Gateway Luggage Mfg. Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsFeb 25, 1959122 N.L.R.B. 1584 (N.L.R.B. 1959) Copy Citation 1584 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD members and the execution of dues checkoff authorizations by all job applicants, in the midst of the employment dispatch operation , at the hiring hall supervised by the respondent association , did not interfere with, restrain , or coerce employees or prospective employees of Alaskan salmon canneries in the exercise of rights statutorily guaranteed, within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act, as amended; nor did it constitute a contribution of support to the Union or an en- couragement of union membership by discrimination in regard to hire or employ- ment tenure , within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2) and (3) of the Act, as amended. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Meyer Fabes , Sam Fabes, Norman Fabes, Sherman Fabes, Eugene Fabes, Edward J. Prussack , Sole Sipsh , d/b/a Gate- way Luggage Mfg. Co . and Lodge 790, International Associa- tion of Machinists , AFL-CIO. Case No. 16-CA-1053. Feiru- ary 25, 1959 DECISION AND ORDER On October 22, 1958, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached thereto. Thereafter, the Respondents filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the entire record in this case, including the Intermediate Report, the excep- tions, and the brief, and adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner only to the extent that they are consistent herewith 2 On March 1, 1957, the Union was certified as bargaining repre- sentative of the Respondents' production and maintenance employees. On March 12 the Union presented a written contract proposal to the Respondents and requested the Respondents to supply the Union with the name of each employee, his classification, and rate of pay. The Respondents refused to give the information on the individual basis requested, but orally gave the Union the names of the classifica- 'Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Fanning]. The Respondents contend that the Trial Examiner 's credibility findings are erroneous. However , as the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence does not demonstrate the Trial Examiner ' s credibility findings to be incorrect, we adopt them . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd . 188 F. 2d 362 (C.A. 3). 122 NLRB No. 1.85. GATEWAY LUGGAGE MFG. CO. 1585 tions, the number of employees in each classification, and the various wage rates paid within each classification, contending that this information was sufficient for the Union's purposes. At the next meeting, held on March 20, 1957, representatives of the Respondents and the Union reviewed the Union's proposed con- tract article by article, agreeing on some and disagreeing as to others. During the discussion, the Respondents rejected the Union's request for a union shop but agreed to a modified maintenance-of-member- ship provision. The Union requested the Respondents to change from a piecework system to an hourly wage-rate system and pro- posed increases of about 50 cents an hour in the base pay rate, and repeated its request for individual wage data, which was not sup- plied. The Respondents refused to abandon the piecework system but offered a 5-cent-an-hour increase in the base pay rate. The Respondents also agreed, among other things, to set up a grievance procedure, and to include a clause providing for discharge only for cause. On March 27, 1957, the Union called a strike, which is still in progress. Another meeting was held on April 28 or 29 during which the parties discussed, in general terms, union shop, wages, and con- ditions for the return of the strikers. The next meeting was not held until September 16, 1957, because of the absence of the Respondents' attorney, F. L. Rheam. On that date, Union Representative Jones suggested that the parties review the Union's proposed contract again. Rheam replied that it would be a waste of time. He pointed out that the parties had previously been unable to agree on it, and that the Respondents were now even less inclined to accept the Union's proposals because the Respondents had replaced all striking employees at the current wage rate 3 Rheam suggested that the Union redraft its proposed contract, bringing it more in line with the Respondents' position. The Union agreed to do so, and again requested data as to the pay rates of individual employees. The Union mailed its second written proposal to the Respondents who received it on October 1. The following changes were made in the second proposal: deleted were the checkoff, overtime for Sat- urday morning and for work before and after a shift, and a pro- hibition against subcontracting; reduced were the number of holidays from eight to seven (the Respondents were currently granting six), the vacation periods, sick leave, and layoff notice period. The Union also reduced its wage demand by 25 cents an hour. At the next meeting, held on November 7, Rheam stated Ahat-the, 8 There were 96 employees when the strike was called on March 27 . By September 19„ there were -140 employees , including 13 returned strikers , although the strike was still In, progress. 505395-60-vol. 122-101 1586 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Union's second proposal was so close to its first that it would not do any good to discuss it' Union Representative Bracken then asked the Respondents to submit a counterproposal . Rheam replied that the Respondents would consider submitting a counterproposal and he would let the Union know in 2 or 3 weeks whether or not they would do so. However , it was not until 6 weeks later, on December 19, 1957, that Rheam informed Union Representative Jones, by telephone, that the Respondents would make a counterproposal, in writing, and would have it ready and meet with the Union at a time after the first of the year to be mutually agreed on . Later the same day Rheam received a letter dated December 18 from Union Representative Brackin to the effect that the Union was filing unfair labor practice charges because of the Respondents ' refusal to bargain by com- municating their intentions with respect to the submission of a counterproposal as promised. Thereafter , on the same day, Rheam telephoned Brackin , who asked him if the Respondents wanted to negotiate . Rheam replied that he needed time to look up the law as to whether he was obligated to negotiate in view of the filing of charges . Rheam testified that it was probably a month before he examined the law and that he never so informed the Union. On March 20 , 1958, Brackin called Rheam who agreed to meet on March 27 . When the parties met on the latter date, Rheam orally presented the Respondents ' counterproposal , as follows : The Re- spondents withdrew their agreement to a maintenance -of-membership provision and announced they would operate an open shop; withdrew their offer of a 5-cent wage increase , and their agreement to dis- charge only for cause and to set up a grievance procedure. The Respondents offered only to continue current benefits , such as their health and welfare programs , and in addition , to pay time and half for work after 40 hours ( a requirement of Federal law) and for holiday work , to provide for equal distribution of overtime, and to draw up a seniority clause based on ability and seniority . In reply to the Union 's renewed request for individual wage data, the Re- spondents supplied only the same type of information previously given, brought up to date , viz, the classifications and the number of employees and the pay range within each classification . The Union rejected the Respondents ' oral proposal , and there were no further meetings between the parties. After carefully considering all the relevant facts and the Re- spondents ' defenses, we have concluded , as did the Trial Examiner,. 4 The Trial Examiner credited the testimony of Respondents' representative; Rheam; on direct eiamiaatlon , which conforms substantially with that of Union Representative Jones, as to Rheam's refusal to discuss the Union's second contract proposal . ; Rheam's additional testimony , on redirect, that he expressed willingness to discuss the Union's proposal if the Union "wanted to do it" was not credited. GATEWAY LUGGAGE MFG. CO. 1587 that the Respondents failed to bargain with the Union in good faith. On the basis of the Trial Examiner's credibility findings, which we have adopted, it is clear, and we find, that on March 12 and 20, and September 19, 1957, as well as on March 27, 1958, the Union re- quested, and the Respondents refused to furnish, wage information consisting of the name of each employee, his classification, and his rate of pay. As the requested information was relevant to the nego- tiations of a collective-bargaining agreement, in which the parties were engaged, refusal to furnish it upon request was indicative of bad faith.-' We also find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respondents further demonstrated their bad faith by their pro- crastination and by failing to honor their committments to the Union that they would take constructive steps toward the negotiation of a contract. Thus, the Respondents, after recessing negotiations for over 4 months while their representative was out of the country, refused to discuss further the Union's original written contract pro- posal. Thereafter, when the Union, at the Respondents' request, presented a second written proposal, the Respondents refused to discuss it also, on the ground that it was virtually the same as the first, even though it contained, contrary to the Respondents' conten- tion, substantial concessions from the Union's original demands. The Respondents then, in breach of their commitment to tell the Union within 3 weeks whether or not they would submit a counter- proposal, delayed for an additional 3 weeks before giving the Union their answer to this question. When the Respondents finally advised the Union that they would submit a counterproposal in writing, and the Union requested an early resumption of negotiations, the Respondents replied that negotiations would be further delayed until the Respondents ascertained whether they were legally re- quired to negotiate in view of the Union's filing of unfair labor practice charges. It was another month before the Respondents attorney searched the law on this point 6 and even then he failed to inform the Union that he was ready to proceed with the negotia- tions. On the contrary, it was not until over 3 months after the promise to submit a written counterproposal that the Respondents finally met with the Union, at the latter's request. Even then, the Respondents failed to keep their promise that their proposal would be in writing, but submitted the proposal orally. While the Act does not require that contract proposals be submitted in any par- ticular form, the reduction of such proposals to writing will normally obviate any doubt or misunderstanding as to the precise terms thereof, thereby facilitating further discussion. 5 Valley City Furniture Company , 110 NLRB 1589 , enfd. 230 F . 2d 947 (C.A. 6). Olt is well established that the filing of unfair labor practice charges does not relieve a party of its duty to bargain . Automotive Supply Co ., Inc., 119 NLRB 1074. 1588 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Accordingly, we find that, by refusing to furnish the requested wage data, and by engaging in the delaying tactics outlined above, including their failure to honor commitments to expedite or facilitate the bargaining process, the Respondents revealed an intent to pro- long and impede bargaining. We conclude therefore that on and after September 16, 1957, the Respondents failed to bargain in good faith, in violation of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.' ORDER Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondents, Meyer Fabes, Sam Fabes, Norman Fabes, Sherman Fabes, Eugene Fabes, Edward J. Prussack, and Sole Sipsh, d/b/a Gateway Luggage Mfg. Co., Claremore, Oklahoma, their agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Lodge 790, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all their employees in the following appropriate unit : All pro- duction and maintenance employees at the Respondents' Claremore, Oklahoma, plant, including riveters, puritans, and laborers, but ex- cluding office clerical and professional employees, guards, watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) In any manner interfering with the efforts of the said labor organization to bargain collectively with the Respondents on behalf of the employees in the above appropriate unit. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Furnish to the above-named labor organization the name of each employee in the above unit together with his job classification and rate of pay. (b) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-named labor organization as the exclusive representative of all employees in the above appropriate unit, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and embody any understanding reached in a signed agreement. (c) Post at their plant in Claremore, Oklahoma, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, I In view of our decision herein , we find it unnecessary to, and therefore do not, adopt the Trial Examiner ' s additional finding that the Respondents ' withdrawal of previous concessions constituted bad faith , under the circumstances of this case . For the same reason , we do not adopt the Trial Examiner 's finding that the Union was justified in its understanding that the Respondents withdrew all concessions previously made, including those not specifically referred to in its oral counterproposal. 8 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order." GATEWAY LUGGAGE MFG. CO. 1589 shall, after being duly signed by the Respondents' authorized repre- sentative, be posted by the Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, and maintained by them for at least 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondents have taken to comply therewith. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with Lodge 790, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, as the ex- clusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below, with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees at our Clare- more, Oklahoma, plant, including riveters, puritans, and laborers, but excluding office clerical and professional em- ployees, guards, watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL furnish to the above-named labor organization the name of each employee in the above unit together with his job classification and rate of pay. WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of the above-named labor organization to bargain collectively with us, or refuse to bargain with said labor organization, as the ex- clusive representative of all our employees in the bargaining unit set forth above. MEYER FABES, SAM FABES, NORMAN FABES, SHERMAN FABES, EUGENE FABES, EDWARD J. PEUSSACK, SOLE SIPSH, D/B/A GATEWAY LUGGAGE MFG. CO., Employers. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 1590 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD INTERMEDIATE REPORT STATEMENT OF THE CASE A charge having been duly filed and served, a complaint and notice of hearing thereon having been issued and served by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, and an answer having been filed by the above-named Respondent,' a hearing involving allegations of unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136), herein called the Act, was held in Tulsa, Oklahoma, on August 12 and 13, 1958, before the duly designated Trial Examiner. At the hearing all parties were represented, were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues, to argue orally upon the record, and to file briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Argument was waived. Briefs have been received from the Respondent and General Counsel. On September 8, 1958, the Trial Examiner informed the parties by wire that the transcript, as then received, contained so many errors that unless corrections could be agreed upon a rehearing might be necessary. General Counsel and the Respondent replied on September 9 that such stipulation would be sought, and on September 24 a corrected and revised transcript was received from the official reporter. It is this latter transcript which is being used by the Trial Examiner as the basis for the following findings of fact. The Respondent's motion at the conclusion of the hearing, upon which ruling was then reserved, to dismiss the complaint is disposed of by the following findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent is a partnership doing business as Gateway Luggage Mfg. Co., under the laws of Oklahoma. The principal office and place of business is in Claremore, Oklahoma, where it is engaged in the manufacture of luggage and related products. During the 12-month period just before issuance of the complaint, the Respond- ent shipped merchandise valued at more than $50,000 in interstate commerce from its plant to points outside Oklahoma. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Lodge 790 , International Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO, is a labor or- ganization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Setting and major issues The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and the Trial Examiner finds that at all times since February 21, 1957, the Charging Union has been the exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. The appropriate unit is: The Respondent's production and maintenance employees at its Claremore, Oklahoma, plant, including riveters, puritans, and laborers, but excluding office clerical and professional employees, guards, watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act. There is no dispute that following certification the Union requested to negotiate an agreement, and that during a period from March 1957 to March 1958 a number of negotiating sessions were held, attended by representatives of the Union and of the Respondent. The complaint alleges only and the answer only denies in general terms that the Respondent "did refuse and continues to refuse to bargain collectively"- on 1 The complaint spells the last name of certain of these individuals as "Fabeas." The answer spells the name as appears in the title above, as does the official transcript. Since the error appears to be typographical, and inadvertent, the complaint is hereby ordered corrected. GATEWAY LUGGAGE MFG. CO . 1591 September 16, November 7, December 19, 20, and 21, all in 1957, and on Feb- ruary 28 and March 27, in 1958. Neither in the complaint nor at the hearing did General Counsel specify in what respect he claimed the Respondent had refused to bargain on any date. In his brief, however, General Counsel urges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act in the following respects: (1) failure to supply individual wage data requested by the Union; (2) failure to present a counterproposal in writing as requested; and (3) its withdrawal in March 1958, of provisions earlier agreed upon. Both General Counsel and the Respondent ad- duced evidence on each of these three issues. B. Failure to present counterproposal in writing Testimony is in agreement as to the fact that the Respondent, despite its coun- sel's written promise to do so, has failed to submit a written counterproposal to the Union's two written contract proposals. The question is thus not one of fact, but one of conclusion, and as to whether or not there is merit in General Counsel's claim that this failure constituted bad-faith bargaining on the part of the Re- spondent. The relevant circumstances in substance are as follows: Shortly after its cer- tification the Union submitted to the Company its proposed contract, in writing. It contained more than 30 separate provisions. The two parties negotiated at considerable length thereafter , reaching accord on some points but remaining apart on others. At a meeting on September 16 the Respondent's representative declared that no good purpose would be served by going through the original provisions again. The Union suggested that the Respondent submit a counterproposal. The Respondent, however, urged the Union to submit a redraft and revision of its own original proposal, and finally the Union agreed to do this. Early in October it submitted to the Respondent , in writing , its second proposed contract. At a meeting on November 7 the Respondent's representative declared that it would be a waste of time, also, to discuss the Union's new proposals, claiming that they were "so close to the old draft of the original contracts." (The quota- tions are from the testimony of Attorney Rheam, spokesman for the Respondent.) When the union representative again asked the Company for its own proposals, according to his own testimony Rheam told him "we would consider it and that within the next 3 weeks I would let him know about it." Rheam failed to keep his oral agreement. More than a month went by. On December 18, the union representative wrote to Rheam, among other things in- forming him that because of the failure of the Company even to communicate its intentions, one way or the other, unfair labor practice charges would be filed. Although a letter written by Rheam to Union Representative Brackin on Decem- ber 21, 1957, notably fails to support his own testimony that on December 19, at 5:15 p.m ., he told Brackin by telephone that "we were willing to make a counter- proposal," 2 the Trial Examiner accepts Rheam's testimony that on December 19 he called another union representative, Jones, and "told him the Company was willing to make a counterproposal in writing and we would meet with the union at a time to be mutually agreed upon after the first of the year." No counterproposal in writing was ever submitted , despite Rheam 's own version of his promise to Jones. No explanation for this failure was offered either to the Union at a later meeting , or at the hearing. That is failure to submit to counterproposal in writing was a "stalling tactic" and made in bad faith is a reasonable conclusion supported also by related and concurrent events, established by Rheam's own testimony. When he called Brackin regarding his letter announcing the filing of charges , the union repre- sentative asked him to "negotiate ," but Rheam told him that he "didn 't know what our position would be because they were filing charges ." Rheam further told him he "needed time to look up the law . . . and see whether we were obligated to negotiate . under the circumstances." It was "probably a month" before he "checked the law," Rheam testified, and there is no credible evidence that the attorney ever let the union representative know that it would meet for negotiations. It was not until March 27, 1958, fol- lowing union insistence , that another meeting was held. 0 The letter asserts only that Rheam gave this message to another union representative, Jones, on December 19. Had Rheam in fact given the same information to Brackin on the same day , it is reasonable to believe that the attorney would have reminded him of the fact in his letter of December 21. 1 592 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD When the Respondent finally met with the Union on that date, nearly 5 months after it had brushed aside the Union's second proposal and promised to "consider" submitting its own proposal, and more than 3 months after Rheam promised to submit in writing the company counterproposal, it orally offered, in general terms, to accord its employees almost precisely the identical working conditions they had been working under before the Union was certified. C. Withdrawal of earlier agreements As noted above, the Union's original proposed contract contained more than 30 articles. The second was nearly as long. The Respondent's "proposals," made orally by Rheam on March 27, 1958, occupy hardly more than a single page in the transcript, were couched in generalities, and in large part were specific with- drawals from position which the Company had previously agreed upon. Even then, according to Rheam's testimony, he prefaced his oral proposals by stating that "no agreement was to be final and binding until it was reduced to writing and signed by both parties." It is quite obvious from this candid statement that Rheam well knew that his "offer" would be unacceptable to the Union and that he himself had insufficient faith in it even to put it into writing. From Rheam's own testimony comes evidence to support the allegations of the complaint: (1) I told them ... we were withdrawing our previous offer of maintenance of membership.. . (2) We offered to pay overtime after forty hours [a requirement of Federal law] . . . we would pay the same wages and give all other benefits which we are now paying and giving, reserving the right to give individual increases when in opinion of management it is justified. . . . [The company had previ- ously offered a 5 cents wage increase.] (3) I stated that we were withdrawing our previous offer on the grievance procedure. In addition to the foregoing three points on which the attorney testified that the Respondent specifically withdrew previously made agreement, his oral offer com- pletely ignored several points on which at least tentative agreement had been reached. Since he had prefaced his offer by stating that it must be placed in writing and signed before becoming binding, the Union had no reason to believe that the offer contained any more than Rheam specifically stated. It was reasonably justified in considering that the Company was also abandoning and withdrawing its previous agreement on points not included in the oral offer. D. Failure to supply individual wage data There is dispute in the evidence as to the fact: whether or not the Union ever asked for such data. There is no dispute that the Company failed to supply it. Rheam and three of his clients simply denied that such data was requested. Thus a sharp question of credibility arises. First, as to the nature of the information union representatives claim they sought from the Company. All evidence shows that the Respondent operated several production lines, and that employees on such lines were paid piecework rates. It is undisputed that neither the Union nor these employees themselves were able to determine in advance what they were to receive while doing piecework on these lines, nor how their ultimate payment was computed. To the Trial Examiner it appears clearly reasonable that without such piecework data, furnished as to specific individuals, the Union lacked an essential factor in negotiating for monetary provisions in any contract. The testimony of Union Representative Jones is con- vincing that he recognized the need of this data. Since he recognized the need, it is reasonable that he would have asked company representatives for it. While company representatives admit that they provided the Union with certain general information, such as classifications and rates for classifications, Rheam admitted that no piecework rates were ever given to the Union. Their claim that such individual wage data was never requested, and so not provided, does not withstand scrutiny, not only in the light of the obvious reasonableness that such data, being necessary, would have been requested, but also in view of the Re- spondent's plainly "stalling tactics" of failing to keep its own promises, described heretofore. In short, undisputed factors of bad-faith bargaining fully support the conclusion, here reached, that contrary to the, Respondent's claim, individual wage data was requested by the Union in March 1957, on September 16, 1957, and again on March 27, 1958. GATEWAY LUGGAGE MFG. CO. 1593 E. Conclusions As to the failure to furnish the wage data requested, the Board has held this to be an index of bad -faith bargaining in -a long line of cases , notably in Whitin, Machine Works ( 108 NLRB 1537 , enfd . 217 F. 2d 593 (C.A. 4), cert. denied 349 U.S. 905). As to the withdrawal of its earlier agreements , this is a competent factor to be considered in determining the entire question of good-faith bargaining , as has been. noted by the court in N.L.R.B. v. National Shoes, Inc., 208 F . 2d 688, 692 (C.A. 2). And in New England Die Casting Company ( 116 NLRB at 4) the Board found that an employer's change on position on the termination date of a. contract was a pertinent factor in the determination of the bargaining issue. Here the complete withdrawal of agreements made nearly a year earlier permit only the reasonable inference that the Respondent , throughout its negotiations, was resolved not to reach contractual agreement with the Union. To the Trial Examiner it does not appear that the Respondent's failure to abide by its own admitted promise to submit a counterproposal in writing can be con- strued as other than a flagrant violation of good -faith bargaining. In sum , the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that the three above-described factors establish a pattern of bargaining on the part of the Respondent which fails to meet the requirements of good-faith bargaining . Their impact , considered as a whole , and the inference reasonably drawn therefrom , warrants the conclusion here made, that on and at all times after September 16, 1957, the Respondent has failed and refused to bargain in good faith with the Charging Union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the above -described appropriate unit. By thus refusing to bargain , as required by the Act, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained , and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and ob- structing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY It has been found that the Respondent has engaged in the unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain collectively with the chosen representative of its employees in an appropriate unit . It will therefore be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and from like and related conduct . It will further be recommended that the Respondent furnish the Union with the individual wage data of the em- ployees it represents and that, upon request, it bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Lodge 790, International Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. All production and maintenance employees of the Respondent at its Clare- more, Oklahoma , plant , including riveters , puritans, and laborers, but excluding office clerical and professional employees , guards, watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 3. The said labor organization was on February 21, 1957, and at all times since has been , the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 4. By refusing to bargain with the aforesaid Union, on and after September 16, 1957, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(S) of the Act. 5. By refusing to bargain with the said Union, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained , and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, thereby engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation