General Electric Company

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 24, 2020

2019002667 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/734,691 06/09/2015 Christopher Michael Raczynski 19441-1089 7725
13077 7590 06/24/2020
Eversheds Sutherland GE
Suite 2300
999 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
DANG, HUNG H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2117
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentdocket@eversheds-sutherland.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL RACZYNSKI,
LARRY WILLIAM SWANSON, LISA ANNE WICHMANN,
MATTHEW COLIN MICHAEL, and UTTAM NARASIMHAN
____________________

Appeal 2019-002667
Application 14/734,691
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before ELENI MANTIS-MERCADER, ERIC S. FRAHM, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF CASE
Introduction
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Non-Final
rejection of claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. “The word ‘applicant’ when used in this title refers to the
inventor or all of the joint inventors, or to the person applying for a patent as
provided in §§ 1.43, 1.45, or 1.46.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as the inventor, General Electric Company
(Appeal Br. 1).
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Appellant’s Disclosed and Claimed Invention
Appellant’s disclosed invention “relates generally to combined cycle
power plants, and more particularly, to systems and methods for power plant
data reconciliation” (Spec. ¶ 1). As disclosed by Appellant, “[a] combined
cycle power plant may include a combustion turbine, a steam generator, and
a steam turbine. The steam turbine of a combined cycle power plant is
powered by the steam generated by the hot exhaust of the combustion
turbine in the steam generator” (Spec. ¶ 2). Appellant recognized that:
Degradation of power plant components can be analyzed
by personnel utilizing a tuned model of the power plant.
However, power plant data used for input to conventional tuned
models may be incomplete, inaccurate, and relatively difficult
to interpret. In certain instances, conventional tuned models are
not maintained, and as the physical plant degrades over time,
tuning values used as inputs for the models will be inaccurate.
Without relatively accurate model inputs and proper model
maintenance, tuned models will be unreliable, and power plant
and component performance and degradation will not be
accurately predicted.

Spec. ¶ 3 (emphasis added). As a result, Appellant’s disclosed and claimed
invention solves these problems by providing an “automated data
reconciliation of the power plant . . . to replace conventional manual data
collection and operating procedures” (Spec. ¶ 14; see generally claims 1, 8,
15). Doing so provides improvements in “predicting, identifying, and
reducing isolated and/or recurring instances of component degradation,
failures, and/or malfunctions in a power plant” (Spec. ¶ 15), as well as “early
detection of malfunctions, abnormal conditions, and power plant process
deviations, which can minimize instances of failures, tripping, and shutdown
of the power plant and/or associated components” (Spec. ¶ 15).
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Exemplary Claim
Claims 1, 8, and 15 are independent. Claims 1–7 recite a method, and
claims 8–20 recite a system, “for implementing data reconciliation using a
power plant model” (see e.g., claim 1, preamble), with the end result being
the determination and transmission of “at least one control action for a
power plant component using the power plant model” (see e.g., claim 1,
limitation E). Exemplary claim 1 under appeal, with bracketed lettering and
formatting added, and emphases added to key portions of the claim at issue,
reads as follows:
1. A method for implementing data reconciliation using
a power plant model, comprising:
[A] receiving, by at least one processor, power plant
operational data, wherein the operational data comprises one or
more parameters affecting power plant operations, information
that represents dependencies between one or more power plant
operating conditions and a physical behavior of the power plant
response, and information associated with component
degradation in the power plant;
[B] determining, by at least one processor, measurements
for calibrating and tuning based at least in part on the
operational data, wherein the operational data comprises a
predefined number of stable data points;
[C] selecting, by at least one processor, thermally stable
data and baseload data from the operational data to coincide
with output data associated with one or more power plant
operating conditions, wherein the operating conditions align
output data from a power plant model with physical behavior of
the power plant;
[D] modifying, by at least one processor, one or more
parameters of the power plant model, wherein at least one
difference is minimized between the output data associated with
the power plant model and a measured value in the power plant
operational data; and
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[E] determining, by at least one processor, at least one
control action for a power plant component using the power
plant model, [F] wherein the at least one control action
comprises a communication generated by the controller and
transmitted by the controller2 to a user device.
Claims Appendix, p. 2 (emphases, formatting, and bracketed lettering
added).
The Examiner’s Rejections
(1) The Examiner rejected claims 1, 8, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (an abstract idea),
without significantly more. Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–11.
(2) Claims 1, 2, 8, 9, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)
as being anticipated by Greenlee (US 2012/0095574 A1; published April 19,
2012). Final Act. 5–8.
(3) Claims 3, 10, and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Greenlee in view of Mathan et al. (US 2007/0239814 A1;
published Oct. 11, 2007) (hereinafter, “Mathan”). Final Act. 8–9.
(4) Claims 4, 11, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Greenlee in view of Danai et al. (US 2011/0167025 A1;
published July 7, 2011) (hereinafter, “Danai”). Final Act. 9–11.

