have earned the vacation he was
requesting, but that he would have sufficient hours as of the
date for which the vacation was requested. Boraski signed his
approval of the request on October 30. He testified that the
vacation request was approved despite the fact that he was
thinking about laying off Collins because he did not “want the
line supervisor to know what’s going on.” I do not credit this
testimony. The line supervisor was Belch, but Belch’s approval
is not on the form. If Boraski had, in fact, been considering
discontinuing panel fabrication, he would simply have held this
document, which he signed on October 30, for 2 more working
days and disapproved it on Monday, November 3, when Collins
and Roberts were laid off.
Notwithstanding Respondent’s alleged cessation of oven
panel fabrication, employee Gerald Rahm was, on several occa-
sion, sent to plant 1 where he built oven panels with Bill Har-
vey, the shearing machine operator. Boraski admitted that there
were two occasions that oven panels were made, and that “other
panels” had also been built.
It is undisputed that fabrication of oven panels did require
welding. Despite this, Boraski asserted that Collins and Roberts
had been hired as general labor and that he did not consider
them for other positions because, on the basis of their resumes,
neither was qualified as a welder/fabricator. Boraski did not
explain why he would rely on resumes rather than observation
of Collins and Roberts by himself and his supervisors. Assum-
ing he did rely upon resumes, Roberts’ file contains a letter of
recommendation from Sandusky Cabinets that notes Roberts
had worked on the welding line. Regarding Collins, although a
handwritten note by Plant Manager Tyree reports “no welding
experience,” his file contains three certificates of welding train-
ing that Collins presented when applying for work. I do not
credit Garba’s uncorroborated testimony that a former supervi-
sor told him that Collins had performed poorly on a welding
test. Collins credibly testified that he was never given a welding
test by Respondent.
Documentary evidence reveals that Respondent paid general
laborers, including Greg Willis, who was hired on July 8, and
Oliver Blount, who was hired on July 22, $7.50 per hour.
Collins had been hired at $8 on December 23, 1996. On De-
cember 26, 3 days later, Richard Scheel was hired as a
welder/fabricator at the same pay rate, $8 per hour. In October,
Collins was being paid $9.50 an hour and Roberts was being
paid $9.25. This was more than the $9 per hour being paid to
Mark Christini, who was hired as a welder/fabricator on July
21, and comparable to welder/fabricator Jeremiah Pitts who
was being paid $9.50 an hour.4
Respondent advertised in local newspapers for welder/fabri-
cators on November 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Respondent stipulated that, if it had continued to produce
oven panels, there would have been work for Collins and Rob-
erts. Respondent’s advertising for welder/fabricators suggests
that, even having discontinued oven panel fabrication, there
was work for Collins and Roberts. Respondent tolerated lack of

4 The pay rates of Blount, Christini, and Pitts are reflected on their
authorization cards.
GENERAL FABRICATIONS CORP. 1123
skill in other employees as reflected in Boraski’s testimony
concerning a field installation to which Kyle Perkins and two
other employees had been assigned after second shift was dis-
continued. Regarding this job, Boraski explained, “None of the
three knew what an oven was, knew what a conveyor was, or
knew even how to install the stuff.” Collins and Roberts knew
what an oven was.
b. Analysis and concluding findings
In assessing the evidence under the analytical framework of
Wright Line, I find, as already discussed, that the panel build-
ers, Collins and Roberts, did engage in union activity. I have
also found that Respondent became aware of that activity on
either October 30 or 31. The record establishes that Respondent
bore animus towards employees who engaged in union activity.
I find that the General Counsel has carried the burden of prov-
ing that union activity was a substantial and motivating factor
in the permanent layoffs of Collins and Roberts.
Respondent contends that Collins and Roberts were laid off
as a consequence of its economic decision to eliminate its panel
fabrication operation. There is no probative evidence that Re-
spondent would have eliminated its panel fabrication operation
in the absence of union activity by Collins and Roberts. The
only alleged basis for elimination of the department was eco-
nomic, but Boraski was not even able to assert the component
cost for panels. Cost is, of course, a function of production
efficiency. Despite the testimony of Garba that, after conversa-
tion with Boraski, a decision was made to monitor panel pro-
duction, there is no evidence that such monitoring occurred. As
discussed above, I find that Garba’s testimony regarding an
alleged decision to monitor panel production was not truthful.
Thus, the record reflects that two previously model employees,
neither of whom had received any warnings and one of whom
had been promoted to the position of leadman, were summarily
and permanently laid off within 5 days of their attendance at a
union meeting. The precipitous nature of this retaliatory action
is further established by Boraski’s October 30 approval of
Collins’ Christmas vacation request. Respondent had never
previously permanently laid off any employee.
Confirmation of Respondent’s discriminatory motivation is
established by its failure to consider either Collins or Roberts
for any other position. I am satisfied that Respondent did not
pay employees for skills they did not possess. Collins worked
as a fabricator when he was initially hired on December 23,
1996. He was paid at the same rate as welder/fabricator Scheel
who was hired 3 days after him. Collins obviously impressed
Respondent and was promoted to leadman in panel fabrication.
When terminated he was making the same as welder/fabricator
Pitts who had been hired on September 17 and 50 cents an hour
more than employee Christini who had been hired as a
welder/fabricator on July 21 and was, in November, working as
a field installer. Roberts, who was also senior to Pitts and
Christini, having been hired on June 9, was making 25 cents an
hour more than Christini and 25 cents an hour less than Pitts.
Neither Pitts nor Christini had attended the first union meeting.
I find that the General Counsel has carried the burden of
proving that union activity was a substantial and motivating
factor for Respondent’s purported elimination of oven panel
fabrication. Respondent has not established that it would have
taken the same action if Collins and Roberts had not engaged in
union activity. Manno Electric, 321 NLRB 278 (1996). I find
that Respondent permanently laid off Collins and Roberts be-
cause they engaged in union activity. In so doing, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
3. John Johnson, Bryan Cloud, and Ron Fields
a. Facts
Bryan Cloud was hired as an electrician helper on March 7
by Arnold Kath. Kath knew Cloud because Cloud’s mother
took care of Kath’s children. Ron Fields was hired as an elec-
trician on June 18, and John Johnson was hired as an electrician
on July 28. Fields and Johnson performed the wiring on electri-
cal panels used to control the washers, ovens, and other prod-
ucts that were fabricated in plant 2 and, on occasion, would go
into the field to install the electrical controls. Cloud assisted at
the plant and, on three occasions, was sent into the field to help
on installations, twice to Cleveland and once to a customer
identified as Autoplex in Belleville, Ohio. Cloud was taking
classes at a local community college. Kath told Cloud that he
intended to send him into the field during his Christmas break.
Cloud and Fields heard about the first union meeting from
Collins, who gave them copies of the literature that had been
distributed at that meeting. Cloud placed the leaflets on a shelf
in his work area; Fields placed his leaflets in his car. Cloud,
Fields and Johnson attended the second union meeting, on Oc-
tober 31, where all three signed authorization cards. The fol-
lowing Monday, November 3, Cloud spoke about the Union
with Collins and Roberts, who had been told not to build any
panels that day. Cloud also spoke about the Union with electri-
cians John Johnson and Ron Fields, who had attended the meet-
ing with him.
On November 4, following the meeting in which Boraski
threatened to cease building any projects in Sandusky, Cloud
spoke to his supervisor, Electrical Engineering Manager Arnold
Kath, stating his concern about his job. Kath replied, “As long
as you guys keep doing what you’ve been doing, keep produc-
ing, putting out work, I have the ammunition to keep you guys
on ten hour days, and Saturdays, we have lots of work here.”
The third electrician, Thomas Searcy, had been working in
plant 2 on a washer and had not been involved in any of the
conversations involving the Union with Cloud, Johnson, and
Fields. Searcy had previously been suspended after shoving
Cloud. Thereafter, he kept notes and reported any action by
Cloud that he considered to be improper. Jones had given
Searcy copies of union literature, but there is no evidence that
Searcy was aware of union meetings that had been attended by
electricians. On November 4, following Boraski’s meeting in
which he referred to threats, Searcy asked Johnson and Fields if
they had attended any meetings and they replied that they had.
Electrician helper Cloud was present when this occurred. Fields
informed Searcy that they had all signed cards, referring to
himself, Johnson, and Cloud. Searcy replied that they were
crazy, that this was not good idea and left the building, heading
in the direction of plant 2 where the management offices were
located.
At the end of the workday on November 4, Johnson was
called to Kath’s office and laid off. As Johnson left Kath’s
office, Kath called Cloud into his office. Kath told Cloud, “I’m
going to have to lay you off.” Cloud, having earlier in the day
been assured that there was plenty of work, asked what was
going on. Kath replied, “Chet had been receiving threats and he
said he will not bring any work into this area until the threats
stop.” He then further explained, “Let’s just say both sides are
butting their heads, both sides are flexing their muscles right
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1124
now. I’m going to lay you off for two weeks. I want you to treat
it as a little vacation. Let’s let everything cool down, and I’ll
have you back in here in two weeks.”
Kath did not deny having knowledge of the union activities
of Cloud, Johnson, and Fields. Nor did he deny telling Cloud
that he intended to send him into the field during his Christmas
break and assuring Cloud that there was plenty of work for the
electricians. Although he asserted that he made the layoff deci-
sion because he had only 2 weeks of work over the next 12 to
14 weeks, Kath later testified that he had 2 weeks of work for
two electricians, 4 weeks of work for one electrician, and that
he typically would “try to keep one guy” in reserve in case the
other electrician did not “show up for work.” Kath did not deny
making the “butting heads” comment. He acknowledged refer-
ring to two weeks, testifying, “I told them the possibility, you
know, if things pick up—uh, was maybe—uh, very temporary,
uh, may be able to have them back within the next two or three
weeks.” Kath was unable to credibly explain this comment,
responding “probably not” when asked if he expected that they
would soon be called back. I credit Cloud and find that Kath
truthfully told Cloud, perhaps because he knew him outside the
workplace, that the layoff was because “both sides are butting
their heads,” and that the employees would be recalled in 2
weeks, after “everything cool[ed] down.”
Things did not “cool down” in the following 2 weeks. As
hereinafter discussed, Frank Mikolay began experiencing vari-
ous difficulties on the job. On November 17, the Union estab-
lished a picket line in front of Respondent’s facility. The em-
ployees that Respondent had discharged and laid off, Jones,
Collins, Roberts, Johnson, and Cloud were present on the
picket line. On a few occasions, Fields ate lunch at the picket
line where he talked with Collins, Roberts, Johnson, and Cloud.
The picket line was in plain view of the plants. Boraski actually
took notes reflecting when Mikolay was on the picket line.
Fields was laid off on December 2.
Prior to being laid off on December 2, Fields had spoken
with Sales Manager Paul Shaffer, who stated that he could not
understand why employees were being laid off, that he “had a
lot of work lined up.”
Notwithstanding the purported decline in electrical work,
Kath did not immediately lay off Fields, who had less seniority
than Cloud. Kath explained that Fields, who was senior to
Johnson, was retained because service technician Bartlett and
Supervisor Mygrant “were involved in numerous field installa-
tions . . . [and] were not readily available for a service call or
maintenance of any type.” Mygrant returned to the shop about a
week after Cloud and Johnson were laid off and began perform-
ing wiring work in the plant. Fields was sent to Lebanon, Indi-
ana, to correct faulty work by the electric subcontractor.
Boraski testified that the electricians were not engaged in
production at the time of the layoff; rather, they were perform-
ing indirect labor, which Kath called “busy work.” Respon-
dent’s records reflect that, in the three weeks prior to the layoff,
Searcy performed 31 hours of overtime, Fields performed 6
hours of overtime, Johnson performed 7.8 hours of overtime,
and Cloud performed 12 hours of overtime. The foregoing fig-
ures reveal, consistent with the testimony of Cloud and Fields,
that the electricians were performing production work. I am
satisfied that Respondent would not have paid overtime to elec-
tricians for “busy work.”
During the period from November through January 1998,
Respondent hired Wendell Joseph, a former electrical supervi-
sor who had retired, on a contract basis as Respondent’s project
manager at the installation of a project identified as Metokote.
Respondent presented no evidence that Mygrant would not
have performed this function had he not been performing wir-
ing work at Respondent’s facility.
Documentary evidence reveals that following the layoff of
Cloud and Johnson, Respondent began subcontracting electrical
installation work, chiefly to Bodie Electric. In the 6-month
period from June through November 21, Bodie had performed
three installations for Respondent at a total cost of $32,812.
During the next 2 months, from December 8 through January
25, Bodie performed five installations at a total cost of
$35,209.25. Respondent presented no evidence establishing that
Cloud, Johnson, and Fields could not have performed this
work. Although Kath testified that Johnson had no driver’s
license, he acknowledged that he observed him drive himself to
work in his van. Respondent presented no evidence from any
official source revealing either revocation or suspension of
Johnson’s license. Fields credibly testified that Johnson and
Cloud were capable of performing the work he was sent to
perform in Lebanon, Indiana. Kath did not contradict this testi-
mony.
Fields was recalled on February 23 when Searcy quit. Dan
Malloy, who had previously been employed by Respondent as
an electrician, was rehired as a supervisor on the same day. For
the first few weeks, Malloy performed the same work as Fields.
Malloy was also sent out on installations.
b. Analysis and concluding findings
Cloud, Johnson, and Fields all engaged in union activity,
signing authorization cards at the second meeting. I find that
Respondent learned of this on November 4, after Fields spoke
to Searcy. Immediately following Boraski’s meeting, Kath had
assured Cloud that there was sufficient work for the electricians
notwithstanding Boraski’s threats. Cloud and Johnson were laid
off that very afternoon. Kath never denied having knowledge of
their union activity or, when promising recall after 2 weeks,
referring to the “two sides” butting heads. This reference con-
firms that Respondent had learned that Cloud and Johnson were
on the wrong “side.”
Respondent’s animus is confirmed by Kath’s repeat of Bo-
raski’s threat not to bring in any work until the “threats”
stopped. This repeated threat violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.5
The threat of unionization did not stop. The Union estab-
lished a picket line upon which Cloud and Johnson appeared.
They were not recalled after 2 weeks because things did not
“cool down.” Despite his retention, Fields visited the picket line
a few times, talking with Cloud and Johnson. In so doing, he
exhibited his continuing solidarity with his former coworkers
and the Union. I find that the General Counsel has carried the
burden of proving that union activity was a substantial and
motivating factor in the layoffs of Cloud, Johnson, and Fields.
Respondent has not established that these employees would
have been laid off absent their union activity. Both Johnson and
Cloud had worked overtime during the week immediately pre-
ceding the layoff. Respondent’s sales manager commented to

