General Dynamics Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 29, 1984

268 N.L.R.B. 1432 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
General Dynamics Corporation, Quincy Shipbuilding
Division and Local 5, Industrial Union of
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America,
AFL-CIO. Case l-CA-20013
29 February 1984
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
ZIMMERMAN AND HUNTER
On 14 February 1983 Administrative Law Judge
Elbert D. Gadsden issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in sup-
port of the judge's decision.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order
as modified below.
The judge concluded that the Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to
furnish certain information requested by the Union,
namely, a study prepared for the Respondent by a
professor from the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, herein called the MIT study. In reaching
that conclusion, the judge found, inter alia, that the
information requested was relevant and necessary
to the Union's representative function and that the
Union did not "clearly and unmistakably" waive its
right to receive such information. Further finding
that the Respondent had presented no evidence of
an "aura of confidentiality of a legitimate and sub-
stantial nature," the judge rejected the Respond-
ent's defense that the information was privileged
from disclosure. The judge therefore included in
his recommended Order an unconditional order
that the Respondent provide the Union access to
the MIT study. While we agree generally with the
judge's findings and conclusions, 2 we do not agree
I The judge stated in fn. 2 of his decision that he did not credit the
testimony of the Respondent's manager of labor relations, Raffeld, that he
told union officials Brandow and Piccuito that the MIT study was a
"confidential employer record." The record indicates, however, that al-
though Raffeld testified that he told Brandow and Piccuito that.other re-
quested information, e.g., blood-lead test results, constituted confidential
employer records, he did not testify at all regarding his response to the
Union's requests for the MIT study. We therefore shall reverse this erro-
neous credibility finding of the judge.
In sec. III,B, par. 4 of the judge's decision, the second sentence is
hereby clarified as follows: "According to Brandow, Raffeld stated that
although he originally had told them that the problem with the piping
was poor workmanship he never had refused to give them other rea-
sons." We also shall correct the judge's references to the Union's griev-
ance committee chairman, Sinclair, as "St. Clair."
' We agree with the judge's conclusion that the instant dispute over
the Union's request for the MIT study is not an appropriate matter for
268 NLRB No. 220
with his total rejection of the Respondent's confi-
dentiality defense.
The essential facts are as follows. In December
1979, the Respondent contracted with Coastwise
Trading Company to build three petroleum barges,
Hulls 73, 74, and 75. The Respondent contracted to
build a fourth barge, Hull 82, in November 1980.
On 30 July 1981 Coastwise filed the first of several
lawsuits against the Respondent in New York state
court seeking damages and other relief for alleged
delays in the delivery of the four barges. Thereaf-
ter, in October 1981, the Respondent discovered
serious defects in the piping system on Hull 74,
which had been installed by unit employees. The
Respondent thereafter agreed, upon Coastwise's in-
sistence, to subcontract the reinstallation work to a
firm in England. Around the same time, the Re-
spondent also commissioned a professor from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to study the
piping system before it was replaced. This study
was conducted and issued in a written report be-
tween October 1981 and March 1982.
Meanwhile, Coastwise continued to press its law-
suits against the Respondent. Thus, in its complaint
filed in October 1982, Coastwise alleged, inter alia,
that "General Dynamics was aware from early Oc-
tober 1981 that its work in installing the heating
coils of [Hull 74] was defective and would require
replacement," and that the "primary reason for the
delay in delivery of [Hull 74] . . . has been the de-
fective work of General Dynamics with respect to
the Vessel's heating coils." The Respondent point-
ed out in its brief to the Board that the litigation
instituted by Coastwise was still pending.
The Respondent first advised the Union of the
existence of both the MIT study and the litigation
deferral to arbitration. In so finding, we rely particularly on the fact that
the Union requested the study for the purpose of determining whether to
proceed with grievances it was planning to, and later did, file regarding
the subcontracting of unit work. Thus, the procedural issue of disclosure
of the study is merely preliminary to the resolution of the parties' sub-
stantive dispute over the subcontracting. In these circumstances, we find
no merit in encumbering the process of resolving the pending subcon-
tracting grievances with the inevitable delays attendant to the filing,
processing, and submission to arbitration of a new grievance regarding
the information request. Such a two-tiered arbitration process would not
be consistent with our national policy favoring the voluntary and expedi-
tious resolution of disputes through arbitration. Nor would it be consist-
ent with prior Board decisions in this area. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, 236
NLRB 1126 fn. I (1978); St. Joseph's Hospital, 233 NLRB 1116 fn. 1
(1977).
Additionally, in agreeing with the judge's conclusion that the step 2
language of the parties' collective-bargaining agreement did not waive
the Union's right to request and have access to the MIT study, we do not
rely on his findings that the phrase "classified or confidential Employer
records" in art. 4, sec. 4, refers only to "inplant" records and further that
the MIT study was not an employer record because it was prepared by
an independent contractor. Even assuming that the above-quoted phrase
encompasses documents like the MIT study, we find that the contract
language does not constitute a "clear and unmistakable" waiver by the
Union.
1432
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP.
pending against the Respondent at a meeting on 10
June 1982, in response to union inquiries about
rumors that the piping on Hull 74 had to be re-
placed. At that meeting, the Union, indicating that
it had possible grievances in mind, made the first of
several requests to examine the MIT study.3 On 27
July, about a month after the Respondent finally
advised the Union that it would not make the MIT
study available, the Respondent again mentioned
the Coastwise litigation before giving the Union a
brief oral summary of the MIT study.
Based on the foregoing, the judge found that the
Respondent's claim of confidentiality was without
merit. The Respondent excepts to that conclusion,
and asserts that the MIT study is a confidential
document, prepared for the Respondent in contem-
plation of litigation, and that its disclosure would
harm the Respondent in its defense of the pending
lawsuits. We find merit in the Respondent's excep-
tion. Contrary to the judge, we find that the exist-
ence of the lawsuits, which involve substantial li-
ability, coupled with the timing of the study with
respect to those lawsuits, establishes that the study
was prepared in contemplation of litigation.4 Fur-
ther, the Respondent has established that disclosure
of the study would have an impact on the pending
litigation. Thus, we find that the Respondent has
established a confidentiality concern of a legitimate
and substantial nature. 5
We also recognize, however, the relevance of
the MIT study to the pending grievances filed by
the Union as well as the importance of the parties'
having a free flow of information to encourage the
amicable resolution of collective-bargaining dis-
putes. The Board is therefore required to balance
the union's need for the information against the le-
gitimate confidentiality interest established by the
employer.6 Here, in acknowledging the Respond-
ent's legitimate interest in seeking to preserve the
study's confidentiality, we find that the Respond-
ent's interest does not outweigh the Union's statu-
tory right to relevant information such that the Re-
spondent may withhold the study entirely. To the
3 On 21 June the Union filed two grievances alleging that unit work
had been subcontracted in violation of the parties' collective-bargaining
agreement. The Respondent denied both grievances at step I on 22 June.
4In this regard, we note that the complaint filed against the Respond-
ent by Coastwise in October 1982 alleges that the Respondent was aware
from early October 1981 that the piping installation on Hull 74 was de-
fective and would require replacement. Moreover, the Respondent had
already been sued by Coastwise when it commissioned the study. Thus, it
could reasonably apprehend the possibility of another lawsuit relating to
the defects.
5 See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979); Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 252 NLRB 368 (1980). See also Plough, Inc., 262 NLRB
1095, 1096 (1982); Minnesota Mining A Mfg. Co., 261 NLRB 27, 30
(1982).
^ See Detroit Edison Co., above at 314-320; Johns-Manville Sales, above
at 368.
contrary, we agree with the judge that the Re-
spondent's complete refusal to furnish access to the
MIT study is violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1).
We find, however, that some accommodation must
be made to the Respondent's legitimate concerns
not to have information of a confidential nature re-
vealed. 7 Accordingly, and consistent with the
policy we have followed in recent cases presenting
similar issues,8 we shall order the parties to bargain
in good faith in order to reach a mutually accepta-
ble accommodation of their respective interests.
We therefore shall revise the judge's recommended
Order to provide that the Respondent shall furnish
the Union access to the MIT study subject to bar-
gaining in good faith regarding the conditions
under which the information may be furnished,
such that access is provided in a manner consistent
with maintaining appropriate safeguards protective
of the Respondent's confidentiality concerns.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge as modified below and orders that the Re-
spondent, General Dynamics Corporation, Quincy
Shipbuilding Division, Quincy, Massachusetts, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a).
"(a) On request, provide Local 5, Industrial
Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, access to the MIT study sub-
ject to bargaining in good faith concerning the
conditions under which the information may be
furnished to the Union, such that access is provid-
ed in a manner consistent with maintaining appro-
priate safeguards protective of the Respondent's le-
gitimate confidentiality interests."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
administrative law judge.
7 Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp, 143 NLRB 712, 718 (1963).
a Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 266 NLRB 587 (1983); Plough, Inc., above;
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Ca, above.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
1433
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to provide access to
the MIT study requested by the Union for its eval-
uation in effectively performing its representative
function in processing employee grievances.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain collec-
tively with the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of our employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL, on request, provide the Union access
to the MIT study requested for its evaluation, sub-
ject to bargaining in good faith concerning the
conditions under which such information may be
furnished to the Union, such that access is provid-
ed in a manner consistent with maintaining appro-
priate safeguards protective of our legitimate confi-
dentiality interests.
WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively with
the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in the appropriate
unit as described in article I, section 1 of the cur-
rent collective-bargaining agreement.
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION,
QUINCY SHIPBUILDING DIVISION
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ELBERT D. GADSDEN, Administrative Law Judge:
Upon a charge and an amended charge of unfair labor
practices filed on June 30, 1982, and August 4, 1982, re-
spectively, by Local 5, Industrial Union of Marine and
Shipbuilding Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union, against General Dynamics Corpora-
tion, Quincy Shipbuilding Division, herein called Re-
spondent, a complaint was issued by the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 1, on behalf of the General Counsel, on
August 13, 1982. In substance the complaint alleges that
the Union, as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of Respondent's employees in the appropriate
unit, requested Respondent to furnish it certain informa-
tion which was relevant to its performance of its func-
tion as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of employees; that Respondent has failed and refused to
furnish the information requested; and that its failure
constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
In its answer filed on August 24, 1982, Respondent
denied that it has engaged in any unfair labor practices
as alleged in the complaint.
The hearing in the above matter was held before me in
Boston, Massachusetts, on October 27, 1982. Briefs have
been received from counsel for the General Counsel and
counsel for Respondent, respectively, which have been
carefully considered.
On the entire record in this case and from my observa-
tion of the witness, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
General Dynamics Corporation, Quincy Shipbuilding
Division, Respondent herein, is, and has been at all times
material herein, a corporation organized under and exist-
ing by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware. As
such, Respondent has at all times material herein main-
tained an office and place of business at 97 East Howard
Street, in the city of Quincy, Massachusetts, where it is
and has been engaged in the manufacture, sale, and dis-
tribution of ships.
In the course and conduct of its business operations,
Respondent receives goods valued in excess of $50,000
annually from points located outside the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts.
The complaint herein alleges, Respondent admits, and
I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find
that Local 5, Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuild-
ing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is, and has been at
all times material herein, a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background Facts
At its Quincy, Massachusetts location Respondent is
engaged in the construction and maintenance of commer-
cial vessels, including ships and barges. During the years
1981 and 1982, Respondent contracted with Coastwise
Trading Company to construct what is called a deep-
notch petroleum barge. Respondent constructed such a
vessel which it identified as Hull 74 and which Coast-
wise Trading Company later named the "Amoco Virgin-
ia." A portion of the construction of Hull 74 required the
installation of a piping system which involved sketching
of the configuration of piping, cutting, bending, anneal-
ing and welding piping. This work, in the past and
during the construction of Hull 74, was performed by
employees in the Quincy shipyard. After a considerable
amount of the piping had been installed in October 1981,
Respondent discovered that there were serious defects in
the installation. Consequently, on the insistence of the
owner, they agreed to remove the defective piping
system and reinstall a corrected piping system. In doing
so, Respondent subcontracted the manufacturing of the
piping to Yorkshire Imperial Metals, of Yorkshire, Eng-
land, with the understanding that the piping would be
bent and annealed by Yorkshire Imperial, and thereafter
installed in the vessel.
However, before the defective piping was removed,
Respondent retained a consultant from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology to study the piping system. The
consultant, Professor Edgar, did conduct such a study
1434
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP.
and issued a report thereon between October 1981 and
March 1982, herein called the MIT study. Thereafter,
the initial piping system was removed and a second
piping system was delivered from Yorkshire to the
Quincy shipyard in a bent and annealed state, and subse-
quently installed in Hull 74. Consequently, none of the
sketching, bending, or annealing of pipework was per-
formed by unit employees in the Quincy shipyard.
Members of the Union (Union President John Bran-
dow and Vice President Richard Piccuito) learned about
the MIT study and Respondent's arrangement to subcon-
tract work to replace the piping system on Hull 74.
Since all such piping work prior thereto had been per-
formed by Respondent's yard unit workers, the Union
requested the report of the MIT study. Respondent re-
fused to furnish the Union with the report of the study
and its refusal is the subject of this current dispute.
Article IV, section 4, step 2 on page 12 of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement between the parties, effective
October 17, 1980, through October 16, 1983 (Jt. Exh. 1),
provides as follows:
A grievance appealed to Step 2 of the grievance
procedure shall be submitted by the Steward to the
Department Head or his designated alternate of the
Department. If there is disagreement as to the facts
relating to the grievance, the Department Head and
the Steward shall, at the request of either, jointly
investigate the facts; provided, however, that this
shall not require the department head to make avail-
able to the Steward classified or confidential Em-
ployer records. If the Steward and Department
Head are unable to reach a satisfactory adjustment
within three (3) working days after the grievance is
presented to the Department Head, the Union may
appeal the grievance to step 3 of the grievance pro-
cedure.
On June 20, 1982, the Union, on behalf of Respond-
ent's unit machine operators in Department 843, filed a
grievance (Jt. Exh. 3) demanding that its machine opera-
tors be made whole for being deprived of the work sub-
contracted to the Yorkshire company and the installation
of the second piping system. On the same date the
Union, on behalf of Respondent's unit sketchers in De-
partment 843, filed a grievance (Jt. Exh. 4) demanding
that all unit sketchers be made whole for hours and over-
time work of which they were deprived as a result of
Respondent having subcontracted installation of the
second piping system, and for Respondent's failure to
comply with the current collective-bargaining agree-
ment. '
B. Respondent Refuses the Union's Request for the
MIT Study
The essentially undisputed testimony of record estab-
lishes that former steward and current union president,
John Brandow, and Union Vice President Richard Pic-
cuito met frequently on numerous occasions over the
I The facts set forth above are undisputed and are not in conflict in the
record.
past 3 years with members of management, usually Re-
spondent's labor relations managers Dale Raffeld and/or
Fred Stobart. On or before June 4, 1982, Brandow and
Piccuito asked Managers Raffeld and Stobart about the
validity of a rumor that the Company was sending
sketches on piping work to England to be used as fabri-
cation of pipe to be installed on Hull 74. Raffeld and
Stobart said they were unaware of such an arrangement
but Raffeld said he would find out and get back to them.
When they met with Raffeld on June 7, 1982, they asked
Raffeld if he had investigated the rumor on subcontract-
ing, and Raffeld said he had not had a chance to do so.
When union officers Brandow and Piccuito met with
Raffeld on June 10, Raffeld informed them that Re-
spondent had commissioned a study by a consultant from
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT study); that
the findings thereof revealed that the piping system mal-
functioned because of poor quality and serious defects in
workmanship on the piping and pipe bending. He also
advised them that sketches of how the pipe should be
bent were sent to England. Thereupon, Brandow asked
Raffeld if the Union could examine a copy of the MIT
study, since it appeared relevant to a potential grievance
the Union was contemplating processing. Raffeld said he
did not know if he would make the study available to
them. Brandow said he thought the Union had a right to
the study under the National Labor Relations Act. Raf-
feld said, "Don't play games and don't threaten me," but
he said he would evaluate their request. Brandow ad-
vised Raffeld that the Union needed the study in order
to determine whether it had valid reasons to process a
grievance, and also, to determine if there were some
things in the study which indicated a weakness in the
contract language, which an examination of the study
would enable the Union to improve on such language by
seeking to amend the contract during negotiations.
On June 15, in response to their request for the study,
Raffeld told Brandow and Piccuito the study was still
not available; that he was still reviewing it. Raffeld told
them the same thing on June 17 and 21. On June 24, Raf-
feld told them he would have to check with management
before he could make the study available to the Union.
Finally, on June 28, Raffeld told them he had completed
his review of the study but it was not going to be made
available to the Union; and that work quality and poor
workmanship were only one aspect of the problem.
When they asked Raffeld to tell them about other as-
pects of the problem he declined to do so by saying, "I
don't have to tell you." However, Raffeld denied that he
made the latter quoted statement, but instead, said he
told Brandow and Piccuito the study was a confidential
record of the Company. Brandow and Piccuito denied
that Raffeld told them the study was confidential or clas-
sified, or that the Company (Raffeld) had ever refused to
supply the Union with information requested by the
Union. However, on further cross- and redirect examina-
tion, Piccuito modified his denial and admitted the Com-
pany had previously refused to submit it requested infor-
1435
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mation of employees' medical blood-lead and safety tests
before the grievance was processed to step 2.2
On July 26, when Brandow, Piccuito, or George
O'Kane met with Raffeld, Brandow asked Raffeld for
the MIT study and Raffeld informed them that it was
not available and would not be made available. Raffeld
said he wanted to go on record by having Raffeld refuse
to furnish the study without giving them reasons for
such refusal. However, Brandow stated that in process-
ing 300 to 400 grievances in his official union capacity
over the years, Respondent had never told him he was
not entitled to information requested by the Union,
except on one occasion in reference to the Company's af-
firmative action plan.
On July 27, Raffeld voluntarily stated that he wanted
to acquaint Brandow and Piccuito with a summary of
the MIT report. He commenced by advising them that
the Company was being sued for approximately $15 mil-
lion; that the Company had discussions with Coastwise
and the discussions indicated that the piping, the reinstal-
lation, and the subcontracting of the piping work had to
be sent to Yorkshire, England.
With respect to the piping work, Brandow testified
that Raffeld's briefing to them continued as follows:
It was to be bent by a firm called Carlton-Leslie,
which he indicated had a great amount of experi-
ence in bending aluminum brass piping, particularly
because of what he characterized as a complicated
procedure, an annealing procedure that had to be
done on the pipe.
He explained that the report did not focus on
poor workmanship, but rather on the procedure and
the handling of the pipe; that, as I said, there was
this annealing procedure that should have been
gone through, and would have to be gone through
in the future; that had not been followed at the
yard, for one reason or another, and had resulted in
a leakage in porosity of the pipe; and that the con-
tracting would-the subcontracting would go out to
Carlton-Leslie for the pipe bending.
We-I asked whether any of the bending was
going to be done inside the shipyard, after the sub-
contract was let out. And Mr. Raffeld indicated that
there were going to be about 100 bends that would
be done inside the shipyard, for a final fit of the
piping, that sort of thing; but as few as possible due
to the agreement that they had with Coastwise.
I credit Brandow's testimony to the effect that Raffeld told Brandow
and Piccuito he (Raffeld) did not have to tell them why he was not going
to make the MIT study available to the Union. Not only was Brandow's
testimony corroborated in this regard by Piccuito, but it is consistent
with the evidence of the initial reluctance by Respondent to tell the
Union whether or not it was going to make the study available to the
Union. Similarly, I do not credit Raffeld's testimony that he told Bran-
dow and Piccuito the study was a confidential employer record, because
Brandow and Piccuit9 denied he gave them such a reason, and their deni-
als are consistent with evidence of Respondent's reluctance to state
whether it would allow the Union access to the study, as well as with its
past practice of advising the Union in writing that the information
(blood-lead and safety tests results) requested was confidential. Addition-
ally, I was also persuaded by the demeanor of the witnesses that Bran-
dow and Piccuito were testifying truthfully in this regard, and Raffeld's
denial was not truthful.
I believe that was the long and the short of what
he had to say about the report; the emphasis being
that it was more the handling and the procedures,
rather than poor quality workmanship, and the spe-
cific machinery that Carlton-Leslie had that he felt
the yard wasn't equipped with.
Brandow further undeniably testified that Raffeld
never stated to them that the MIT study was not going
to be submitted to the Union under step 2 of the griev-
ance procedure, or that the Union had waived its right
to such information. Also, the Union's officer Arthur
Durant, a pipefitter in Department 843 of Respondent's
plant, testified that, in the course of processing about
1000 grievances, the Company had never refused to fur-
nish the Union information on the grounds that it was
confidential or classified, or that the Union had waived
its right to such information under step 2 of the griev-
ance procedure. Durant further testified that when he
told Company Superintendent Joe Metiever that the em-
ployees had always performed the annealing work and
he did not understand why it was being subcontracted,
Metiever simply responded, that it came from the top.3
Dale Raffeld testified that over the years he had told the
Union it could not furnish it with health or safety
records because they are confidential employer records
under the contract. However, Jonathan Brandow denied
that the Company had ever refused the Union requested
information of records on blood-lead tests or on the basis
that they were private or confidential, but simply in-
formed the Union that it was not entitled to such
records.4
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
As to whether union access to the MIT study is rele-
vant and necessary for the Union to perform its function
as collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's
unit employees, counsel for the General Counsel argues
that the study is relevant and necessary in accordance
with the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Acme In-
dustrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 438 (1967). There, the Court
held that an employer has a duty under the Act to
supply, on request, such information which is probably
relevant, in fact relevant, necessary, and useful to a
union's effective and intelligent evaluation in determining
whether to process employee grievances.
Counsel for Respondent does not specifically argue
that the MIT study is not relevant and necessary, but
rather that the study is privileged against disclosure be-
cause it is a confidential employer record; and because
3 I credit Durant's testimony not only because I was persuaded by his
demeanor that he was testifying truthfully, but also because his account is
essentially consistent with the testimony of Brandow, except with respect
to the request for the blood-lead and safety test results. However, it may
be reasonably assumed that Durant was not involved in any of the re-
quests for blood-lead or safety tests results.
4 I credit Raffeld's testimonial account over Brandow's account, which
is essentially consistent with Piccutio's account, that Raffeld (Respond-
ent) had previously refused to give the Union blood-lead and safety tests
results on the ground that the results were confidential. I was also per-
suaded by the demeanor of Raffeld and Brandow that Raffeld's account
was accurate and Brandow's account was not accurate, in this regard.
1436
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP.
the Union has waived any entitlement to the study under
the language of article IV, section 4, step 2 of the griev-
ance procedure of the contract between the parties. With
respect to the relevance of the study to the Union's rep-
resentative function, the essentially undisputed and cred-
ited evidence shows that, on request by the Union, Re-
spondent's labor relations manager (Raffeld) investigated
a rumor that the initial piping system on Hull 74 was
going to be subcontracted to a company in Yorkshire,
England. Raffeld subsequently advised the Union that a
consultative study (MIT), made on behalf of Respondent,
revealed that the initial piping system was seriously de-
fective as a result of poor quality workmanship in bend-
ing pipe; and that sketches of how the pipe should be
bent were sent to a subcontractor in Yorkshire, England.
The Union thereupon requested to see a copy of the
MIT study to evaluate whether it had reasons to process
a potential grievance which was in fact filed a few weeks
later, regarding loss of subcontracted piping work of its
unit employees; and to enable the Union to determine
whether the language in the current contract is sufficient
to protect unit-employee work against subcontracting of
such work. After denying the Union's request on several
occasions, Respondent eventually advised that it was not
going to make the study available to the Union. The
work of replacing the initial piping system was in fact
subcontracted to, and performed by, Yorkshire Imperial
Metals, Yorkshire, England.
Since Respondent announced that the MIT study re-
vealed serious defects in the piping system as a result of
poor quality workmanship, and all work on prior piping
systems had been performed by the unit employees of
Respondent, I therefore conclude and find that the study
was relevant and useful to the Union's representative
function of the unit employees. NLRB v. Acme Industrial
Co., supra, and Florida Steel Corp., 235 NLRB 941, 942
(1978), enfd. 101 LRRM 2671, 2674 (4th Cir. 1979), and
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 237 NLRB 982, 984-985 (1978).
Ordinarily, under such circumstances the employer is ob-
ligated to supply the Union with such relevant informa-
tion as the study herein. Since the contents of the MIT
study may very well determine whether or not the initial
piping system was defective as a result of poor quality
workmanship, as the Union was advised, and such work
in replacing the system has in fact been subcontracted by
Respondent, I find that the study was directly relevant
to wages, hours, and working conditions of the unit em-
ployees. Under these circumstances the Union was enti-
tled to the study pursuant to the above-cited authority.
However, Respondent argues that even if the MIT
study is relevant and necessary to the representative
function of the Union, the Union has nevertheless
waived any right to the MIT study under the following
language of step 2 of the grievance procedure:
If there is disagreement as to the facts relating to
the grievance, the Department Head and the Stew-
ard shall, at the request of either, jointly investigate
the facts; provided, however, that this shall not require
the department head to make available to the Steward
classified or confidential Employer records ...
Respondent also argues that any right to the study was
waived by a binding course of conduct of the Union
during the administration of the collective-bargaining
agreement; and that the Board should defer the Union's
request for the study to arbitration, because the question
requires a binding interpretation of the above-quoted step
2 language of the collective-bargaining agreement.
Did the Union Expressly Waive Its Right to the
Information Requested?
A careful reading of the step 2 language of the above
grievance procedure readily reveals that it is addressed
to disagreements between employees and management
about factors which are the subject of a grievance at the
second step, and who shall investigate the grievance on a
request by either party. As counsel for the General
Counsel argues, here, the unit employees were deprived
of work normally performed by them which was subcon-
tracted by Respondent. The Union is requesting the
study which may explain if, or how and in what way,
the workmanship on the initial piping system was of
poor quality; or whether the work subcontracted by Re-
spondent was permissible under the current language of
the contract. Hence, it is clear that there is no factual
dispute between the parties about the subject of the
grievance at this juncture. However, union access to the
study, which is relevant, may establish grounds for dis-
agreement, or agreement may be achieved disposing of
any need to grieve the matter regarding the work sub-
contracted. Under the latter circumstances the Union
may very well withdraw its grievance and spare itself
the agony and expense of processing the grievance to ar-
bitration. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir.
1965).
Waiver by Contract
Respondent further argues that, pursuant to the lan-
guage of the step 2 grievance procedure, the Union
waived its right to request and have access to "classified
or confidential Employer records, such as its MIT
study." However, it is readily noted that, while the lan-
guage of step 2 does not define "classified or confidential
Employer records," it is clear that such language is in
reference to in-plant records relating to a disagreement
on the facts involving a grievance at the step 2 level, and
investigation of the grievance. There is no disagreement
on the facts in the instant proceeding and the request
was made before the potential grievance was filed.
Rather, the grievances contend Respondent has violated
the collective-bargaining agreement. Respondent does
not categorically deny or admit such a violation, but
simply refuses the Union's request for information (MIT
study), contending Respondent had it prepared by an in-
dependent contractor in contemplation of a lawsuit
against the Company, and the study is confidential. The
credited evidence does not demonstrate that the Union
was ever advised by Respondent, prior to this proceed-
ing, that the study was a confidential employer record,
or that it was confidential pursuant to step 2 of the griev-
ance procedure.
1437
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Additionally, the record evidence does not show that,
during negotiations for the current or any prior contract
between the parties, the parties ever discussed "classified
confidential Employer records."
Consequently, in the absence of such evidence, I con-
clude and find that the language of step 2 of the griev-
ance procedure contains a waiver by the Union to access
to in-plant Employer records classified "confidential,"
when such records relate to facts in dispute of a step 2
grievance. However, I further conclude and find that, al-
though the MIT study is a document purchased by Re-
spondent, it is not an Employer record, normally re-
ceived, recorded, and maintained in the usual course of
business, or affidavits or other personal and private
records of employees. Instead it is a document prepared
by an independent contractor, a copy of which was re-
ceived by Respondent, and it is very much relevant to
the work which was subcontracted by Respondent. The
language of step 2 of the grievance procedure does not
make reference to such nonemployer record documents
as the MIT study and the parties have no bargaining his-
tory in respect thereto.
Since Respondent herein is under a statutory duty to
furnish information requested by the Union, and the
Union has a corresponding right to receive such relevant
information, the Union's right to access to the MIT
study herein is conferred by statute, and not obtained by
contract. Under such circumstances, the court held in C
& P Telephone Co. v. NLRB, 687 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir.
1982), as follows:
National labor policy disfavors waivers of statutory
rights by unions and thus a union's intention to
waive a right must be clear before a claim of
waiver can succeed. Waivers can occur in any of
three ways: by express provision in the collective
bargaining agreement, by the conduct of the parties
(including past practices, bargaining history, and
action or inaction), or by a combination of the two.
The court continued:
The language of a collective bargaining agreement
will effectuate a waiver only if it is "clear and un-
mistakable" in waiving the statutory right. Fafnir
Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir.
1966).... The same standard applies to conduct of
the parties; whether alone or in combination with
contractual language, conduct can effectuate a
waiver only if the union's intent to waive is clear
and unmistakable from the evidence presented.
Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v.
NLRB, 676 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Road
Sprinkler 11); Communications Workers Local 1051 v.
NLRB, 644 F.2d 923, 927 (Ist Cir. 1981).
Thus, a comprehensive reading of the step 2 waiver
clause herein readily reveals on its face that the waiver
of disclosure of confidential employer records does not
apply to all confidential information in the possession of
Respondent. If the waiver clause were intended to in-
clude all confidential information, employer records, and
otherwise, the parties should have used explicit language
to that effect. In the absence of such precise language, I
find that the waiver language of step 2 does not clearly
and unmistakably include a document such as the MIT
study and, as such, a waiver of the right to the study has
not been effectuated. C & P Telephone Co. v. NLRB, 687
F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1982); PPG Industries, 255 NLRB 296
(1981).
Notwithstanding, and assuming arguendo, that the lan-
guage of step 2 does constitute a waiver to all confiden-
tial information in Respondent's possession, Respondent
has failed to establish, as hereinafter found, that the MIT
study has a legitimate aura of confidentially because of
its private and sensitive nature, or because Respondent
will probably sustain economic or other injury in its busi-
ness. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979);
New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 265 NLRB 1382 (1982).
Respondent also argues that the Board should defer
the question of the Union's request for the MIT study
and Respondent's refusal to arbitration, because it raises
an issue which requires a binding interpretation of the
step 2 language of the collective-bargaining agreement.
While this argument is recognized by me, it is also noted
that Respondent first argued that the Union, under the
contract and also by its conduct, waived its right to the
MIT study as a confidential employer record. These two
arguments raise the question of the old cliche: "which
came first, the chicken or the egg." Obviously the first
question here is the question of waiver, and a determina-
tion of that question requires a comprehensive reading of
the language of step 2 of the grievance procedure, an ex-
amination of the record for evidence of bargaining histo-
ry of the parties, and conduct of the Union, which mani-
fested a clear and unmistakable intent by the Union to
waive its right to information such as the MIT study.
Such an examination of the evidence is necessary to
ascertain whether Respondent's refusal is in violation of
the Act, as well as possibly sparing the Union from un-
necessarily undertaking the time and expense of process-
ing grievances to arbitration, which may be resolved
simply by reading the clear language of the contract.
This practice has been followed by the courts and the
Board in several cases. C & P Telephone Co. v. NLRB,
687 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1982); PPG Industries, 255 NLRB
296 (1981); and Pacemacher Yacht Co., 253 NLRB 828,
830 (1980).
Having examined the language of step 2 and the
record evidence of the bargaining history of the parties,
I do not find a clear and unmistakable intent by the
Union to waive its right to all information (including the
MIT study) claimed "confidential" by Respondent. I
therefore conclude and find that the Union did not waive
its right to such information as the MIT study. Conse-
quently, there is no legitimate or meritorious dispute on
the meaning of the language of step 2, which on its face
is clear. This being so, there is no question necessitating
deferral to arbitration for interpretation of the contract.
Instead, the question remaining for determination is
whether Respondent's refusal violated Section 8(aXS) of
the Act. C & P Telephone Co., above; Pacemaker Yacht
Co., above.
1438
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP.
Waiver by Conduct
In support of its contention that the Union, by a
course of conduct, has waived any right it had to confi-
dential Employer records, Respondent cites testimony of
Union President Brandow, wherein he acknowledged
that on one occasion in the past he requested records
which the Company advised were confidential. Brandow
thereupon wrote a grievance demanding the Company's
affirmative action plan. The Company's written reply ad-
vised him that the plan was confidential. Brandow did
not testify that the Union further grieved the Company's
refusal. However, the fact that the Union did not renew
its request or grieve Respondent's refusal does not, on
this one occasion, necessarily mean that it waived its
right to request and receive such information. The ab-
sence of further action by the Union in this regard could
very well have meant that it no longer deemed the plan
necessary for the purpose for which it was first request-
ed.
Other union conduct which Respondent contends con-
stituted evidence of waiver by the Union is testimony by
grievance chairman St. Clair, who acknowledged that
the Company has denied the Union's request for health
and safety information on several occasions. However,
St. Clair further testified that although the Company said
the information was confidential, it also told the Union
to request the information through its safety committee.
Since the information requested on each such occasion
was for blood-test-for-lead results of individual employ-
ees, the Union said it did not need the identity of the in-
dividual employees and the Company supplied the safety
committee with the test results without identification of
employees.
It is further noted by me that Respondent did not
advise the Union that its initial refusal to furnish the re-
sults of the blood-lead tests was based on confidentiality
pursuant to step 2 of the grievance procedure. The
Union might have later recognized that it did not need
the identity of the employees for the purpose for which
the request was initially made, and therefore advised Re-
spondent accordingly. Evidently, it was not necessary
for the Union to grieve Respondent's initial refusal to
supply the test results because the Union was not pre-
cluded from effectively performing its representative
function by the refusal. The information it needed was
supplied by the Company upon a condition (without
identification of employees) acceptable to the Union.
While the above facts are well stated in the record, the
MIT study, as previously found herein, is not a docu-
ment by which the waiver clause language of step 2 of
the contract is governed. Nonetheless, further assuming,
arguendo, that the MIT study is deemed governed by
the step 2 language, one might speculate on the above
limited evidence whether the Union, by not grieving the
Company's past refusal on confidentiality, waived its
statutory right to receive the MIT study. In this regard,
it is clear from the evidence that the above-discussed
union conduct did not constitute a consistent pattern of
conduct, which was clear and unmistakable that the
Union intended to waive its right to all information la-
beled "confidential" by Respondent. In the absence of
such clear and unmistakable evidence, an employer's
duty to furnish the Union relevant information requested
by it, and the Union's corresponding entitlement to such
information, cannot be found waived. Road Sprinkler Fit-
ters Local 669 v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
and PPG Industries, 255 NLRB 296, 297 (1981).
Respondent Argues Confidentiality
Respondent argues that the MIT study is privileged
and confidential, and therefore outweighs any right the
Union has to receive it; that the MIT study was prepared
in contemplation of litigation against the Company and
therefore is not obtainable unless, pursuant to New York
law, it cannot be duplicated because of changed condi-
tions, and withholding it will result in injustice or undue
hardship. Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc. v. State, 62 Misc.
2d. 725, 309 NYS 2d 645, 649 (1970). This privilege, Re-
spondent argues, is incorporated in Section 3101 of the
New York Civil Practice Law, and also in Section
26(b)(4)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, a reading of these sections as well as Johnson,
Drake & Piper, Inc., above, all clearly disclose that such
material prepared for litigation by one party may not be
obtained by the other party to the litigation. Since the
Union in the instant case is not a party to the litigation in
which Respondent is involved, it appears that the legal
authorities cited by Respondent are inapplicable to the
Union and to the facts in this proceeding.
While Respondent concedes that the employer's obli-
gation "includes a duty to provide relevant information
necessary for the Union to effectively perform its duties
to employees in processing their grievances," NLRB v.
Acme Industrial Co., above, it nevertheless argues that
the Union's right to such information has never been un-
limited, and the employer's refusal to furnish such infor-
mation must be considered in view of a determination as
to whether the employer has satisfied the obligation to
bargain in good faith. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
149, 153-154 (1956). In this regard, Respondent cites
Western Massachusetts Electric Co. v. NLRB, 589 F.2d 42,
47 (Ist Cir. 1978), where the court said:
[L]egitimate management reasons for objecting to
disclosure-such as a demonstrated probability of
economic injury to the company's business from the
disclosure-furnish some basis for protecting an em-
ployer by limiting if not denying disclosure. [Cita-
tions omitted.] A shotgun approach to enforced discov-
ery may be inappropriate, at least when dealing with
management information of this type as contrasted
with wage data, where the union's demonstrated need
is relatively slight and management's legitimate rea-
sons for nondisclosure are compelling. .... There is
no statutory rule of disclosure-only the require-
ment that the employer bargain in good faith....
An employer is entitled to show that special circum-
stances justify some protection, just as parties to litiga-
tion may be entitled to protective orders in the course
of discovery. [Emphasis added.]
Consequently, Respondent contends that, since the
MIT study was undertaken by it in contemplation of a
lawsuit, which has in fact been filed and may subject Re-
1439
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
spondent to liability for as much as $18 million, the MIT
study is a confidential employer record. Respondent
seems to imply from such contention that its disclosure
of the MIT study to the Union may cause it economic
injury. However, a review of the facts in this case in
conjunction with the pleadings (R. Exh. 1) in the suit in
the New York Supreme Court against Respondent by
Coastwise Trading Company, Inc., it is particularly ob-
served that the relief or damages sought therein are in
large part stipulated and dependent on a resolution of di-
verse interpretations of the construction contract (includ-
ing a "Delivery Certificate") between the parties.
The suit against Respondent does not allege negligence
or intentional delay for which unspecified damages are
sought, or might be sought. It merely alleges damages
actually sustained, and asserts a right under the contract
to cancel the contract for delay in delivery occasioned
by a defective piping system which had to be replaced.
The record is barren of any evidence by Respondent as
to how Respondent would sustain any economic injury
in excess of that allegedly already occasioned by the
delay, as a result of allowing the Union to examine the
MIT study. In other words, if Respondent is liable at all
in the New York suit, it appears that the damages are al-
ready determinative by the contract and the delay in de-
livery. The evidence fails to show how Respondent
would sustain other economic injury by allowing the
Union access to the MIT study. Nor does the evidence
demonstrate how or in what manner Respondent may
otherwise suffer probable injury, such as that which
could result from a disclosure of trade secrets, disclosure
of identifying medical, or other professional and privi-
leged information on individual employees, or by other
special circumstances justifying protection of legitimate
business interests. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Ca, 261
NLRB 27 (1982).
The only basis advanced by Respondent for refusing
the Union access to the study is its contention that the
study was undertaken by Respondent in contemplation of
a lawsuit against it, which suit has in fact been instituted
as heretofore mentioned. Respondent's refusal to allow
the Union access to the study is, at most, a bare claim of
confidentiality which is unsupported by evidence of con-
fidentiality or probable injury as a result of disclosure. In
the absence of such evidence, I am not persuaded that
Respondent has established that the MIT study is within
the protective exceptions to its statutory duty to supply
requested information, as enunciated by the courts and
the Board in Detroit Edison Ca v. NLRB, above; Western
Massachusetts Electric Co., above, and Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Ca, above.
Although Respondent characterizes the Union's re-
quest for the study as an unspecified need for the study,
the evidence does not support this characterization. On
the contrary, both the Union's oral as well as its written
request for the study made reference to a potential griev-
ance, and thereafter to actual grievances about the piping
work previously performed by unit employees but sub-
contracted by Respondent to Yorkshire Imperial Metals
in violation of their agreement.
Article XX of the current collective-bargaining agree-
ment between the parties provides as follows:
Subcontracting
The Employer agrees not to subcontract work
normally performed by the employees under this
Agreement, when proper equipment and employees
are available, in order to deprive employees of
work.
Since the work subcontracted herein was work which
had been performed by the unit employees in the past,
and Respondent had advised the Union the study indicat-
ed that the work replacing the piping system had to be
subcontracted as a result of poor quality workmanship
on the initial piping system, and because Respondent did
not have some of the employees, equipment, and proce-
dures necessary to prepare the piping work, disclosure of
the MIT study is certainly relevant and necessary for the
Union to determine whether the unit employees were de-
prived of work which was subcontracted, either in com-
pliance with, or in violation of, the above subcontracting
provision of the agreement; and to determine whether
the current language of the agreement is sufficient to
assure protection of employees' work from being subcon-
tracted in the future. Both reasons for the Union's need
for the study clearly show that access to the study
would, or probably would better, enable the Union to in-
telligently evaluate whether to process grievances to ar-
bitration.
Respondent also advocates balancing the Union's need
for the information (study) against any "legitimate and
substantial" confidentiality interest of Respondent, as the
Board expressed in Minnesota Mining d Mfg. Co., above.
However, even in applying this balancing evaluative test
to the facts herein, I find that Respondent has not pre-
sented any evidence of an aura of confidentiality of a le-
gitimate and substantial business interest. Certainly it has
not presented such a business interest which outweighs
the Union's relevant and well-established need for the
study, so as to compel the conclusion that Respondent
need not allow the Union access to the study.
Although Respondent (Raffeld) gave the Union an
oral report of what the MIT study is purported to con-
tain, the Union was not satisfied with such oral report
and insisted on its request for the study. Since the Union
did not accept Respondent's oral account of the study as
satisfactory, Respondent cannot maintain that it has satis-
fied its statutory duty to furnish requested information
when it had every opportunity to select what informa-
tion it desired to disclose, and withhold that which it de-
sired not to disclose. Under these circumstances the
Union would have to rely exclusively on the accuracy
and integrity of Respondent. There would be no need for
the duty of an employer to furnish information upon re-
quest of a union if that were the intent of Congress. The
evidence does not show that Respondent ever offered to
show the Union any part of the study. If it had, the
Union might have found that it had sufficient informa-
tion to carry out its representative function. In the ab-
sence of such evidence, Respondent's oral explanation of
the report does not discharge Respondent's statutory
duty to furnish the information (study) requested.
1440
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP.
Finally, in determining whether Respondent is bargain-
ing in good faith, the evidence shows that the Union has
not waived its right to receive all information claimed
confidential by Respondent; that the evidence has not es-
tablished that Respondent had classified the MIT study
as confidential information prior to this proceeding, or
that the study actually has an aura of confidentiality
which should be protected. Consequently, the evidence
supports a conclusion that Respondent's refusal to fur-
nish the Union with the information (MIT study) re-
quested is a refusal to bargain collectively in good faith
with the Union. Under such circumstances, Respondent's
refusal is in violation of Section 8(aXl) and (5) of the
Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in close connection with its operations
as described in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act, we shall order that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
It having been found that Respondent interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of
their Section 7 rights, by refusing to furnish the Union
relevant information requested by the Union for its eval-
uation in processing grievances under the collective-bar-
gaining agreement, and that by so refusing Respondent
has failed and refused to bargain with the Union in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act, the recom-
mended Order will provide that Respondent cease and
desist from engaging in such conduct.
Because of the character of the unfair labor practices
herein found, the recommended Order will provide that
Respondent cease and desist from or in any like or relat-
ed manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act. NLRB v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d
532, 536 (4th Cir. 1941).
On the basis of the above findings of fact and on the
entire record in this case, I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. General Dynamics Corporation, Quincy Shipbuild-
ing Division, Respondent herein, is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
2. Local 5, Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuild-
ing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the
Union, is and has been at all times material herein a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. By failing and refusing to furnish the Union with
access to the MIT study for its evaluation in effectively
performing its representative function in processing em-
ployee grievances, Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By failing and refusing to furnish the Union with
access to the MIT study for its evaluation in effectively
performing its representative function in processing em-
ployee grievances, Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommended
ORDER6
The Respondent, General Dynamics Corporation,
Quincy Shipbuilding Division, Quincy, Massachusetts, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to furnish the Union access to
the MIT study for its evaluation in performing its repre-
sentative function of processing employee grievances.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as
the exclusive representative of the unit employees.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish, on request, to Local 5, Industrial Union of
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, AFL-
CIO, access to the MIT study (report) which was pre-
pared by Professor Edgar upon contract and on behalf of
Respondent herein.
(b) On request, bargain collectively with the Union as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
employees in the appropriate unit.
(c) Post at Respondent's Quincy, Massachusetts facility
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 7
Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 1, after being signed by Respond-
ent's authorized representative, shall be posted immedi-
ately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent
has taken to comply.
6 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
7 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board."
1441