2 We note that because there is no controller previously recited in the
preamble of claim 1, nor in any of limitations A–E, the term “the controller”
here in limitation F of claim 1 lacks antecedent basis. Claim 8 suffers a
similar problem. Because there is no indefiniteness rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 112(b) for lack of antecedent basis before us on appeal, we will not
address this any further. However, in the event of further prosecution of this
application, Appellant and the Examiner may wish to resolve this issue.
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(5) Claims 5–7, 12–14, and 18–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Greenlee in view of Wilkes et al. (US
2013/0054031 A1; published Feb. 28, 2013) (hereinafter, “Wilkes”). Final
Act. 11–13.
Because Appellant does not present any separate arguments as to the
(i) anticipation rejection of claims 1, 2, 8, 9, and 15; and (ii) obviousness
rejections of claims 3–7, 10–14, and 16–20,3 Appellant has not shown that
the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–20, and we sustain the anticipation
and obviousness rejections pro forma. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072,
1076 (BPAI 2010) (“Precedential”) (“[T]he Board will generally not reach
the merits of any issues not contested by an appellant.”); 37 C.F.R. § 41.37
(c)(1)(iv)(2017) (“Each ground of rejection must be treated under a separate
heading.). Other than including these prior art rejections of claims 1–20 (see
supra Rejections 2–5) in our conclusion, we will not discuss them further.
Appellant’s Contentions
With regard to the patent eligibility rejection of claims 1, 8, and 15,
Appellant primarily makes arguments regarding claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 5–
14; Reply Br. 2–5), and relies on those arguments for the patent eligibility of
the remaining claims (see Appeal Br. 6, 15; Reply Br. 2). Although
Appellant frames the issue for the patent eligibility rejection as concerning
the rejection of claims 1–20 (see Appeal Br. 5; Reply Br. 2), we note that the
Examiner only rejected claims 1, 8, and 15 on this ground (see Final Act. 2;

3 See e.g., Appeal Br. 5 and Reply Br. 2 (stating that the only ground of
rejection to be reviewed on appeal is the patent eligibility rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101).
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see also Ans. 3–11 (only discussing the merits of claims 1, 8, and 15)).
Therefore, only the rejection of claims 1, 8, and 15 is before use on appeal.
With regard to claim 1, Appellant generally contends claim 1 is not
directed to an abstract idea (see Appeal Br. 6–12), but to a technical solution
to a technical problem that produces specific improvements to computer
technology (see Appeal Br. 12–14). More specifically, Appellant contends
the claims “solve a problem specific to reconciling data between a power
plant model and an operating power plant for which there is no manual
analog, and result in improved predictions of power plant component
degradation and failures,” thereby “the present claims allow for increased
efficiency and accuracy” (see Appeal Br. 12). Appellant further asserts that:
the present claims provide an unconventional technological
solution (using a neural-net surrogate model that indicates
physical degradation of plant components by reconciling the
operational data, determining data match multipliers (DMMs),
and determining performance factors) to a technological
problem (reconciling data between a power plant model and an
operating power plant).

Appeal Br. 13. Finally, Appellant argues that even if the claims are directed
to a mental process, and thus an abstract idea, the abstract idea is integrated
into a practical application because it is limited to power plant modeling (see
Reply Br. 2–5).
Therefore, based on Appellant’s patent eligibility arguments, and
because claims 1, 8, and 15 contain commensurate limitations, we select
claim 1 as representative of claims 1, 8, and 15 rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 for patent-ineligibility.
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Principal Issue on Appeal
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br. 5–
16) and the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–5), the following issue is presented on
appeal:
Did the Examiner err in rejecting representative claim 1, as well as
claims 8 and 15 grouped therewith, under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed
to patent-ineligible subject matter (i.e., a judicial exception such as an
abstract idea), without significantly more)?

ANALYSIS
First Issue: Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
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risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).4 Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong 1”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING

4 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, updating and clarifying the Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
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PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th Ed.,
Rev. 08.2017, 2018) (“Step 2A, Prong 2”).5
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception (“Step 2B”).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
Even if the claim recites an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit explains
the “directed to” inquiry is not simply asking whether the claims involve a
patent-ineligible concept:
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical
products and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”) Rather, the “directed to”
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light
of the specification, based on whether “their character as a
whole is directed to excluded subject matter.”

5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’
claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a
whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”).
We have reviewed the Examiner’s subject matter eligibility rejection
(Final Act. 2–4) in light of Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner has
erred (Appeal Br. 5–16; Reply Br. 2–5), and the Examiner’s response to
Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Ans. 3–11). We are not
persuaded by Appellant’s contention of Examiner error in rejecting
representative claim 1, or claims 8 and 15 grouped therewith, under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
Step 1
Under Step 1 of the patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101, we
determine whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories
of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
In the instant case on appeal, representative claim 1 recites “[a]
method for implementing data reconciliation using a power plant model”
performed by “at least one processor” which includes, inter alia, the steps
which results in the determination and transmission of “at least one control
action for a power plant component” to a user (claim 1, limitation E).
Therefore, claim 1, as a method claim, recites at least one of the enumerated
categories (e.g., a process including a series of steps) of eligible subject
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matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner (see
Ans. 5) that claim 1 passes Step 1.
Accordingly, as to claim 1, as well as claims 8 and 15 grouped
therewith, we continue our analysis under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Guidance
to determine whether claim 1recites a judicial exception (a law of nature,
natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the enumerated groupings of
abstract ideas above).
Step 2A, Prong 1
The Guidance states that the abstract idea exception includes mental
processes, which include “concepts performed in the human mind (including
an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52. Such concepts must be capable of being practically performed in the
human mind, although the use of a physical aid, such as a pen and paper, or
a computer does not negate the mental nature of such a concept. October
2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (hereinafter, 2019
Update) 8–9 (October 2019), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df.
We agree with the Examiner’s determination (see Final Act. 2–4; Ans.
3–5) that claim 1 recites limitations falling within the mental process
category of abstract ideas, including the steps of “receiving data, selecting
data, modifying parameters of a power plant model, and determining at least
one control action using the model” (Final 2; Ans. 5). These steps recite the
types of observation, evaluation, and judgment that are characteristic of
mental processes that may be practically performed in the human mind, or
with the aid of pen and paper. See Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1146 (“While the
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Supreme Court has altered the § 101 analysis since CyberSource in cases
like Mayo and Alice, we continue to ‘treat[] analyzing information by steps
people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without
more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.’”)
(quoting Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstrom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental processes can be
unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”); Benson, 409 U.S.
at 67.
Thus, consistent with the Guidance and case law, we conclude
representative claim 1 recites mental processes (i.e., a concept performed in
the human mind, such as, an observation, evaluation, judgment, and
opinion), which are abstract ideas. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52;
Guidance Update, 7–9; Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. For Imaging,
Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (2014) (concluding claims reciting receiving two
data sets, and combining those data sets into a single data set is “an
ineligible abstract process of gathering and combining data”); CyberSource
654 F.3d at 1372–73 (concluding claims reciting obtaining a data transaction
set affiliated with a particular Internet address, generating a map based on
those transaction, and using the map to determine whether a transaction is
valid were abstract because they were directed to steps a person could
perform mentally); Elec. Power Group, 830 F.3d at 1353–54 (concluding
claims directed to “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying
certain results of the collection and analysis” were abstract); SAP Am., Inc.
v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding claims
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were directed to the abstract idea of “selecting certain information, analyzing
it using mathematical techniques, and reporting or displaying the results of
the analysis”); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1361–
62 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (determining claims reciting obtaining statistics,
analyzing those statistics to determine another piece of information—i.e., a
price at which to sell a product—was directed to the abstract idea of offer-
based price optimization).
Although claim 1 recites a “processor” (see claim 1, limitation A), a
“controller,” and “a user device” (see claim 1, limitation F), the focus of
claim 1 is on performing the steps of a mental processes (see Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972), i.e., using a power plant model to reconcile
data (claim 1, preamble). As such, the claimed invention recites a mental
process, which is an abstract idea. See, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“analyzing
information by steps people [can] go through in their minds, or by
mathematical algorithms, without more [are] mental processes within the
abstract-idea category.”); Clarilogic v. Formfree Holdings, 681 F. App’x.
950, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (gathering, analyzing, and outputting financial
data/assessment is an abstract idea that is patent ineligible).
Our reviewing court has also concluded that abstract ideas include the
concepts of collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected data
set, and storing the data in memory. Content Extraction & Transmission
LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2014); see also Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873
F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding “claims directed to the
collection, storage, and recognition of data are directed to an abstract idea”).
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Moreover, our reviewing court has concluded that acts of parsing,
comparing, storing, and editing data are abstract ideas. Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In addition, the collection of
information and analysis of information (e.g., recognizing certain data
within the dataset) are also abstract ideas. Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at
1353. Similarly, “collecting, displaying, and manipulating data” is an
abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850
F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“merely presenting the results of
abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information . . . is abstract as
an ancillary part of such collection and analysis”) (quotations omitted). In
this light, reconciling data with the use of processor, is similar to the
concepts of collecting, parsing, comparing, storing, and analyzing data
recognized by our reviewing court to be abstract ideas.
Because we conclude claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we proceed to
Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance to determine whether claim 1 is “directed
to” the judicial exception, by determining whether additional elements of the
claim integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Such additional
elements may reflect an improvement to a technology or technical field. See
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Step 2A, Prong 2 – Practical Application
Having determined that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we next
determine, under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance, whether claim 1 is
directed to that abstract idea, or whether the claims have additional elements
that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application of that abstract
idea. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
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Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of “at least one
processor” (claim 1, limitation A), and a “controller” and “a user device”
(claim 1, limitation F). Appellant contends that claim 1 is not directed to an
abstract idea, but to a technical solution to a technical problem such as
improving power plant modeling (see Reply Br. 4). We do not agree.
As noted in our discussion of Step 2A, Prong 1 above, the method for
implementing data reconciliation using a power plant model set forth in
claim 1 is only used as a tool for performing certain activities of the recited
process (to collect and analyze necessary information). Appellant’s claim 1
recites determining a “control action for a power plant component using the
power plant model” (claim 1, limitation E), and using the controller to
transmit the results (claim 1, limitation F), but fails to require any physical
result, such as actually changing a control parameter for a component.6 The
method for reconciling power plant modeling data recited in claim 1 only
serves to gather data needed for analysis (see claim 1, limitation A), analyze
and process the data (see claim 1, limitations B–E), and output the results
(see claim 1, limitation F).
The mere recitation of receiving, determining, selecting, and
modifying data in claim 1 (see claim 1, limitations A–E) does not embody
an improvement in computer capabilities as in Enfish. See 822 F.3d at 1336
(“[T]he plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to computer
functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is
used in its ordinary capacity.”).

6 Should there be further prosecution of this application on appeal, Appellant
and the Examiner may wish to consider amending the independent claims to
reflect a physical result occurs and is an outcome resulting from the data
reconciliation.
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In the instant case, the additional limitations recited beyond the
judicial exception itself fail to integrate the exception into a practical
application. More particularly, representative claim 1 does not recite: (i) an
improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or
technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular machine” to apply
or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular
transformation of an article to a different thing or state (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e)). See also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Rather, the additional element of a processor in limitation A of claim
1 simply recites insignificant extra-solution activity, i.e., receiving power
plant operational data, which is merely conventional data gathering (see
MPEP § 2106.05(g); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354); and/or insignificant
extra-solution activity that does not meaningfully limit the claim (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(g)).
Specifically, limitation A adds only insignificant extra-solution
activity because it merely receives an initial set of power plant operational
data to enable executing the mental steps making up the abstract idea.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612
(2010) (holding the use of well-known techniques to establish inputs to the
abstract idea as extra-solution activity that fails to make the underlying
concept patent eligible); CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (finding that, even
to the extent certain “physical steps are required to obtain information from
the database . . . such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer
patentability”); Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355 (explaining that “selecting
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information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, and display does
nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary mental
processes”). In other words, this data-gathering step merely obtains
information needed to perform the recited abstract idea. Further, the output
of the results, transmitting the determined control action from a controller to
a user device as set forth in limitation F, is also insignificant extra-solution
activity that does not meaningfully limit the claim (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
Therefore, we consider the steps set forth in limitations A and F to be
steps in addition to the abstract idea that, considered in light of the claim as a
whole, fail to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
To the extent that the claimed method may perform data reconcilation
faster than other computerized scheduling methods, that would not provide
an improvement to the computer itself. See, e.g., Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v.
SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in
order for a machine to add significantly more, it must “play a significant part
in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function
solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved
more quickly”) (emphasis added); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (2016) (“While the claimed system and method
certainly purport to accelerate the process of analyzing audit log data, the
speed increase comes from the capabilities of a general-purpose computer,
rather than the patented method itself”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a
computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed
subject matter”).
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Merely adding a programmed computer to perform generic computer
functions does not automatically overcome an eligibility rejection. Alice,
573 U.S. at 223–24. Furthermore, the use of a general purpose computer to
apply an otherwise ineligible algorithm does not qualify as a particular
machine. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716–17; In re TLI Commc’ns LLC
v. AV Automotive, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (mere recitation
of concrete or tangible components is not an inventive concept); Eon Corp.
IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(noting that Alappat’s rationale that an otherwise ineligible algorithm or
software could be made patent-eligible by merely adding a generic computer
to the claim was superseded by the Supreme Court’s Bilski and Alice
decisions). In the instant case, using a computer to more quickly facilitate or
reconcile power plant modeling data is nothing more than the abstract idea
itself (i.e., a mental process).
And while Appellant acknowledges that the claimed solution is useful
to automate data reconciliation of power plants (see Spec. ¶ 14), and provide
early detection of problems so as to avoid failures and/or malfunctions (see
Spec. ¶ 15), these types of improvements to the abstract idea result from the
routine application of computers as tools, not from any technical innovation.
See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent
with applying the abstract idea on a computer [does not] provide a sufficient
inventive concept”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can.
(U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required
calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not
materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”).
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“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more
accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OIP
Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (citing Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2359). We do not consider
representative claim 1 to recite any element(s), or ordered combination of
elements, which transforms the abstract idea to patent eligible subject
matter.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Appellant’s claim 1
(and claims 8 and 15 grouped therewith) invokes generic computer
components (“at least one processor,” a “controller,” and “a user device)
merely as a tool in which the computer instructions apply the judicial
exception and, thus, the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical
application. Because Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner’s
determination that claim 1 recites an abstract idea under Step 2A is in error,
and claim 1 recites a judicial exception (i.e., the abstract idea of a mental
process) that is not integrated into a practical application, in accordance with
the Guidance, we conclude claim 1 and claims 8 and 15 grouped therewith,
are directed to an abstract idea under Step 2A, and the eligibility analysis
with regard to claims 1, 8, and 15 proceeds to Step 2B.
Step 2B – Inventive Concept
Having determined claim 1 and claims 8 and 15 grouped therewith are
directed to an abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application,
we now evaluate whether the additional elements, whether examined alone
or as an ordered combination, add a specific limitation that is not well-
understood, routine, or conventional activity in the field, or simply append
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
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industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract idea. See
generally Guidance.
The Examiner made the following determination:
The claims do not include additional elements that are
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because the additional elements when considered
both individually and as an ordered combination do not amount
to significantly more than the abstract idea. The claims recite
the additional limitations of processor, controller, user device,
and equipment. The processor, controller, user device, and
equipment are recited at a high level of generality and are
recited as performing generic computer functions routinely used
in computer applications. Generic computer components recited
as performing generic computer functions that are well-
understood, routine and conventional activities amount to no
more than implementing the abstract idea with a computerized
system.
The processor, controller, user device, and equipment
add only insignificant extrasolution activity (such as mere data
gathering).
Thus, taken alone, the additional elements do not amount
to significantly more than the above identified judicial
exception (the abstract idea). Looking at the limitations as an
ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present
when looking at the elements taken individually. There is no
indication that the combination of elements improves the
functioning of a computer or improves any other technology.
Their collective functions merely provide conventional
computer implementation.

Final Act. 4. We agree. Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of “at
least one processor” (claim 1, limitation A), a “controller,” and “a user
device” (claim 1, limitation F). The “processor” recited in limitation A
serves merely to gather power plant operational data. And, the “controller”
recited in limitation F is neither defined nor described in the claim, other
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than being used to transmit the outcome of the process (data, such as a
determination about a control action for a power plant component), which is
a post-solution activity. Finally, the “user device” simply receives the
transmitted data in limitation F, which is also a post-solution activity.
Considering claim 1 as a whole, the additional elements do not apply
or use the abstract idea in a meaningful way such that the claim as a whole is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.
Appellant generally contends claim 1 recites significantly more than
the abstract idea (see Appeal Br. 6–12), and represents a technical solution
to a technical problem that produces specific improvements to computer
technology (see Appeal Br. 12–14). More specifically, Appellant contends
the claims “solve a problem specific to reconciling data between a power
plant model and an operating power plant for which there is no manual
analog, and result in improved predictions of power plant component
degradation and failures,” thereby “the present claims allow for increased
efficiency and accuracy” (see Appeal Br. 12) (emphasis added).
These arguments are not persuasive of Examiner error, at least
because Appellant’s conclusory statements to this effect do not provide an
explanation as why the Examiner erred on this ground of rejection, as
required by 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (mere lawyer’s arguments and conclusory statements, which are
unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little probative value); In re
De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Pearson, 494 F.2d
1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (attorney argument is not evidence); In re Schulze,
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346 F.2d 600, 602 (CCPA 1965) (arguments of counsel cannot take the
place of evidence in the record).
In addition, Appellant’s assertion that there is no manual analog is not
persuasive, as Appellant discloses in the Specification that “[i]n one
embodiment, automated data reconciliation of the power plant can be
implemented to replace conventional manual data collection and operating
procedures” (Spec. ¶ 14).
Appellant’s contention that:
the present claims provide an unconventional technological
solution (using a neural-net surrogate model that indicates
physical degradation of plant components by reconciling the
operational data, determining data match multipliers (DMMs),
and determining performance factors) to a technological
problem (reconciling data between a power plant model and an
operating power plant)

(Appeal Br. 13), is also unpersuasive. The solution simply helps the user get
an answer faster than manually modeling procedures, and does not actually
improve the operation of the processor, controller, or user device in any
proven way.
Further, specific portions of the Specification support the Examiner’s
determination. For example, the Specification shows (see Figs. 1, 4) and
describes (Spec. ¶¶ 15–19, 36, 37, 39–42) only the use of well-understood,
routine, conventional computer systems.
Appellant’s disclosure does not describe the controller, processor,
sensors, or user device as being anything beyond well-known, routine, and
conventional devices. In fact, Appellant’s Specification states that the
“computer program instructions may be loaded onto a general purpose
computer” (Spec. ¶ 39), and that components used to achieve the invention
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“may be practiced with other computer system configurations, including
hand-held devices, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor based or
programmable consumer electronics, min-computers, mainframe computers,
and the like” (Spec. ¶ 41). See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies,
Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “a patent need
not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”); see also
USPTO, Memorandum on Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to
Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision
(Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-
20180419.PDF (explaining that a specification that describes additional
elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional elements are
sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe the
particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can
show that the elements are well understood, routine, and conventional);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation
details that it amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware,
or firmware) that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to
retrieve the user-specific resources.”).
Appellant has not explained persuasively why the Examiner’s
characterization of the functions of the processor, controller, and user
device, based on the description of those components in the Specification, is
in error.
Furthermore, generically claimed elements of processor and
controllers/computers have been found to be no more than well-understood,
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routine, and conventional activity in the context of gathering and assembling
data. See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“The conventional limitations of claim 1, combined with limitations of
analyzing and comparing data and reconciling differences between the data
. . . amount to no more than performing the abstract idea of parsing and
comparing data with conventional computer components) (emphasis added);
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (updating an activity log
by computer is well-understood, routine, conventional activity). As
explained by the Supreme Court, the presence of a generic computer
performing generic computer functions, such as calculation and transmission
of data, is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 225–226 (2014).
Here, the processor acts as a computational tool to receive and store
data, generate intermediate data, and compare and analyze data to determine
an action to be taken. Indeed, Appellant even recognizes that the method
recited in claim 1 provides an “automated data reconciliation of the power
plant . . . to replace conventional manual data collection and operating
procedures” (Spec. ¶ 14).
Under our governing case law, this is not enough to show that a
processor, controller, and/or user device causes claim 1 to be significantly
more than the identified abstract idea. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s arguments (see Appeal Br. 12–14) that claim 1 provide
significantly more than the abstract idea.
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Summary
(1) As explained above, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility
Guidance, based on the record before us, and informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not shown the Examiner
erred in rejecting representative claim 1, as well as claims 8 and 15 grouped
therewith, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter without
significantly more, and we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 8, and 15 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
(2) In addition, Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in
rejecting (a) claims 1, 2, 8, 9, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being
anticipated by Greenlee; and (b) claims 3–7, 10–14, and 16–20 as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the base combination of Greenlee
taken with various other secondary references. In view of the foregoing, we
sustain the (i) anticipation rejection of claims 1, 2, 8, 9, and 15; and (b)
obviousness rejections of claims 3–7, 10–14, and 16–20.

CONCLUSION
In summary, for all of the reasons above, we hold as follows:

Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 8, 15 101 Eligibility 1, 8, 15
1, 2, 8, 9,
15
102(a)(1) Greenlee 1, 2, 8, 9, 15
3, 10, 16 103 Greenlee, Mathan 3, 10, 16
4, 11, 17 103 Greenlee, Danai 4, 11, 17
5–7, 12–
14, 18–
20
103 Greenlee, Wilkes 5–7, 12–14,
18–20

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Overall
Outcome
1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. §§ 41.50(f), 41.52(b) (2013).

AFFIRMED