Food & Commercial Workers Local 540

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 31, 2001

334 N.L.R.B. 852 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 852
United Food and Commercial Workers Local Union
540 and Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation. Case 16–
CB–5152
July 31, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, TRUESDALE, AND
WALSH
Pursuant to a charge filed on April 8, 1997, against
United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 540,
the Respondent, the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board issued a complaint and notice of
hearing on August 20, 1997. On January 27, 1998, the
General Counsel, the Charging Party, Pilgrim’s Pride
Corporation, and the Respondent filed a motion to trans-
fer case and continue case before the Board and stipula-
tion to facts.1 On May 8, 1998, the Board issued an order
approving the stipulation, granting the motion, and trans-
ferring the proceeding to the Board. Thereafter, the Gen-
eral Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respondent
filed briefs. Simultaneously with the filing of the briefs,
the parties filed a supplemental stipulation to facts,
which is hereby accepted.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
On the entire record and the briefs, the Board makes
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent United Food and Commercial Workers
Local 540 is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
Charging Party Pilgrim’s Pride, a Delaware corpora-
tion with an office and place of business in Lufkin,
Texas, is engaged in the business of poultry processing.
During the 12-month period ending January 27, 1998,
Pilgrim’s Pride, in conducting the operations described
above, sold and shipped from its facility goods valued in
excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of
Texas. At all material times, Pilgrim’s Pride has been an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

1 The parties agreed that the stipulation with attached exhibits, in-
cluding the charge, the complaint and notice of hearing, and the Re-
spondent’s answer, constitute the entire record in this case, and that no
oral testimony is necessary or desired. The parties waived a hearing
before an administrative law judge, the making of findings of fact and
conclusions of law by an administrative law judge, and the issuance of
an administrative law judge’s decision; and indicated a desire to submit
this case directly to the Board for findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the issuance of a Decision and Order.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Stipulated Facts
At all times material to this case, the Respondent
Union has been the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive, pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act, of the follow-
ing employees of the Charging Party:
INCLUDED: All production, warehouse, shipping
and sanitation workers at the Charging Party’s
Lufkin plant.
EXCLUDED: Maintenance, quality control, drivers,
office clerical, watchmen, guards, salaried supervi-
sors, hourly forepersons, leads, shipping clerks, pur-
chasing clerks and cafeteria employees.
At all times material to this case, the Charging Party
and the Respondent have been parties to a collective-
bargaining agreement, which is effective from August
11, 1996, through midnight August 10, 1998. Article
V, section A, subsection 1 of that agreement contains
the following dues-checkoff clause:
The Company shall deduct, as to each employee who
shall authorize it in writing on a proper and lawful
form as in Exhibit 1, Union Representation Fees, Un-
ion Dues and Initiation Fees as certified by the Union
as due and owing on a weekly, bi-weekly or monthly
basis as requested by the Union.
The agreement, at article V, section A, subsection 3,
also contains the following provision:
The Union agrees to indemnify and save the Com-
pany harmless against any and all claims, suits or
other forms of liability arising out of the deductions
of money for Union dues from any employee’s pay.
Attached to the collective-bargaining agreement, as
exhibit 1, is a sample dues-checkoff authorization,
which in pertinent part reads as follows:
This Checkoff Authorization and Agreement is sepa-
rate and apart from the Membership Application and
is attached to the Membership Application only for
convenience.
CHECKOFF AUTHORIZATION
TO: Any Employer under contract with United Food
and Commercial Workers Union, Local 540, AFL–
CIO
You are hereby authorized and directed to deduct
from my wages, commencing with the next payroll
period, an amount equivalent to dues and initiation
fees as shall be certified by the Secretary-Treasurer
of Local 540 of the United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union, AFL–CIO, and to re-
mit same to said Secretary-Treasurer.
334 NLRB No. 114
FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 540 853
This authorization and assignment is voluntarily made
in consideration for the cost of representation and col-
lective bargaining and is not contingent on my present
or future membership in the Union. This authorization
and assignment shall be irrevocable for a period of one
(1) year from the date of execution or until the termina-
tion date of the agreement between the Employer and
Local 540, whichever occurs sooner, and from year to
year thereafter, unless not less than thirty (30) days and
not more than forty-five (45) days prior to the end of
any subsequent yearly period I give the Employer and
Union individually written notice by certified Letter to
the Secretary-Treasurer of Local 540 of revocation
bearing my signature thereto.
The Secretary-Treasurer of Local 540 is authorized to
deposit this authorization with any Employer under
contract with Local 540 and is further authorized to
transfer this authorization to any other Employer under
contract with Local 540 in the event that I should
change employment.
On various dates between 1993 and 1996, employees
Darwin Huitt, Jesus Gonzales, Anthony Handy, Carmen
Penson, Edwinna Lewis, Altherman Gibson, Noemi
Soto, Roberto Perez, Juanita Hernandez, and Johnnie
Rodgers executed and submitted checkoff authorizations
using the form set forth above. On various dates subse-
quent to each employee’s execution of the checkoff au-
thorization, the employee ceased employment with the
Charging Party. On termination of employment, each
employee forfeited all seniority rights and other rights
under the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement.
Each of the employees named above was subsequently
rehired, as a new employee, by the Charging Party. On
the employee’s rehire, the Charging Party withheld dues
from each employee’s wages pursuant to the previously
executed checkoff authorization. None of the employees
executed another checkoff authorization after rehire by
the Charging Party. On various dates in 1997, the Charg-
ing Party ceased deducting dues from the pay of employ-
ees Handy, Penson, Gibson, and Rodgers, because the
employees had requested that the Charging Party do so.
The Charging Party continued, at all times material here,
to deduct dues from the pay of the remaining employees
named above.
On January 27, 1997, the Respondent filed a grievance
asserting that the Charging Party had violated the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement by ceasing to deduct dues
from the pay of employees Handy, Penson, Gibson, and
Rodgers, and asserting that their previously executed
checkoff authorizations remained valid for this purpose.
On May 19, 1997, the Respondent filed a complaint in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
seeking to compel the Charging Party to submit the
Respondent’s grievance to arbitration. On November
5, 1997, the district court granted the Respondent’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and ordered the parties
to submit the dispute to arbitration.2 On March 9,
1998, following submission of the dispute to arbitra-
tion, arbitrator Barnett M. Goodstein issued his award
finding that the Charging Party had violated the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement “by refusing to withhold
Union dues from those employees who had signed
Checkoff Authorizations, and which authorizations had
not yet expired under their terms, and were still in ex-
istence at the time of rehire.”3 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the arbitrator confined his analysis to an interpre-
tation of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement,
and specifically refused to consider the Charging
Party’s contention that continued dues withholding
would violate the Act.
By letter dated March 16, 1998, the Charging Party
refused to comply with the arbitrator’s award. On Oc-
tober 15, 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit issued its decision affirming an order
of the U.S. District Court enforcing the arbitrator’s
award.4
B. Contentions of the Parties
The General Counsel asserts that the Respondent
unlawfully filed a grievance for the purpose of compel-
ling the Charging Party to deduct dues from the wages
of its employees when they were rehired following a
break in employment. According to the General Coun-
sel, it is a longstanding principle of Board law that
severance of an employment relationship extinguishes
an individual’s obligation under a dues-checkoff au-
thorization.5 Based on the stipulated facts, the General

2 Food & Commercial Workers Local 540 v. Pilgrim’s Pride
Corp., No. 9:97CV182 (TH).
3 The arbitrator provided the following remedy (emphasis in
original):
SUBJECT TO THE FURTHER RULING OF EITHER THE [Na-
tional Labor Relations] BOARD OR A COURT OF
COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN A FINAL DECISION, the
Company is ordered to reimburse the Union for all such dues and
other authorized deductions, not withheld from the wages of re-
hired employees with continuing authorizations, and not then paid
over to the Union; and to begin deducting from all such employees
with continuing authorizations, still in effect, all such dues and
other authorized deductions, until the authorization is terminated in
accordance with its terms. The indemnity provisions of the Agree-
ment should protect the Company in the event any final decision
reverses this award.
4 Food & Commercial Workers Local 540 v. Pilgrim’s Pride
Corp., 193 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 1999).
5 The General Counsel cites Railway Clerks (Yellow Cab), 205
NLRB 890, 891 (1973), enfd. 498 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir. 1974), where
the Board stated that
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 854
Counsel asserts that these employees severed their em-
ployment relationship and that the Respondent, by at-
tempting to cause and by causing the Charging Party to
deduct dues from the wages of the rehired employees,
without first securing a new dues-checkoff authorization,
has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2). The General
Counsel further asserts that, contrary to the Respondent’s
position, the particular language of the dues checkoff
form used by the Respondent does not “clearly and un-
mistakably” authorize these dues deductions, as is re-
quired by the Board’s decision in Electrical Workers
Local 2088 (Lockheed Space).6 The General Counsel
also contends that the Board should not defer to the
arbitrator’s award in the Respondent’s favor.
The Charging Party likewise asserts that the Respon-
dent has violated the Act by insisting that the Charging
Party commence dues deductions for employees who are
hired as new employees after a prior period of employ-
ment and who have not signed a new dues-checkoff au-
thorization on their being reemployed by Pilgrim. The
Charging Party also claims that the arbitrator’s interpre-
tation of the checkoff authorization language is in error,
and that the arbitrator compounded his error by choosing
to ignore Board and court decisions establishing that a
dues checkoff authorization is terminated on the sever-
ance of the employment relationship.7
The Respondent contends that the Board and court de-
cisions cited by the General Counsel do not establish a
rule that all dues-checkoff authorizations are void on
termination of employment. Instead, the Respondent as-
serts that the specific language of the authorization is
controlling. The Respondent points out that an arbitrator
has issued a final and binding award finding that the Re-
spondent’s dues-checkoff authorization survives termina-
tion of employment and extends to rehired employees,
and asserts that no policy of the Act prohibits its en-
forcement of the award. Relying on Lockheed, supra, the
Respondent also contends that, to the extent employees
must “clearly and unmistakably” agree to such deduc-

when an individual severs his employment relationship, he also severs
any obligation under a signed checkoff authorization, and that such
obligation cannot be revived until the individual has signed a new au-
thorization.
The General Counsel also cites Industrial Towel & Uniform Service,
195 NLRB 1121 (1972), enf. denied 473 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1973)
(same).
6 302 NLRB 322, 328 (1991). The General Counsel also notes that,
in Lockheed, the Board defined a dues-checkoff authorization as a
“partial assignment of a future right, that is, an employee (the assignor)
assigns to his union (the assignee) a designated part of the wages he
will have a right to receive from his employer (the obligor) in the fu-
ture, so long as he continues his employment.” Id. at 327.
7 The Charging Party cites, inter alia, Railway Clerks, supra, and In-
dustrial Towel & Uniform Service, supra.
tions, that standard is satisfied by the language of the
checkoff clause in this case.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
The complaint in this case alleges that the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by filing a
grievance to compel the Charging Party to deduct dues
from the wages of the rehired employees, and by filing
a lawsuit to compel the Charging Party to arbitrate that
grievance; i.e., by submitting this dispute concerning
the meaning and application of the dues checkoff au-
thorizations to the contractual grievance-arbitration
process. For the reasons that follow, we find that the
Respondent did not violate the Act by the acts and
conduct alleged in the complaint. The broader question
addressed in the parties’ briefs—whether the Respon-
dent could lawfully require the Charging Party to re-
sume deducting dues from rehired employees, after a
break in employment, on the basis of the dues checkoff
authorizations signed by these employees, during a
prior period of employment—is not before us in this
case. The issue is, however, addressed in The Kroger
Co., 334 NLRB No. 113 (2001).8
In Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB,9 the Su-
preme Court held that the Board may not enjoin a state
court lawsuit, regardless of the plaintiff’s motive in
filing the lawsuit, unless the suit lacks a reasonable
basis in fact or law. The Court recognized that “[a]
lawsuit no doubt may be used by an employer as a
powerful instrument of coercion or retaliation” against
employees who have engaged in protected activity.10
However, the Court held that these interests must be
balanced against the First Amendment right of access
to the courts and the interest of each state in maintain-
ing domestic peace by “providing a civil remedy for
conduct touching interests ‘deeply rooted in local feel-
ing and responsibility.’”11 In order to accommodate
these interests, the Court held that “the filing and
prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit may not be en-
joined as an unfair labor practice, even if it would not
have been commenced but for the plaintiff’s desire to
retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights
protected by the Act.”12 Where, however, the lawsuit
lacks a reasonable basis in fact or law, these interests
8 As explained below, in The Kroger Co., we hold that the lan-
guage of the dues check-off authorization involved both in that case
and in this one did not constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of
employees’ Section 7 rights. We also explain why the Board there
was not required to defer to the arbitrator’s award in this case.
9 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
10 Id. at 740.
11 Id. at 741 (quoting from San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)).
12 Id. at 743.
FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 540 855
do not come into play. Accordingly, “it is an enjoinable
unfair labor practice to pursue a baseless lawsuit with the
intent of retaliating against an employee for exercising
rights protected by § 7 of the NLRA.”13
In Longshoremen Local 7 (Georgia-Pacific),14 the
Board applied these principles to the grievance-
arbitration process. In Georgia-Pacific, the respondent
union filed grievances seeking to compel an employer to
pay wages in lieu of assigning disputed work to employ-
ees represented by the union. The union ultimately ob-
tained an award in its favor from an arbitrator. However,
the Board subsequently issued a Section 10(k) jurisdic-
tional award finding that employees represented by the
union were not entitled to perform the disputed work.
The Board thereafter considered whether the union, by
filing “in lieu of” grievances both before and after the
Board issued its 10(k) award, violated Section
8(b)(4)(D).
The Board noted that “national labor policy encour-
ages resort to the grievance-arbitration procedure as the
preferred method of resolving labor-management dis-
putes.”15 The Board stated that preserving access to the
grievance machinery closely parallels the First Amend-
ment concerns cited by the Supreme Court in Bill John-
son’s and that the Federal policy favoring private resolu-
tion of labor disputes is analogous to “the states’ interest
in the maintenance of domestic peace, which was
stressed in the Bill Johnson’s analysis.”16 Accordingly,
the Board concluded that “[t]hese weighty interests, like
the ones the Court discussed in Bill Johnson’s, militate
against a rule barring the processing of an arguably meri-
torious pre-10(k)-award work assignment grievance sim-

13 Id. at 744. In Bill Johnson’s, the Supreme Court also observed that
the case before it was not
a suit that is claimed to be beyond the jurisdiction of the state courts
because of Federal-law preemption, or a suit that has an objective that
is illegal under federal law. Petitioner concedes that the Board may en-
join these latter types of suits. Nor could it be successfully argued oth-
erwise.
Id. at 738 fn. 5 (citation omitted.)
14 291 NLRB 89 (1988), enfd. 892 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
15 Georgia-Pacific, supra at 92, citing Sec. 203(d) of the Act. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of this Con-
gressional policy in the promotion of industrial stability and peace. See,
e.g., Paperworkers v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 37 (1987) (Federal labor
policy “reflect[s] a decided preference for private settlement of labor
disputes without the intervention of government.”).
In furtherance of the Congressional policy, the Board has for many
years withheld its authority to adjudicate alleged unfair labor practices
in cases where the parties have agreed to submit the dispute to binding
grievance-arbitration. See United Technologies Corp., 268 NLRB 557
(1984) and Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971) (prearbitral
deferral to grievance-arbitration machinery); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
NLRB 1080 (1955) (deferral to arbitrator’s award).
16 Georgia-Pacific, supra at 93.
ply on a showing of prohibited motive.”17 The Board
has consistently applied these principles to efforts by a
party to obtain arbitration of a variety of disputes, in-
cluding claims of single employer status and accretion
to an existing unit,18 efforts to apply a collective-
bargaining agreement to alleged owner-operators,19
and efforts to merge bargaining units.20
Consistent with these principles, we hold that the
submission to grievance arbitration of an arguably
meritorious claim concerning the meaning of a dues
checkoff authorization, without more, is not an unfair
labor practice. Federal labor policy strongly favors the
use of the grievance-arbitration process. The Board, in
turn, has observed that:
[t]he Act itself requires only, in Section 302 (c)(4),
that employees be accorded an opportunity to revoke
their checkoff authorizations at least once a year and
at the termination of any applicable collective-
bargaining agreements. Beyond that, it is well-
established Board law that disputes about dues
checkoff procedures essentially involve contract in-
terpretations rather than interpretation and applica-
tion of the Act. Furthermore, the Board has specifi-
cally recognized that such contract issues are fully
capable of resolution through arbitration [footnotes
omitted].21
In recognition of the contractual nature of such dis-
putes, the Board will defer processing of unfair labor
practice charges while the parties present the dispute to
an arbitrator.22 In appropriate cases, the Board will also
defer to an arbitrator’s award resolving the dispute.23
In these circumstances, it would be anomalous, to say
the least, and inconsistent with the principles set forth
in Bill Johnson’s and Georgia Pacific, to find that the
17 Id.
18 Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 274 (Warwick Caterers),
282 NLRB 939 (1987). Compare, Teamsters Local 776 (Rite Aid),
305 NLRB 832 (1991), enfd. 973 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied 507 U.S. 959 (1993) (suit to enforce arbitration award accret-
ing employees to existing unit was unlawful, where Board had pre-
viously found unit to be separate).
19 Teamsters Local 483 (Ida Cal), 289 NLRB 924 (1988).
20 SEIU Local 32B-32J (Vaux Condominium), 313 NLRB 267
(1993).
21 Furr’s, Inc., 264 NLRB 554, 556 (1982).
22 Id. See also The Associated Press, 199 NLRB 1110 (1972), rev.
denied 492 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Board deferred to arbitrator’s
award finding that certain employees failed to effectively revoke
dues checkoff authorizations, and ordered Collyer deferral on issue
of whether checkoff authorizations were terminable at will during
contract hiatus).
23 Id.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 856
mere submission of such a dispute to grievance arbitra-
tion, without more, is unlawful.24
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we
find that the grievance filed by the Respondent was ar-
guably meritorious. To begin, we reject the General
Counsel’s contention that, as a matter of statutory law,
dues-checkoff clauses expire when employment is sev-
ered. Accepting this contention, of course, would pre-
clude the position taken by Respondent’s grievance.
Next, we conclude that Respondent’s position was color-
able, as a matter of contract interpretation, considered in
light of the legal requirement that waivers of Section 7
rights must be clear and unmistakable.
As discussed above, the Board has consistently recog-
nized that, apart from the requirement for periodic revo-
cability set forth in Section 302(c)(4), “disputes about
dues checkoff procedures essentially involve contract
interpretations rather than interpretation and application
of the Act.”25 In Electrical Workers Local 2088 (Lock-
heed Space),26 the Board reaffirmed this principle. It held
that Section 7 of the Act protects both the right to join
and assist unions and the right to refrain from doing so,
and that paying dues to a union is a form of assistance.
The Board acknowledged that an employee could waive
that Section 7 right, for example by agreeing through a
checkoff authorization to pay union dues and fees for a
certain period irrespective of whether he remained a un-
ion member. The Board held, however, that an em-
ployee’s agreement to such an arrangement must be
manifested in “clear and unmistakable language.”27 It
would be inconsistent with these principles to hold (as
the General Counsel and the Charging Party suggest)
that, regardless of its specific terms, a dues checkoff au-
thorization may never remain effective when an em-
ployee is rehired following a severance of employment.28
The Board’s holdings in Railway Clerks and Industrial
Towel do not compel a different result here. In those
cases, we stated that
when an individual severs his employment relationship,
he also severs any obligation under a signed checkoff
authorization, and that such obligation cannot be re-

withholdings only for employees w
24 See also Auto Workers Local # 1752 (Schweizer Aircraft), 320
NLRB 528 (1995), rev. denied sub nom. Williams v. NLRB, 105 F.3d
787 (2d Cir. 1996) (union lawfully filed a grievance seeking to compel
employer to continue dues checkoff from an employee who had re-
signed from the union but was subject to lawful union security clause).
25 Furr’s, supra at 556.
26 302 NLRB 322, 327 (1991).
27 Schweizer Aircraft, supra at 531.
28 Accordingly, the Respondent’s invocation of the grievance arbitra-
tion process did not have an illegal objective within the meaning of fn.
5 of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bill Johnson’s. See fn. 13, supra.
vived until the individual has signed a new authoriza-
tion.29
But this statement was necessarily based on the spe-
cific language of the authorizations signed by the em-
ployees in those cases.30 In any event, to read these
cases as establishing a per se rule that a checkoff au-
thorization can never survive the severance of em-
ployment would be inconsistent with the Board’s long-
standing recognition that the meaning and application
of a dues checkoff clause is primarily a question of
contract interpretation.31
We turn now to the specific language of the dues-
checkoff authorization in this case, which provided for
the deposit of the authorization “with any Employer
under contract with” the Respondent and which further
provided for the transfer of the authorization “to any
other Employer” if the employee “should change em-
ployment.” In The Kroger Co., we find that this lan-
guage was not a clear and unmistakable waiver of em-
ployees’ Section 7 rights, the standard to be applied in
the context of that case. The issue, here, in contrast, is
not whether the language amounted to a waiver, but
whether the Respondent could colorably argue that it
was. We believe that such an argument was
colorable—when the grievance was filed—even
though we have since rejected it. Indeed, an arbitrator
found that the Respondent’s position was in fact
meritorious.32 Moreover, the Respondent’s position is,
at least to some extent, consistent with the Charging
Party’s actions, in that the Charging Party
automatically resumed dues withholding from the pay
of rehired employees on the basis of their previously
executed authorization forms, and ceased the
ho had made a re-
29 Railway Clerks, supra at 891. See also Industrial Towel, supra.
30 The checkoff authorization forms in Railway Clerks, supra at
894–895, and Industrial Towel, supra at 1125, were substantially
identical. They did not contain any of the provisions found in the
authorization forms executed by the employees in this case, which
the Respondent invokes to establish that the authorizations survived
the employees’ breaks in employment. Further, these cases do not
address the issue, discussed in Lockheed, of whether the employees,
by signing the disputed checkoff authorizations, had waived their
Sec. 7 rights to refrain from supporting the union.
31 The Board in Lockheed characterized a dues checkoff authori-
zation as a “partial assignment of a future right, that is, an employee
(the assignor) assigns to his union (the assignee) a designated part of
the wages he will have a right to receive from his employer (the
obligor) in the future, so long as he continues his employment.”
Lockheed, supra at 327. For the reasons stated above, this characteri-
zation should not be read as establishing a per se rule with regard to
the meaning or application of dues checkoff authorizations.
32 Georgia-Pacific, supra at 93 (grievance found “arguably meri-
torious” for Bill Johnson’s analysis in part because union had pre-
vailed in arbitration).
FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 540 857
who had made a request to the Charging Party that it do
so.33
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we find that the Re-
spondent’s contention that the Charging Party violated
the collective-bargaining agreement by ceasing dues
withholding on behalf of employees Handy, Penson,
Gibson, and Rodgers, was arguably meritorious. Accord-
ingly, we hold that the Respondent did not violate Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by filing a grievance concerning
this matter, and by filing a lawsuit to compel the Charg-
ing Party to submit the dispute to arbitration. Because
these are the only acts alleged in the complaint to have

33 Our finding that the Respondent’s position was arguably meritori-
ous does not, of course, mean that the Board would necessarily “have
made the same interpretation of the contract on de novo review of the
facts…” Furr’s, supra at 557.
violated the Act, we shall dismiss the complaint. We
express no view concerning any of the other actions,
not alleged to be unlawful in the complaint, which the
Respondent and the Charging Party have taken with
respect to the deduction of dues from the pay of the
Charging Party’s employees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has not violated the Act as al-
leged in the complaint.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.