Freight, Constr., General Drivers, Local 287

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsNov 1, 1971

193 N.L.R.B. 1078 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

1078 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Freight , Construction , General Drivers , Warehouse- men and Helpers Union , Local No. 287, Interna- tional Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America and Pitts- burgh-Des Moines Steel Company. Case 20-CB-2316 November 1, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND KENNEDY On June 17, 1971, Trial Examiner Maurice M. Miller issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. The General Counsel and the Charging Party filed briefs in answer to the Respondent's exceptions and in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent, Freight, Construction, General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 287, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Santa Clara, California, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order. 1 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Trial Examiner It is the Board 's established policy not to overrule a Trial Examiner 's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MAURICE M. MILLER, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge and first amended charge, filed and duly served on September 2 and November 20, 1970, respectively, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board caused a complaint and notice of hearing, dated December 16, 1970, to be issued and served on Freight, Construction, General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 287, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, designated Respondent Union within this decision. Therein, Respon- dent Union was charged with the commission of unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519. Subsequently, through an answer duly filed, Respondent Union conceded certain factual allegations made within General Counsel's com- plaint but denied the commission of any unfair labor practice. Pursuant to notice, a hearing with respect to the issues was held at San Jose, California, on February 17, 1971, before me. The General Counsel, Respondent Union, and complainant herein, Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Compa- ny, were represented by counsel. Each party was afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues. On March 22, counsel were notified that I proposed to take "official notice" of various published reports, dealing with certain collateral matters which I considered possibly relevant and material, primarily with respect to some testimonial credibility determinations which the present record requires me to make; the parties were advised that any party desiring to make a different or contrary showing, with respect to these matters, would be privileged to file a detailed offer of proof, present relevant stipulations, or request that the record be reopened. See Administrative Procedure Act, Section 7(d), in this connection. General Counsel's representative and complainant's counsel duly noted their opposition, contending that the matters proposed for official notice were neither relevant nor material with respect to the "fundamental issues" presented by the present record; General Counsel contended, further, that the matters detailed were not proper subjects for official notice. My disposition with respect to these questions will be detailed, subsequently, herein Thereafter, General Counsel's representative, Respon- dent Union's counsel and complainant's counsel filed detailed and helpful briefs. These have been duly considered. FINDINGS OF FACT Upon the entire testimonial record, documentary eviden- ce received, and my observation of the witnesses, I make the following findings of fact: 1. JURISDICTION The Respondent Union raises no question herein with respect to General Counsel's jurisdictional claim. Upon the 193 NLRB No. 160 FREIGHT , CONSTR ., GENERAL DRIVERS , LOCAL 287 1079 complaint's relevant factual declarations-specifically, those set forth in detail within the second paragraph thereof-which are conceded to be correct, and upon which I rely, I find that complainant, Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company, was, throughout the period with which this case is concerned, and remains, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and business activities which affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the statute. Further, with due regard for presently applicablej unsdictional standards, I find assertion of the Board's jurisdiction of this case warranted and necessary to effectuate the statutory objectives. II. THE RESPONDENT UNION Freight, Construction, General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 287, International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, designated Respondent Union within this decision, is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Throughout the period with which this case is concerned, Fred Hofmann, then Respondent Union's secretary-treasurer, and Jack Black, Respondent Union's business representative, were-so I find-the designated labor organization's agents, functioning in its behalf, within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the statute. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE A. Issue General Counsel contends, herein, that Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(3) of the statute when it withheld requisite signatures from a contract draft properly setting forth a collective-bargaining consensus which its designated representative had previously reached during negotiations with complainant's spokesmen. Respondent Union would have this Board find, however, that whatever June 1970 consensus the parties reached was a consensus "subject to modification" subsequently, should a higher wage scale or greater fringe benefits later be confirmed for local delivery drivers elsewhere, during certain negotiations then in progress for a national master freight contract and vanous regional "pickup and delivery" contracts. Within his brief, General Counsel notes, cogently, that, with matters in this posture, the present case's disposition will turn upon this Board's resolution with respect to a single factual question: Did Respondent Union's represent- ative and complainant's principal negotiator really reach a complete and final agreement with respect to all renegotiat- ed terms within their prospective collective bargaining contract? General Counsel and complainant's counsel, pressing for a rejection of Respondent Union's stated contention, would have this Board find that they did. B. Facts 1. Background a. Complainant's facility Complainant herein fabricates and distributes steel products. Though a Pennsylvania corporation, it maintains and operates several California facilities ; these include a fabrication plant, office and warehouse located in Santa Clara, California, with which this case is directly con- cerned. At Santa Clara, complainant employs, inter aha, two general classifications of truckdrivers. These drivers constitute two separate work forces, so-called "toolhouse" drivers who make over-the-road or long-haul deliveries, and warehouse drivers who make local or short-haul deliveries, within Santa Clara County and certain nearby counties. During the particular period with which this case is concerned, complainant had four warehouse drivers with seniority records; no more than three were, however, working currently. The toolhouse group compassed three long line drivers. b. Complainant's relationship with Respondent Union For some 15 years, at least, Respondent Union has been the recognized collective-bargaining representative for complainant's Santa Clara drivers. The warehouse and toolhouse groups have, however, been represented sepa- rately. Historically, their contracts have, likewise, been negotiated separately, though "approximately" concurrent- ly. Regarding both worker groups, complainant has regularly negotiated with Respondent Union, directly, for "single employer" contracts, complainant belongs to no multiple-employer bargaining group, nor has it, ever, designated any trade association to bargain on its behalf. Complainant's most recent 3-year driver contracts, which covered warehouse and toolhouse drivers separately, had simultaneous March 31, 1970, expiration dates. The present case concerns, specifically, certain recent collective-bar- gaining negotiations between complainant and Respondent Union's business representative looking toward a successor collective-bargaining contract for complainant's Santa Clara warehouse drivers. 