GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 29, 2021

2020003281 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/410,460 01/19/2017 Brian Leslie HENDERSON 313983/22113-0322 9253
13152 7590 04/29/2021
McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC
100 Pine Street
P.O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166
EXAMINER
PATEL, DEVANG R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1735
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/29/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patents@mcneeslaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte BRIAN LESLIE HENDERSON,
PAUL A. COOK, DANIEL JAMES DORRIETY, and
LAWRENCE JAMES WHIMS
____________

Appeal 2020-003281
Application 15/410,460
Technology Center 1700
____________

Before JEFFREY T. SMITH, BRIAN D. RANGE, and
MERRELL C. CASHION, JR., Administrative Patent Judges.

CASHION, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision finally rejecting claims 1–4, 6–8, 10, 11, 21, and 23–32.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real parties in interest as Brian
Leslie Henderson, Paul A. Cook, Daniel James Dorriety, Lawrence James
Whims, and General Electric Company. Appeal Br. 1.
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The invention generally relates to a method of wide gap brazing to
repair small gaps or defects in a component by promoting capillary flow of
braze material in a gap. Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1 illustrates the invention and is
reproduced below from the Claims Appendix of the Appeal Brief:
1. A method of brazing comprising:
providing at least one component having a gap between a first
metal portion and a second metal portion of the at least one
component, the gap lacking a complete capillary field due to a gap
distance between opposing surfaces of the first metal portion and the
second metal portion, the gap distance being such that the gap does
not fill with a molten braze material by capillary action alone;

placing a non-foam matrix having a three-dimensional matrix
structure with a predetermined equivalent mesh size in the gap to
provide a complete capillary field to the gap for the molten braze
material flowing into the gap; and

applying the molten braze material to the gap such that the
molten braze material flows into the gap and the complete capillary
field and through the non-foam matrix in the gap by capillary action to
fill the gap and cools to form a solid braze in the gap.

Appellant requests review of the following rejections from the
Examiner’s Final Office Action dated June 24, 2019:
I. Claims 1, 3, 6, 10, 21, 23, 25, 26, 29, 31, and 32 rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Huxol (US 2016/0059364 A1,
published March 3, 2016), Landwehr (US 2016/0325368 A1, published
Nov. 10, 2016), and Montross (US 2014/0020823 A1, published Jan. 23,
2014);

II. Claims 2, 7, 8, 27, 28, and 30 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Huxol, Landwehr, Montross, and Park (US 8,568,826 B2,
issued Oct. 29, 2013);

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III. Claim 4 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Huxol, Landwehr, Montross, and Ellison (US 7,199,174 B2, issued April 3,
2007); and

IV. Claims 11 and 24 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Huxol, Landwehr, Montross, and Johnson (US 7,789,288
B1, issued Sept. 7, 2010).

Appellant presents specific arguments only for the following claims:
(a) claims 1, 6, 31, and 32 (Rejection I); (b) claim 7 (Rejection II). Appeal
Br. 7–13. Appellant relies on these arguments to address the rejections of
the claims not specifically argued. Id. Accordingly, we select claim 1 as
representative of the subject matter claimed and decide the appeal as to all
grounds of rejections based on the arguments presented for claims 1, 6, 7,
31, and 32.

OPINION
After review of the respective positions the Appellant provides in the
Appeal and Reply Briefs and the Examiner provides in the Final Office
Action and the Answer, we affirm the Examiner’s prior art rejections of
claims 1–4, 6–8, 10, 11, 21, and 23–32 based on the fact-finding and the
reasoning the Examiner provides. We add the following.

Independent claim 1
Claim 1 recites placing a non-foam matrix having a three-dimensional
matrix structure in a gap to provide a complete capillary field to the gap for
molten braze material to flow into the gap to subsequently form a solid braze
in the gap.

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The Examiner finds Huxol teaches a method of brazing by inserting
an alloy powder filler into a gap of a component, where the alloy powder
filler provides a complete capillary field to the gap for a molten braze
material to flow into the gap to form a solid braze in the gap. Final Act. 4–5;
Huxol ¶¶ 34, 37–40. The Examiner finds Huxol’s inserted alloy powder to
be a non-foam matrix having a three-dimensional matrix structure. Final
Act. 4. However, the Examiner finds that Huxol does not teach a non-foam
matrix in the form of a matrix structure with a predetermined mesh size as
claimed. Id. at 5. The Examiner finds that Landwehr, like Huxol, teaches a
method of brazing a gap between two components using a powder filler
matrix and brazing material. Final Act. 5; Landwehr Figures 1–2, ¶ 28. The
Examiner further finds that Landwehr teaches the use of fibers and sheets as
alternate filler materials for brazing. Final Act. 5; Landwehr ¶ 28. The
Examiner additionally finds Montross teaches it is known to braze
components to each other by using a metal mesh, perforated foil, a compact,
a pre-cast tape, a fiber preform, a powder layer, or combinations thereof.
Final Act. 5; Montross ¶ 43. The Examiner finds that these teachings
encompass the claimed fiber material in the form of a matrix structure with a
predetermined mesh size. Final Act. 5. The Examiner determines it would
be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Huxol’s brazing
method by using a filler material in the form of a fiber material in a matrix
structure, as suggested by Landwehr and Montross, in place of Huxol’s alloy
powder filler because it is an art-recognized alternative brazing filler for
brazing processes. Final Act. 5.
Appellant argues that the Examiner has not explained how Huxol’s
alloy powder filler would be a “non-foam matrix” as claimed. Appeal Br. 7.
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“[D]uring examination proceedings, claims are given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” In re Translogic
Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Hyatt, 211
F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). See also In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that the scope of the
claims in patent applications is not determined solely on the basis of the
claim language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable
construction in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of
ordinary skill in the art); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim
construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to
the meaning of a disputed term.’” (citation omitted)). In general,
the PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the
broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary
usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in
the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of
definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written
description contained in the [Appellant’s] specification.

In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Appellant’s argument does not identify reversible error in the
Examiner’s determination of obviousness. The Specification describes that
a “braze matrix 24 is preferably a non-foam matrix that is not formed as a
foam.” Spec. ¶ 38. The Specification also describes a “braze matrix” as
“any matrix material that provides a capillary field such that molten braze
material flows throughout the matrix material by capillary action.” Spec. ¶
17. Thus, based on this disclosure, the broadest interpretation of “non-foam
matrix” encompasses Huxol’s alloy powder filler given that it provides a
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capillary field when inserted into a gap to facilitate the flow of the brazing
material. Huxol ¶ 40. Thus, Appellant has not explained adequately why
Huxol’s alloy powder filler is not a “non-foam” matrix material.
Appellant argues that Huxol does not teach the bi-modal braze
composition flowing through a matrix in the gap. Appeal Br. 8. This
argument is also unavailing because it does not take into account Huxol’s
teachings as a whole. Huxol is directed to repairing wide gaps that have
poor capillary action for the use of slurries, pastes, and transfer tapes. Huxol
¶ 5. Huxol describes the use of a nanosized alloy powder filler as a gap
filler and that the repair method using this filler “increases capillary forces
for the braze metal to flow and hereby minimize or eliminate voids in the
gap.” Id. ¶¶ 34, 40. Thus, contrary to Appellant’s argument, one skilled in
the art would have reasonably inferred from this disclosure that Huxol’s
alloy powder filler provides capillary action once inserted into the gap to be
repaired. See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264–65 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(holding that a reference stands for all of the specific teachings thereof as
well as the inferences one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably
been expected to draw therefrom).
Appellant contends that Landwehr does not disclose capillary action.
Appeal Br. 8. According to Appellant, Landwehr teaches brazing two
components together by “first placing a filler material between the parts and
then placing a metal or alloy on top of the filler material” so that the
metal/alloy, once heated to a molten state, can infiltrate the filler material.
Id. In addition, Appellant asserts Landwehr “alter[s] the chemistry and
location of the filler material of Landwehr during the braze process such that
there is no reason to believe that the filler material of Landwehr, even if a
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fiber material, would be capable of providing a capillary field to the gap for
flow through of [sic] the molten metal/alloy.” Appeal Br. 8–9; see also
Reply Br. 3.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of reversible error in the
Examiner’s determination of obviousness.
To establish a prima facie case of obviousness, the Examiner must
show that each and every limitation of the claim is described or suggested by
the prior art or would have been obvious based on the knowledge of those of
ordinary skill in the art or the inferences and creative steps a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have employed. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007); In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Moreover, “the test for combining references is not what the individual
references themselves suggest but rather what the combination of disclosures
taken as a whole would suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re
McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971).
As the Examiner finds, Landwehr is directed to brazing two
components together using a filler material that can be in the form of a
powder, fiber, or sheet. Final Act. 5; Landwehr Figures 1, 2A, ¶ 28.
Landwehr discloses providing the filler material between the two
components and then places a brazing material that infiltrates the filler
material when the brazing material is in molten state. Landwehr ¶¶ 32–38.
Landwehr expressly describes that the filler material may be porous to allow
the brazing material to infiltrate the filler material. Id. ¶ 38. Landwehr’s
disclosure of a porous filler material would result in a brazing method
having capillary action to promote the infiltration of the brazing material
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into the filler material.2 See Fritch, 972 F.2d at 1264–65. Therefore, given
that Landwehr discloses fibers and sheets as alternatives to powder filler
material, there would have been a reasonable basis for one skilled in the art
to have modified Huxol’s brazing method by substituting Huxol’s alloy
powder filler with Landwehr’s porous filler material in the form of fibers or
sheets and reasonably expect that the modified method would have been
suitable for Huxol’s repair purposes. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 904
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (“For obviousness under § 103, all that is required is a
reasonable expectation of success.”). Appellant fails to explain adequately
why Landwehr’s fiber/sheet filler material would not have been suitable for
Huxol’s method.
Appellant’s argument that Huxol teaches wide gap brazing while
Landwehr and Montross do not is unpersuasive. Appeal Br. 10. The
premise of the Examiner’s rejection is substitution of one brazing filler
material for another. Final Act. 5. For the reasons we provide above,
Appellant fails to explain adequately why Landwehr’s fiber/sheet filler
material would not have been suitable for Huxol’s gap repair method.
Appellant additionally argues that the combination of a powder and
vibration to fill the gap space is critical to Huxol’s method and that replacing
Huxol’s fiber matrix with Landwehr’s fiber material would change the
principle of operation of Huxol’s method. Appeal Br. 9. We understand the

2 Léger, made of record with this decision, discloses it is known that
capillary forces are a dominant force for liquid metal infiltration into porous
preforms. Léger, A., Calderon, N.R., Charvet, R. et al., Capillarity in
pressure infiltration: improvements in characterization of high-temperature
systems. J Mater Sci 47, 8419–30 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10853-
012-6645-2. See page 1 of online version.
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argument to mean that a change in the filler matrix material would
necessitate a change in the way the alternative filler material is placed into
the gap to be repaired.
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive for the reasons the Examiner
presents. Ans. 9. Namely that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
readily understand that powder material, fiber material or metal mesh-type
are art-recognized alternative forms of filler materials for brazing.
Moreover, Appellant fails to explain why one skilled in the art, using no
more than ordinary creativity, would not have been capable of selecting a
means to insert a filler material into a gap that is appropriate for the type of
filler used. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”); see also In re Sovish, 769
F.2d 738, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (presuming skill on the part of one of
ordinary skill in the art).

Claims 6 and 31
Claim 6 recites “the non-foam matrix is a fiber matrix of interwoven
fibers,” and claim 31 further recites “the interwoven fibers are metal fibers.”
The Examiner finds that “[e]ach of Huxol, Landwehr and Montross
discloses metal filler.” Final Act. 6. As the Examiner further explains in the
Answer, Montross teaches a metal mesh material that encompasses
interwoven metal fibers because the customary definition of “mesh” includes
woven strands. Ans. 9–10. Thus, the Examiner determines that Montrose’s
disclosure teaches the limitations of claims 6 and 31. Id. at 10.
We have considered Appellant’s arguments with respect to these
claims (Appeal Br. 10–11), but we find them unpersuasive of reversible
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error for the reasons the Examiner presents in the Answer. Further, we note
that Appellant’s Reply Brief does not address the Examiner’s stated position
in the Answer.