5 The General Counsel adduced no evidence regarding an alleged
threat of loss of overtime by Kath. The General Counsel has moved to
withdraw all allegations of alleged threats by Kath purportedly made in
telephone conversation on November 4 upon which no evidence was
adduced. The motion is granted.
GENERAL FABRICATIONS CORP. 1125
Fields that he did not understand why employees were being
laid off in view of the work that he was aware needed to be
performed. The record establishes that Johnson and Cloud con-
tinued to be needed and that Respondent had to make various
arrangements to assure that the work that they would have per-
formed was accomplished. Fields was not laid off simply be-
cause his presence was absolutely essential. Respondent could
operate without one electrical and one helper while making
arrangements to cover those vacancies, but operating without
two electricians was impossible. Bartlett and Mygrant were not
available to Kath on November 4. The following week, My-
grant was moved to the shop. Thereafter, Respondent hired
Joseph on a contract basis to supervise an installation. Respon-
dent presented no evidence that Mygrant could not have served
as project manager for this installation. Respondent also sub-
contracted installations to Bodie Electric. There is no evidence
that Johnson, Fields, and Cloud were incapable of performing
this work. By early December, Respondent had made sufficient
arrangements so that it could rid itself of the remaining union
adherent in the electrical department. It did so by laying off
Fields on December 2.
Respondent, having laid off rather than discharged these em-
ployees, was placed in the position of having to recall them
when Searcy and Mygrant left its employment in February.
Respondent recalled Fields. Rather than recall union adherent
Johnson, Respondent hired former employee Dan Malloy as a
supervisor.6
Respondent has not rebutted the General Counsel’s evidence
that union activity was a substantial and motivating factor in
the layoffs of Cloud, Johnson, and Fields. The evidence pre-
sented in Respondent’s attempt to establish that the layoffs
were economically motivated underscores the lengths to which
Respondent went to rid itself of these union adherents. I find
that the layoffs of Cloud, Johnson, and Fields, the failure to
recall Fields until February 23, and the failure to recall Cloud
and Johnson, were motivated by the union activity of these
employees. Their layoffs and the failure to recall them violated
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. Frank Mikolay
a. Facts
Frank Mikolay began working for Respondent as a
welder/fabricator on May 20. It was he who contacted the Un-
ion, as he told Boraski in the conversation on November 4 in
which Boraski asked Mikolay who had made him the spokes-
man.
Shortly after this conversation, Mikolay’s worktable was
moved to a position approximately 12 to 15 feet in front of
Supervisor Mike Belch’s office. Belch directed Mikolay to
work at the relocated table. Thereafter, Mikolay noted that
Belch was regularly observing him through the office window.
Belch told Mikolay not to talk to anybody, and, on one occa-
sion, when Mikolay went to obtain assistance from another
employee, directed him to return to his worktable.
On November 6 Mikolay left work for a doctor’s appoint-
ment. There is no evidence that he received permission to
leave, and Mikolay testified only that he “told them I had an

6 This action did not constitute a unilateral change in violation of
Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act as alleged in the complaint since supervisors had
regularly performed unit work in the past.
appointment,” without identifying “them.” On November 10 he
was warned for leaving work without proper authorization.
Mikolay had been convicted of driving under the influence in
August and sentenced to 3 days in jail. The sentence was to be
served at an undetermined future time. Mikolay reported this to
Garba, asking if this would present a problem as far as his job
was concerned. Garba assured him that it would not. Mikolay
was directed to serve the 3 days beginning on November 7. He
informed Respondent of this in late October. After serving his 3
days and being released on November 10, Mikolay reported to
work. He was given a warning for leaving on November 6 and
a second warning for missing work on November 7 and report-
ing late on November 10. Both warnings threatened suspension
if there was a further offense.
Mikolay became concerned regarding the treatment he was
receiving, and he made an appointment to consult with legal
counsel. On November 12, he told Belch that he had an ap-
pointment, but he did not divulge the nature of the appointment.
Belch asked Mikolay where he was going, and Mikolay asked
if the absence would be excused if he told him. Belch said,
“Yes,” and Mikolay reported that he was going to see an attor-
ney. As Mikolay was leaving, he sought to confirm that the
absence would be excused. Belch informed him that it would
not be excused. Despite this, Mikolay went to the appointment,
returning with a letter confirming that he had been where he
said that he was going. Mikolay was not disciplined.
On November 13, Mikolay spoke with Personnel Director
Carol Boraski regarding what he described as a stress problem.
He felt he needed to see a psychiatrist and that his evaluation
and treatment should be paid for by workers compensation. In
this regard, he explained that the stress he felt was work related
because of the things that were happening to him because of the
Union. Carol Boraski testified, but Mikolay denies, that he
stated that he “felt like he was going to explode and did not
want to ‘lose it’ on the job.”
Although I am satisfied that Mikolay attempted to testify
truthfully, there were several occasions when his memory de-
serted him and he simply did not respond to questions that were
asked. His own notes regarding his feelings of stress refer to
“pressure from management” due to his union involvement. In
view of his mental state at the time he spoke with Carol
Boraski, I find that she, rather than Mikolay, is the more reli-
able reporter of the events of November 13. I credit her recol-
lection which is recorded on a memorandum she prepared fol-
lowing her conversation with Mikolay.
Carol Boraski provided Mikolay with a workers compensa-
tion form. Mikolay left the plant at 10:35 a.m. He did not work
on Friday, November 14. On Monday, November 17, Mikolay
reported to work without any evidence that he had received
treatment for his stress problem. Respondent presented him
with a letter signed by Tyree stating that, in view of his state-
ment to Carol Boraski that he was “ready to explode,” Respon-
dent was unwilling to permit him to return until he provided a
detailed report from his doctor. The letter noted that it was
taking this action for Mikolay’s safety “and the safety of the
other employees.”
Mikolay was evaluated by a psychiatrist on December 2. The
psychiatrist gave him a short note stating that Mikolay was
under his care and “may return to work without restriction” on
December 4. Mikolay returned to the plant with the note on
December 4. Plant Manager Tyree met with Mikolay and told
him, as he had stated in the letter of November 17, that Re-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1126
spondent was unwilling to permit him to return until he pro-
vided a “detailed report” from his doctor. Respondent stipulated
that this was the only occasion upon which it had required a
detailed report. Mikolay obtained a detailed report that states
that he had no “acute psychiatric pathology” that would pre-
clude him from working. Mikolay gave this to Boraski on De-
cember 17, and Boraski told him to report to work the follow-
ing day.
On December 18, upon reporting to work, Mikolay was
given a memorandum outlining Respondent’s expectations of
him. It stated that there were to be no outbursts or disruptions
and an admonition not to “bother other employees.” The admo-
nition not to “bother” was coupled with a threat that, if Belch
received complaints from employees, Mikolay would be disci-
plined.
In late December, Mikolay received permission from Belch
to leave work because he was ill. When he returned to work,
Belch demanded that he produce a doctor’s excuse. Mikolay
questioned why he needed an excuse since he obviously had
become sick at work. Belch replied that “some people” were
required to have an excuse and that Mikolay was one of them.
On January 2, Boraski came into the plant where Mikolay
was working with Dave White. Boraski told Mikolay that he
had been watching him “for a while” and that he had not “done
a damn thing.” Boraski did not deny this comment. He ac-
knowledges that Supervisor Belch called him and reported that
Mikolay was “agitating everybody in the plant, and the em-
ployees was complaining to Mr. Belch.” Boraski suggested a
more efficient way for Mikolay to perform the work he was
doing. Regarding Belch’s contacting him regarding Mikolay,
Boraski testified, “He just wanted to advise me, yes. It’s a
close—it’s a small company.”
On January 3, shortly before the shift was to end, Mikolay
informed Belch that his heel was hurting and, therefore, he was
leaving. Belch did not direct Mikolay to stay, and he admitted
that, after Mikolay stated that he was in pain and was leaving,
he said nothing. Mikolay came to the plant on January 5, but
did not work, ostensibly due to continuing foot pain. Mikolay
was unable to recall the conversation he had at the plant on
January 5. He received no discipline that day. On January 6, he
returned with a doctor’s excuse indicating that he had been
treated on January 6 and would be unable to work from January
6 through 21. Respondent issued Mikolay a 3-day suspension
effective January 5 through 7, for “leaving your shift early” on
January 3. It appears that Mikolay received a further medical
leave after January 21. Mikolay is no longer employed by Re-
spondent.
b. Analysis and concluding findings
(1) The 8(a)(1) allegations
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by engaging in surveillance of Mikolay’s
union activities on November 4, threatening not to excuse a
previously excused absence in November, ordering Mikolay
not to talk to another employee on December 18, disparately
treating him regarding the need for a doctor’s excuse on De-
cember 30, and engaging in surveillance on January 2.
The General Counsel correctly argues that the moving of
Mikolay’s worktable on November 4 did not constitute surveil-
lance, but more closely monitoring. Respondent, in its brief,
suggests that this occurred after Mikolay was released by the
psychiatrist, but there is no evidence to support this suggestion.
Belch did not deny that it occurred on November 4, shortly
after Mikolay told Boraski that he had contacted the Union.
Respondent’s unlawful monitoring of Mikolay is confirmed by
his unrebutted testimony that Belch directed him to return to his
table when he attempted to ask another employee for assis-
tance. Thus, Mikolay was not only more closely monitored, he
was also isolated from other employees. This conduct violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent does not address the occasion in the second
week of November when Mikolay sought permission to contact
his attorney, was initially granted permission, but then in-
formed by Belch, as he was leaving, that the absence would be
unexcused. Although Respondent did excuse the absence,
thereby avoiding a violation of Section 8(a)(3), Mikolay’s un-
rebutted testimony concerning Belch’s threat not to excuse this
previously excused absence, especially considering that Miko-
lay had been threatened with suspension on November 10, con-
stituted restraint and coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
Regarding the direction not to talk to another employee, the
General Counsel cites the restrictions placed upon Mikolay
upon his release for work by the psychiatrist. Belch provided
Mikolay with a set of expectations. The requirement that Miko-
lay was not to “bother other employees” was coupled with a
threat of discipline if any other employee complained to Belch.
Respondent argues that the expectations were in response to
alleged disruptions that Mikolay had caused prior to November
17, none of which it documented and none of which resulted in
discipline to Mikolay. Respondent does not specifically address
the “bother other employees” restriction which promises disci-
pline upon complaint by an employee, rather than evidence of
misconduct by Mikolay. This restriction, which certainly would
preclude Mikolay from talking favorably about the Union to an
antiunion employee who would be bothered by his comments,
unlawfully restricted talking with other employees and violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent presented no evidence that any employee, other
than Mikolay, had ever been required to provide a doctor’s
excuse in order to return to work after receiving permission to
leave work when that employee became sick on the job. Belch
did not deny the conversation in which he responded that an
excuse was required of “some employees.” This requirement
imposed upon the leading union adherent remaining in Respon-
dent’s workforce constituted harassment and violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
The allegation that Boraski engaged in surveillance on Janu-
ary 2 arises from the occasion upon which Boraski told Miko-
lay that he had been observing him and that he had not done a
“damn thing.” The evidence does not establish surveillance. It
does establish another incident of more closely monitoring the
leading union adherent in the plant. If it were true that Mikolay
was agitating everybody, Mikolay would have been disciplined
pursuant to the prohibition against disruptions given to him on
December 18. Belch, upon observing Mikolay doing something
that he deemed inappropriate, immediately brought the matter
to Boraski’s attention rather than dealing with it himself. This
incident reconfirms that Respondent was continuing to more
closely monitor union adherent Mikolay, as it had been doing
since November 4, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(2) The 8(a)(3) allegations
The complaint alleges violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act
regarding the two warnings issued to Mikolay on November 10
GENERAL FABRICATIONS CORP. 1127
and his suspension in January, as well as the refusals to allow
Mikolay to return to work on November 17 and December 4.
The record establishes Mikolay’s union activity and Respon-
dent’s knowledge of, and animus towards, that activity. Thus,
the General Counsel has established that disciplinary action
against Mikolay was motivated by his union activity unless
Respondent adduces evidence that the same action would have
been taken in the absence of Mikolay’s union activity.
With regard to the warning for leaving work on November 6
for a doctor’s appointment, Mikolay testified, “I told them I had
an appointment,” without identifying “them.” The warning
states that Mikolay left work without proper authorization. The
General Counsel has not established that Mikolay either noti-
fied supervision or received permission to leave work. There is
no evidence of disparity. I shall recommend that this allegation
of the complaint be dismissed.
Regarding Mikolay’s November 10 warning for missing
work due to his incarceration, Garba had told Mikolay that this
would not affect his job. Respondent suggests that Mikolay did
not inform Respondent when he would be absent, citing his
testimony that he could not recall whom he notified when he
learned the specific days that he would be in jail. The warning
states that Mikolay missed work due to incarceration, thus con-
firming that Respondent was aware of his upcoming absence
and the reason for it. The warning is for the absence, an ab-
sence Garba excused. By warning a leading union proponent
for an absence that its general manager had excused in advance,
Respondent violated Section (8)(a)(3) of the Act.
On November 17, the first time that Mikolay had appeared at
the plant after his conversation with Carol Boraski on the morn-
ing of November 13, he had no document indicating that he had
been treated for the stress that he had described to her. Both the
General Counsel and the Charging Party argue that Respondent
treated Mikolay discriminatorily by requiring an unprecedented
“detailed report” before permitting him to return to work. With
regard to November 17, this argument begs the question since
Mikolay had no document at all.
Respondent concedes that the requirement for a detailed re-
port was unprecedented, and notes that the situation presented
by Mikolay was also unprecedented. The General Counsel ar-
gues that Mikolay was treated disparately compared to leadman
Matt Stookey who acknowledged having a substance abuse
problem and whose absences were excused, ostensibly without
a detailed report. I find Stookey’s situation inapposite. Stookey
never advised Respondent that he “felt like he was going to
explode and did not want to ‘lose it’ on the job.”
Mikolay was not permitted to return to work on December 2
when he presented a one sentence release statement. The state-
ment made no reference to Mikolay’s reported stress problem
or concern that he might “lose it.” In view of the potential li-
ability if Respondent had returned Mikolay to the job and he
had “exploded,” I find Respondent’s caution totally justified. I
am mindful that Respondent had already singled out Mikolay
by moving his worktable and issuing him an unlawful warning.
Despite this, I simply cannot find that Respondent’s refusal to
return him to work without a detailed statement from a mental
health professional was discriminatorily motivated. Mikolay
presented the detailed report that Respondent had requested on
December 17, and he returned to work on December 18. I shall
recommend that the allegations that Respondent unlawfully
refused to permit Mikolay to return to work on November 17
and December 4 be dismissed.
It is undisputed that Mikolay informed Belch that he was
leaving work because of pain in his heel shortly before the shift
ended on January 3. In testimony, Belch implied that discipline
was issued because Mikolay informed him that he was leaving
rather than asking permission to leave; however, Belch said
nothing to him. Insofar as silence constitutes assent, there is no
reason that Mikolay believed that he was leaving without au-
thorization. The discipline issued to Mikolay does not state that
he left without permission or was insubordinate; it simply states
the he was being suspended for “leaving your shift early.” I
find this suspension to be pretextual. Any ambiguity regarding
Respondent’s unlawful motivation is dispelled by the evidence
that Respondent imposed this 3-day disciplinary suspension
upon Mikolay on 3 days when Respondent was aware that
Mikolay was physically unable to work. I find that the January
6 suspension of Mikolay violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
5. Jeremiah Pitts
a. Facts
Jeremiah Pitts worked for Respondent as a welder/fabricator
from September 15 until April 5. He signed a union authoriza-
tion card at the second union meeting. After the picket line was
established on November 17, Pitts visited with the employees
on the line during his lunchbreak. Later during the organiza-
tional campaign, he began wearing a hat and shirt identifying
him as a supporter of the Union.
Shortly before the election Pitts was talking with fellow em-
ployees Bill Montgomery and Dan Rogers, who both expressed
the opinion that if the employees selected the Union as the em-
ployees’ collective-bargaining representative that Boraski
would close the plant. Boraski was walking by the employees
as this occurred. Pitts’ stopped him and asked how he felt about
Montgomery and Rogers answering for him. Without respond-
ing to Pitts, Boraski addressed Montgomery stating, “Bill I
can’t really respond on that.” He then rhetorically asked, “Do
you really think I need the headaches and aches and pains of
this? This is just a business that I just—I just do it. Do you
really think I need all this?” Boraski testified that he had no
recollection of a conversation involving Montgomery, Rogers,
and Pitts. He denied making a headaches comment or threat to
close the plant to Pitts. Whether Respondent intended this to be
a denial of the comment Boraski made to Montgomery, the
individual that Boraski was addressing, is immaterial since I
credit Pitts.
On another occasion, Belch, in the presence of Kyle Perkins,
stated that he wanted Pitts to tell the union to “f— off,” that he
wanted Pitts to know the facts, that Pitts was a follower and that
he wanted Pitts to get the story straight and “vote no.” Belch
slammed his fist down for emphasis during this conversation in
which he went on to state that “the doors would not be opened
if the Union came in the shop. The company would shut down.”
Belch denied the “f— off” comment and threat of closure, but
did not deny slamming down his fist or telling Pitts to get the
story straight and vote no. I credit Pitts.
Shortly before the election, Pitts spoke with Perkins who,
during October and November, oversaw the work performed on
the short-lived second shift. Perkins stated that, since he had
been demoted, he could vote in the election. Pitts replied that
after the election he expected that Perkins would be promoted
to supervisor, and that Perkins responded, “Yeah, probably.”
There is, however, no evidence that Perkins has been promoted
from leadman.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1128
Right around the time of the representation election, Pitts
was assigned to buff the metal panels on a large washer tank.
He explained that this was tedious work. He acknowledged that
two other employees, both of whom were also welder/fabri-
cators, Dan Rogers and Chris Wade, were also assigned to buff,
“There was a lot of buffing to do.” Pitts states that, as he was
working, both Belch and Tyree told him to buff one panel every
hour and a half. Tyree acknowledged that he assigned Pitts and
others to buffing, that Respondent was behind schedule on a
washer that was being completed section by section. He ob-
served that it took about an hour and a half to properly buff a 9
foot by 42-inch steel panel and he advised the employees doing
the buffing of this. He testified that if they were going faster
they may not be doing a “nice job” and that to go slower was
unnecessary. There is no evidence that any records reflecting
the time spent per panel were kept and no sanction was estab-
lished for deviation from Tyree’s suggestion.
b. Analysis and concluding findings
When Pitts asked Boraski if he was going to let Montgomery
speak for him, Boraski did not disavow the statements of
Montgomery and Rogers regarding their belief that he would
close the plant if the employees selected the Union. His rhetori-
cal comments, concluding by asking Montgomery, “Do you
really think I need all this?” effectively confirmed that he did
intend to close the plant if the employees selected the Union.
By threatening plant closure, Boraski violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
Similarly, Belch’s statement that “the doors would not be
opened if the Union came in the shop[;]. . . . [t]he company
would shut down,” constituted a threat of closure in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Charging Party argues that
Belch’s remark that Pitts should get the story straight and “vote
no” violated the Act and was objectionable conduct separately
from the threat of closure. The complaint does not allege the
“vote no” comment as a violation of Section 8(a)(1). State-
ments by supervisors to “vote no,” standing alone, do not vio-
late the Act or constitute objectionable conduct. Montfort of
Colorado, 298 NLRB 73, 184 (1990).
The record establishes Pitts’ union activity, Respondent’s
knowledge of that activity, and animus towards union activity.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is no probative evidence
that the assignment of buffing was discriminatorily motivated.
Pitts’ candid and credible testimony establishes that employees
Rogers and Wade were, like Pitts, assigned buffing duties. Al-
though Wade signed a card, there is no evidence that Respon-
dent was aware of his union activity, and he is not alleged as a
discriminatee. There is no evidence that Rogers engaged in any
union activity. The assignment of these three employees was
dictated by Respondent’s production needs. Respondent was
behind schedule on the washer. I note that this might not have
been the case if Respondent had not terminated Jones, Collins,
and Roberts. Tyree’s direction to buff each panel for an hour
and a half did not establish a production quota. There is no
evidence that any record was thereafter maintained regarding
the time each employee spent per panel and no disciplinary
action of any kind was either threatened or administered. If
Respondent had imposed a quota, it would have instituted some
procedure for assuring compliance with the quota. Tyree’s
comment was a supervisory direction regarding the most effi-
cient manner by which to accomplish the job assignment. I
shall recommend that this allegation of the complaint be dis-
missed.7
6. Gerald Rahm
a. Facts
Rahm was hired as a welder/fabricator on December 26,
1996, and worked until his termination on March 11, 1997. He
signed an authorization card at the second union meeting and
regularly visited the picket line after it was established on No-
vember 17.
On a Sunday in mid-November, employees Rahm and
Trushell were working. They became involved in a conversa-
tion regarding the Union with Rahm advocating the Union and
Trushell opposing it. Trushell suggested that they speak with
Boraski, who had walked into the plant. In Boraski’s office,
Trushell continued to speak against the Union. Rahm stated that
he did not want the employees to lose their jobs. Boraski took a
set of keys from his office, held one up and asked Rahm if he
knew what it was. Rahm replied that it was a key, and Boraski
asked, “A key to what?” Rahm responded, “The building.”
Boraski stated, “That’s right, and I can close it and move it
anytime I want to.” Boraski claims that the Union was not men-
tioned in this conversation, that Trushell only spoke about the
“atmosphere in the plant,” which he attributed to the employee
with the bad leg, thereby identifying Mikolay.
Although all parties briefed this issue as if it occurred on
November 2, prior to the November 4 meeting, I note that the
complaint places it in mid-November, and that Rahm initially
testified that it occurred in mid-November. Although Rahm did
mention the date November 2, he immediately testified that he
was not certain of the date. When asked about this meeting,
counsel called Boraski’s attention to November 2; Boraski did
not independently place the conversation on that date. If it did
occur on November 2 and if Trushell talked about the atmos-
phere in the plant, the failure of Boraski to mention the alleged
threatening telephone calls he had purportedly been receiving is
further evidence that such calls were not received. I find it un-
likely that the conversation occurred on November 2, since
Rahm was clearly concerned about jobs, an issue that became a
concern after the terminations and Boraski’s threats at the meet-
ing of November 4. Regardless of when the conversation oc-
curred, I credit Rahm’s testimony regarding what was said.
In mid-January, Rahm was using the telephone in Supervisor
Belch’s office. Belch, talking to Leadmen Mike Griggs and
Kyle Perkins, stated, in a loud voice, that “even if the Union
does come in here . . . nobody would stand a chance,” mention-
ing that he documented “everything.” Belch did not deny mak-
ing this comment.
The day before the election, Garba spoke with Rahm solicit-
ing his support. Garba reminded Rahm that Respondent had
supported him in the past, a reference that Rahm understood to
refer to an occasion when he had been suspended rather than
terminated after having drunk an alcoholic beverage at lunch
when he was on a job. Respondent had also permitted Rahm to
leave early to attend school throughout the fall. Garba noted
that as a result of experience that Rahm would be more valu-
able than a person with just education or only hands on experi-
ence. Rahm testified that Garba stated that, after Rahm got his
degree, he “could stand a good chance” of working as an engi-

7 Insofar as I have found that no production quota was instituted,
there was no unilateral change in violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act.
GENERAL FABRICATIONS CORP. 1129
neer. It is clear that Garba suggested to Rahm that, as a result of
education and experience, his future with Respondent was
bright; however, ever Rahm’s recollection of the conversation
does not tie his advancement to his support for Respondent.
The controlling factor was getting his degree.
Following the election, Rahm advised Belch that he was
seeking other employment. When Belch questioned why, Rahm
responded that he wanted a clean start, an apparent reference to
his less than pristine disciplinary record.
On January 28, Rahm again spoke with Belch. Belch told
him that “some people had been talked to about signing affida-
vits to the Union,” and that he knew Pitts was one of them.
Belch asked if Rahm also was one of them. Rahm replied that
he did not know what Belch was talking about. Belch then told
Rahm, if he was contacted by any union members about signing
any affidavit, “[T]o tell them that I didn’t want nothing to do
with them . . . the Union was over.” The Union, at this time,
was obtaining evidence in support of its objections to the elec-
tion. Belch did not deny this conversation or these remarks.
Rahm did not inform Belch that he gave an affidavit to the
Union, and there is no evidence that Respondent was aware that
he did so.
A couple of days following this conversation, Rahm testified
that Belch allegedly told him that he was giving him a clean
start; however, this testimony is inconsistent with his further
testimony that Belch threatened that he could fire him because
he “had everything in black and white.” In view of the internal
inconsistencies in these remarks, together with Belch’s testi-
mony that he told Rahm that he could obtain a clean slate sim-
ply by starting to come to work on time, I do not credit either
Rahm’s testimony that Belch told him that he had been given a
clean start or that Belch threatened him with termination.
Rahm’s attendance record, although not exemplary prior to
December 1997, was not unacceptable. He was attending a
local community college, thus he often left work early, but
these departures were excused. He did not have a full day un-
excused absence in 1997.
On December 1, Rahm was verbally warned for insubordina-
tion. He received a written warning for insubordination on De-
cember 2. In addition, Rahm was late on three occasions that
were unexcused and received a written warning dated Decem-
ber 23 advising that future incidents of tardiness or absenteeism
would result in a 3-day suspension. None of the foregoing
warnings are alleged as discriminatory. In January 1998, Rahm
was late twice and did not call in on either occasion. He also
missed 2 days due to illness. In February 1998, he reported to
work late twice without calling in, but received no further dis-
cipline. On March 2 Rahm did not report to work or call in. On
March 3, when Rahm reported to work, he was questioned
about March 2, and he replied that he just did not come in and
did not know why he did not call.
On March 6, Boraski, Garba, Tyree, and senior employee
Ron Barron met separately with Rahm, Matt Stookey, and
Jeremiah Pitts regarding their attendance. Pitts received a ver-
bal warning that is not alleged as discriminatory in the com-
plaint.8 Stookey received no discipline. Stookey had a sub-
stance abuse problem that he brought to Respondent’s attention

8 The General Counsel’s brief notes the warning to Pitts and states
that it “would also be violative of the Act under the circumstances.”
This warning was disclosed in the presentation of Respondent’s case. It
is not alleged in the complaint and there was no motion to amend.
and for which he began receiving treatment. Rahm had no ex-
planation for either his failure to report to work or call in. He
was issued a 3-day suspension, effective March 9, 10, and 11.
Monday through Wednesday. When Rahm was told he was
being suspended for 3 days, he mentioned that he was “99 per-
cent sure that he would be leaving and taking another job.”
Boraski asked if he was giving notice, and Rahm replied that he
was. Immediately following the meeting, Rahm asked Plant
Manager Tyree if he had to work Saturday, and Tyree replied
that he did, to look at his suspension, it was for Monday
through Wednesday.
Rahm testified that, in the meeting but after he had been sus-
pended, Boraski commented that he would see him on Thurs-
day. When asked if he recalled asking Tyree whether he had to
work overtime, Rahm responded, “No. I would have just not
worked it.” Insofar as this response be considered a denial of
the conversation with Tyree, I do not credit it. Rahm’s eager-
ness to deny a question that had not been asked was apparent
and is reflected in the transcript. Boraski’s comment about
seeing Rahm on Thursday establishes nothing. It could reflect
Boraski’s plans to be absent on Saturday or an offhand remark
that did not take the Saturday work schedule into account. As-
suming it may have left Rahm with a false impression, Tyree
corrected any such false impression by confirming with Rahm
that he was to work on Saturday and begin his suspension on
Monday. Rahm testified that other employees had failed to
report or call in and were not disciplined. He did not identify
any employee by name. The General Counsel adduced no evi-
dence that any employee who had recently been warned was
treated differently from Rahm. I do not find that Respondent’s
treatment of Stookey constitutes evidence of disparate treat-
ment. Stookey had acknowledged a substance abuse problem
and Respondent made an accommodation for him, just as Re-
spondent accommodated Rahm’s early departures in order to
attend school. The General Counsel’s reference to employee
Gentle Philon’s 1997 attendance record does not establish dis-
parity since his disciplinary record was not introduced into
evidence, nor is there any evidence relating to his attendance in
1998.
Rahm did not report to work or call in on Saturday, March 7.
When he reported on Thursday, March 11, he was terminated.
On an exit form with spaces reflecting the reason for leaving,
“better job” is checked. Rahm did not recall making the check.
All parties agreed that Rahm was terminated, thus, whether
Rahm did or did not give notice on March 6 or check “better
job,” is irrelevant. I credit Tyree’s testimony that he did not call
Rahm on Monday and terminate him because “I don’t handle
those things by phone.”
b. Analysis and concluding findings
In mid-November, Boraski, using the keys to the plant to
emphasize his remarks, threatened to close or move the plant in
response to the employees’ organizational activity. This threat
of closure and loss of jobs violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
In mid-January, Belch stated that employees would not
“stand a chance” if they selected the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative because of the manner in which he
documented “everything.” I find that this statement implied that
the employees’ organizational efforts were futile and violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Garba’s conversation with Rahm the day prior to the election
regarding Respondent having supported him in the past and his
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1130
standing a good chance of working as an engineer after he got
his degree is not alleged in the complaint as a violation of the
Act. The Charging Party contends that it constituted objection-
able conduct. I find no unlawful promise of benefit since the
predicate for any possible advancement was the obtaining of a
degree rather than support of Respondent in the election.
Belch’s undenied interrogation of Rahm regarding whether
he had given an affidavit to the Union, when the Union was
obtaining evidence in support of its objections to the election,
and his direction that, if asked to give an affidavit, to refuse to
do so, were coercive and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
This conversation is the predicate for alleging Rahm’s sus-
pension and discharge as violations of Section 8(a)(4) of the
Act. As noted above, Rahm informed Belch that he did not
know what he was talking about. There is no probative evi-
dence that Respondent learned that Rahm had given an affida-
vit.
Rahm had signed a union card and regularly visited the
picket line. Respondent was aware of Rahm’s union sympa-
thies. Respondent’s animus is amply demonstrated by the re-
cord. Thus, under Wright Line, the issue is whether Respondent
would have discharged Rahm in the absence of his union activ-
ity.
Unlike Davin Jones, who had never missed an entire day of
work and had received permission whenever he left early,
Rahm had missed entire days of work and had reported late
without calling in. Jones had never been warned, much less
suspended, because of attendance. Rahm had been twice
warned for insubordination in December and, on December 23,
had been warned for absenteeism and threatened with a 3-day
suspension. Thereafter he missed 2 days due to illness and on
March 2 simply did not report for work. The warning and
threatened suspension issued to Rahm on December 23 is not
alleged as discriminatory. Rahm was not disciplined for miss-
ing work on the days he was ill, nor was he disciplined when he
was late for work twice in January and twice in February with-
out calling in. He was not suspended until he did not report to
work and did not call in on March 2. When questioned about
why he had not reported or called in, Rahm had no explanation.
There is no evidence that Respondent has not imposed a sus-
pension when an employee who had previously been warned
regarding attendance failed to report without calling in.
Despite having been counseled regarding attendance, sus-
pended for 3 days, and specifically told by Plant Manager Ty-
ree to report to work on Saturday and begin his suspension on
Monday, Rahm did not report for work or call in on Saturday.
Contrary to the General Counsel, I do not find that the treat-
ment afforded Stookey establishes disparate treatment. Stookey
advised Respondent of his substance abuse problem. Rahm had
been issued a nondiscriminatory warning in December, he had
no cogent explanation for his failure to either report to work or
to call in on March 2, and he ignored Tyree’s reminder that he
was to work on Saturday, March 7. I find that Respondent
would have terminated Rahm irrespective of his union activity.
I shall recommend that the allegations relating to the
suspension and discharge of Rahm be dismissed.
F. Additional 8(a)(1) Allegations
1. Statements relating to bargaining negotiations
Boraski held various meetings with employees throughout the
organizational campaign. His comments at these meetings were
not recorded, and he had no written text. Boraski testified that
his remarks were based upon the written materials that Respon-
dent distributed to employees, that he would go over the mate-
rials and invite questions. Rahm testified that Boraski stated
that employees would be forced to work for less than they al-
ready had, and Pitts testified that Boraski stated that negotia-
tions would start from ground zero, and the employees would
work under the rate he set. Boraski admits stating, “[W]henever
you bargain with the Union . . . you start at zero, you don’t start
where you’re at right now, you don’t start with your existing
wages, you don’t start with your existing benefits, you start at
zero.”
“When an employer makes a statement that can be under-
stood as a threat of loss of existing benefits and employees are
left with the impression that what they may ultimately receive
depends upon what the union can induce the employer to re-
store,” the employer has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Taylor-Dunn Mfg. Co., 252 NLRB 799, 800 (1980). Boraski’s
admitted statement, consistent with the testimony of Rahm and
Pitts, advised the employees that by selecting the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative, they would lose existing
benefits, that “you don’t start with your existing wages . . . you
start at zero.” Respondent’s statement, as alleged in the com-
plaint, threatened the loss of existing benefits and the futility of
negotiations in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. Document referring to enforcement of rules
After the advent of the Union’s organizational campaign,
Respondent distributed various pieces of literature to employ-
ees. One of these documents sets out three expectations: that
employees report to work every day, do a good job, and “follow
the company rules and procedures.” The document states that
Respondent had these expectations prior to the Union. It then
states that, with a union, the Company would have the same
expectations and, in addition, employees will be required to
“follow the company rules and procedures to the letter.”
The complaint alleges this as a threat that Respondent’s rules
would be more strictly enforced if the Union were successful.
Respondent cites Tri-Cast, Inc., 274 NLRB 377 (1985), a rep-
resentation case in which the Board held that advising employ-
ees that selection of a union alters certain aspects of the em-
ployment relationship does not constitute objectionable con-
duct. Respondent argues that, under that standard, the comment
regarding following rules and procedures to the letter is pro-
tected speech and not a threat. I disagree. In Tri-Cast, the em-
ployer stated that it would not be able to freely respond to per-
sonal requests, but would have to run things “by the book.” The
Board held that this constituted a permissible explanation re-
garding the changed aspect of relations if the employees se-
lected the union as their 9(a) representative. In the instant case,
Respondent advised the employees that it had always expected
them to obey its rules and regulations, but, if they selected the
Union, the Respondent would require obedience “to the letter.”
This constituted an impermissible threat of more strict en-
forcement of plant rules and polices and violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 318 NLRB 470,
495 (1995); United Artists Theatre, 277 NLRB 115, 121
(1985).9

9 This document was identified by Fields, who was laid off on De-
cember 2. It was, therefore, published before the representation petition
was filed on December 4.
GENERAL FABRICATIONS CORP. 1131
3. Employee committees and improved working conditions
At a meeting in January, employee Pitts raised the issue of
establishing a shop committee. There was some discussion of
what a shop committee could do, including making suggestions
for improvements and putting together a list of problems that
the company could address. Pitts stated that Boraski stated that
a shop committee was “something that could be talked about
after all the Union ordeal is over with,” that it would have to
await the outcome of the election. Boraski acknowledges that
the issue was raised. He recalls responding that he had heard
that they worked in other places but he could not comment right
now.
The complaint alleges that Boraski encouraged the formation
of employee committees. The mutually corroborative testimony
of Pitts and Boraski does not support this complaint allegation.
Pitts introduced the issue of shop committees, there was discus-
sion of how they worked, and Boraski stated that any further
discussion would have to await the outcome of the election.
There is no contention that Boraski either encouraged the for-
mation of a committee or stated that he would be receptive to
the formation of a committee if the Union were defeated. He
made no promise. I shall recommend that this allegation be
dismissed.
4. Threat of lost work orders
On January 19, at a company meeting, Respondent’s sales
manager, Paul Shaffer, informed the employees that an Austra-
lian company had refused to permit Respondent to bid on a
project after observing the picket line at the facility. He also
informed the employees that a current customer had refused a
bid submitted by Respondent, citing that Respondent was be-
hind schedule on a current project and noting Respondent’s
“current labor problems.” The General Counsel argues that
these remarks constituted a threat of loss of business, and im-
plies that it was incumbent upon Respondent to present evi-
dence that Shaffer’s remarks were true. I find no case authority
for this proposition. I would certainly analyze this allegation
differently if the General Counsel, who has the burden of proof,
had established that that there was no basis for Shaffer’s re-
marks; however, the General Counsel adduced no evidence
challenging the truth of Shaver’s remarks. Atlantic Forest
Products, 282 NLRB 855, 861 (1987). Unlike DTR Industries,
311 NLRB 833 (1993), cited by the General Counsel, the re-
sponsibility for the purported economic consequences were
attributed to the actions, lawful or otherwise, of third parties. I
shall recommend that this allegation be dismissed. Atlantic
Forest Products, supra at 861.
5. Surveillance
On January 8, the Union conducted a meeting at the Holiday
Inn in Sandusky. At a company meeting prior to this union
meeting, Mikolay had challenged a statement by Boraski re-
garding the amount of union initiation fees and mentioned that
the Union would be having a meeting at the Holiday Inn on
January 8. On the afternoon of the meeting, Collins and Roberts
waited outside to direct employees to the meeting room. They
observed Respondent’s office manager, Deb Kath, arrive and
enter the lobby carrying some manila folders. There is a United
Parcel Service drop box in the lobby. Deb Kath remained in the
lobby for only a minute and then left. Deb Kath confirmed her
presence, stating that she was following her normal routine of
making the UPS drop after work. In corroboration of her testi-
mony she presented receipts for four packages sent by UPS on
January 8. Although Collins and Roberts denied seeing Deb
Kath place anything in the UPS drop box, I credit Kath’s testi-
mony, as corroborated by the UPS receipts, that she did so. I
find that Collins and Roberts simply did not observe her at the
moment she placed the documents into the UPS drop box.
The mere presence of a supervisor or management official at
a location where union activity is taking place does not estab-
lish unlawful surveillance. “[W]here purely fortuitous circum-
stances bring such parties together there is no dogmatic legal
principle by which the employer would be declared to have
violated the Act.” Gossen Co., 254 NLRB 339, 353 (1981).
Consistent with this principle, and in agreement with counsel
for Respondent, I find that the presence of Deb Kath at the
Holiday Inn pursuant to her normal schedule, but also near the
time of the union meeting, was coincidental. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 189 NLRB 80, 83 (1971). The record does not establish
that Respondent unlawfully engaged in surveillance of a union
meeting. I shall, therefore, recommend that this allegation be
dismissed.
6. Classifications
There is no complaint allegation regarding classifications.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party, in their briefs,
refer to testimony by Rahm that, at a company meeting, Bo-
raski mentioned classifications, stating that if an employee was
classified as a welder, and there was only 2 hours of welding,
the employee would be sent home, “that the Union would not
let us . . . work in any other areas.” Pitts testified to similar
remarks by Belch. In the absence of an allegation placing Re-
spondent on notice that these alleged remarks constituted a
violation of the Act and the failure to fully litigate this issue, I
shall recommend dismissal on procedural grounds. Middletown
Hospital Assn., 282 NLRB 541, 543 (1986). I also note that,
even if made, the statement reflects an opinion of what the
Union would require. It contains no threat of retaliatory action
by Respondent. Thus, as in Pentre Electric, 305 NLRB 882,
883 (1991), this statement would be protected by Section 8(c)
of the Act, which protects the expression of “any . . . opinion
. . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit.”
G. The Bargaining Order and 8(a)(5) Allegations
The stipulated appropriate unit is:

All full-time welders, fabricators, electricians, and installers
employed by the Employer at the Sandusky, Ohio, facility;
but excluding all office clerical employees, sales persons, en-
gineers and professional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act, and all other employees.

The parties stipulated that the employees named on the Ex-
celsior list constituted the appropriate unit as of December 4,
the date of the Union’s claimed majority, noting that the eligi-
bility of Jones, who had been discharged, and Collins and Rob-
erts, who had been permanently laid off, would be determined
by my decision. Insofar as I have found that all three termina-
tions were unlawful, they are properly included in the unit.
The Union challenged the ballot of Kyle Perkins, contending
that he was a supervisor. There is no probative evidence that
Perkins served as a supervisor after the second shift was dis-
continued. The record does not establish when this occurred,
although it is clear that it occurred before Christmas because
Perkins was supervised by Boraski when working on an instal-
lation project that began sometime before Christmas. “A party
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1132
seeking to exclude an individual from voting for a collective
bargaining representative has the burden of establishing that
that individual is, in fact, ineligible to vote.” Ohio Masonic
Home, 295 NLRB 390, 393 (1989). The stipulation for certifi-
cation upon consent election states that the eligible voters are
those employed by Respondent on the payroll period ending
December 6. Thus it was incumbent upon the General Counsel
or the Union to establish that Perkins was a supervisor on the
eligibility date. There is no evidence that Perkins was a super-
visor on that date. His status as a former supervisor does not
render him ineligible to vote. Coradian Corp., 287 NLRB
1207, 1220 (1988). Thus, I find that Perkins is properly in-
cluded in the unit.
As of December 4, the unit consisted of 31 employees, in-
cluding Jones, Collins, Roberts, and Perkins. As of that date a
total of 18 employees, a clear majority, had signed unambigu-
ous single purpose cards that authorized the Union to represent
them. There was no objection to the admission into evidence of
the cards signed by the following employees, all of which were
properly authenticated:

Oliver Blount Frank Mikolay
Mark Christini Bill Montgomery
Bryan Cloud Gentle Philon
Ed Collins Jeremiah Pitts
Ron Fields Gerald Rahm
Bill Harvey James Roberts
Freeman Hunter Thomas Searcy
John Johnson Chris Wade
Davin Jones Dave White

Employee Montgomery, who signed a card on October 30,
requested that his card be returned on November 3, following
the discharge of Jones and permanent layoffs of Collins and
Roberts. He told Union Organizer Matt Oakes that he could not
afford to lose his job. Under longstanding Board precedent, the
attempted revocation of a card that is “the product of Respon-
dent’s unfair labor practices” is ineffectual. Dlubak Corp., 307
NLRB 1138 fn. 2 (1992). Even if I considered this card to have
been revoked, the remaining 17 authorizations would constitute
a majority in the unit of 31.
Respondent argues that a bargaining order should not issue
since, assuming Jones, Collins, and Roberts were unlawfully
discharged and, therefore, their ballots should be counted, the
Union presumptively retained the support of 16 employees.
Hence, there was no “erosion of support for the Union because
of actions by the Company.” Although this argument has a
certain appeal, it is based upon the speculation that Jones,
Collins, and Roberts continued to support the Union and voted
for representation. If Respondent’s retaliation against them
dissuaded them from their support of the Union, the opening of
the challenged ballots will not change the result of the election
which the Union lost by a vote of 14 to 13. Respondent con-
tends that these employees were lawfully terminated. Thus it is
contending that the unit consists of 28 employees, 15 of whom
authorized the Union to represent them, but only 13 of whom
voted for the Union.
I find, in the circumstances of this case, that the holding of a
fair election in the future would be virtually impossible. Upon
Respondent’s learning of union organization activity, it termi-
nated three of the six employees who attended the first union
meeting, and then laid off two of the employees who attended
the second union meeting. As of November 5, the number of
employees working at plants 1 and 2 had been reduced from 24
to 19, approximately 20 percent of the work force at the plants.
Boraski threatened closure, Garba threatened closure, Kath
repeated the threat of closure. The leading remaining union
adherent, Mikolay, was subjected to isolation and monitoring,
having his worktable moved to the supervisor’s doorway.
Thereafter, threats of closure were repeated by Boraski. I am
mindful that Respondent most egregious unlawful actions were
concentrated into the period following the first two union meet-
ings. Respondent’s swift retaliation was not lost on the employ-
ees. Montgomery requested recession of his authorization card.
In this case, as the Board found in Electro-Voice, Inc., 320
NLRB 1094, 1096 (1996), I find that Respondent’s concen-
trated unlawful actions “enhanced their severity and lasting
impact on employees’ free choice.”
In view of the foregoing and the entire record, I find that the
possibly of erasing the effects of Respondent’s unfair labor
practices is slight and that the holding of a fair election is
unlikely. Thus, I find that a bargaining order is warranted.
H. Election Challenges and Objections
1. Challenges
The representation election conducted on January 20 resulted
in 13 votes being cast for the Union, 14 votes being cast against
the Union, with 4 determinative challenged ballots. Three of
those were the ballots of alleged discriminatees Davin Jones,
Ed Collins, and James Roberts. I have found that all three of
these alleged discriminatees were unlawfully discharged. The
fourth challenged ballot was that of alleged Supervisor Kyle
Perkins, whom I have found is properly included in the unit. In
view of the foregoing I shall recommend that all four chal-
lenged ballots be opened and counted. If the revised tally of
ballots shows that the Union has lost the election, the petition
should be dismissed in view of the bargaining order that I have
found to be warranted. If the Union has won the election, the
bargaining order should be given effect and, additionally, the
Regional Director shall issue a certification of representative.
F. L. Smithe Machine Co., 305 NLRB 1082 (1992).
2. Objections
The order directing a hearing on the Union’s objections re-
ferred to hearing every objection that was coextensive with a
complaint allegation. All parties, in their briefs, correctly note
that only conduct that occurred during the critical period, be-
tween the filing of the petition and the date of the election, may
serve as a basis for setting aside an election.
The Charging Party argues that Boraski’s individually speak-
ing with each employee the day before the election, requesting
the support of the employee, was tantamount to a prohibited
captive audience speech. The conversations were at the em-
ployees’ work stations, and there is no evidence of any coercive
statement in these conversations. Such conversations, in the
absence of evidence of coerciveness, do not constitute a captive
audience speech in violation of Peerless Plywood, 107 NLRB
427 (1953). Flex Products, 280 NLRB 1117 (1986). I shall,
therefore, recommend that objection 14 be overruled.
I have found that Respondent’s January suspension of Miko-
lay, who was the leading remaining proponent of the Union,
violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. This is alleged as objection-
able conduct in Objection 9. I have also found various 8(a)(1)
violations that are coextensive with various objections to the
election filed by the Union. Objection 8 relates the treatment of
GENERAL FABRICATIONS CORP. 1133
Mikolay who, during the critical period, was more closely
monitored and isolated, restricted from talking to other employ-
ees, and harassed. Objection 19 alleges Belch’s threat of futil-
ity, Objection 24 alleges threats of loss of benefits which I have
found Boraski made, and Objection 25 alleges threats of plant
closure which I have found were made during the critical pe-
riod by Boraski and Belch to Pitts.
I find the foregoing violations of the Act that occurred dur-
ing the critical preelection period and that correspond to the
Union’s objections interfered with the employees’ free choice
of representation. Notwithstanding this finding, in view of my
finding that a bargaining order is appropriate, the petition
should be dismissed if the revised tally of ballots shows that the
Union has lost the election.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By advising employees who support the Union that they
should quit, threatening loss of jobs and plant closure, advising
employees that selection of the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative is futile, more closely monitoring and
isolating employees who support the Union, threatening not to
excuse previously excused absences of employees who support
the Union, restricting employees who support the Union from
talking with other employees, harassing employees who sup-
port the Union, interrogating employees concerning their activi-
ties on behalf of the Union, directing employees not to cooper-
ate with the Union in obtaining evidence with regard to objec-
tions to an election, and threatening loss of benefits and more
strict enforcement of company rules in an effort to dissuade
employees from supporting the Union, the Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. By discharging Davin Jones on October 30, 1997, perma-
nently laying off Ed Collins and James Roberts on November 3,
1997, laying off Bryan Cloud and John Johnson on November
4, 1997, laying off Ron Fields on December 2, 1997, warning
Frank Mikolay on November 10, 1997, and suspending Frank
Mikolay effective January 5, 1998, because of their union sym-
pathies and activities, the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
3. Since December 4, 1997, the Union has been the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative, within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act, representing a majority of the employ-
ees in the following appropriate unit:

All full-time welders, fabricators, electricians, and installers
employed by the Employer at the Sandusky, Ohio, facility;
but excluding all office clerical employees, sales persons, en-
gineers and professional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act, and all other employees.

4. By refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union since
December 4, 1997, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged Davin
Jones, permanently laid off Ed Collins and James Roberts, and
laid off without recalling Bryan Cloud and John Johnson, it
must offer them reinstatement and make them whole for any
loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a quarterly
basis from the date of the discharge and layoffs to date of
proper offer of reinstatement, less any net interim earnings, as
prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus
interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283
NLRB 1173 (1987).
The Respondent, having discriminatorily laid off Ron Fields,
it must make him whole for any loss of earnings and other
benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from December 2,
1997, until February 23, 1998, the date he was recalled, less
any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co.,
supra, plus interest as computed in New Horizons for the Re-
tarded, supra.
The Respondent must also remove any reference to the fore-
going discharges and layoffs from the files of the foregoing
employees and must also rescind the warning and suspension
issued Frank Mikolay and remove any reference to them from
his file.10
Having found that a bargaining order is appropriate, Respon-
dent, on request, shall bargain collectively with the Union as
the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the
appropriate unit.
Insofar as Respondent’s violations of the Act are sufficiently
egregious so as to warrant a bargaining order, it follows that a
broad cease and desist order is appropriate. Hickmont Foods,
242 NLRB 1357 (1979).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended11
ORDER
The Respondent, General Fabrications Corp., Sandusky,
Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Advising employees who support Sheet Metal Workers
International Association of Northern Ohio, Local Union No.
33, AFL–CIO or any other union that they should quit.
(b) Threatening loss of jobs and plant closure in order to dis-
courage employees from engaging in union activities.
(c) Advising employees that selection of the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative is futile.
(d) More closely monitoring and isolating employees who
support the Union.
(e) Threatening not to excuse previously excused absences of
employees who support the Union, restricting employees who
support the Union from talking with other employees, and har-
assing employees who support the Union.
(f) Interrogating employees concerning their activities on be-
half of the Union and directing employees not to cooperate with
the Union with regard to objections to an election.

10 Mikolay is due no backpay since he was physically unable to work
when suspended.
11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1134
(g) Threatening loss of benefits and more strict enforcement
of company rules in an effort to dissuade employees from sup-
porting the Union.
(h) Discharging, laying off, suspending, warning, or other-
wise discriminating against any employee for supporting the
Union.
(i) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the ex-
clusive bargaining representative of the employees in the ap-
propriate unit.
(j) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Davin
Jones, Ed Collins, James Roberts, Bryan Cloud, and John John-
son full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Davin Jones, Ed Collins, James Roberts, Bryan
Cloud, John Johnson, and Ron Fields whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimi-
nation against them, in the manner set forth in the remedy sec-
tion of the decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the unlawful discharge and layoffs and
notify the employees in writing that this has been done and that
these actions will not be used against them in any way.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the unlawful warning and suspension
issued to Frank Mikolay and notify him in writing that this has
been done and that these actions will not be used against him in
any way.
(e) On request, bargain with Sheet Metal Workers Interna-
tional Association of Northern Ohio, Local Union No. 33,
AFL–CIO as the exclusive representative of the employees in
the following appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions
of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the
understanding in a signed agreement:

All full-time welders, fabricators, electricians, and installers
employed by the Employer at the Sandusky, Ohio, facility;
but excluding all office clerical employees, sales persons, en-
gineers and professional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act, and all other employees.

(f) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Or-
der.
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cilities in Sandusky, Ohio, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”12 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 8, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since October 30, 1997.
(h) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the challenges to the ballots of
Davin Jones, Ed Collins, James Roberts, and Kyle Perkins are
overruled.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case 8–RC–15667 is severed
from Case 8–CA–29443 et. al, and that it is remanded to the
Regional Director for Region 8 for action consistent with the
direction below.
DIRECTION
IT IS DIRECTED that the Regional Director for Region 8 shall,
within 10 days from the date of this decision, open and count
the ballots of Davin Jones, Ed Collins, James Roberts, and Kyle
Perkins, and prepare and serve on the parties a revised tally of
ballots.
If the final revised tally in this proceeding reveals that the
Petitioner has received a majority of the valid ballots case, the
Regional Director shall issue a certification of representative.
If, however, the revised tally shows that the Petitioner has not
received a majority of the valid ballots case, the Regional Di-
rector shall set aside the election, dismiss the petition, and va-
cate the proceedings in Case 8–RC–15667.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT advise you that you should quit if you support
Sheet Metal Workers International Association of Northern
Ohio, Local Union No. 33, AFL–CIO or any other union.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of jobs and plant closure
in order to discourage you from engaging in union activities.
GENERAL FABRICATIONS CORP. 1135
WE WILL NOT advise you that selection of the Union as your
collective-bargaining representative is futile.
WE WILL NOT more closely monitor or isolate those of you
who support the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with unexcused absences, restrict
you from talking to other employees, or harass you because you
engage in union activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate you concerning your activities on
behalf of the Union and WE WILL NOT direct you not to cooper-
ate with the Union with regard to objections to an election.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of benefits and more
strict enforcement of company rules in an effort to dissuade you
from supporting the Union.
WE WILL NOT discharge, lay off, suspend, warn, or otherwise
discriminate against any of you because you support the Union.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Sheet Metal
Workers International Association of Northern Ohio, Local
Union No. 33, AFL–CIO as your exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative in the following unit:

All full-time welders, fabricators, electricians, and installers
employed by us at our Sandusky, Ohio, facility; but excluding
all office clerical employees, sales persons, engineers and pro-
fessional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act, and all other employees.

WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union concerning your
terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is
reached, embody the understanding in a signed agreement.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
offer Davin Jones, Ed Collins, James Roberts, Bryan Cloud,
and John Johnson full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if
those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Davin Jones, Ed Collins, James Roberts,
Bryan Cloud, John Johnson, and Ron Fields whole for any loss
of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the dis-
crimination against them, less any net interim earnings, plus
interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful discharge
of Davin Jones and unlawful layoffs of Ed Collins, James Rob-
erts, Bryan Cloud, John Johnson, and Ron Fields, and WE WILL,
within 3 days thereafter, notify each of them in writing that this
has been done and that these actions will not be used against
them in any way.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful warning
and suspension issued to Frank Mikolay, and WE WILL, within 3
days thereafter, notify him in writing that this has been done
and that these actions will not be used against him in any way.
GENERAL FABRICATIONS CORP.