Franklin Tanning Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 17, 1953

104 N.L.R.B. 192 (N.L.R.B. 1953)

192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petitions in Metro R-K,
Incorporated, 13-RC-3133; Matagrano ' s, Inc ., 13-RC-3134; and
Gerolmo Wholesale Beverage Company, 13-RC-3136, be, and
they hereby are, dismissed.
[Text of Direction of Elections omitted from publication.]
FRANKLIN TANNING COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL FUR
AND LEATHER WORKERS UNION OF THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA, Petitioner. Case No. 6-RC-1108. April 17,
1953
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Emil E. Narick,
hearing officer., The hearing officer's rulings made at the
hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the
Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Murdock
and Peterson].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds:
1. The Employer is engaged incommerce withinthe meaning
of the Act.
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent cer-
tain employees of the Employer.
The Employer and the Intervenor' move to dismiss contending,
inter alia, that District 3 and District Council 3 of the Peti-
tioner, both encompassing the same geographical area, consti-
tute a single entity, and that District 3 is a labor organization,
having an interest in the employees sought, which has not
complied with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act.' The Peti-
tioner, in opposing the motion to dismiss , contends that District
i The original hearing was held on July 28, 1952. On December 10 and 11 , 1952, a second
hearing was held pursuant to an order to reopen to obtain additional evidence on the status and
activities of District 3 and Curwensville Organizing Committee as labor organizations, and
with regard to the extent of their respective interests in the employees sought by the Petitioner.
2United Leather Workers, Local No. 31, Congress of Industrial Organizations.
SIn moving to dismiss , the Employer and the Intervenor further contend that ( 1) the non-
complying Curwensville Organizing Committee is a labor organization having an interest in
the employees sought and must, therefore , comply; ( 2) the Petitioner 's president , although
having filed a non-Communist affidavit , did so fraudulently , and is in fact in accord and
sympathy with the aims and purposes of the Communist Party, so that Petitioner is not in full
compliance ; and (3) that District Director Woolis is an officer of the international and that the
Board , pursuant to its Rules and Regulations , should conduct an investigation to determine
whether the Petitioner failed to designate the alleged office in its constitution so as to circum-
vent the filing requirements of the Act. We find no merit in ( 1) and ( 2) for the reasons assigned
in United Tanners, Inc., 103 NLRB 760, where similar contentions were raised with regard to a
local organizing committee and to the president of the same petitioner as in the case at bar.
We also find that contention (3) is without merit for the reason that the question of whether a
union has failed to identify all of its officers is not litigable . Sunbeam Corporation , 93 NLRB
104 NLRB No. 11.
FRANKLIN TANNING COMPANY 193
3 and District Council 3 are separate entities, the former
simply a geographical subdivision of the complying Inter-
national, with its director, Bernard Woolis, negotiating and
signing contracts on behalf of the International, and the latter
constituting the district executive board,4 which functions in an
advisory capacity to the district between sessions of the dis-
trict convention, but which has no other function. The Petitioner
further contends that there exists no organization or entity in
District 3 known as, or functioning as, a "district council"
within the definition thereof contained in the Petitioner's con-
stitution and the Leather Division's bylaws.
The Petitioner's constitution provides for the organization of
a "District Council," which, if organized, "shall secure a
charter from the International Union"; it further provides that
the "International... aid its chartered bodies and their duly
authorized representatives are authorized to handle and settle
all grievances relating to hours, wages and working conditions
for the workers in their respective jurisdictions." A by law of
the Leather Division, though entitled "District" provides, in
part, that "District Councils may be organized by the local
unions in geographical districts designated by the Leather
Division Executive Board . . . Such district councils may elect
officers and provide for district council revenues...."
At the original hearing, the Petitioner did not attempt to
differentiate between District 3 and District Council 3, nor did
the Petitioner claim, or seek to prove, that no chartered body
identifiable as a constitutionally created "district council"
existed within the geographical area known as District 3. The
Petitioner at that hearing insisted that District 3, or District
Council 3, was not a labor organization, and that, even though
the demand for recognition was made on District 3 stationery,
the request for recognition was on behalf of the Petitioner,
and that therefore District 3 was not inthe picture with regard
to the employees sought.5
At the reopened hearing, the Petitioner for the first time
alleged a distinction between District 3 and District Council 3.
To overcome this allegation, the Employer introduced a District
Council 3 charter dated 1945, as evidence of the present
existence of a constitutionally defined and authorized District
Council 3. This charter obviously creates and delineates a
district council corresponding in scope and authority in the
"district council" defined by the Petitioner's constitution and
the Leather Division's bylaws. Although, as contended by the
1205 . Moreover, we are administratively satisfied, after careful consideration of the Peti-
tioner 's constitution and Leather Division's Bylaws , that the Employer's contention does not
raise a sufficient question as to whether Woolis is, in fact , an officer of the Petitioner, to
warrant further administrative investigation of this facet of the compliance issue . Luckenbach
Steamship Company, Inc., 103 NLRB 1.
4 This "executive board" comprises the district director , the elected officers of the
district , and the "staff." The "staff" consists of several employees of the International
who perform organizational work within the district and who serve under the direction of
the district director.
5 The petition herein was filed by and in the name of the Petitioner , the international, only,
and the authorization cards designate only the International.
194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Petitioner, certain of the individuals named in the charter
are no longer associated with the Petitioner and seven of the
locals named therein are completely defunct, nevertheless,
the charter specifically states that it is given not only to the
persons and locals named therein, but also to their successors.
Moreover, the Petitioner did not offer any evidence tending to
prove that the charter had ever been revoked by the Petitioner
or had been handed back to the Petitioner by the members.
We conclude that the organization that exists as the District 3
organization at the present time is the same organization that
was chartered as District Council 3 in 1945 in that it performs
the same functions and is clothed with identical authority. It
holds an annual district convention at which local, district,
and International activities and plans are discussed and adopted;
it collects a per capita tax from each of its member locals; and,
although it does not have a constitution or bylaws, it elects a
full slate of officers at each convention. The district director
and the organizers, although paid employees of the Petitioner,
are active at the district conventions either as organizers,
planners, or officers of the district.' The Petitioner's official
newspaper has carried in several editions stories of the ac-
tivities of District 3 in organizing locals and negotiating in-
creased wages for the members of various locals. Moreover,
at the 1951 and 1952 District 3 conventions resolutions were
passed directing continued concerted attempts to organize the
Employer's employees.
By reason of the foregoing, and because the district director
plans to negotiate and sign any contracts that might result from
a certification of the Petitioner as the bargaining representative
of the Employer's employees, we conclude that (1) District
Council 3 is the same organization that Petitioner designates as
District 3; (2) District Council 3 is a labor organization within
the meaning of the Act; and (3) District Council 3 has sufficient
interest in the Employer's employees to compel its compliance
with the filing provisions of the Act.' Accordingly, the holding of
the election directed herein is conditioned upon the compliance
of District Council 3. If District Council 3 fails to achieve
compliance within 2 weeks from the date of this Decision,
the Board's Regional Director will so advise the Board. No
election shall be held unless and until compliance has been
achieved.'
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the
representation of employees of the Employer within the meaning
of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.9
6 Joseph M . Reinard , a paid organizer of the petitioning International, is also the elected
recording secretary of the district.
?United Tanners , Inc., 103 NLRB 760, and cases cited therein.
8 United Tanners , Inc., supra.
9We find without merit the contentionoftheEmployer and the Intervenor that their contract,
covering the employees sought , is a bar to this proceeding , as the Employer and the Intervenor
mutally agreed to open the contract before the automatic renewal clause could operate to ex-
tend the contract for an additional year . The contract , therefore , expired on September 1. 1952,
STANDARD OIL COMPANY 195
4. The following employees of the Employer constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act:10
All production and maintenance employees11 at the Em-
ployer's Curwensville, Pennsylvania, plant, excluding office
clerical employees, guards, professional employees, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.]
10 The parties stipulated as to the appropriate unit.
11 Ciprian and Dale , the two students who, depending on financial conditions , may or may not
leave the Employer 's employ to return to school , perform the same . work and receive the same
pay and benefits as others in the plant and therefore possess sufficient interest to participate
in the voting.
STANDARD OIL COMPANY and OIL WORKERS INTERNA-
TIONAL UNION, CIO, and its LOCAL 348, Petitioner. Case
No. 18-RC-1776. April 17, 1953
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed, a hearing was held before a hear-
ing officer of the National Labor Relations Board. The hearing
officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial
error and are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case,' the Board finds:
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce withinthe meaning
of the National Labor Relations Act.
2. The labor organization named below claims to represent
certain employees of the Employer.
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the
representation of certain employees of the Employer, within the
meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The unit requested herein involves 3 of the 4 product pipe-
line terminals on the Employer's western pipeline, the fourth
being presently represented in a separate unit by another union.
The parties are in agreement as to the classifications of em-
ployees to be included in an appropriate unit. The Employer,
however, urges that only 3 separate terminal units would be
appropriate. In its opposition to the single multiterminal unit
sought by the Petitioner, the Employer relies mainly upon: (1)
The fact that each of the 3 terminals falls under the jurisdiction
of the manager of a separate and distinct sales field division
in the Employer's administrative organization; (2) the assertion
that employees have no community of interest because of the
distance between terminals, the lack of interchange or transfer
of employees between the 3 terminals, and because their area
1 The Employer's request for oral argument is denied because in our opinion the record and
briefs adequately present the positions of the parties.
104 NLRB No. 12.