2. Negotiations Before their previous agreement's scheduled termination date, Respondent Union timely notified complainant by letter regarding its desire to negotiate a new contract. Thereafter, following a consensus reached sometime during the 60-day notice period preceding the contract's March 31 termination date, the parties' designated negotiators met, for their first bargaining session , on April 29 at complain- ant's Santa Clara facility. (James Dickey, complainant's western warehouse division manager , and Santa Clara District Service Manager Bert Lewis, supervisor of complainant's warehouse workers, represented the firm. Jack Black, Respondent Union's business representative, together with Jack Herman, then a Local 287 member and secretary-treasurer of Respondent Union's federal credit union , were present for that organization . During subse- 1080 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD quent sessions-which will be detailed within this decision-Black functioned as Respondent Union's sole negotiator; complainant's representatives were Dickey and Robert Barrett, complainant's western division personnel manager.) Black presented complainant's spokesmen with typewritten copies of Respondent Union's contract propos- als; they were, concededly, designated as Respondent Union's demands. Set forth on some 19 separate sheets of paper these demands had been formulated as specific proposals for the amendment of certain language within the parties' previous contract. The discussion with respect to Respondent Union's contract proposal, however, was relatively brief, primarily because Personnel Manager Barrett, complainant's princi- pal negotiator, could not be present. The Union demands were, however, reviewed generally, section by section. Black's several proposals compassed, inter aka, a proposal for four periodic wage increases programmed to total $1.10 per hour within a proposed 3-year contract term. Further, Respondent Union proposed increases with respect to health and welfare and pension plan payments totaling $2 per week for each, over the proposed contract term. (Respondent Union's wage demands, when present- ed, were expressed in terms of daily rates. Black was, however, requested to declare the "cents per hour" increases which Respondent Union sought, and provided an hourly breakdown. The Union's proposal regarding health and welfare benefits, when presented, called for a total monthly increase; this was, likewise, subsequently rephrased in weekly terms.) At one point, Black mentioned, possibly in response to Lewis' question, that Respondent Union's health and welfare contribution proposal particu- larly "came from a national agreement" never specifically designated. While a witness, Dickey conceded his personal knowledge-based on San Francisco newspaper reports-that some "national negotiations" were then in progress between the International Brotherhood of Team- sters and various motor carriers; the present record, considered in totality, will not, however, support a determination that these negotiations were discussed or canvassed in detail, either during the April 29 session or any subsequent bargaining session between complainant's spokesmen and Respondent Union's negotiator. The present record does contain a number of testimonial references to various multiple-employer collective-bargain- ing agreements, together with references to purportedly concurrent negotiations , then in progress , for their modification and/or renewal . Among those mentioned-within various contexts-were the so-called National Master Freight Agreement, the so-called Chicago negotiations, and certain local "drayage" or "pickup and delivery" contracts purportedly negotiated or being negotiated between International Brotherhood of Team- sters' Joint Council 7, or Respondent Union, and various San Jose area motor carriers. General Counsel and complainant contend, however, that neither these contracts nor related negotiations for their modification or replace- ment should be considered relevant or material with respect to those questions presented by the present record for determination; Respondent Union's counsel vigorously presses a contrary view. My determination, with respect to their relevancy and materiality, will be noted subsequently within this decision. No commitments with regard to substantive contract changes were made during the parties' first session, though Warehouse Division Manager Dickey did declare com- plainant's readiness to concur with Respondent Union's several suggestions regarding the date or dates when certain specified contractual provisions should be made effective. The Union's substantive proposals were held for further discussion during a second session-for which no definitive date was set-when Personnel Manager Barrett would be present. The present record-with respect to this first session-further reflects Business Representative Black's positive testimonial declarations regarding a statement, which he had purportedly made dunng the session, that Respondent Union's substantive proposals with respect to wages, health and welfare, and pension contributions were based on whatever "finalizations" the negotiators privy to certain so-called national negotiations and Joint Council 7 Pickup and Delivery contract negotiations reached. (The business representative's testimony in this connection was generally corroborated by Jack Herman, then secretary- treasurer of respondent labor organization's credit union.) According to Respondent Union's business representative, his statement had provoked no "adverse" response. Black's purported recollections in this regard were, however, contradicted. Both Dickey and Lewis, complainant's representatives, categorically denied hearing any statement whatsoever calculated to suggest that Respondent Union's contract proposals, and/or the organization's readiness to confirm a contractual consensus reached, should be considered tentative, or conditioned, in any way, upon the final outcome of certain contract negotiations concurrently in progress between complainant and Respondent Union or some other parties. Complainant's Warehouse Division manager, indeed, denied that the so-called National Master Freight Agreement or Respondent Union's local "pickup and delivery" contracts were "mentioned" during the session now under consideration. (In this connection, note should be taken with regard to Black's testimonial concession, during cross-examination, that complainant's spokesmen were never categorically told that Respondent Union would "not even consider" contract proposals, dealing with economic terms and conditions, which failed to match those finally negotiated during the national bargaining sessions then in progress.) My determinations, regarding this testimonial conflict, will be noted, subse- quently, within this decision. For the present, therefore, I find it sufficient to note-consistently with contentions made by complainant's counsel-the Respondent Union's several written proposals contained no language whatsoev- er conditioning that organization's specific economic demands upon some other contractual consensus, or settlements reached in some other negotiation. On May 27, the parties met for their second bargaining session at complainant's Santa Clara facility. Personnel Manager Barrett was present, together with Dickey and complainant's service manager; Business Representative Black was Respondent Union's sole negotiator. The Union's contractual proposals were again reviewed and FREIGHT, CONSTR., GENERAL DRIVERS, LOCAL 287 1081 discussed Barrett suggested complainant's readiness to concur with respect to some union proposals, rejected others flatly, suggested that some be reserved for further consideration, and proffered several counter- proposals-some of which Respondent Union's negotiator accepted. (During the discussion now under consideration-so the record shows-Black was queried, inter aba, regarding the source of Respondent Union's economic demands, specifically those relating to wages, health and welfare and required pension plan contnb- utions. Respondent's business representative declared, so I find, that the proposed increases with respect to these matters were "identical with the national settlement" though the particular contract settlement meant was not specifically designated Barrett's testimony with regard to this conversational exchange would warrant a determina- tion that his "knowledge" regarding the so-called national settlement derived from hearsay, and could not be considered complete or definitive.) One of Barrett's several counterproposals related to Respondent Union's demand, which, so we have seen, called for periodic pay increases totaling $1.10 per hour, spaced within a 3-year contract term In complainant's behalf, Barrett counterproposed that the parties set a succession of hourly rate increases which would total 95 cents within a 36-month contract term or, alternatively, successive raises which would total $1.10 per hour spread over a 39-month term. Consideration of complainant's wage rate counterproposal was reserved. No counterproposal was made-so Barrett testified-with regard to health and welfare and pension plan contribution levels. The parties' third session, set for June 8, was likewise held on complainant's premises. Personnel Manager Barrett testified, credibly, that discussions were largely confined to complainant's counterproposals with regard to such matters as vacation pay, holidays, the development of company rules, and complainant's desire to retain records on worker's reprimands for disciplinary purposes. (Respondent Union's demands with respect to wages, health and welfare, and pension plan contributions were not-so Barrett credibly testified-discussed.) Shortly before the session concluded, Black declared that he wished to meet with complainant's warehouse drivers and discuss complainant's contract proposals with them. On Monday, June 22, Black telephoned complainant's personnel manager Barrett was told that he (Black) had met with complainant's warehouse drivers-the previous Friday evening, so Black recalled-and that the parties were "pretty close to an agreement" though there were still some areas of disagreement. When queried regarding these unsettled matters, Black listed four subjects. These were: retention of Admission Day as a paid holiday, and Respondent Union's proposals with regard to vacation pay, picket line observance, and daily starting times. With reference to complainant's previously stated counterpropo- sal that successive wage increases calculated to total $1.10 per hour would have to be "tied" to a 39-month contract term, Respondent Union's business representative declared that Barrett's proposal would be acceptable. Complainant's personnel manager was likewise told that his counterpropo- sals with respect to company rules, and the firm's retention of reprimand records, would not be challenged. Black was asked whether his statement covered all of Respondent Union's then current differences. Upon receiving the business representative's affirmative reply, Barrett declared that complainant would drop its counterproposals with regard to the four questioned subjects. His further testimony, with respect to this conversation, then, reads as follows: Jack [Black] then said, "Well, I guess we have an agreement." He said I'll meet with the employees tomorrow night right after work or the next night, and have them vote or give them [your] proposal. Barrett requested a telephone call following Black's meeting with complainant's warehouse drivers. Upon this note, their conversation ended. A few days later, on Friday, June 26, Respondent Union's business representative telephoned Barrett to report that complainant's three current warehouse drivers had voted-during a meeting that morning-to accept the proposed agreement. Black declared that he wished to reduce their negotiated contract changes to written form, and then review these language changes with complainant's personnel manager. (Nothing within the present record reflects any comment or suggestion by Respondent Union's business representative, during his conversation with com- plainant's personnel manager, that the drivers' favorable vote should not be considered final, or that the settlement reached and ratified should be considered conditioned on national negotiations or any other contract settlement. Particularly, note should be taken of the fact that Respondent Union's business representative proffered no such testimony. None of complainant's drivers were summoned to testify regarding the circumstances of their ratification vote.) Barrett concurred with respect to Black's suggestion, but asked when his proposed task would be completed Black declared that he would be "over" within a few days, but not more than 1 week. On June 30, Respondent Union's business representative presented Barrett with a typewritten draft embodying the contractual language changes which had been negotiated, and which complainant's warehouse drivers had ratified. Regarding the contract's so-called "economic package" the document in question set forth those terms which had been previously settled by the parties; namely, successive wage increases totaling $1.10 per hour over 39 months, plus $2 per week increases with respect to health and welfare and pension plan contributions during the same stated contract term. After making a minor correction, the negotiators agreed, so I find, that Black's prepared document correctly set forth those changes which would be made within their prospective collective-bargaining contract. When Barrett reported that his office was temporarily limited with respect to clerical help, Black volunteered to have Respondent Union's staff prepare the new contract for signature and "run off" some copies; he declared that he believed he could deliver the final document within I week. With arrangements for their new contract's preparation settled, Respondent Union's business representative promptly asked how soon complainant could get the negotiated wage changes effectuated. Barrett declared that 1082 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD this could be done immediately. That same day, by letter, complainant's personnel manager directed his firm's accounting department to institute the newly negotiated rates. 3. Respondent Union's change of position Several weeks passed; Black failed to deliver their new contract. Nor did he communicate with Personnel Manager Barrett , though the latter had tried several times, without success, to reach him by telephone. Finally, on July 27, Black returned Barrett's most recent call. Following a brief discussion concerning a nonrelated matter, Barrett asked Respondent Union's business repre- sentative when he would bring in the new contract. The personnel manager's further testimony regarding their conversation reads as follows: Jack said, "Well, we've got a problem." I said, "What's the problem?" He said, "Well, as you know, there's been a new settlement nationally." I said, "What does that have to do with us?" And he said, "Well, we're going to have to take the position, that is to apply to this settlement ." I said that was kind of ridiculous when we already have an agreement. We had a little more discussion along that line and at the-at one point he said, "Is that your position, the Company's position?" "That you're not going to agree to any further change?" I said, "Yes." He said, "Well I guess I'll have to discuss this with Fred Hofmann [Respondent Union's secretary -treasurer] and I'll get back to you later." While a witness, Black's proffered testimony regarding this telephone conversation substantially corroborated Barrett'- s, save in some limited but-from Respondent Union's point of view-crucial respects. For example, Black conceded a reference to the new "national settlement" and "local pickup and delivery" settlement which provided for $1.85 worth of periodic wage increases. According to Respondent Union's business representative, Barrett was told that, "In relationship to our first meeting with the Company, we're going to adjust our agreement to reflect the changes." When Barrett protested that the parties had a contractual consensus, Black replied, so he testified, that they "didn't have an agreement" based on the $1.10 wage package. He denied any concession-during this July 27 or later conversations-that he knew a contractual consensus had been reached, but that Respondent Union would have to demand terms consistent with the national contract settlements nevertheless For reasons which will be detailed, further, within this decision, Barrett's testimonial recapitulation with regard to this conversation is generally credited. With due regard for the record-considered in totality-determinations may not be considered warranted that Black ever specifically conceded their prior contractual consensus. I am satisfied, however, that the business representatives' demand for a modification of their contract's "economic" terms was not bottomed upon some purported understanding, tacit or consensual-dating from his "first meeting" with the company negotiators-that whatever agreement they may have reached with respect to such terms should be treated as tentative or conditional pending some other contractual settlement. Black's testimony, calculated to call for such a factual determination, fails to persuade. On August 12, Black again telephoned complainant's personnel manager. According to Barrett, whose testimony I credit, Black declared that Respondent Union would take the position that complainant would have to grant wage increases and make health and welfare and pension plan contributions matching the new national settlement. Barrett reiterated complainant's position that the parties had negotiated a contract, and that he (Black) would have to produce it; failing this, Black was told, so I find, that complainant would file unfair labor practice charges. With matters in this posture, Respondent Union's business representative declared that he would like to visit Barrett's office and discuss the matter Two or three days later , Black visited Barrett 's office; he declared that he wished to change their contract's economic terms. Regarding their conversation, Barrett testified, credibly, that: He [Black] said early in the conversation something to the effect, "I'm in a bind. I know we have an agreement but we're going to have to have the national settle- ment." I said, "Well, this is ridiculous. We have an agreement. We had a complete contract all wrapped up and agreed to." He said, "I know, but we have to have this $1.85 schedule. I realize this is kind of ridiculous." He went on to tell me that he personally had been involved or was involved in negotiations with two other groups, where they were settling for something other than a $1.85 wage increase. Nevertheless, that was the position the Union was taking with Pittsburgh-Des Moines. I concluded by saying something to the effect, "Well, Jack, we have an agreement and [I'm going to insist that you] produce that agreement as reflecting the terms and conditions we negotiated." He concluded with the remark something to the effect, "Well, I might as well bring this to a head. I'll produce the agreement." Then he left. Respondent Union's business representative returned to Barrett's office August 25 and left a mimeographed contract draft on Barrett's desk. The contractual draft correctly reflected the consensus which the parties had previously reached except that three critical provisions-those related to wages, health and welfare, and pension plan contributions-had been modified. The document in question had concededly been prepared-that is, typed on stencils and reproduced-by Respondent Union's clerical personnel, pursuant to Black's direction, following his June 30 meeting with complainant's personnel manager. And the present record contains a stipulation that-when first prepared and reproduced-the document had contained the so-called economic figures with respect to which the parties had reached consensus before their June 30 session. Specifically, article X, dealing with wage rates, had provided for four successive increases totaling $1.10 per hour over the contract's term; article XIII, section 1, dealing with pension plan contribution rates, had provided for two successive increases totaling $2 per week over the contract term; and article XIV, section 1(b), dealing with health and welfare trust fund contributions, had likewise provided for increases totaling $2 per week FREIGHT, CONSTR ., GENERAL DRIVERS , LOCAL 287 1083 during the contract's life. The stenciled figures which reflected these changes had been physically stricken-by Respondent Union's business representative, or clerical personnel subject to his direction-some time between the date on which the document's stencil had onginally been prepared and August 25. With respect to wage rates, the contract draft, thus revised, called for seven successive hourly rate increases totaling $1.85 per hour within a 39- month contract term. With respect to trust fund contnb- utions for pensions and health and welfare, the revisions called for four successive increases totaling $4 per week over the contract's stated duration. Complainant's management-confronted with Respon- dent Union's physically revised contract draft-has withheld concurrence. As Respondent Union's business representative testified, "No document in existence has been signed" by the parties. On September 2, complainant's 8(b)(3) charge, which initiated the present case, was filed. 4. The contractual consensus Within his brief, Respondent Union's counsel has conceded that the general course of events "leading up to the filing of the charge in this case" should not be considered in dispute. However, with respect thereto, counsel's line of defense does raise a significant factual question: Was there a mutual understanding, shared by the parties throughout the course of these negotiations, that whatever contractual consensus they might reach would be tentative and conditional, subject to modification should there subsequently be some "change in the economic package" concurrently being negotiated on a national scale? Respondent Union would have this Board conclude that such a mutual understanding existed, and constituted a pervasive "theme of the negotiations" between the parties. This contention derives, primarily, from Business Repre- sentative Black's testimony regarding statements which he purportedly made during the parties' first bargaining session-without receiving a negative response-and substantially reiterated thereafter. With respect thereto, however, General Counsel's witnesses have challenged the business representative's purported recollections. The resultant testimonial conflict has been summarized, fairly, within Respondent Union's brief: Black testified that he had stated during the course of the first meeting on April 29, 1970, that the Union's proposals were subject to whatever "finalizations" were reached in the "National Negotiations and the Joint Council 7 Pickup and Delivery negotiations" which at that time had resulted in only tentative agreement .. . Black further stated that he made clear throughout the negotiations with the Company that the Union's position was tied in directly with the uncompleted national negotiations, and that any change in economic terms made on an industry wide basis through those negotiations would have to be reflected in the contract with the Company ...Barrett, on the other hand, denied that the agreement reached between the Company and Union was conditioned upon any outside event. According to Barrett, he was aware of the national negotiations in Washington, D.C., but the subject of their relationship to the negotiations . . . did not come up in any of the meetings between the parties. Secondarily, Respondent Union's counsel contends that relevant practices which the parties had "historically" followed when negotiating prior contracts, together with practices consensually pursued during their 1970 negotia- tions, provide "contextual evidence" sufficient to compel a conclusion that the national negotiations played an important role in the discussions between the parties, and that Respondent Union had sufficiently articulated its position "at all relevant times" that economic modifications in the national settlement would have to be reflected in the settlement between the parties herein. When dispassionately reviewed, however, these conten- tions fail to persuade. The testimonial and documentary record, considered in totality, will not, within my view, sustain counsel's suggestion that both Respondent Union's and complainant's negotiators considered their June 30 contractual consensus, when reached, still tentative or conditional. First: I note that Black's testimony, regarding his purported April 29 statement-should it be deemed worthy of credit-does not really support Respondent Union's present position. According to Respondent Union's business representative, he stated that the proposals presented "were based upon finalizations...reached" during certain other designated negotiations. Such a statement, couched in the past tense, could hardly be considered a clear-cut declaration that the proposals submitted might be subject to later modification, should the "finalizations" thus relied upon subsequently prove to be something less than final. Within this case's total context, certainly, Black's statement-assuming arguendo, that it was made-could, with equal reasonableness, have been construed as nothing more than a descriptive reference to the designated extrinsic source from which Respondent Union's contractual proposals, proffered as definitive, had been derived. Certainly, Black's purported statement , so construed, would have been consistent with his previously demonstrat- ed practices. In this connection, for example, Black testified, when queried regarding his preliminary telephone conversation with complainant's personnel manager before their contract's March 31 termination date, that he had suggested deferral of their first bargaining session "following the same pattern that we did in the past" since: ...we didn't have anything actually to present at the time because we were still waiting for something out of the local pickup and delivery and the O.T.R. [negotiations] which had been our past procedure. [Emphasis supplied.] Further, Black testified that April 29 was finally set for the parties' first bargaining session because "prior to that" he had received information from Respondent Union's secretary-treasurer regarding "the trend and language and the monetary changes" in the local pickup and delivery contract which had previously been "followed as a pattern" during negotiations for complainant's warehouse drivers. And Respondent Union' s business representative contin- ued: And when I had the monetary changes and language 1084 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD changes regard-health and welfare and vacation and holidays, then I brought these into the request I submitted to the Company. When I had them ready to submit, I called Bob and we set up the April 29th date. [Emphasis supplied ] Black further testified , categorically , that similar proce- dures had been followed , in connection with the parties' 1964 and 1967 negotiations , before complainant 's repre- sentatives had been presented with Respondent Union's proposed contract changes. According to Black, he "always" waited for "something" to "come down" with regard to contractual language changes , and monetary changes regarding wages, health and welfare and pension plan contributions , derived from concurrent or concluded national "over-the-road" contract negotiations and/or local Joint Council Pickup and Delivery negotiations. Confronted with this testimony , I am satisfied that-when queried during the parties' first bargaining session regard- ing Respondent Union 's basis for certain monetary proposals-the Respondent Union's negotiator did, thus, describe their source When the parties ' April 29 bargaining session convened, Black may, himself , have "understood" that neither of the contract negotiations from which his figures derived had, before that date , reached the stage of final settlement. His testimony , however, will not , within my view, support a determination that complainant 's negotiators were specifi- cally told Respondent Union 's monetary proposals were tentative , or subject to modification should the prospective "national" or "Joint Council" settlements be revised, depending upon the outcome of certain so-called Chicago negotiations. According to Black, there was some general discussion-during the parties' May 27 session and subsequent sessions-regarding the progress of his parent organization 's Chicago and Washington , D.C., contract negotiations . Respondent Union's business representative, however, could not recall what was said , or by whom. Certainly , he never testified , herein, that complainant's negotiators were told that prospective settlements which might subsequently result from these concurrent negotia- tions could or would dictate a modification of Respondent Union's monetary proposals. While a witness, Personnel Manager Barrett denied Black 's testimony that there had been frequent conversational references , during the parties' several bargaining sessions , to concurrent Chicago negotia- tions or national contract talks. However, with due regard for the present record considered in totality , this testimoni- al conflict need not be resolved . Should a determination be deemed warranted , arguendo, that these concurrent negoti- ations were generally mentioned , nothing within the testimonial record will support a factual conclusion that their possible relevance , with respect to causing Respon- dent Union to modify previously defined monetary demands, was ever noted, specifically , for the benefit of complainant 's representatives . The business representa- tive's direct testimony , rather, merely reflects his subjective "assumption " that the complainant 's negotiators were interested in these concurrent negotiations because of their possible relationship to some "final monetary package" with which they might , subsequently, be confronted. Black's assumption , however, cannot be considered probative with respect to Personnel Manager Barrett 's state of mind Nor, by his own admission , did Black ever declare that Respondent Union would reject any company proposal for a new contract which deviated from the prospective final outcome of the national negotiations . Further, his typewrit- ten proposals-submitted during the parties' first bargain- ing session-certainly contained no qualifications or conditions , save one related to holidays , linking them, in any way, with some other contractual settlement. If, as General Counsel , within his brief, cogently notes , Respon- dent Union had really intended to qualify its negotiating position , it is reasonable to assume that the Union 's written proposals, which were otherwise exhaustive in coverage, would have mentioned the existence of the purported qualification or condition. Second. Respondent Union's claim , that its contract proposal was , from the outset mutually understood as conditioned upon the final outcome of these other negotiations , must be considered belied by Black's subsequent course of conduct . For example : When asked by Respondent Union's counsel whether he had ever submitted a "final proposed contract " to complainant's warehouse drivers for ratification , Black testified affirma- tively; he subsequently designated Friday, June 26, as the date on which he had done so. (As previously noted, Black claimed the drivers were told , when he submitted the proposed contract to them for ratification, that, in his opinion, the monetary , questions should not be considered settled until final negotiations on the National Freight contract and Joint Council pickup and delivery contracts had been completed . Respondent Union, however, prof- fered no corroboration for Black 's testimony-though the drivers present when Black purportedly made the statement noted were still in complainant 's hire, and could have been summoned . Without corroboration, Black 's testimony fails to persuade ; within this case's context , I find , his purported recollection reflects rationalization derived from self-serv- ing hindsight.) Further, promptly following the drivers' ratification vote, Respondent Union 's business representa- tive visited Barrett's office and told him that the employees had "agreed to the agreement ." He proffered no comment, whatsoever , calculated to suggest that the drivers ' contract ratification, when voted, had been preceded by declara- tions, from him, characterizing the monetary provisions therein as tentative or conditional. Thereafter, so the record shows, Respondent Union's business representative voluntarily drafted a four-page document setting forth the contractual changes which had been negotiated ; he testified that he had done so because he "wanted" to have everything which had been discussed reduced to written form. This document was submitted to Personnel Manager Barrett for concurrence , during their June 30 conference . Like Respondent Union 's prior written proposals , Black's prepared document, with respect to monetary changes , contained no condition or qualification. The record shows, without contradiction , that the docu- ment was carefully reviewed . And, with respect to their discussion's consummation , Barrett testified that both men "agreed" these were the changes which would be embodied FREIGHT, CONSTR., GENERAL DRIVERS, LOCAL 287 1085 in their new contract. His testimony, dealing with this crucial consensus, stands without contradiction While a witness, Respondent Union's business representative was asked several times, by his own counsel, whether anything was said, during this June 30 conference, regarding the so- called national settlement or national negotiations; while declaring merely his generalized "belief" that some discussion with respect to national negotiations, and local pickup and delivery contracts, took place during every conference which he and Personnel Manager Barrett had, Black testified as follows regarding their June 30 session: I think we just went through this language to make sure everything was proper That there was no change. Further, following their discussion, so the record shows, the business representative offered to have Respondent Union's clerical staff "print up the document" and "run off" some copies, with which suggestion Barrett concurred. The record, finally, reveals Black's specific testimonial concession that, following their June 30 discussion, complainant's personnel manager was requested to make the first step of their negotiated $1 10 wage increase sequence effective promptly. Barrett took steps that very day, so the record shows, looking toward such a consummation. With matters in this posture, determination seems clearly warranted that Black's entire course of conduct-between his June 22 acknowledgement that the parties had reached agreement and his June 30 request for that agreement's partial effectuation-was completely consistent with a belief, on his part that some definitive contractual consensus had been reached. Certainly, complainant's personnel manager held such a view. In this connection, Black's request for the prompt effectuation of their consensus regarding wage increases, coupled with Barrett's ready concurrence, must be considered particularly signifi- cant. As General Counsel notes, cogently, within his brief: It is highly improbably that Black would have made such a request prior to the parties' reaching complete agreement upon a new contract and even less likely that PDM would have agreed to implement a substantial wage increase if negotiations had remained in a state of uncertainty, as Respondent contends. Thus, even should a conclusion be deemed presently warranted, despite the testimonial record summarized herein, that Black did, initially, characterize Respondent Union's proposals as merely tentative and conditional, his course of conduct during subsequent negotiations neverthe- less reflected a deliberate relinquishment of purported conditions or reservations. To summarize: Following a final resolution of differences, during his June 22 telephone conversation with complainant's personnel manager, Respondent Union's business representative voluntarily submitted the contractual "understandings" reached to complainant's warehouse drivers for ratification, communi- cated their "acceptance of the agreement" to Barrett directly, and promptly reduced the ratified terms and condition to written form. Such behavior, within my view, clearly reflects either a concession that some definitive agreement had been reached, or a relinquishment of whatever conceivable position Respondent Union may previously have taken regarding the purportedly condition- al nature of their contractual consensus I so find. Third The fact that Respondent Union's complete contract draft-prepared and mimeographed, pursuant to Black's direction, before its modification-conformed completely with the consensus reached provides further support for my conclusion that Black never really considered Respondent Union's concurrence, with respect thereto, conditional In this connection, Black's testimony regarding the circumstances under which the presumptively "final" contract draft was prepared and reproduced merits particular consideration. Upon being first queried-with regard to when necessary stencils were cut, and when Respondent Union's first draft contract copies were reproduced-the business representative claimed a failure of recollection; then he testified that the document could "possibly" have been prepared and reproduced about August 1, or during the first part of that month. Then, when questioned regarding the approximate dates on which the document's original wage and contribution figures had been physically stricken and replaced with new figures, Respondent Union's business representative could proffer no definite recollection. First, he thought these changes had been made, pursuant to his direction, directly following the document's preparation; then he purported to recall that the changes had been made following the document's first reproduction on Respondent Union's mimeograph ma- chine. This could have been, so Black testified, during either July or August; he could not recall. Finally, when summoned as Respondent Union's witness, Black declared, during cross-examination by General Counsel's representa- tive, that he "believed" the stencils for the contract draft had been cut before his July 27 conversation with complainant's personnel manager; that they could "possibly" have been cut before July 9; but that he recalled the stencils being cut "about 3 weeks" following the driver's June 26 ratification vote. (Basing his testimony upon a mistaken date provided in General Counsel's question, Black first testified that the stencils would have been cut about July 9. If, however, they were cut some 3 weeks after the drivers' June 26 ratification vote, they would have been cut on July 16, approximately.) With matters in this posture, determination would seem to be clearly warranted that Respondent Union's business representative had directed the preparation of necessary stencils for a contract draft-which called for a consensual $1.10 per hour wage increase package-during a period of time when he had full reason to believe, on the basis of hearsay reports, that a previously negotiated "national settlement" compassing a comparable wage increase consensus might thereafter be reopened for renegotiations Previously, within this decision, reference has been made to my March 22, 1971, notice-served on the parties-stating that I proposed to take official notice with respect to certain collateral matters which might prove relevant and material herein. The matters in question, regarding which I proposed to take notice, were some newspaper and periodical reports describing the so-called national negotiations for a new National Master Freight contract and certain concurrent Chicago negotiations 1086 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD looking toward new "over-the-road" and "pickup and delivery" contracts between several concerned labor organizations and motor carriers headquartered there. Reference to the publications in question-together with newspapers of general circulation published in San Francisco particularly-would warrant a determination that, following a settlement reached during the so-called Chicago negotiations, reports were published on July 4, 6, and July 7, 1970, regarding a renegotiated national settlement which called for current and prospective wage increases calculated to total $1.85 per hour, spread over a 39-month contract term. Based upon such a determination-with due regard for Black's rather vague testimony regarding the present contract draft's prepara- tion and reproduction-some further determination might well be considered warranted that the document with which we are directly concerned was first prepared and repro- duced during a period of time when Respondent Union's business representative had reason to believe, on the basis of published newspaper reports, that a renegotiated national settlement which called for greater wage increases had already been reached. The General Counsel's repre- sentative and complainant's counsel have, however, protested my declared intention to take official notice regarding the publication of these newspaper and periodi- cal reports They contend that such reports cannot properly be considered relevant and/or material with respect to questions presented for determination herein. Further, General Counsel contends that such newspaper reports cannot be considered proper subjects for official notice. Confronted with these protests I have decided to refrain from taking official notice with respect to the publications in question Nevertheless, I remain convinced of their relevancy and materiality, clearly some determinations with respect to the reported course of the "national negotiations" mentioned, considered in conjunction with the present record, would clarify many passing transcript references to these separate, but substantially concurrent contract talks, within the context of which Respondent Union and complainant herein conducted their collective- bargaining sessions. Further, I remain convinced that-when the procedural safeguards defined within Section 7(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act have been followed-such official notice may properly be taken, even regarding the publication of newspaper reports and their contents. See Wigmore, Treatise on Evidence, Vol. IX, Book IV, Title I, "Judicial Notice," §§2568(a), 2571, 2580 and, more particularly, §2583, Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Chapter 15, "Official Notice" and particularly § 15 14 therein See also Universal Camera Corporation v. N L R B, 340 U S. 474, 497, wherein the Court, comment- ing upon current trends in litigation, notes that, "Machinery for discovery of evidence has been strength- ened, the boundaries of judicial notice have been slowly but perceptibly enlarged " Since I am now satisfied, however, that the present record, without such supplemen- tation, will adequately sustain the factual determinations herein made, no present necessity appears for breaking new ground, with regard to the proper scope of official notice, herein. The fact that Business Representative Black directed subordinates to prepare a final contract draft, despite his purported subjective "understanding" that certain contract settlements-upon which his proposals had concededly been bottomed-might be thereafter revised, provides further cogent support for my factual determination, herein, that he never really considered his June 30 consensus, reached with Complainant's personnel manager, conditional. C Conclusions As General Counsel notes, the controlling legal princi- ples, in cases of this type, are well established The statute provides that parties bound to bargain collectively must meet and confer in good faith with respect to the negotiation of trade agreements Thereafter, should either party so request, they must execute written contracts which incorporate whatever agreements they have reached F W Means & Company, 157 NLRB 1434, 1437. When a labor organization qualified to claim status as the exclusive bargaining representative of workers within a properly defined bargaining unit under the statute refuses to comply with this requirement, Section 8(b)(3) of the statute is violated Respondent Union herein, realistically, concedes that complainant's personnel manager requested Business Representative Black to present for signature a written draft prepared in conformity with the contractual consen- sus which they had purportedly previously reached, but that Respondent Union's negotiator has refused to comply with this request. Nevertheless, Respondent Union's counsel seeks to defend Black's conceded refusal to present such a contract draft for signature upon the ground that no final agreement had ever been reached during negotiations In particular, Respondent Union contends that Black's concurrence regarding a presumptive contractual consen- sus had been conditioned-with Personnel Manager Barrett's knowledge and acquiescence-upon the final outcome of the national Teamster Union negotiations. His June 30 agreement with complainant herein, so Respondent Union contends, should be considered tentative, merely. The present record, however, would, at most, warrant a determination that the progress being made, elsewhere, in connection with the national Teamsters Union negotiations was nothing more than a topic of conversation during the collective-bargaining sessions with which this case was concerned. And-despite the fact that such concurrent negotiations and possible contract settlements may have been discussed conversationally-discussions so limited hardly establish Respondent Union's contention Rather, the record, considered in totality, clearly discloses what I have found to be Respondent Union's unqualified concurrence with regard to the contractual terms and conditions upon which the parties had reached consensus. Compare Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhang- ers of America, Glaziers Local Union No. 1385, AFL-CIO, 143 NLRB 678, 679-680, enfd as modified 334 F 2d 729 (C.A 7). These terms and conditions were, patently, spelled out with requisite certainty; taken in conjunction with those prior contractual terms and conditions which the parties did not propose to change, they constituted a complete collective bargaining agreement FREIGHT, CONSTR., GENERAL DRIVERS, LOCAL 287 1087 As a further, supplementary, ground for decision, I find that the course of conduct properly chargeable to Respondent Union's principal negotiator, between his patent, nonqualified, June 22 concession that the parties had reached a contractual consensus and his June 30 request that their ratified and confirmed consensus be effectuated promptly, was a course of conduct reasonably calculated to persuade complainant that a final agreement had, indeed, been reached. Clearly, complainant' s person- nel manager was relying on such a belief, when he honored Black's request for the prompt implementation of the wage increase provisions compassed within their June 30 consensus . Having knowingly led complainant to take action in reliance upon a belief that the parties had a contract, Respondent Union may not now be heard to claim that complainant was mistaken in its reliance. See International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 12 (Tri-County Association), 160 NLRB 173, 178. It follows, so I find, that, by refusing to proffer for signature a final contract draft which correctly reflected their consensus previously reached, Respondent Union has refused to bargain, within the meaning of Section 8(b)(3) of the statute. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE Respondent Union's course of conduct set forth in section III, above, since it occurred in connection with complainant's business operations, described in General Counsel's complaint and concededly described correctly therein, has had, and continues to have, a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States. Absent correction, such conduct would tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce, and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Since I have found that Respondent Union did engage, and continues to engage, in unfair labor practices, I will recommend that the designated labor organization and its representatives cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative action, including the posting of appropriate notices designed to effectuate the policies of the Act, as amended. Specifically, I have determined that Respondent Union has improperly failed and refused to prepare or present for signature a draft document correctly reflecting the contractual consensus-with respect to terms and condi- tions of work-which its responsible negotiator had reached with complainant's spokesman during their June 30, 1970 bargaining session, and which Respondent Union's membership in complainant's hire had, thereafter, ratified. My recommendation, therefore, will be that Respondent Union now sign, upon request, draft contracts prepared to reflect that consensus. Should complainant herein fail to request the designated contract's execution, my recommendation will be that Respondent Union, as the I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations and Recommended Order herein exclusive representative of complainant's workmen within the unit herein found appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes, bargain collectively, upon request, with com- plainant, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW In the light of these findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following conclusions of law: 1. All warehouse truckdrivers employed by Pittsburgh- Des Moines Steel Company at its Santa Clara facility, excluding all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 2. At all times material herein, Respondent Union has been, and remains, entitled to claim recognition as the exclusive representative of all employees within the aforesaid unit for collective-bargaining purposes, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 3. By refusing, after July 27, 1970, to execute a written contract embodying the collective-bargaining agreement reached by the parties prior thereto, Respondent Union has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, as amended. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER' Respondent Union, Freight, Construction, General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 287, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, its officers , agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from refusing to execute, upon request, a written contract embodying the agreement which it reached with Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company on June 30, 1970, or any other agreement that may in the future be reached with that company concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other terms and conditions of work for warehouse truckdrivers employed at Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company's Santa Clara facility, excluding all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, execute a written contract embodying the agreement which it reached on June 30, 1970, with Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company. (b) Post in conspicuous places at Respondent Union's business office and meeting hall, including all places where shall, as provided in Sec . 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 1088 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD notices to members are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 2 Copies of this notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, as the Board's agent, shall be posted immediately upon their receipt, after being duly signed on behalf of respondent labor organization by its duly designated representative. Once posted, these notices shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by respondent labor organization to insure that these notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 20, sufficient signed copies of the said notice for posting by Pittsburgh- Des Moines Steel Company, that recipient being willing, at its Santa Clara facility, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision , what steps Respondent Union has taken to comply herewith.3 2 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 3 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing, during which all parties were given an opportunity to present evidence and argument, it has been determined that Freight, Construction, General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 287, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America violated the law by committing an unfair labor practice. In order to remedy such conduct, we are being required to post this notice. We intend to comply with this requirement, and to abide by the following: WE WILL, upon request by Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company, sign a contract containing the terms of our agreement reached with that company on June 30, 1970, and any other agreement that may be reached with that company in the future concerning the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other terms and conditions of work, for employees within the following bargaining unit: All warehouse truckdrivers employed by Pitts- burgh-Des Moines Steel Company at its Santa Clara facility, excluding all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act FREIGHT, CONSTRUCTION, GENERAL DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS UNION, LOCAL No. 287, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS OF AMERICA (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 13050 Federal Building, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36047, San Francisco, California 94102, Telephone 556-0335.