Florida Steel Corporation

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 30, 1982

262 N.L.R.B. 1460 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Florida Steel Corporation and United Steelworkers
of America, AFL-CIO. Case 12-CA-6871
July 30, 1982
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
ZIMMERMAN
On August 20, 1979, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board issued its Supplemental Decision and
Order in this proceeding' in which the Board, inter
alia, granted certain additional remedies which the
Administrative Law Judge had refused to provide.
Thereafter, both Respondent and the Charging
Party Union petitioned the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia for review of
the Board's Order, and the General Counsel filed a
cross-application for enforcement of the Order. On
February 25, 1981, the court remanded the case to
the Board for further consideration and clarifica-
tion of the remedy granted therein.2
On April 22, 1981, the Board accepted the
court's remand and notified the parties that they
could file statements of position with regard to the
issues raised by the remand. Subsequently, the
General Counsel, Respondent, and the Union filed
statements of position. In addition, Respondent
filed a request for leave to file a response to the
Union's statement of position, and an attached re-
sponse. The Union also moved that the Board take
judicial notice of the June 15, 1981, decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Florida
Steel Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 648 F.2d 233 (as
amended on denial of rehearing July 28, 1981).
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the entire case in light
of the court's decision, the statements of position
on remand, the response brief and the motion, and
we now enter the following findings.3
I. THE PREVIOUS BOARD ORDER AND THE
COURT'S REMAND
In its Supplemental Decision and Order, the
Board granted extraordinary remedies in this case
for reasons explained therein. 4 The Board found
I 244 NLRB 395.
L'nited Steelworkers of .merica [Florida Steel Corporation', v. V. L R.B..
646 F.2d 616.
3 We have permitted Respondent to file its response and have fully
considered it here. We also grant the Union's motion.
4 In an earlier decision in this proceeding, Florida Steel Corporation,
235 NL RB 1010 (1979), the Board reversed the Administrative Law
Judge and found that Respondent had violated the Act as discussed.
262 NLRB No. 102
that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act by unilaterally changing the pay
rates of two employees in the bargaining unit rep-
resented by the Union at Indiantown, Florida,
without first notifying and bargaining with the
Union about the issue. Based on the rationale ex-
plained in a previous decision involving this Re-
spondent,5 the Board concluded that the usual
cease-and-desist and affirmative remedial order
would not adequately remedy the violations. The
Board stated that Respondent's "pattern of unlaw-
ful conduct" in preceding years had evidenced a
"rejection of the principles of collective bargain-
ing," of which its most recent violation was but a
continuation. 6 Thus, the Board provided for the is-
suance of a corporatewide cease-and-desist order;
corporatewide posting of the notice; the mailing
and reading of the notice to all of Respondent's
employees; and publication of the notice in all ap-
propriate publications. In addition, the Board or-
dered Respondent to permit the Union access to
any of Respondent's plants if, within 2 years of the
Order, a Board-conducted election was held at the
plant, or if Respondent gave a speech concerning
union representation to employees convened for
such a purpose. As noted above, these remedies
were deemed warranted because of Respondent's
pattern of attempting to defeat union representation
at all costs by a sustained campaign of varied and
repeated unfair labor practices at organized and un-
organized plants alike.7
Only the propriety of the Board's remedial
Order was at issue before the reviewing court. Re-
spondent contended to the court that the Board's
Order was inappropriately broad, especially the
union access requirements. The Union argued that,
in light of Florida Steel's earlier violations, the
Board's remedy insufficiently protected employee
rights under the Act and should have included ad-
ditional remedies.
The court determined that it was faced with the
difficult issue of determining the scope of the
Board's remedial authority as balanced against an
employer's right to deny a union access to its prop-
erty. The court considered whether the principles
of NL.R.B. v. The Babcock & Wilcox Company,
infra. The case was remanded to the Administrative Law Judge for fur-
ther hearing anid a decision as to whether Respondent had violated the
Act in certain other respects The Administrative Law Judge concluded
that Respondent had not further ,iolated the Act, and the Board adopted
that conclusion.
5242 NLRB 1333 (1979).
6 See 244 NLRB at 305; 242 NLRB at 1333-34.
7 For a detailed description of Respondent's unlawful conduct, see
Florida Steel Corporation, 242 NLRB at 1333-34, and cases cited therein.
See also United Steelworkers of America v. N.L.R.B., supra, 646 F.2d at
621-624, and cases cited therein at 621, fn. 9; Florida Steel Corporation v.
L. R.B., supra, 648 F2d at 237.
1460
FLORIDA STEEL CORPORATION
351 U.S. 105 (1956), affected the Board's remedial
grant of access to a union on a corporatewide basis
at unorganized plants. In so doing, the court distin-
guished between access for organizational purposes
and access as a remedy to deter employer interfer-
ence with employee rights under the Act. In the
former situation, the court held, private property
rights need not be sacrificed as long as employee
rights can be exercised through other means. As to
the latter circumstances, however, the court stated
that:
[A]ccess may be imposed as a remedial meas-
ure without a finding that the union will be
unable to reach the employees through other
available channels of communication. Instead,
the critical inquiry is whether the employer
conduct is of such a nature that access is
needed to offset harmful effects that have been
produced by that conduct. If union access is
needed to dissipate those effects, access may
be granted even though the union has alterna-
tive means of communicating with employees.
646 F.2d at 638.
The court further decided that union access may
be awarded as a remedial measure at locations
other than those where the employer engaged in its
unlawful conduct if such conduct produces a coer-
cive effect at those other plants. Such access would
also be permitted where unlawful conduct at an or-
ganized plant chills employee rights at an unorga-
nized plant.8 However, the court concluded that
the Board was required to substantiate its conclu-
sion that access was necessary to offset the conse-
quences of unlawful employer conduct. Turning to
the instant proceeding, the court determined that
the Board's analysis had been insufficient to justify
the remedial grant of access. The court stated:
Given the amount at stake in this setting, how-
ever, a conclusory statement by the Board that
access is needed to neutralize effects is not suf-
ficient to justify a grant of access. Assumptions
must be supported by evidence in the record.
The seriousness of the violations at issue must
be weighed. Where access is awarded beyond
the locations at which unfair labor practices
are found, the extent to which employees lo-
cated in other plants know, or have reason to
know, of unlawful conduct must be consid-
ered. The distance between the employer's op-
erations may be relevant. The presence or ab-
sence of union activity at various company lo-
cations is an important factor that should be
considered. In the case of a recidivist violator,
8 646 F 2d at 638. In this regard. the court noted its disagreement with
a contrary holding by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See
Florida Steel Corp. v .VL.R.B., 620 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1980).
the effect of the passage of time between vio-
lations must be evaluated. In short, we hold
that the Board must find that the employees at
those plants where access is imposed have suf-
fered coercive effects from the employer's un-
lawful conduct and that an access remedy is
necessary to cure those effects. 646 F.2d at
639.
The court remanded the case to the Board to con-
sider the remedy previously granted in light of the
court's decision. It reasoned that the Board had not
had the benefit of its guidelines and that upon
remand the Board might determine that different
remedies should be ordered to offset the effects of
Respondent's unlawful conduct. We have accepted
the court's decision as the law of the case. There-
fore, we now turn to a consideration of the facts in
light of the standard of analysis set forth by the
court.
II. THE REMEDY
A. The Positions of the Parties
Subsequent to the reviewing court's opinion, the
General Counsel, the Union, and Respondent sub-
mitted statements of position. The Union and the
General Counsel still seek here certain corpor-
atewide remedies previously ordered by the Board,
including a corporatewide cease-and-desist order,
and companywide posting, mailing, reading, and
publication of the Board's notice. However, the
Union now limits its request for access to Respond-
ent's Tampa and Jacksonville, Florida, facilities,
rather than to all of Respondent's facilities. Because
of this new, limited request, the General Counsel,
while maintaining that the Board's original remedi-
al Order was appropriate, no longer argues for cor-
poratewide access. Respondent asserts that a con-
ventional cease-and-desist order is the proper
remedy. For the reasons that follow, we believe
that union access to the Tampa and Jacksonville
facilities is appropriate." In all other respects, we
adopt our previous Order.' °
B. The Appropriateness of the Remedy
As noted above, the court propounded guidelines
for the Board to follow in determining whether
access to facilities other than the one at which Re-
spondent committed the unfair labor practice is
warranted. These guidelines, which we follow as
the law of the case, are considered below.
a Accordingly, we do not reach the issue of whether corporatewide
access would have been an appropriate remedy.
l0 Both Respondent and the Union oppose remanding this case for a
new hearing. We agree with both parties that further hearings are neither
warranted nor desirable at this stage of the proceeding.
1461
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1. The seriousness of the violations at issue
Respondent violated the Act by failing to fulfill
its statutory obligation to bargain with the Union
concerning changes in the pay rate of two employ-
ees recalled from layoff in the bargaining unit, at
Indiantown, Florida, represented by the Union.
Certainly, the bypassing of a collective-bargaining
representative by an employer is not a de minimis
violation of the Act. Indeed, Respondent does not
dispute that it violated the Act. The Board has pre-
viously stated, however, that the 8(a)(5) violation
involved here "would not, under ordinary circum-
stances, appear to justify extraordinary remedies.
." This violation, however, must be evaluat-
ed in the context of Respondent's earlier conduct,
which we now examine.
The Union was certified in May 1974 to repre-
sent the production and maintenance employees at
Respondent's Indiantown facility. Because of this
exercise of Section 7 rights by the employees, Re-
spondent refused to institute a new quarterly wage
review policy or to grant wage increases to Indian-
town employees. Respondent also denied employ-
ees there an increase for call-in pay and an increase
in Respondent's tuition refund plan. These 8(a)(1)
and (3) violations occurred in the last quarter of
1974.12 Layoffs at the Indiantown plant were ef-
fectuated in January 1975,13 and the 8(a)(5) and (1)
violation involved here took place in April 1975, a
scant few months after Respondent's first discrimi-
natory conduct. The form of these unlawful actions
was similar to the prior conduct. They both in-
volved the pay rates of employees represented by
the Union.
Further, as the reviewing court here noted, Re-
spondent has previously attempted to undercut the
Union's standing as the exclusive bargaining agent
by refusing to bargain at two other plants, where
the Union was certified, in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1).'4 Furthermore, at each of the four
plants where the Union conducted an organization-
al campaign, Respondent withheld companywide
benefits, in the manner described supra. The with-
holding of the benefits at Respondent's Croft
(Charlotte), North Carolina, plant was widely pub-
licized at the Indiantown facility in an attempt to
discourage employees at the latter facility from se-
lecting the Union.' 5 Thus, it is clear that employ-
" 244 NLRB at 395. The court of appeals characterized Respondent's
conduct as "a relatively minor violation of the Act, committed, however,
by an employer apparently dedicated to defeating the Union at all costs."
it 220 NLRB 1201 (1975), enfd. 538 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1976).
3s These layoffs were never alleged as unfair labor practices.
" See 646 F.2d at 622; 231 NLRB 923 (1977); 235 NLRB 941 (1978).
" See 220 NLRB at 266.
ees working at the Indiantown facility have been
subjected to repeated and varied unfair labor prac-
tices over the course of a relatively short period of
time. And these unfair labor practices were de-
signed to discourage employees from voting for the
Union, to penalize them for selecting the Union as
their representative, and then to undercut the
Union's status as exclusive representative. In these
circumstances, the violation here, although minor
in scope, looms much more serious than it would
were it standing alone.' 6
2. Extent of knowledge at other facilities
The evidence in cases involving this Respondent
convinces us that employees in other plants know,
or have reason to know, of Florida Steel's unlawful
conduct. The reviewing court made particular note
in its disposition of this proceeding that there had
been no evidence before it that Respondent had
ever publicized its unlawful conduct either corpor-
atewide or at any plant at which there had not
been union activity.17 Recent developments, how-
ever, demonstrate the extent to which Respond-
ent's unfair labor practices have been disseminated
to employees at all plants, including those at
Tampa and Jacksonville.
We note first, as did the court, that Respondent
itself on at least two occasions used statutory viola-
tions committed at one plant as a warning to em-
ployees at another plant. As already discussed
above, the withholding of benefits at Respondent's
Croft plant was publicized at the Indiantown
plant.' 8 In addition, employees at the Tampa facili-
ty, where the Union requests access in the instant
case, also received information calculated to dis-
courage organizational attempts at that location. In
August 1974, Respondent had warned its Tampa
employees: "Why gamble with your wages and
benefits. Don't get caught in the union trap. Wait,
watch, and see what happens in Indiantown . . .
and in Charlotte." Employees at Tampa were also
told "Don't go down the Charlotte road.""' 9 In
1974, Tampa employees saw Respondent deny
benefits to Indiantown employees because they had
selected the Union as their representative. In 1975,
Respondent unilaterally changed working condi-
tions and discriminated against employees by
adopting disparate reimbursement policies at its
Croft plant. Respondent's conduct, detailed above,
t' We are sensitive to the court's admonition regarding the invocation
of a history of past violations as justification for extraordinary remedies.
646 F.2d at 639, fn. 45. We believe the above analysis carefully takes into
account the criteria articulated by the court in its decision, and the con-
cern expressed therein.
" 646 F.2d at 641.
s 220 NLRB 260, 266.
Is 231 NLRB 923, 926.
1462
FLORIDA STEEL CORPORATION
which Tampa employees were specifically invited
to observe, violated the Act. During this timespan,
in April 1975, Respondent committed the instant
violation at the Indiantown facility which Tampa
employees had also been admonished to watch.
Additional evidence of employee knowledge
concerning Respondent's unlawful conduct was de-
tailed in a recent opinion by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. Florida Steel Corporation v.
N.L.R.B., 648 F.2d 233 (1981). In that case, the
court agreed with a Special Master's finding that
two aspects of a videotape shown by Respondent
to employees violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Therefore, the court concluded that Respondent
was in civil contempt for violating three previous
orders issued by the Fifth Circuit. 20 The facts of
that case are particularly pertinent to the issue of
knowledge and the scope of access, if any, to be
granted as a remedy in this case.
In 1976, following an organizational campaign at
Respondent's Tampa facility, Respondent decided
to produce a videotape of its campaign material to
prevent employees from signing union authoriza-
tion cards. Florida Steel's public relations manager
hired an independent advertising and public rela-
tions firm that had previously done antiunion cam-
paign work for Respondent. Respondent's vice
president for industrial relations approved the vid-
eotape, and he distributed it to Florida Steel plants
with directions that it be shown to all current and
new employees. The only employees excluded
from the showing were those represented by the
Union at Indiantown and at Croft, and those work-
ers at the Tampa plant who had already viewed
the antiunion material upon which the videotape
was based.
As discussed above, several of the messages dis-
played to employees were found to have violated
the Act, and the Company was declared to have
acted in contempt of court decrees enforcing
Board orders that Respondent not threaten its em-
ployees. One of these messages, although referring
to events which occurred from 1970 to 1972, in-
formed employees that the Company could not
grant wage increases without negotiating with "the
Union." However, as the court stated, four circuit
courts of appeals had already determined that Re-
spondent could not withhold periodic wage in-
creases based on its annual surveys. Respondent
thus drove home to almost every one of its em-
ployees its own previous unlawful conduct, and it
threatened to do more of the same. Also in the vid-
eotape presentation, Respondent specifically al-
20 221 NLRB 371 (1975). enfd. 534 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1976): 22?
NLRB 955 (1976), enfd. 536 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1976): 224 NLRB 587
(1976), enfd. 552 F 2d 368 (5th Cir 1977)
luded to the situation of the employees at Indian-
town. The court affirmed the Special Master's con-
clusion that Respondent threatened employees that
they could suffer adverse consequences with re-
spect to their employment if they signed a union
attendance roster or a union card. Thus, employees
throughout Respondent's facilities, including those
at Jacksonville and Tampa, had particular reason to
be interested in and have knowledge of, events
which happened at Indiantown, the plant involved
in the instant proceeding.
The unlawful portions of Respondent's videotape
concerning wage and benefit practices were not ex-
cised until December 1978. The segment on misuse
of employee signatures remained in the video-
tape. 2 l The inference is clear that Respondent's
contumacious conduct extended throughout 1978
and, indeed, beyond that time. Respondent's policy
was nothing less than to show the film "to all cur-
rent employees and those hired in the future." 22
Thus, we cannot accept Respondent's argument
that its employees did not know, or had no reason
to know, of the Indiantown violations because em-
ployees at Indiantown were not told of them and
Respondent did not mention it elsewhere in its pub-
lications. Respondent's own actions insured that
employees throughout its system would focus on
events at Indiantown. Indeed, employees at Jack-
sonville, at Tampa, and elsewhere have been ad-
vised by Respondent to take account of the fate of
Indiantown employees. We think it reasonable to
presume that knowledge of the unfair labor prac-
tices would be communicated to, or learned by,
employees. Further, Respondent's own actions give
rise to the assumption that they have had a chilling
effect on employees companywide.
3. The distance between operations
In addition to its Indiantown plant, Respondent
operates Florida facilities at Tampa, Jacksonville,
Miami, Fort Meyers, and Orlando. These plants are
all within 300 miles of Indiantown, and the Tampa
and Jacksonville plants are located approximately
230 and 300 miles from Indiantown, respectively.
The Company also has facilities in Charlotte
(Croft) and Raleigh, North Carolina; Atlanta,
Georgia; Aiken, South Carolina; and New Orleans,
Louisiana. Organizational activity has occurred at
the Croft plant, and at Tampa, Jacksonville, and
Indiantown. Although it appears, as Respondent
argues, that Indiantown is a relatively isolated loca-
tioon in Florida, we cannot agree with its assertion
that Florida Steel employees located elsewhere are
2 See 648 F.2d at 239-240.
" Id. at 236.
1463
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
likely to be unaware of violations committed at In-
diantown. For the relevant history reveals, as de-
veloped above, that Respondent has specifically di-
rected its employees' attention to events at Indian-
town. This happened with respect to the Tampa
employees in 1977,23 and with respect to all em-
ployees, except those represented by the Union at
Croft and Indiantown, as described in the recent
Fifth Circuit contempt proceedings.
4. Existence of union activity and the passage
of time between violations
As noted, organizational activity has been under-
taken by the Union at four of Respondent's loca-
tions: Croft, Indiantown, Tampa, and Jacksonville.
At each plant, Respondent waged a "tough, pro-
longed campaign" against the Union, which includ-
ed the commission of numerous unfair labor prac-
tices at each facility. 2 4 Respondent avers that there
has been no significant union activity at unorga-
nized plants since the 1976 election at its Tampa fa-
cility. Based on this fact, Respondent asserts that
union access to employees at unorganized plants is
unwarranted because the Union has no special in-
terest in the employees and since such access
would have no additional remedial effect for a vio-
lation occurring in 1975 at Indiantown. Respondent
further argues that no charges of unfair labor prac-
tices have been sustained against it since 1976, and
that this "improved record and the remoteness of
the Company's past violations" indicates that any
coercive or chilling effect on employees has been
dissipated. This is especially so, according to Re-
spondent, because of the remedial measures already
ordered by the Board.
The General Counsel asserts that there was no
passage of time between the violation at Indian-
town and other of Respondent's violations. The
General Counsel argues that the instant violation,
which occurred in 1975, was committed during the
"prime law breaking years" for Respondent--1974,
1975, and 1976. Both the General Counsel and the
Union direct attention to Respondent's contuma-
cious behavior as found by the Fifth Circuit as a
further indication of Respondent's unlawful con-
duct during the period under consideration. In ad-
dition, the Union contends that organizational ac-
tivity at Tampa and Jacksonville was the special
focus of Respondent's concern. It notes that Tampa
and Jacksonville employees have been subjected,
among other things, to coercive interrogation, sur-
veillance, discharge, and the withholding of wages
as See 231 NLRB 923, 926.
24 See cases referred to supra at fn. 7. See also Steelworkers. supra, 646
F.2d at 622.
and benefits. 2 5 According to the Union, these facts,
coupled with those previously articulated supra,
support the need of union access to Tampa and
Jacksonville to remedy Respondent's unlawful con-
duct. We agree.
Respondent's arguments concerning the lack of
union activity and its own lack of unlawful con-
duct strike a hollow note when played against the
overwhelming evidence of its continual unlawful
responses to union activity. We are mindful of the
court's admonition that "history alone cannot justi-
fy" corporatewide access unless "it is reasonably
foreseeable that the employees at . . . other loca-
tions have suffered coercive effects from the em-
ployer's conduct and that an access remedy is nec-
essary to cure those effects."2 6 We note, however,
that the lapse of time between when the violation
under consideration here was committed and the
current date is in large part a function of the legal
process. Respondent availed itself of the time after
it had committed the violation here to continue to
disseminate by videotape its unlawful messages to
virtually all of its employees. Furthermore, the
Company's unfair labor practice here came at a
time when it was committing various other unfair
labor practices. In such circumstances, we presume
that such an unfair labor practice will have a great-
er impact than it otherwise might have had, and
that its effect will linger beyond the time it normal-
ly would. Employees at Tampa, who were instruct-
ed to observe events at Indiantown, as well as em-
ployees at Jacksonville, could not help but be im-
pressed with Respondent's antiunion attitude and
unlawful conduct. Such employees will surely re-
member, if this Union or another were to under-
take an organizational campaign, Respondent's pre-
vious unlawful course of conduct. Indeed, all of
Respondent's employees are on notice of Respond-
ent's commitment to flouting this nation's labor
laws, as attested to by the recent Fifth Circuit con-
tempt proceeding.
Moreover, the mere passage of time does not
inure to Respondent's benefit. Respondent is, of
course, free to campaign against unionism. Howev-
er, it has committed itself to coercive means to
reach that end. We refuse to infer, as Respondent
would have us do, that the recent lack of unfair
'5 See Florida Steel Corporation, 215 NLRB 97 (1974) (Tampa), enfd. in
part 529 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1976), supplemented 234 NLRB 1089 (1977),
enfd. 586 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1978); Florida Steel Corporation, 220 NLRB
225 (1975) (Tampa), enfd. in part 544 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1977); Florida
Steel Corporation, 221 NLRB 371 (1975) (Tampa), enfd. 534 F.2d 1405
(5th Cir. 1976); Florida Steel Corporation; 224 NLRB 45 (1976) (Tampa);
Florida Steel Corporation, 224 NLRB 587 (1976) (Tampa), enfd. 552 F.2d
368 (5th Cir. 1977); Florida Steel Corporation, 222 NLRB 955 (1975)
(Jacksonville), enfd. 536 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1976); Florida Steel Corpora-
tion, 223 NLRB 174 (1976) (Jacksonville).
2' 646 F.2d at 641.
1464
FLORIDA STEEL CORPORATION
labor practices committed by it indicates an "im-
proved record" by this recidivist. It is more reason-
able to conclude, given Respondent's continual pat-
tern of unlawful behavior, that Respondent's un-
lawful conduct has eviscerated its employees' full
exercise of Section 7 rights so as to make Respond-
ent's unlawful conduct unnecessary over the last
few years. This pattern teaches that if the Union
were to begin anew organizational activity at any
plant, the Company would respond as it has in the
past. Indeed, Respondent's contumacious conduct
is proof of its disregard not only of the orders of
this Board, but those of the courts as well. Despite
its corporatewide posting and mailing of notices to
remedy past violations, Respondent has repeatedly
engaged in like or related conduct. In so describing
Respondent's past conduct, we are not elevating it
to paramount consideration in deciding the appro-
priate remedy here. Rather, we are drawing infer-
ences which we believe are reasonable in light of
this Respondent's propensity to engage in unlawful
conduct, in order to assess properly the corpor-
atewide effect of Respondent's conduct and the
need to remedy that conduct on a corporatewide
basis. We are not seeking to punish Respondent
merely to deter future violations. We are of the
opinion, however, that it is reasonably foreseeable
that employees working for Respondent have suf-
fered coercive effects because of Respondent's mis-
conduct, and the history surrounding such miscon-
duct is relevant in ascertaining such effects and the
appropriate remedy.
C. Summary: The Appropriate Remedy
The court itself stated that the Board is "clearly
entitled, in shaping its remedial order in this case,
to consider the extensive record of past unlawful
activity of Florida Steel." 646 F.2d at 640. As can
be observed from the above, Respondent has con-
tinually sought to use its unlawful conduct at one
plant to vitiate the rights of employees at another.
Respondent cannot now profess that its conduct
has had no effect on its employees. We agree with
the argument that the Board must provide broad
remedies to assure Respondent's employees that
their Section 7 rights, long the subject of attack,
will be protected. Specifically, we again note that
Respondent recently has been found in contempt of
court by committing unfair labor practices at
almost all of its plants. Further, Respondent has
concentrated antiunion efforts wherever and when-
ever the Union has attempted to organize employ-
ees, including those at Tampa and Jacksonville.
The harmful effects of such violations are plain.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we believe
that certain companywide remedies are necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act. Corporatewide
mailing, posting, and publication of the Board's
notice will be ordered. Respondent officials will
also be ordered to read the notice to a gathering of
its employees. These remedies will assure, in a
manner commensurate with Respondent's own far-
reaching tactics, that employees will have the ful-
lest opportunity to hear from Respondent that their
Section 7 rights will be protected. Furthermore,
we shall also provide for access by the Union limit-
ed to Respondent's Tampa and Jacksonville facili-
ties. As the Union has cogently argued, the em-
ployees at these facilities have borne the brunt of
Respondent's unfair labor practices. The access or-
dered here is not burdensome. It requires Respond-
ent -to relinquish some time and space to the Union
so that information may be imparted and employe;
apprehension of retaliation be dissipated.2 7 Such
remedies restore the parties to the status quo ante,
and ensure that the rights of employees will be
protected. 2 8
Accordingly, we reaffirm our previous order in
this case, except that the access ordered will be
limited to the Tampa and Jacksonville facilities. 2 9
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Florida Steel Corporation, Indiantown, Florida, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Unilaterally changing the pay rates of em-
ployees within the bargaining unit represented by
United Steelworkers of America at Indiantown,
Florida, without first notifying and consulting with
United Steelworkers of America.
(b) In any other manner refusing or failing to
bargain with the Union or interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them under the Act.
27 We are sensitive to the court's concern that advantages are granted
to the Union which competing unions, if any, are not given Ho. ever. ias
we have stated in the past, we need not consider such hypotheticals at
this time. Florida Steel Corporation, 242 NLRB at 1334. fn II.
28 We recognize that in the recent Fifth Circuit contempt case. the
court did not provide, inter alia, corporatewide mailing, reading, or
access In this regard, we note that the reviewing court here has stated
that it differs from the Fifth Circuit on the question of union access 646
F.2d at 638; compare Florida Steel Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 620 F.2d 79
(5th Cir. 1980). Moreover, the Board. although not the court. believed
such remedies were necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act be-
cause of Respondent's contumacious behavior. That such remedies s ere
not granted in that case does not mean they are not warranted here
29 As it did previously before both the Board and the court. the Unionl
argues that certain additional remedies are necessary here. The Union
specifically requests bulletin-board privileges, and a list of names and ad-
dresses of employees at Tampa and Jacksonville While the Board has
granted such remedies before. see John Singer. Inc. 197 NLRB 88 (1972).
we do not believe they are necessary here.
1465
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Make whole A. F. McCammon and B. W.
McDonald for losses resulting from unilateral
changes in their pay rates upon their recall in 1975.
(b) Mail a copy of the attached notice marked
"Appendix" 3 0 to each and every employee
throughout its corporate facilities, post copies at
each of its corporate facilities, and include it in ap-
propriate company publications. Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 12, after being duly signed by Re-
spondent's representative, shall be posted by Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Convene during working time all employees
at each of its plants throughout its corporate facili-
ties, either by shifts or departments, or otherwise,
and have a responsible official of Respondent, at
department supervisor level or above, read to the
assembled employees the contents of the attached
appendix.
(d) If, within the next 2 years following entry of
this Order, the Board schedules an election in
which the Union is a participant at Respondent's
Tampa or Jacksonville, Florida. plant, then, upon
request by the Union, afford at least two repre-
sentatives reasonable access to Respondent's said
plant or plants to deliver a 30-minute speech to em-
ployees on working time, the date thereof to be
within 10 working days before but not within 48
hours prior to any such election.
2O IIn the event that this Order Is enforced hy .i Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the wcirds in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National .;abor Relations Bo)ard" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Coult of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of trh National l.ahor Relation, Boarl-d
(e) In the event that during a period of 2 years
following entry of this Order, any supervisor or
agent of Respondent convenes any group of em-
ployees at Respondent's Tampa or Jacksonville,
Florida, plant and addresses them on the question
of union representation, give the Union reasonable
notice thereof and afford two union representatives
a reasonable opportunity to be present at such
speech, and, upon request of said representatives,
permit one of them to address the employees for
the same amount of time as Respondent's address.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 12,
in writing, within 20 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT change the pay rates of em-
ployees in the bargaining unit represented by
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO,
without first notifying and consulting with the
Union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner refuse to
bargain with the Union or interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them under the Act.
WE WILL make whole A. F. McCammon
and B. W. McDonald for losses in the unilater-
al changes in their pay rates upon their recall
in 1975.
WE WILL send to all our employees copies
of this notice; WE WILL read this notice to all
our employees; and WE WILL grant the Union,
as ordered, speaking opportunities at our
plants in Tampa and Jacksonville, Florida.
FLORIDA STEEL CORPORATION
1466