Claim 32
Claim 32 recites “the placing comprises inserting the non-foam matrix
into the gap.”
Appellant argues the significance of the limitation “inserting the non-
foam matrix into the gap,” requiring a three-dimensional matrix before and
after the inserting step. Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 5–6.
These arguments are also unpersuasive for the reasons we give above
when discussing Huxol’s use of vibrations for insertion of powder fillers.
Specifically, Appellant fails to explain why one skilled in the art, using no
more than ordinary creativity, would not have been capable of selecting a
means to insert a filler material into a gap that is appropriate for the type of
filler material used. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421; Sovish, 769 F.2d at 743.
Moreover, the argument does not take into account that the premise of the
Examiner’s rejection is replacing Huxol’s powder with the interwoven
material suggested by the secondary references.

Claim 7
Claim 7 recites “the predetermined equivalent mesh size is in the
range of about 15 µm to about 100 µm (about 0.6 mil to about 3.9 mil).”
In Rejection II, the Examiner addresses claim 7 by additionally
relying on the additional reference to Park. Final Act. 8. The Examiner
finds Park discloses a brazing method that uses particulate filler materials
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with an average diameter ranging from approximately 0.254 mm to 1.5 mm
and average mesh size of approximately 400 mesh to 100 mesh (which
converts to about 38–150 microns). Final Act. 8; Park col. 4, l. 54–col. 5, l.
17. The Examiner further finds Park teaches that the particulate material
undergoes capillary action in the treatment area to allow the material to flow
uniformly throughout the area and form a stronger brazed joint. Final Act.
8; Park col. 5, ll. 25–32. The Examiner finds that Park’s mesh size overlaps
with the claimed mesh/microns size of about 15–100 μm. The Examiner
determines that the overlapping range establishes that a prima facie case of
obviousness exists for this claim. Final Act. 8.
Appellant argues Park teaches the particle size of a powder and not
the size of the void space between elements in the three- dimensional matrix.
Appeal Br. 12–13; Reply Br. 6.
Appellant’s argument does not point to reversible error in the
Examiner’s determination of obviousness for the reasons the Examiner
presents. Ans. 11.
Moreover, as we discuss above, Huxol solves the problem of a gap
defect that is too large to draw the gap filler material into defects by
capillary forces alone. Huxol ¶ 4. Huxol solves this problem using an alloy
powder filler material to increase the capillary forces to draw the gap filler
material. Id. ¶ 40. Thus, Huxol recognizes that the size of the voids is
critical for effective capillary action. Appellant directs us to no objective
evidence regarding the criticality of the claimed range of mesh sizes. Given
Huxol’s disclosure, Appellant fails to explain why one skilled in the art,
using no more than ordinary creativity, would not have been capable of
determining the appropriate size for the voids (i.e., mesh size) within the
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filler material to ensure that capillary forces can act to draw the brazing
material into the filler for effective repair of the gap. See KSR, 550 U.S. at
421; Sovish, 769 F.2d at 743.
Arguments not specifically addressed are deemed not persuasive for
the reasons the Examiner presents.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s prior art rejection of claims 1–
4, 6–8, 10, 11, 21, and 23–32 for the Examiner provides and we give above.

DECISION SUMMARY

In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 6, 10,
21, 23, 25,
26, 29, 31,
32
103 Huxol, Landwehr,
Montross
1, 3, 6, 10,
21, 23, 25,
26, 29, 31,
32

2, 7, 8, 27,
28, 30
103 Huxol, Landwehr,
Montross, Park
2, 7, 8, 27,
28, 30

4 103 Huxol, Landwehr,
Montross, Ellison
4
11, 24 103 Huxol, Landwehr,
Montross, Johnson
11, 24
Overall
Outcome
1–4, 6–8,
10, 11, 21,
23–32

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED