FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 23, 2021

2020004564 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 23, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
16/160,487 10/15/2018 Ali SOLOUKMOFRAD 84052907 4183
28395 7590 04/23/2021
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
BOST, ALEXANDER CONNOR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3662
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/23/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ALI SOLOUKMOFRAD, DANIEL LEWIS BOSTON,
AMEEN AL-KHAFAJI, and MOHSEN LAKEHAL-AYAT

Appeal 2020-004564
Application 16/160,487
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before EDWARD A. BROWN, BRETT C. MARTIN, and
MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, Administrative Patent Judges.

FITZPATRICK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant, Ford Global Technologies, LLC,1 appeals under 35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a) from the Examiner’s final decision rejecting claims 1 and 4–20.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm in part.

1 “Appellant” refers to the applicant as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42.
Appellant identifies itself as the sole real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Specification
Appellant’s disclosure “relate[s] to methods and apparatuses for
improved vehicle control accommodating fuel economy.” Spec. ¶1.
The Claims
Claims 1 and 4–20 are rejected. Final Act. 1. Claims 2 and 3 are
cancelled. Appeal Br. Claims App. 1. No other claims are pending. Final
Act. 1. Independent claims 1 and 15 are illustrative and reproduced below.
1. A system comprising:
a processor in communication with a first vehicle,
configured to:
determine that travel data, reflecting previous
travel by other second vehicles, exists for an upcoming
route segment, the other second vehicles sharing at least
one predetermined similarity with the first vehicle, the
similarity predefined as being sufficient to use the data
from the second vehicles to determine a fuel-efficient
control strategy for the first vehicle;
determine the fuel-efficient control strategy for the
upcoming route segment, based on fuel efficient behavior
of the other second vehicles reflected in the travel data;
and
instruct execution of the fuel-efficient control
strategy in the first vehicle while the first vehicle travels
over the upcoming route segment to instruct control of
the first vehicle in accordance with the fuel-efficient
control strategy for at least a portion of the upcoming
route segment.

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15. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
access a record of data representing travel, for an
identified driver, over an identified route segment;
determine instances of previous travel along the
identified route segment, from the record, representing
optimal fuel usage, based on fuel usage in the record;
create a travel strategy instructing vehicle control
to optimize fuel usage, based on the determined
instances; and
output a distance to empty calculation projected
from the travel strategy.
Claims App. 1, 3.
The Examiner’s Rejections
The following rejections are before us:
1. claims 15–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by
Koebler (US 2018/0118030 Al, published May 3, 2018);
2. claims 1 and 4–13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Koebler; and
3. claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Koebler and Jobson (US 2018/0170349 Al, published June 21, 2018).
DISCUSSION
Rejection 1—Claims 15–20 as Anticipated
Koebler discloses “methods of managing the power consumption of a
vehicle, including calculating an applied power for the vehicle using a
processor.” Koebler ¶21 (cited at Final Act. 6). Koebler discloses
“[e]xamples of power management systems,” including a “1. Fuel Efficient
Hybrid Vehicle,” “2. Fuel Efficient Internal Combustion Engine (ICE)
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Vehicle,” and “3. Energy Efficient Solar-Powered Vehicle.” Id. ¶¶134–138.
The Examiner relies on the hybrid vehicle example in rejecting claims 15–
20. See Final Act. 7 (quoting Koebler ¶¶135–136).
Independent claim 15 recites, among other things, “output[ting] a
distance to empty calculation projected from the travel strategy.” Claims
App. 3. Appellant argues that Koebler does not disclose this limitation.
Appeal Br. 5–6; Reply Br. 2–3. The Examiner found this limitation taught
by Koebler in paragraphs 135 and 136 (Final Act. 7), which, in reference to
a hybrid vehicle, state:
Using one variation of the power management system
described herein (e.g., a power management system having an
integrated with a GPS), a hybrid car approaching a large hill or
grade can adjust the ratio of electric to ICE such that the batteries
would be empty at the crest of the hill and fully charged at the
bottom of the hill, and therefore would use less gasoline.
The same methods described above could be used to
calculate the energy usage of the vehicle as in the previous
example. The mix of electric to ICE can be based on the
calculated energy usage and the energy stored in the batteries.
The exact mechanism for instructing the hybrid vehicle to alter
its electric/ICE ratio may vary between manufacturers.
Koebler ¶¶135–136.
Appellant argues that this disclosure does not disclose a distance to
empty calculation. Appeal Br. 6. In particular, Appellant argues: “It is
unclear if the Examiner is contending that such a calculation is inherent in
what is going on in paragraph [0135] and/or [0136], but there is certainly no
reference to calculating the distance to empty.” Id. The Examiner responds
that “in order to determine an electric/ICE propulsion ratio such that the
batteries are empty after traveling a particular distance, a calculation must be
made about how much energy will be required to move the vehicle that
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distance.” Ans. 5 (bold typeface omitted). We do not find the Examiner’s
response satisfactory. What must be shown to be disclosed in Koebler,
whether expressly or inherently, is a “distance to empty calculation” (claim
15) not an energy required calculation. The Examiner further responds that
“a calculation of a distance to empty cannot be performed without taking
speed into account, and in this way the analysis of cited P. [0106] (which is
further elucidated in P. [0107]) is used to calculate and output distance to
empty as recited by Koebler P. [0135] and P. [0136].” Ans. 6 (bold typeface
omitted). However, just because a distance to empty calculation may require
taking speed into account does not mean that calculating “a probable optimal
speed” as taught in paragraph 106 requires a distance to empty calculation.
Additionally, even if Koebler taught calculating the distance until the
hybrid car’s battery would be depleted, the Examiner has not explained how
such a calculation would constitute a “distance to empty calculation” within
the meaning of the claims. As used in the Specification, “empty” refers to
an internal combustion engine’s fuel tank becoming empty such that the
vehicle can no longer travel before being re-fueled. See Spec. ¶55
(explaining that a higher projected “mpg” yields a longer distance to empty),
¶56 (referring to the “empty[ing] of a tank”). In the Koebler hybrid vehicle
example cited by Examiner, it is Koebler’s battery that is depleted. Koebler
¶135. Its tank of gas is not empty. Indeed, the vehicle continues to be
driven in the example. Id.; see also Reply Br. 2 (“[T]here is fuel remaining
in the teachings of par. 135, so obviously that vehicle is not ‘empty,’ even if
one aspect of fuel source may be under certain circumstances.”).
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In sum, Appellant has apprised us of error in the rejection of claim 15,
as well as that of claims 16–20, which ultimately depend from claim 15.
Accordingly, we reverse the rejection of claims 15–20.
Rejection 2—Claims 1 and 4–13 as Unpatentable
Appellant argues the rejection of these claims under the same heading
and thus not separately. Appeal Br. 6–9; see 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)
(“Under each heading identifying the ground of rejection being contested,
any claim(s) argued separately or as a subgroup shall be argued under a
separate subheading that identifies the claim(s) by number.”). Accordingly,
we choose claim 1 as representative of all of these claims. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“When multiple claims subject to the same ground of
rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by appellant, the Board may
select a single claim from the group or subgroup and may decide the appeal
as to the ground of rejection with respect to the group or subgroup on the
basis of the selected claim alone.”).
Independent claim 1 recites:
determine that travel data, reflecting previous travel by other
second vehicles, exists for an upcoming route segment, the other
second vehicles sharing at least one predetermined similarity
with the first vehicle, the similarity predefined as being sufficient
to use the data from the second vehicles to determine a fuel-
efficient control strategy for the first vehicle.
Claims App. 1. The Examiner cited several Koebler paragraphs as teaching
this limitation. Final Act. 9–10 (citing Koebler ¶¶62, 123, 132, 145).
Appellant does not dispute that Koebler teaches travel data reflecting
previous travel by other second vehicles. Appeal Br. 7–9; Reply Br. 3.
What Appellant disputes is the Examiner’s finding that Koebler teaches that
the second vehicle(s) “shar[e] at least one predetermined similarity with the
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first vehicle,” as recited in claim 1. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 7 (“This
relationship between other vehicles and the vehicle of interest is never taught
by Koebler.”); Reply Br. 3 (“Cited paragraph 145 is simply about choosing
data based on the object vehicle having traveled the path, other vehicles
having traveled the path, or both. There is still no consideration as to
whether the other vehicles are similar, in the manner claimed, to the object
vehicle.”).
Appellant’s argument begs the question: What does the claim mean
by “sharing at least one predetermined similarity with the first vehicle”?
Appellant does not answer this question. Appeal Br. 7–9; Reply Br. 3. Nor
is the Specification very helpful in qualifying the type or quantifying the
amount of similarity required by the claim. See, e.g., Spec. ¶52 (“Once the
vehicle has found 503 a suitable similarity (whether this is personal or crowd
data may depend on design or driver preference), the process loads 505 the
usable similar data for a control strategy.”). However, the surrounding claim
language explicitly recites “the similarity predefined as being sufficient to
use the data from the second vehicles to determine a fuel-efficient control
strategy for the first vehicle.” Claims App. 1.
Koebler teaches that the travel data concerning the “one or more other
vehicles” (Koebler ¶145) is used to create a fuel efficient control strategy for
the object vehicle. Thus, Koebler implicitly teaches that the other vehicle(s)
must be similar enough such that its data is usable for informing the first
vehicle. This is precisely what is claimed by Appellant.
Appellant has not apprised us of error in the rejection of claim 1.
Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claim 1, as well as that of claims 4–
13, which fall therewith. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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Rejection 3—Claim 14 as Unpatentable
Appellant’s sole argument for claim 14 is that “Johnson [sic, Jobson]
does not cure the noted deficiencies of the rejection of claim 7, and thus
claim 14 is allowable based at least on dependency from allowable claim 7.”
Appeal Br. 9. Because Appellant has not apprised us of error in the rejection
of claim 7 (which was not separately argued from claim 1), Appellant
likewise has not apprised us of error in the rejection of claim 14. Thus, we
affirm the rejection of claim 14.
SUMMARY

Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
15–20 102(a)(2) Koebler 15–20
1, 4–13 103 Koebler 1, 4–13
14 103 Koebler, Jobson 14
Overall
outcome
1, 4–14 15–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED IN PART