Ford Global Technologies, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardApr 1, 2021

2020000540 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 1, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/265,007 09/14/2016 Charles Everett Badger II 83713900; 67186-299PUS1 1578 46442 7590 04/01/2021 CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C./Ford 400 W. MAPLE RD. SUITE 350 BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009 EXAMINER NEGRON, DANIELL L ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2699 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/01/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): cgolaw@yahoo.com ptodocket@cgolaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte CHARLES EVERETT BADGER II Appeal 2020-000540 Application 15/265,007 Technology Center 2600 Before JAMES R. HUGHES, KRISTEN L. DROESCH, and JOHN A. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judges. DROESCH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3–5, 7–10 and 12–23. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM IN PART. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant indicates the real party in interest is Ford Global Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2020-000540 Application 15/265,007 2 BACKGROUND The disclosed invention relates to a method of controlling a vehicle from a remote location. See Spec. Abstract, ¶ 5 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claims 1 and 10, which are representative of the subject matter of the appeal and are reproduced from the Claims Appendix of the Appeal Brief, read as follows: 1. A method of controlling a vehicle from a remote location, comprising: receiving, at a vehicle, a first signal from a vehicle-paired device within a wireless communication range of the vehicle and initiating a vehicle function in response to the first signal, the first signal sent by the vehicle-paired device in response to a second signal sent from a secondary triggering device that is outside the wireless communication range, the first signal is a wireless communication signal. 10. A range extending system, comprising: a vehicle-paired device configured to transmit a first signal to a vehicle when within a communication range of the vehicle; and a secondary triggering device that transmits a second signal from outside the communication range to the vehicle- paired device to initiate a transmission of the first signal from the vehicle-paired device, the first signal is a wireless communication signal. Appeal 2020-000540 Application 15/265,007 3 REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Theurer et al. (“Theurer”) US 2013/0110632 A1 May 2, 2013 Kothavale et al. (“Kothavale”) US 2014/0103866 A1 April 17, 2014 Grabar et al. (“Grabar”) US 2016/0075249 A1 Mar. 17, 2016 REJECTIONS ON APPEAL Claims 1, 3–5, 7–10, 12–21, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Kothavale and Grabar. Final Act. 2–5. Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Kothavale, Grabar, and Theurer. Final Act. 5–6. ANALYSIS Appellant argues claims 1, 5, 9, 16, and 18 separately, and states that the remaining claims depend from patentable claims and are patentable for this reason. See Appeal Br. 3–5. Appellant does not argue independent claim 10 separately and does not group independent claim 10 with claim 1. See id. Consequently, we choose independent claim 1 as representative of the group consisting of claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 19–21, choose independent claim 10 as representative of the group consisting of claims 10, 12–15, 22, and 23, and choose claim 16 as representative of the group consisting of claims 16 and 17. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief, as well as the Examiner’s Answer. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments below for emphasis. Unpatentability of Claims 1, 3–5, 7–9, and 19–21 The Examiner finds that Kothavale teaches “receiving, at a vehicle, a first signal from a vehicle-paired device within a wireless communication Appeal 2020-000540 Application 15/265,007 4 range of the vehicle and initiating a vehicle function in response to the first signal,” as recited in claim 1, based on Kothavale’s disclosures of an electric charge at a first amp, inductive charging, and charging a vehicle. See Final Act. 2 (citing Kothavale ¶¶ 20, 29). The Examiner acknowledges that Kothavale fails to explicitly teach “the first signal is a wireless communication signal,” as recited in claim 1. See id. The Examiner finds that Grabar teaches a wireless vehicle charging method including a wireless communication signal embedded into a power signal for the purpose of detecting the presence or absence of active vehicle receivers. See id. at 3 (citing Grabar ¶ 54). The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art at the time the application was filed to modify the teachings of Kothavale so as to transmit a wireless communication signal within a power signal as taught by Grabar because it would conserve energy and prolong the useful life of a charging system by ensuring a compatible vehicle is present when a charging process is activated. See id. The Examiner further explains that Kothavale’s disclosure in paragraph 29 of an electric charge at a first amp amount is equated to the first signal, and “Kothavale discloses that a vehicle draws a first amount of current (i.e., a first amp amount) and at this time, the vehicle is being initially charged.” Ans. 5. Appellant argues that the Kothavale’s first signal, and as modified in view of Grabar, does not initiate charging. See Appeal Br. 3. According to Appellant, “[t]he alleged first signal is charging the Kothavale vehicle, not initiating any charging.” Id.; see Reply Br. 2. Appellant further contends that “[i]f the power signal is transmitting to the vehicle, the charging has been initiated.” Appeal Br. 3; see Reply Br. 2. Also according to Appellant, “[n]o vehicle function in Kothavale is initiated in response to the Appeal 2020-000540 Application 15/265,007 5 ‘electric charge at a first amp amount.’” Reply Br. 1 (quoting Ans. 5). Appellant contends the Examiner’s interpretation improperly reads “initiating” and “in response to” out of claim 1. See id. We agree with Appellant’s arguments because the Examiner does not direct us to evidence sufficient to demonstrate that Kothavale alone, or as modified by Grabar, discloses, teaches, or suggests that vehicle charging is initiated (i.e., started, began) in response to receiving an electric charge at a first amp amount. Paragraph 29 or Kothavale’s disclosure is silent regarding how the charging process is initiated (i.e., started, began). See Kothavale ¶ 29. Instead, Kothavale discloses that the vehicle is being charged at an initial or first amp amount, as compared to subsequent charging at a second lower amp amount due to Kothavale’s disclosure of reducing the charging power provided to the vehicle based on a power limiting event or demand response event. See id. ¶¶ 29–40. For at least these reasons, we are persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1, and claims 3–5, 7–9, and 19–21 dependent therefrom under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Kothavale and Grabar. Therefore, we cannot sustain the rejection of claims 1, 3–5, 7–9, and 19–21. Unpatentability of Claims 10, 12–15, 22, and 23 Independent claim 10, as can be observed from the reproduction of claim 10 above, does not recite or require initiating a vehicle function in response to a first signal, as recited in claim 1. Appellant’s arguments do not address the limitations of independent claim 10, and claims 12–15, 22 and 23, dependent therefrom. See Appeal Br. 3–5; Ans. 1–3. We review appealed rejections for reversible error based on the arguments and evidence the Appellant provides for each issue identified by Appellant. 37 C.F.R. Appeal 2020-000540 Application 15/265,007 6 § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that even if the Examiner had failed to make a prima facie case, “it has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections”)). Because Appellant’s arguments do not address the limitations of independent claim 10 and claims 12–15, 22 and 23, dependent therefrom, we summarily affirm the rejection of claims 10, 12–15, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Kothavale and Grabar, and the rejection of claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Kothavale, Grabar, and Theurer. Unpatentability of Claims 16 and 17 Claim 16 depends from claim 10 and recites “wherein the vehicle is configured to initiate a vehicle function in response to the first signal, wherein the first signal is a wireless command of a wireless technology standard.” Claim 16 is similar in scope to the disputed limitation of claim 1. For at least the same reasons as those discussed above addressing claim 1, we are persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 16, and claim 17 dependent therefrom, under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Kothavale and Grabar. Therefore, we cannot sustain the rejection of claims 16 and 17. Unpatentability of Claim 18 Claim 18 depends from claim 10, and recites “wherein the secondary triggering device is part of a home control system.” The Examiner finds that Kothavale teaches the limitations of claim 18 based on Kothavale’s disclosure of server 125 that communicates with charging station, and a charging station mounted in a fixed location position within a residence having the home control system. See Final Act. 2 (citing Kothavale ¶ 21), 4 Appeal 2020-000540 Application 15/265,007 7 (citing Kothavale ¶ 19); Kothavale Fig. 1. We agree with Appellant that the Examiner provides insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Kothavale teaches server 125 is part of a home control system. See Appeal Br. 4. We further agree with Appellant’s following argument: “[t]hat the server 125 is coupled to a charging station 120 located near a private residence does not teach that the server 125 is part of a home control system.” Id.; see Kothavale ¶¶ 19–23. For at least these reasons, we are persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Kothavale and Grabar. Accordingly, we cannot sustain the rejection of claim 18. CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 10, 12–15, 22, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–5, 7–9, and 16–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3–5, 7–10, 12–21, 23 103 Kothavale and Grabar 10, 12–15, 23 1, 3–5, 7–9, 16–21 22 103 Kothavale, Grabar, Theurer 22 Overall Outcome 10, 12–15, 22, 23 1, 3–5, 7–9, 16–21 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED IN PART