FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 4, 20212020004521 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 4, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/859,682 09/21/2015 Robert David HANCASKY 83571656; 67186-206PUS1 5482 46442 7590 06/04/2021 CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C./Ford 400 W. MAPLE RD. SUITE 350 BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009 EXAMINER DIBENEDETTO, MICHAEL N ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2859 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/04/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): cgolaw@yahoo.com ptodocket@cgolaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ROBERT DAVID HANCASKY, BRYAN MICHAEL BOLGER, and KARIN LOVETT Appeal 2020-004521 Application 14/859,682 Technology Center 2800 Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, BRIAN D. RANGE, and JENNIFER R. GUPTA, Administrative Patent Judges. HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–22.2 See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 2. 2 It is harmless error that the Examiner inadvertently rejected claim 24 in the Final Office Action as claim 24 was cancelled on 09/09/2019. Appeal 2020-004521 Application 14/859,682 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a system and method for charging electrified vehicles. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method, comprising: controlling charging of a battery pack of an electrified vehicle including prioritizing charging using a wired charging system over a wireless charging system when power is available from both the wired charging system and the wireless charging system, wherein the wired charging system and the wireless charging system are separate systems located at separate locations of the electrified vehicle. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Rask US 2008/0275600 A1 Nov. 6, 2008 Tonegawa US 2009/0043450 A1 Feb. 12, 2009 Gwozdek US 2010/0320018 A1 Dec. 23, 2010 Gu US 2012/0229084 A1 Sept. 13, 2012 Weidner US 2017 /0033586 Al Feb. 2, 2017 REJECTIONS Claims 1, 5, 7–10, 16–18, 20, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Weidner and Gu. Final Act. 3. Claims 2–4, 6, 15, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Weidner, Gu, and Gwozdek. Final Act. 8. Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Weidner, Gu, and Tonegawa. Final Act. 11. Appeal 2020-004521 Application 14/859,682 3 Claims 12–14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Weidner, Gu, and Rask. Final Act. 11. Claim 21 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Weidner, Gu, and Gwozdek. Final Act. 13. OPINION Upon consideration of the evidence in this appeal and each of Appellant’s contentions as set forth in the Appeal Brief filed Jan 21, 2020, as well as the Reply Brief filed May 29, 2020, we determine that Appellant has not demonstrated reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection (e.g., Ans. 3– 11 (mailed Mar. 12, 2020)). In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining the Board’s long-held practice of requiring Appellants to identify the alleged error in the Examiner’s rejection). We sustain the rejection for the reasons expressed by the Examiner in the Final Office Action and the Answer. We add the following for emphasis. In assessing whether a claim to a combination of prior art elements or steps would have been obvious, the question to be asked is whether the improvement of the claim is more than the predictable use of prior art elements or steps according to their established functions. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). “[T]he analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418. As found by the Examiner, there is no doubt that a skilled artisan knew how to construct a system for charging a battery of an electrified vehicle using a power cord that plugs into a charging port, or by using a Appeal 2020-004521 Application 14/859,682 4 wireless charger, as exemplified in Weidner (¶¶ 56–57; Ans. 3, 4, 6; see also Spec. ¶¶ 2–3 (the concept of using wired and wireless chargers to charge a vehicle battery has been disclosed in the prior art generally)). Appellant however disputes the Examiner’s determination that it would have been obvious to incorporate into Weidner a controller for controlling charging of a battery of a vehicle to include prioritizing charging using a wired charging system over a wireless charging system, as exemplified in Gu (see generally Appeal Br.). With respect to claims 1 and 16, Appellant argues that Weidner teaches away from the wired and wireless charging systems being separate systems (Appeal Br. 5–6; Reply Br. 3–5) because Gu (which determines that a wired charging unit will be prioritized over a wireless charging system when both systems are available (e.g., See Gu ¶¶ 28–34, 68)) is non analogous art (Appeal Br. 10-11; Reply Br 5). However, this argument is not persuasive of error in the Examiner’s rejection because it fails to adequately consider the prior art as a whole, and the inferences that one of ordinary skill would have drawn therefrom, and thus does not adequately address the Examiner’s obviousness position (see generally Ans.). If a reference is not within the relevant field of endeavor, it may still be properly considered if it is reasonably pertinent to the problem the inventor faced; that is, if it would have logically commended itself to an inventor’s attention. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In KSR, the Supreme Court observed that: In determining whether the subject matter of a . . . claim is obvious, neither the particular motivation nor the avowed purpose of the patentee controls. What matters is the objective reach of the claim. If the claim extends to what is obvious, it is Appeal 2020-004521 Application 14/859,682 5 . . . [unpatentable] under § 103. One of the ways in which a patent’s subject matter can be proved obvious is by noting that there existed at the time of the invention a known problem for which there was an obvious solution encompassed by the patent's claims. 550 U.S. at 419–420; see also Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in KSR . . . directs us to construe the scope of analogous art broadly,” stating that “familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person of ordinary skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle”). It is appreciated that Gu does not disclose the use of its charging controller specifically in an electrified vehicle. However, there is no doubt from the applied references that it was a known problem that modern electrified vehicles may utilize both wired and wireless charging systems, and thus to maintain efficiencies, one type of charger must be in control over the other (i.e., be prioritized) (Ans. 8–9). Specifically, the Examiner only relies upon Weidner to exemplify that it is known for an electrified vehicle to utilize both wired and wireless charging capabilities. (Ans. 3–4, 6). See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425–26 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”); see also, e.g., In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264–65 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (it is well established that in evaluating references it is proper to take into account not only the specific teachings of the references but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom). And as Examiner points out, it is Appeal 2020-004521 Application 14/859,682 6 not suggested that the circuit from Gu be directly placed into a vehicle like the one disclosed in Weidner, but rather that the combined teachings of Weidner and Gu suggest that the charging controller of Gu could be incorporated into Weidner in order to control which type of charger takes priority (Ans. 8–9). As aptly pointed out by the Examiner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have readily inferred that it would have been obvious to use such a control system to control both a wired and wireless charging units (as exemplified in Gu) on the Weidner vehicle charging system, especially since it was known that wired charging systems have a significant power transfer efficiency over that of wireless charging systems (e.g., Ans. 7–8). Further, Gu teaches a power management and interface circuit which together determine which of the wired or wireless controller will take priority to charge the battery and thus whether to switch on or off the wireless charging unit based on the availability of power from the wired charging unit (¶¶ 28– 34, 60–64). Gu teaches deciding to charge a battery using a wired charging unit even if a wireless charging unit is available also—one of ordinary skill would have readily inferred that deciding to charge a battery using a wired charging unit even if a wireless charging unit is also available for charging is akin to the claimed prioritizing charging using a wired charging system over a wireless charging system when power is available for both. Even further, Gu discloses a wired charger taking higher priority over a wireless charger (see, e.g., Gu ¶¶ 67–68). Therefore, Appellant’s contention that Gu does not disclose prioritizing wired over wireless charging (Appeal Br. 4–6) is not persuasive of reversible error. Appeal 2020-004521 Application 14/859,682 7 Appellant further argues that neither Weidner nor Gu teaches the claimed wired and wireless charging systems as separate systems. Appellant contends that the Examiner’s interpretation that Gu teaches separate wired and wireless charging systems would discourage a person of ordinary skill in the art from modifying the system of Weidner because Weidner teaches “integrated” wired/wireless systems (Appeal Br. 5–6). However, as discussed below the Examiner’s interpretation that both Weidner and Gu disclose separate wired and wireless systems is consistent with both the teachings of Weidner and Gu, and Appellant’s own Figure 2. “[T]he PTO must give claims their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. . . . Therefore, we look to the specification to see if it provides a definition for claim terms, but otherwise apply a broad interpretation.” In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “[A]s applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or patentee.” Id. As the Examiner points out, Appellant’s Figure 2 shows a wireless charging system 60, and a wired charging system 58, both which appear to have one or more connections to a control system 76 (Ans. 4–5). The Examiner points out, analogously, that the interpretation of both Weidner and Gu are consistent with Appellant’s Figure 2 in that both Weidner and Gu, respectively. disclose a wired charging port along with wireless charging unit (see, e.g., Weidner ¶¶ 56, Ans. 4–5) and disclose a wired charging unit and a wireless charging unit (see, e.g., Gu, Fig. 1, Ans. 4–5). Notably, we do not find—and Appellant has not directed our attention to— any limiting definitions in the Specification, nor does Appellant provide any Appeal 2020-004521 Application 14/859,682 8 persuasive reasoning or credible evidence to establish that the Examiner’s interpretation of the language of claims 1 and 16 is unreasonable. Therefore, Appellant’s contention that neither Weidner nor Gu teach separate wired and wireless charging systems is not persuasive of reversible error by the Examiner. With regard to claim 5, Appellant argues that Gu cannot be relied upon for teaching the claimed “automatic switching” from a wired charging to a wireless charging system when power from the wireless charging system becomes unavailable (Appeal Br. 6–7; Reply Br. 3–4). While it is appreciated that Gu does not specifically disclose a scenario where power from the wired power system becomes unavailable, the Examiner effectively points out that a person of ordinary skill would easily infer from the overall teachings of Gu that the wireless charging unit switch of Gu can be used to activate the wireless charger when the access to the wired charger is unavailable (Ans. 5–6). Therefore, Appellant fails to show reversible error. Appellant argues that combining Gu’s prioritization with Weidner’s battery charging system would render Weidner unsatisfactory for its intended purpose because Weidner discloses integrating outputs of the two charging types (Appeal Br. 7–9). However, as the Examiner points out, nothing about integrating outputs of the two chargers necessarily makes it impossible for Gu’s controlling of priority to improve the charging of Weidner (Ans. 6–7). Further, Appellant points to no additional facts in the record to support the allegation that the combination of Weidner and Gu would be unfit for the intended purpose of controlling the charging of a battery using two different charging systems. Therefore, Appellant fails to show reversible error. Appeal 2020-004521 Application 14/859,682 9 With regard to claims 2–4, 6, 15, and 19, Appellant alleges that the rejections of these claims are improper for the same reasons that Weidner and Gu fail to render the claims obvious (Appeal Br. 11). Again, this argument is not persuasive of reversible error. With regard to claim 11, Appellant argues that the combination of Tonegawa fails to render claim 11 obvious because Tonegawa’s determination of whether a power cord is plugged in is not in the context of charging (Appeal Br. 11–12). However, it appears the cable of Tonegawa is a charging cable and therefore suggests that Tonegawa’s determination of whether a charging cable is plugged-in is related to a cable for charging a vehicle (see, e.g., Tonegawa, Abstr., ¶¶ 27–32). Therefore, with regard to claim 11, Appellant fails to show reversible error. With regard to claim 21, Appellant argues that Gwozdek’s use of the alternatives to inhibiting charging when either the vehicle is not in a “park” gear or when the vehicle does not have the parking-brake applied is not enough to suggest to one of ordinary skill that both safety features can be implemented together rather than in the alternative, as the claim requires (Appeal Br. 13–14). However, as Examiner effectively points out, one of ordinary skill would infer from the overall teachings of Gwozdek that both the safety alternatives of inhibiting charging if either the parking-brake or park-gear is off can be employed together for additional safety. Therefore, with regard to claim 21, Appellant fails to show reversible error. Accordingly, we sustain the § 103 rejection of all of the claims on appeal. Appeal 2020-004521 Application 14/859,682 10 CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections are AFFIRMED. DECISION SUMMARY Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 5, 7–10, 16–18, 20, 22 103 Weidner, Gu 1, 5, 7–10, 16–18, 20, 22 2–4, 6, 15, 19 103 Weidner, Gu, Gwozdek 2–4, 6, 15, 19 11 103 Weidner, Gu, Tonegawa 11 12–14 103 Weidner, Gu, Rask 12–14 21 103 Weidner, Gu, Gwozdek 21 Overall Outcome 1–22 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation