Folk Chevrolet, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 29, 1969

176 N.L.R.B. 277 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

FOLK CHEVROLET, INC.
Folk Chevrolet , Inc. and Professional Automobile
Salesmen Association . Cases 8-CA-4636,
8-CA-4654, and 8-CA-4736
May 29, 1969
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND
ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULI OCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On July 1, 1968, the National Labor Relations
Board issued a Decision and Order in the
above-entitled proceeding,' finding, inter alia, that
the Respondent had discriminated in regard to the
tenure of employment of Martin L. Wiggins,
Kenneth S. Evans, Roy Kaplan, and Patrick J.
Blanc, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and
directing that the Respondent make the
discriminatees whole for any loss of pay suffered as
a result of said violations.
On October 30, 1968, the Board's Acting
Regional Director for Region 8 issued a backpay
specification and notice of hearing, to which the
Respondent duly filed an answer. A hearing was
held before Trial Examiner Benjamin K. Blackburn
on December 12, 1968, for the purpose of
determining the amount of backpay due the four
discriminatees. On March 12, 1969, the Trial
Examiner issued his Supplemental Decision attached
hereto, in which he found that the discriminatees
were entitled to the following payments, upon which
interest was to accrue at 6 percent per annum until
paid, computed on the basis of the quarterly
amounts of net packpay due, less any tax
withholding required by law: Martin L. Wiggins,
$2,643.15; Kenneth S. Evans, $1,103.60; Roy
Kaplan, $2,087.10; and Patrick J. Blanc, $4,543.65.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision and a
supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
entire record in this case, including the Trial
Examiner's Supplemental Decision, and the
exceptions and brief, and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial
Examiner.
Not published in NLRB volumes.
176 NLRB No. 30
ORDER
277
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Folk Chevrolet, Inc., Akron, Ohio, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall make whole
Martin L. Wiggins, Kenneth S. Evans, Roy Kaplan,
and Patrick J. Blanc by payment to them of the
amounts set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Supplemental Decision.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S SUPPLEMENTAL
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BENJAMIN K. BLACKBURN, Trial Examiner: On July 1,
1968, the Board issued its Order herein, adopting, in the
absence of exceptions, the Decision of Trial Examiner
James V. Constantine, dated February 28, 1968. Trial
Examiner Constantine found that Folk Chevrolet, Inc.,
referred to herein as Respondent, discriminated in regard
to the tenure of employment of Martin L. Wiggins,
Kenneth S. Evans, Roy Kaplan, and Patrick J. Blanc,
referred to collectively herein as the discriminatees,
thereby violating Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The
Board ordered, inter alia, that Respondent make the
discriminatees whole for any loss of pay suffered as a
result of said violation.
A controversy has arisen over the amount of backpay
due the discriminatees under the terms of the Board's
Order. Consequently, the Board's Acting Regional
Director for Region 8 (Cleveland, Ohio) on October 30,
1968, pursuant to Section 102.52 of the Board's Rules and
Regulations, issued and caused to be served on
Respondent detailed backpay specifications alleging the
backpay due these men as required by the Board's Order.
In accordance with Section 102.53(a) of the Board's Rules
and Regulations, the specifications "specifically and in
detail show, for each employee, the backpay periods
broken down by calendar quarters, the specific figures and
basis of computation as to gross backpay and interim
earnings, the expenses for each quarter, the net backpay
due, and any other pertinent information."
In compliance with Section 102.54(b) of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, Respondent, on November 14,
1968, filed a detailed answer to the backpay specifications.
In addition to admitting or denying the various allegations
contained in the specifications, Respondent stated that,
subsequent to June 6, 1968, representatives of Region 8
repudiated an agreement reached on that date as to the
formula to be followed in computing backpay and pleaded
that "any backpay awards that are ultimately issued
should not bear interest after June 6, 1968, the date upon
which the Respondent was ready, willing and able to
make a reasonable settlement with respect to backpay."
Pursuant to due notice a hearing on the specifications
and answer was held before me in Akron, Ohio, on
December 12, 1968, at which the General Counsel and
Respondent appeared by counsel and the discriminatees
appeared as witnesses. All parties were afforded full
opportunity to call and examine or cross-examine
witnesses, to introduce evidence, and to argue orally.
Briefs filed on behalf of the General Counsel and
Respondent have been carefully considered.
278 DECISIONS OF.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon my observation of the witnesses , the testimony
and evidence in this supplementary proceeding , and the
entire record in the case , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. THE MILEAGE ISSUE
The discriminatees worked for Respondent as
automobile salesmen . As a result of Respondent's
discrimination against them, each lost , in addition to the
commissions he would have earned on sales, the use of a
so-called demonstrator automobile furnished by
Respondent .' Demonstrator is something of a misnomer
since the record reveals that each salesman was furnished
a new car each year primarily for his own use and not for
use in demonstrating Respondent 's product to potential
customers . Salesmen were encouraged to permit prospects
to test drive the specific model automobile they were
interested in. Occasions when prospects test drove a
demonstrator assigned to a salesman were extremely rare.
Salesmen had to buy only gasoline and pay an insurance
premium in order to use these automobiles.
The General Counsel has computed the monetary value
of the loss of use of the demonstrators by ascertaining
from each discriminatee the average number of miles he
drove his demonstrator each week prior to the
discrimination ' and reimbursing each at the rate of 10
cents per mile on the theory that he would have continued
to drive the same average number of miles each week
during the period when Respondent denied him the use of
a demonstrator . Respondent challenges the General
Counsel' s computation on the ground that (1) the
demonstrators were merely a selling tool furnished to the
discriminatees for Respondent 's benefit and therefore their
loss is reflected in the discriminatees' loss commissions;
(2) there is no evidence of how many miles the
discriminatees actually drove other automobiles during the
period when they were denied use of their demonstrators
and the General Counsel' s constructive miles is an
improper basis for the computation; and (3) there is no
basis for valuing the loss of an automobile at 10 cents a
mile.
My finding that Respondent furnished demonstrators to
its salesmen for their personal use as a perquisite of their
employment and not as a selling tool disposes of
Respondent's first argument . As to the second, it is true
that the record does not reveal how many miles the
discriminatees drove their own automobiles, if any, during
the relevant period. However, the General Counsel's
theory that the discriminatees would have continued to use
Respondent 's demonstrators in an average manner but for
Respondent 's discrimination is not unreasonable . Since the
purpose of backpay is to make discriminatees whole, that
is, to put them in the same position they would have been
in if they had not been discriminated against,
Respondent 's argument that the true measure of their loss
is the amount they were forced to drive their own cars is
not well taken . But for Respondent 's discrimination they
would have driven Respondent' s demonstrators , not their
own automobiles ., Finally, 10 cents a mile has been held
by the Board to be a reasonable figure for computing the
value of use of an automobile in a backpay proceeding.
,in Blanc's case , two automobiles are in issue , one furnished for his use
and one for his wife's.
'The weekly figure used in each case was the discriminatee's estimate of
his annual mileage divided by 52.
There is no reason for departing from that precedent here.
M. J. McCarthy Motor Sales Co., 147 NLRB 605; Rice
Lake Creamery Company, 151 NLRB 1113.
II. THE EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEE ISSUE
The General Counsel has claimed as an expense in
computing the backpay due Roy Kaplan a debt of $450
which he incurred to an employment agency in the course
of seeking interim employment . Kaplan testified that he
obtained a job with the New York Life Insurance
Company through Allstate Employment Service on June
12, 1967, and was charged $450 for the service rendered.
The only other evidence in the record of the fee charged
Kaplan is a receipt from Allstate dated January 15, 1968.
It shows a $25 payment on an "amount of account" of
$175 and a new balance due of $150. The backpay
specification admits earnings by Kaplan from New York
Life Insurance Company of $2,215 in the second and third
quarters of 1967.
Respondent contends that the $450 expense item should
be disallowed as a credit to Roy Kaplan because ". .
Respondent's Exhibit 1 [the Allstate receipt] is the only
evidence of this alleged expense. . It does not state
when the indebtedness was incurred and, most
significantly , it contradicts Kaplan as it states that the
amount of the account was $175.00. No court could
accept Kaplan's statement that his bill was $450.00 when
the only record states $175.00. Moreover Kaplan did not
state that he paid any amount other than the $25.00
appearing on Respondent 's Exhibit 1. If he had, he would
have similar receipts or cancelled checks. The evidence in
the record shows that Kaplan paid $25.00 to an
employment agency well after the period of discrimination
and this certainly does not prove the $450.00 claimed as
an interim expense by the General Counsel."
I reject Respondent 's argument . The Allstate receipt is
not the only evidence of the expense in the record. On the
contrary, there is Kaplan's direct testimony that he was
charged a fee of $450 in obtaining the job the interim
earnings from which are deducted from his gross backpay.
I credit his testimony. I further find that the import of the
Allstate receipt is that, as of January 15, 1968, Kaplan
had paid off $300 of the $450 debt he incurred. Moreover,
whether he has ever paid the other $150 is immaterial to
the issue before me. The mere fact that he incurred that
debt is sufficient to make the entire $450 fee a proper
credit to him in computing the backpay due him.
III. THE INTERIM EMPLOYMENT ISSUES
A. Self-Employment
Martin L. Wiggins and Patrick J. Blanc did not seek
jobs during the backpay period . Instead, each went almost
immediately into business for himself as a used-car dealer.'
The backpay specifications admit , as their interim
earnings, the amounts of money which each withdrew
from his business during the backpay period. Each
testified , in effect, that he withdrew money when and as
the earnings of the business permitted. Each produced the
'Blanc spent 10 days considering an offer to become general manager of
one of Respondent's competitors . He turned it down when the management
refused his demand for a share of the profits . He then opened his own
business as a sole proprietorship . Wiggins immediately went into business
with a man named Likens as "Likens Automotive Sales," an Ohio
corporation.
FOLK CHEVROLET, INC.
records of his business and made them available to
Respondent . When Respondent requested time at the
hearing to study the records, it was arranged that counsel
for General Counsel and counsel for Respondent would
together work out an exhibit to be marked Respondent's
Exhibit 3 which would reflect any information in Wiggins'
and Blanc 's business records which Respondent wanted to
include in the record. Instead, a letter from Respondent's
counsel to me dated January 21, 1969, has been received
in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 3. It reads:
Please be advised that Respondent's Exhibit No. 3 will
not be submitted. Mr. Watters ['Respondent's office
manager] is not able to determine from the business
records of Wiggins and Blanc what their businesses
were earning during the period of discrimination. This
information is not shown by the accounting records and
it is necessary to look at individual car records. In the
case of Wiggins, he does have the car records but
numerous dates are missing . In the case of Blanc, he
has no car records and it is impossible to trace
particular cars with regard to the time and cost of
acquisition and the time and selling price.
Respondent contends that the General Counsel has
failed to prove Wiggins' and Blanc's "gross backpay"
because it has failed to prove their interim earnings, as
distinguished from their withdrawals, from their used-car
businesses. It cites Mastro Plastics' in support of the
proposition that the burden of proof in establishing the
gross backpay due to an employee is upon the General
Counsel. The citation supports the proposition, but the
proposition does not support Respondent's argument. For,
as Mastro Plastics makes clear, the General Counsel
must, indeed, establish the gross backpay due a
discriminatee , that is , the gross amount of money he
would have earned had he continued in the discriminator's
employ, but the burden of proving interim earnings, that
is, the amount of money the discriminatee did or should
have earned during the period of the discrimination, in
order to establish net backpay, that is, the sum required
to make the discriminatee whole , is upon Respondent.
Any efforts expended by the General Counsel in
establishing interim earnings or a willful loss of interim
earnings are simply a public service and not a part of his
burden in proving a backpay claim. Here, the General
Counsel, as a public service, made Wiggins, Blanc, and
their business records available to Respondent so that
Respondent could prove, if such were the fact, that
Wiggins' and Blanc ' s earnings from their used-car
businesses were substantially larger than the amounts of
money they withdrew from the businesses during the
backpay period. Respondent has failed to carry its burden.
Since I credit the testimony of Wiggins and Blanc that
their withdrawals were roughly equal to the earnings of
their businesses and since , on the record considered as a
whole , such a correlation is not an unreasonable way of
establishing their interim earnings so as to arrive at the
net backpay due them, I find that the General Counsel
has met his general burden of proof in establishing the
damage which has resulted from Respondent's established
discrimination , as that language is used by the, Board in
Mastro Plastics, Cornwell Company, Inc., 171 NLRB No.
43.
'Mastro Plastics Corporation , 136 NLRB 1342, and 145 NLRB 1710,
enfd . as modified 354 F.2d 170 (C.A. 2).
B. Failure to Seek Jobs as Automobile Salesmen
279
Kenneth S. Evans did not seek new employment as an
automobile salesman. Instead, he elected to return to his
old occupation of mechanic, and, a day or two before he
left Respondent's employ, arranged to be hired
immediately by another automobile dealer as foreman of
his garage. Respondent links Evans with Wiggins and
Blanc in arguing that all three disqualified themselves for
backpay by refusing to seek substantially equal
employment. Respondent relies on the undisputed fact
that none of the three accepted reinstatement when it was
offered by Respondent in either September or October
1967. With respect to Evans, it argues that, since he
selected his own termination dates and carefully arranged
less lucrative employment in advance, he should be
distinguished from an employee who must seek any
employment in order to live when he is suddenly
discharged. With respect to Wiggins and Blanc, it argues
that self-employment as sufficient effort by a
discriminatee to mitigate losses by seeking interim
employment is limited only to situations where the
self-employment is obviously an interim attempt to
maintain earnings until reinstatement. I can find no
justification for the distinctions Respondent would draw.
While Evans may not have been required to accept a less
desirable job in order to avoid a finding of willful loss of
interim earnings , the fact that he elected to take such a
job cannot be held against him. I find, therefore, that he
did not disqualify himself by seeking and accepting
interim employment as a garage foreman rather than as
an automobile salesman and thereafter declining
reinstatement when it was offered to him. East Texas
Steel Castings Company, Inc., 116 NLRB 1336;
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 170 NLRB No. 198. Similarly, I
find that Wiggins and Blanc did not remove themselves
from the automobile salesman employment market by
going into business for themselves, even though they too
subsequently declined reinstatement. Heinrich Motors,
Inc., 166 NLRB No. 88.
IV. THE GROSS BACKPAY FORMULA ISSUE
The major issue raised in this proceeding is the formula
used by the General Counsel in computing the gross
backpay due the discriminatees. Wiggins, Evans, Kaplan,
and Blanc were full-time salesmen for Respondent during
all of 1966.' Only four other full-time salesmen - W. L.
Burch, J. E. Dixon, W. R. Kerns, and O. E. Morehart -
worked for Respondent during all of 1966 as well as
during the entire backpay period from April 24 through
October 23, 1967. Numerous other persons worked as
salesmen for Respondent at various times in 1966 and
1967, either full time or part time.
In arriving at the gross backpay figures contained in
the specifications, the General Counsel first averaged the
1966 earnings of Burch, Dixon, Kerns, and Morehart.
Into this figure he divided the 1966 earnings of each of the
discriminatees to establish the ratio between the- earnings
'Trial Examiner Constantine found that Evans and Wiggins were
constructively discharged.
'Trial Examiner Constantine found that Evans , hired by Respondent as a
mechanic in 1963 , was designated a salesman in "early 1966." However,
Evans testified before me , without contradiction , that he became a
full-time salesman on the first day of that year Respondent does not
dispute the use of 1966 commissions as the base period for establishing the
ratios from which commissions lost by the discriminatees are to be
computed.
280 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of an average full-time salesman other than the
discriminatees and the earnings of each of the
discriminatees in the 1966 base period. The results ranged
from a high of 1.423 for Blanc to a low of .689 for Evans.
Next, the General Counsel averaged the earnings of
Burch, Dixon, Kerns, and Morehart for the second and
third quarters and for October 1967. He converted this
figure into an average weekly earning during the second
and third quarters and an average earning for the relevant
number of days in October 1967. Finally, the General
Counsel applied the ratio for each discriminatee to these
average figures for the various portions of the backpay
period to determine the amount of commissions each
would have earned in the portions of the backpay period
relevant to him.
Respondent's business declined substantially between
1966 and 1967. In fact, the situation ultimately became so
bad that General Motors terminated Respondent's
new-car dealership in 1968. Respondent contends that the
only fair way to compute the commissions the
discriminatees would have earned during the backpay
period is to determine what portion of all the commissions
paid by Respondent to its salesmen in 1966 went to each
of the discriminatees and credit him with the same portion
in the backpay period. Stated another way, Respondent's
formula would compare the discriminatees with
Respondent's entire staff of salesmen. If discriminatee A's
total earnings for 1966 were 10 percent of all the
commissions paid by Respondent to salesmen in 1966,
Respondent would compute his gross backpay at 10
percent of the total commissions paid by Respondent
during the backpay period relevant to him.
Respondent ' s argument is based on the premise that
only a certain amount of business was available for
salesmen during the backpay period and the
discriminatees, by their presence, could not and would not
have increased that total. Therefore, only a percentage of
that total as established in the 1966 base period can
reasonably be assumed as the earnings of each
discriminatee during the period in which he was
discriminated against . The General Counsel attempted to
counter this argument by having each discriminatee
estimate what percentage of his sales was to "walk-in"
customers, i.e., to customers who came to Respondent's
showroom to purchase a car, thus creating a sale which
would have been consummated regardless of whether one
of the discriminates or some other salesman handled the
transaction, and what percentage was to prospects the
discriminatees uncovered by their own efforts. Wiggins
and Kaplan testified, respectively, that 60 and 65 percent
of their 1966 sales were walk-ins. Evans testified that
practically all of his sales were to walk- ins; Blanc,
practically none. I credit their estimates although I have
not relied on them , since I consider them immaterial to
the issue.
Which formula is used makes a substantial difference in
gross backpay due the discriminatees. I have attempted to
work out the computations using Respondent 's formula.
The results, in tabular form and utilizing the figures for
demonstrator cars , insurance premiums , interim earnings,
and expenses contained in the backpay specifications, are
attached as Appendixes A-1 through A-4. The figures
entered in the gross commissions column are a percentage
of the total commissions paid by Respondent in each
month which varies from discriminatee to discriminatee:
depending on the ratio of his 1966 earnings to the total
commissions paid by Respondent in 1966. I have
determined from Respondent's records which are in
evidence that, in 1966, Wiggins earned 9.04 percent of the
commissions paid by Respondent; Evans, 6.58 percent;
Kaplan, 6.64 percent; and Blanc, 13.59 percent.
I find Respondent's argument without merit because
the premise on which it is based is faulty. Even if only a
certain quantum of business was available during the
backpay period and the discriminatees, by their efforts,
would not have added substantially to that total, an
analysis of the commissions earned by Burch, Dixon,
Kerns, and Morehart in 1966 and during the backpay
period shows that, while sales did indeed decline in 1967,
the only full-time salesmen with whom the discriminatees
can reasonably be compared in both 1966 and 1967 earned
a substantially higher proportion of the commissions paid
in 1967 than they did in 1966. Such an analysis is
attached as Appendix B. The consistent pattern of a
higher percentage of commissions paid to each man in
1967 than in 1966, as well as in the relevant quarters and
month of 1967 as contrasted with 1966, speaks for itself I
conclude, therefore, that the formula used by the General
Counsel is a reasonable and proper one and more
correctly reflects the amount of commissions each
discriminatee would have earned but for Respondent's
discrimination against him than the formula advanced by
Respondent. Story Oldsmobile, Inc., 145 NLRB 1647. See
also American Manufacturing Company of Texas, 167
NLRB No. 71, 'and N.L.R.B. v. Kartarik, Inc., 227 F.2d
190 (C. A. 8).
V. THE AMOUNT OF BACKPAY DUE
Having resolved the various issues litigated before me
against Respondent, I find that the sums set forth in the
backpay specifications filed and served upon Respondent
by the Board, as amended,' are due the discriminatees, as
follows:
Martin L. Wiggins - $2,643.158
Kenneth S. Evans - $1,103.60
Roy Kaplan - $2,087.10
Patrick J . Blanc - $4,543.658
In addition, Respondent produced no evidence at the
hearing in support of the allegation in its answer that
circumstances exist which should toll the accumulation of
interest on the above sums after June 6, 1968. Therefore,
since the Order herein provides for interest at 6 percent
per annum on the above sums, to be computed in the
manner specified in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716, such interest will continue to accrue until the
date of payment of all backpay due. Finally, payment of
all sums due shall also be less any taxes required, to be
withheld by Respondent under Federal or State law.
'The General Counsel's motion, contained in his brief, to amend the
backpay specification with respect to Wiggins to show interim earnings
during the third quarter of 1967 of $1,312 rather than $1,475 is granted.
'The breakdown for each discriminatee by quarters is set forth in
Appendix C.
FOLK CH€VR(M.El', INC.
APPENDIX A-1
MARTIN I.. WIGGINS: RaLkpay period - .Iuls 19-October 23, 1967 ; denied us
281
GROSS DFMONSTRA'I'OR INSURANCE EARNING. INTERIM NET
COMMISSIONS CAR PRF MIIJMS Al F'OI K EARNINGS EXPENSES BACKPA
Plus Plus Minus Minus Plus Equals
2d DARTER 317.35 317.35
July 1967 443.74* 484.31
August 461.76
September 333.00
3d QUARTER -112385 750.10 40 95 484.31 1,312.00 233.24
October 625.35*
41hQUARTER 625.35 173.10 13 65 68400 128.10
TOTAL 678.69
* 1 ot,tl figure for month used rather than more appropriate figure for relevant part of month because records of Respondent
used in making L omlattation,, do not gise daily, week IN, or other figures for period, of Less than month.
API'I \DIX t% 2
KI NN-1 I II S I VANS, Rack 1s Period - J uly 6-October 16, 1967• denied Use of Car, May 2i. 1967
GROSS r)I'MO\S1 It \I OR I\Sl'R,\NCF 14R\INGS INl I RIM NET
COMMISSIONS ('\R PRI \111 NIS \I FOI K FAR\I\GS I:XPFNSFS BACKPAI
Plus Plus \linu, \ lino, Plus Equals
2d QUARTER 105.60 105.60
July 1967 322,99* 258 09
August 136.10
September 242. IS
3dQl'ARTER 901.47 249 60 25% (19 1.51900 0
October 455.1'*
4th QUAR I f R 455 I' 38.40 338 0(1 155.57
TOTAL. 261.17
*Total figure for month used rathcrthan more approptt.te figure for telesant part of month because record, of Respondent
used in making computations do not gis i1,uty.\seekh.ot other ttgutCslurperiodsot less than month.
282 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX A-3
ROY KAPLAN: Back Pay Period : Ma i, 25 .- October 23 1967 , denied Use of Car . Ma 23 . 19
GROSS DEMONSTRATOR INSI^RANCE EARNINGS INTERIM NET
COMMISSIONS C%R PRI MINIMS Al t-OLK EARNINGS EXPENSES BACKPA
Plus Plus Minus sinus Plus Equals
May 1967 521.70* 633.25
June 336.70
2dQUARTER 858.40 84 .70 633.25 240. 00 240 . 00 309.85
July 325.93
August 339.17
September 244.60
3d UARTE R 909 .70 200.20 1.975. 00 210.00
October 459.32*
4thQUARTER 459.32 46.20 53.20 239.00 213.32
TOTAL 523.17
'Total figure for month used rather than more appropriate figure for relc%ant nart of month because records of Kespondent
used in making computations do not give daily, weekly. or other figure-. for periods of less than month.
APPENDIX 4 4
PATRICK J. BLANC: Backpay period ; April 24 to September 25, 1967; denied Uses of Car, April 25, 1967.
GROSS DEMONSTRATOR INSt I+ 4Ni I EARNINGS INTERIM NIT
COMMISSIONS CAR I'RI \IIt'MS Al FOLK EARNINGS EXPENSES BACKPA
Plu. Plus Minus Minus Plus Equals
April 1967 808.64* 489.13
May 1,067 . 75 26.80**
June 811.93
2dQUARTER 2,688 . 32 425 . 30 36 .40 515 . 93 1,050 .00 1,584.09
July 667.08
August 694.17
September 500.61
3d QUARTER 1,861.86 793 .75 54 .60 3,424.00 0
TOTA L 1,584.09
*Total figure for month used rather than more appropriate figure for relevant part of month because records of Respondent
used in making computations do not rise daily, s cekh . of other figure s for pet iods of less than month
*'There is no explanation for this figure in the record . Pte.umahly Blanc recessed his commission in May for a sale made
prior to his discharge on April 24, 1967.
FOLK CHEVROLET, INC.
AI'I'I \1)IX B
COMMISSIONS I ARNFD BY "COMPARABLE " FULL-TIME SALESMEN
PERIOD
Dol
to nc
1966 130
1967 73
2d Qtr 1966 35
2d Qtr 1967 ue
3d Qtr 1966 28
3d Qtr 1967 13
Oct 1966 12
Oct 1967 6.
283
TOTAL. W. 1.. BUIRCH J. E. DIXON W. R. KERNS O. E. MOREHAR7
lars 1967 as Dollars r4 of total Dollars %of total Dollars %oftotal Dollars cJooftots
crest ri of to nearest for to nearest for to nearest for to nearest for
1 966 S 10 period $1U period $10 period $ 10 period
,310 12 ,630 9 . 7 14,100 10 .8 11,730 9.0 11,360 8.7
,710 56.6 11,220 15. 2 14,140 19 . 2 11,810 16.0 12,720 17.3
,840 3,260 9.1 3,770 10.5 2,560 7.1 3,220 9.0
,780 55.2 2,550 12.9 3,740 18.9 3,240 16.2 3,810 19.3
480 3 .860 13 .6 2,990 10.5 2,530 8.9 2,200 7.7
,700 48 .1 3,110 22.7 3,400 248 3.220 23.5 2,690 196
500 980 7.8 1,890 15.1 1,210 9.7 920 7.4
920 55.4 2300 i3.2 1,350 19.5 1,650 23.8 1,310 18.9
APPFNDIX C
1
COMMIS IONS DEMONSTRATOR I IPRI \III MS I A RI (1 K1 IIARNIVMSI EXPFNSES I BACNETKPAY
Plus Plus Minus !Minus Plus I quals
Martin .I.
'\ igbms: 2d Qtr. 317.35 317 35
3d Qtr 2,373.00 750.10 40.95 1,312.00 1,852.05
4th Qtr 971 (X) 173.10 13.65 684.00 473.75
TOTAL 2,643.15
Kenneth S
E'ana 2d Qtr. .105 .60 105.60
3d Qtr 1,980.00 249.60 1 ,519.00 710.60
4th Qtr 587.(X) 38.4() 338.00 287.40
TOTAL 1.103.60
Roy Kaplan:
2d Qtr 890.00 84 .70 240.00 240.00 974.70
3d Qtr 2, 15&00 200.20 1,975.00 210.00 593.20
4th Qtr 712.00 46.20 239.00 519.20
TOTAL. 2,087.10
Patrick J
Blanc : 2d Qtr 3,458 (X) 425.30 36.40 1,050.00 2,869.70
3d Qtr. 4,250.0() 793.75 54.60 3,424.40 1.673 95
TOTA 1. 4,543.65