FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 4, 2021

2020004521 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 4, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/859,682 09/21/2015 Robert David HANCASKY 83571656; 67186-206PUS1 5482
46442 7590 06/04/2021
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C./Ford
400 W. MAPLE RD.
SUITE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
EXAMINER
DIBENEDETTO, MICHAEL N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/04/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cgolaw@yahoo.com
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ROBERT DAVID HANCASKY,
BRYAN MICHAEL BOLGER, and KARIN LOVETT
Appeal 2020-004521
Application 14/859,682
Technology Center 2800
Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, BRIAN D. RANGE, and
JENNIFER R. GUPTA, Administrative Patent Judges.
HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–22.2 See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
2 It is harmless error that the Examiner inadvertently rejected claim 24 in the
Final Office Action as claim 24 was cancelled on 09/09/2019.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a system and method for charging
electrified vehicles. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A method, comprising:
controlling charging of a battery pack of an electrified
vehicle including prioritizing charging using a wired charging
system over a wireless charging system when power is available
from both the wired charging system and the wireless charging
system,
wherein the wired charging system and the wireless
charging system are separate systems located at separate
locations of the electrified vehicle.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Rask US 2008/0275600 A1 Nov. 6, 2008
Tonegawa US 2009/0043450 A1 Feb. 12, 2009
Gwozdek US 2010/0320018 A1 Dec. 23, 2010
Gu US 2012/0229084 A1 Sept. 13, 2012
Weidner US 2017 /0033586 Al Feb. 2, 2017

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 5, 7–10, 16–18, 20, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Weidner and Gu. Final Act. 3.
Claims 2–4, 6, 15, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Weidner, Gu, and Gwozdek. Final
Act. 8.
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
the combination of Weidner, Gu, and Tonegawa. Final Act. 11.
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Claims 12–14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Weidner, Gu, and Rask. Final Act. 11.
Claim 21 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Weidner, Gu, and Gwozdek. Final Act. 13.

OPINION
Upon consideration of the evidence in this appeal and each of
Appellant’s contentions as set forth in the Appeal Brief filed Jan 21, 2020, as
well as the Reply Brief filed May 29, 2020, we determine that Appellant has
not demonstrated reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection (e.g., Ans. 3–
11 (mailed Mar. 12, 2020)). In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (explaining the Board’s long-held practice of requiring Appellants to
identify the alleged error in the Examiner’s rejection). We sustain the
rejection for the reasons expressed by the Examiner in the Final Office
Action and the Answer. We add the following for emphasis.
In assessing whether a claim to a combination of prior art elements or
steps would have been obvious, the question to be asked is whether the
improvement of the claim is more than the predictable use of prior art
elements or steps according to their established functions. KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). “[T]he analysis need not seek out
precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged
claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418.
As found by the Examiner, there is no doubt that a skilled artisan
knew how to construct a system for charging a battery of an electrified
vehicle using a power cord that plugs into a charging port, or by using a
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wireless charger, as exemplified in Weidner (¶¶ 56–57; Ans. 3, 4, 6; see also
Spec. ¶¶ 2–3 (the concept of using wired and wireless chargers to charge a
vehicle battery has been disclosed in the prior art generally)). Appellant
however disputes the Examiner’s determination that it would have been
obvious to incorporate into Weidner a controller for controlling charging of
a battery of a vehicle to include prioritizing charging using a wired charging
system over a wireless charging system, as exemplified in Gu (see generally
Appeal Br.).
With respect to claims 1 and 16, Appellant argues that Weidner
teaches away from the wired and wireless charging systems being separate
systems (Appeal Br. 5–6; Reply Br. 3–5) because Gu (which determines that
a wired charging unit will be prioritized over a wireless charging system
when both systems are available (e.g., See Gu ¶¶ 28–34, 68)) is non
analogous art (Appeal Br. 10-11; Reply Br 5). However, this argument is not
persuasive of error in the Examiner’s rejection because it fails to adequately
consider the prior art as a whole, and the inferences that one of ordinary skill
would have drawn therefrom, and thus does not adequately address the
Examiner’s obviousness position (see generally Ans.).
If a reference is not within the relevant field of endeavor, it may still
be properly considered if it is reasonably pertinent to the problem the
inventor faced; that is, if it would have logically commended itself to an
inventor’s attention. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In KSR,
the Supreme Court observed that:
In determining whether the subject matter of a . . . claim is
obvious, neither the particular motivation nor the avowed
purpose of the patentee controls. What matters is the objective
reach of the claim. If the claim extends to what is obvious, it is
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. . . [unpatentable] under § 103. One of the ways in which a
patent’s subject matter can be proved obvious is by noting that
there existed at the time of the invention a known problem for
which there was an obvious solution encompassed by the
patent's claims.
550 U.S. at 419–420; see also Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231,
1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in KSR . . . directs us
to construe the scope of analogous art broadly,” stating that “familiar items
may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person of
ordinary skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents
together like pieces of a puzzle”).
It is appreciated that Gu does not disclose the use of its charging
controller specifically in an electrified vehicle. However, there is no doubt
from the applied references that it was a known problem that modern
electrified vehicles may utilize both wired and wireless charging systems,
and thus to maintain efficiencies, one type of charger must be in control over
the other (i.e., be prioritized) (Ans. 8–9). Specifically, the Examiner only
relies upon Weidner to exemplify that it is known for an electrified vehicle
to utilize both wired and wireless charging capabilities. (Ans. 3–4, 6). See In
re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425–26 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for obviousness is
not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily
incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test
is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to
those of ordinary skill in the art.”); see also, e.g., In re Fritch, 972 F.2d
1260, 1264–65 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (it is well established that in evaluating
references it is proper to take into account not only the specific teachings of
the references but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would
reasonably be expected to draw therefrom). And as Examiner points out, it is
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not suggested that the circuit from Gu be directly placed into a vehicle like
the one disclosed in Weidner, but rather that the combined teachings of
Weidner and Gu suggest that the charging controller of Gu could be
incorporated into Weidner in order to control which type of charger takes
priority (Ans. 8–9).
As aptly pointed out by the Examiner, one of ordinary skill in the art
would have readily inferred that it would have been obvious to use such a
control system to control both a wired and wireless charging units (as
exemplified in Gu) on the Weidner vehicle charging system, especially since
it was known that wired charging systems have a significant power transfer
efficiency over that of wireless charging systems (e.g., Ans. 7–8). Further,
Gu teaches a power management and interface circuit which together
determine which of the wired or wireless controller will take priority to
charge the battery and thus whether to switch on or off the wireless charging
unit based on the availability of power from the wired charging unit (¶¶ 28–
34, 60–64). Gu teaches deciding to charge a battery using a wired charging
unit even if a wireless charging unit is available also—one of ordinary skill
would have readily inferred that deciding to charge a battery using a wired
charging unit even if a wireless charging unit is also available for charging is
akin to the claimed prioritizing charging using a wired charging system over
a wireless charging system when power is available for both. Even further,
Gu discloses a wired charger taking higher priority over a wireless charger
(see, e.g., Gu ¶¶ 67–68). Therefore, Appellant’s contention that Gu does not
disclose prioritizing wired over wireless charging (Appeal Br. 4–6) is not
persuasive of reversible error.
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Appellant further argues that neither Weidner nor Gu teaches the
claimed wired and wireless charging systems as separate systems. Appellant
contends that the Examiner’s interpretation that Gu teaches separate wired
and wireless charging systems would discourage a person of ordinary skill in
the art from modifying the system of Weidner because Weidner teaches
“integrated” wired/wireless systems (Appeal Br. 5–6). However, as
discussed below the Examiner’s interpretation that both Weidner and Gu
disclose separate wired and wireless systems is consistent with both the
teachings of Weidner and Gu, and Appellant’s own Figure 2.
“[T]he PTO must give claims their broadest reasonable construction
consistent with the specification. . . . Therefore, we look to the specification
to see if it provides a definition for claim terms, but otherwise apply a broad
interpretation.” In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2007). “[A]s applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope,
a broad construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the
applicant or patentee.” Id.
As the Examiner points out, Appellant’s Figure 2 shows a wireless
charging system 60, and a wired charging system 58, both which appear to
have one or more connections to a control system 76 (Ans. 4–5). The
Examiner points out, analogously, that the interpretation of both Weidner
and Gu are consistent with Appellant’s Figure 2 in that both Weidner and
Gu, respectively. disclose a wired charging port along with wireless
charging unit (see, e.g., Weidner ¶¶ 56, Ans. 4–5) and disclose a wired
charging unit and a wireless charging unit (see, e.g., Gu, Fig. 1, Ans. 4–5).
Notably, we do not find—and Appellant has not directed our attention to—
any limiting definitions in the Specification, nor does Appellant provide any
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persuasive reasoning or credible evidence to establish that the Examiner’s
interpretation of the language of claims 1 and 16 is unreasonable.
Therefore, Appellant’s contention that neither Weidner nor Gu teach
separate wired and wireless charging systems is not persuasive of reversible
error by the Examiner.
With regard to claim 5, Appellant argues that Gu cannot be relied
upon for teaching the claimed “automatic switching” from a wired charging
to a wireless charging system when power from the wireless charging
system becomes unavailable (Appeal Br. 6–7; Reply Br. 3–4). While it is
appreciated that Gu does not specifically disclose a scenario where power
from the wired power system becomes unavailable, the Examiner effectively
points out that a person of ordinary skill would easily infer from the overall
teachings of Gu that the wireless charging unit switch of Gu can be used to
activate the wireless charger when the access to the wired charger is
unavailable (Ans. 5–6). Therefore, Appellant fails to show reversible error.
Appellant argues that combining Gu’s prioritization with Weidner’s
battery charging system would render Weidner unsatisfactory for its
intended purpose because Weidner discloses integrating outputs of the two
charging types (Appeal Br. 7–9). However, as the Examiner points out,
nothing about integrating outputs of the two chargers necessarily makes it
impossible for Gu’s controlling of priority to improve the charging of
Weidner (Ans. 6–7). Further, Appellant points to no additional facts in the
record to support the allegation that the combination of Weidner and Gu
would be unfit for the intended purpose of controlling the charging of a
battery using two different charging systems. Therefore, Appellant fails to
show reversible error.
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With regard to claims 2–4, 6, 15, and 19, Appellant alleges that the
rejections of these claims are improper for the same reasons that Weidner
and Gu fail to render the claims obvious (Appeal Br. 11). Again, this
argument is not persuasive of reversible error.
With regard to claim 11, Appellant argues that the combination of
Tonegawa fails to render claim 11 obvious because Tonegawa’s
determination of whether a power cord is plugged in is not in the context of
charging (Appeal Br. 11–12). However, it appears the cable of Tonegawa is
a charging cable and therefore suggests that Tonegawa’s determination of
whether a charging cable is plugged-in is related to a cable for charging a
vehicle (see, e.g., Tonegawa, Abstr., ¶¶ 27–32). Therefore, with regard to
claim 11, Appellant fails to show reversible error.
With regard to claim 21, Appellant argues that Gwozdek’s use of the
alternatives to inhibiting charging when either the vehicle is not in a “park”
gear or when the vehicle does not have the parking-brake applied is not
enough to suggest to one of ordinary skill that both safety features can be
implemented together rather than in the alternative, as the claim requires
(Appeal Br. 13–14). However, as Examiner effectively points out, one of
ordinary skill would infer from the overall teachings of Gwozdek that both
the safety alternatives of inhibiting charging if either the parking-brake or
park-gear is off can be employed together for additional safety. Therefore,
with regard to claim 21, Appellant fails to show reversible error.
Accordingly, we sustain the § 103 rejection of all of the claims on
appeal.

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CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are AFFIRMED.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 5, 7–10,
16–18, 20,
22
103 Weidner, Gu 1, 5, 7–10,
16–18, 20,
22

2–4, 6, 15,
19
103 Weidner, Gu,
Gwozdek
2–4, 6, 15,
19

11 103 Weidner, Gu,
Tonegawa
11
12–14 103 Weidner, Gu, Rask 12–14
21 103 Weidner, Gu,
Gwozdek
21
Overall
Outcome
1–22

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED