Fire Alert Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMay 28, 1970

182 N.L.R.B. 910 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

910 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Fire Alert Co. and International Brotherhood of Team- sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America , Local Union No. 452. Cases 27-CA-2657 and 27-CA-2731 May 28, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On February 2, 1970, Trial Examiner Alvin Lieberman issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor practices and recommended dismissal of these allegations. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep- tions to the Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in con- nection with these cases to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Exam- iner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and except as modified herein,' hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent Fire Alert Co., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening employees with any form of reprisal, including the removal of the plant from Denver, Colora- do, and the imposition of stricter rules or practices than are presently in effect concerning tardiness, coffee- breaks, or any other condition of employment; or from effectuating any such threat, in order to induce employ- ees to refrain from becoming members of, or giving assitance or support to, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 452, or any other labor organization. (b) Threatening employees that the Denver, Colorado, plant will be closed or that its president would quit his job in order to induce employees to refrain from becoming members of,, or giving assistance or support to, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 452, or any other labor organization. (c) Dominating or interfering with the administration of, or contributing financial or other assistance or support to, the Committee elected by its employees on or about January 29, 1969, or any other labor organization. (d) Discharging, or otherwise discriminating against, any employee for giving testimony under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or for filing charges under said Act with the National Labor Relations Board. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi- zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in conformity with Section 8(a)(3) of said Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Withdraw and withhold recognition from, and com- pletely disestablish, the Committee elected by its employ- ees on or about January 29, 1969. (b) Delete from the document promulgated by it, enti- tled "FIRE ALERT COMPANY POLICIES AND CON- DITIONS OR EMPLOYMENT HOURLY EMPLOY- EES," the section headed by the words "EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION." (c) Offer to Betty J. Armstrong immediate and full reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole, in the manner set forth in the section of the Trial Examiner's Decision entitled "The Remedy" for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the discrimination practiced against her. (d) Notify Betty J. Armstrong if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of her right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (e) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (f) Post at its premises copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice, on forms ' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the We have revised the Trial Examiner ' s Recommended Order and United States Court of Appeals, the words in the Notice reading "Posted Notice to Employees to conform them to court and Board precedent by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted 182 NLRB No. 133 FIRE ALERT CO 911 provided by the Regional Director for Region 27, after being duly signed by Respondent ' s authorized represent- ative , shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecu- tive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material (g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 27, in writing, within 10 days from the receipt of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that paragraphs V, V(a), VII, IX, and X of the complaint in Case 27-CA-2731 be, and they hereby are, dismissed pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial in which all parties had the opportunity to present their evidence , it has been found that we violated the law and we have been ordered to post this notice and we intend to carry out the order of the Board and abide by the following WE WILL NOT threaten to do, or do, any of the following things to prevent you from joining, signing a card for, attending meetings of, supporting or helping in any way International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No 452, or any other union, or because you have already done so Make stricter rules than we now have as to coffeebreaks Make stricter rules than we now have as to latenesses Move our plant from Denver to some other city WE WILL NOT threaten to close our plant to prevent you from joining , signing a card for , attend- ing meetings of supporting or helping in any way International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No 452, or any other union, or because you have already done so Our president, Donald G Stroh, WILL NOT threat- en to quit his job as president of Fire Alert Co to prevent you from joining , signing a card for, attending meetings of, supporting , or helping in any way International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No 452, or any other union WE WILL NOT dominate , control , dictate to mix in the affairs of, or assist in any way your Commit- tee, and we will not do so in connection with any other committee or union Because it has been found that we did these things in relation to your Committee , we will immediately do the following Stop recognizing the Committee as your repre- sentative Stop dealing with the Committee in every respect Discontinue and disestablish the Committee WE WILL NOT fire, layoff, suspend, or in any other way discriminate against any employee because he or she appears as a witness in a trial or hearing before a Trial Examiner or any other officer of the National Labor Relations Board, and we will not fire , lay off, suspend , or in any other way discriminate against any employee because he or she makes a complaint to, or files charges or any other papers with , the National Labor Rela- tions Board or assists in any investigation under- taken by the National Labor Relations Board Because it has been found that we discriminated against Betty J Armstrong by firing her for being a witness in the trial of a case brought against us before a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, we will immediately offer to put Betty J Armstrong back to work at her old job or, if that job no longer exists, to a job just like her old job and we will pay Betty J Armstrong for any wages she lost because we fired her WE WILL strike out of the document called "FIRE ALERT COMPANY POLICIES AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR HOUR- LY EMPLOYEES," which we distributed to employees , that section beginning with the headline words "EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION " WE WILL notify Betty J Armstrong if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of her right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended , after discharge from the Armed Forces WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce you in the exercise of any rights guaranteed to you by the National Labor Relations Act In this connection , we will respect your rights to self-organization , to form , join, or assist any union , to bargain collectively through any union or representative of your choice as to wages, hours of work, and any other term or condition of employ- ment You also have the right , which we will also respect , to refrain from doing so All our employees are free to become or remain, or not to become or remain , members of International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehousemen 912 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 452, or any other union. FIRE ALERT CO. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, New Custom House, Room 260, 721 19th Street, Denver, Colorado 80202, Telephone 303-297-3551. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ALVIN LIEBERMAN, Trial Examiner: The trial in this proceeding, with all parties except the charging party represented, was held before me in Denver, Colorado, on June 10 and 11, and Septermber 16, 17, 18, and 19, 19691 upon the General Counsel's complaints, dated April 10 and July 142 and respondent's separate answer to each complaint.-3 In general, the issues litigated were whether respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein called the Act). Particularly, the questions for decision are as follows: 1. Did respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employees with plant closure or with changes in existing conditions of employment?4 2. Did respondent violate Section 8(a)(2) of the Act in connection with its relationship to a committee of employees (herein called the Committee)? Subsidiarily, in this regard, was the Committee, at times material to this proceeding, a labor organization within the mean- ing of the Act? 3. Did respondent violate Section 8(a)(l), (3), or (4) of the Act by discharging Betty Armstrong?5 All dates subsequently mentioned without stating a year fall within 1969 ' The two complaints will sometimes be referred to individually as the first complaint and second complaint or collectively as the complaint The separate answers to these complaints will be referred to similarly The first complaint was issued on a charge filed on February 17 The second complaint was issued on a charge and amended charges filed, respectively, on June 12, June 19, and July 9 All charges were filed by International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehouse- men and Helpers of America, Local Union No 452 8 During the trial amendments were made to the second set of plead- ings . Thus, par IV of the second complaint was amended to include in the list of persons alleged to be supervisors the name "Al Talbott- Sales Manager," and par. 4 of the second answer was amended to admit all the allegations of par. IV, as amended , of the second complaint. Finally, par. 8 of the second answer was amended to deny so much of par VIII of the second complaint as alleged the discharge of Terry Padilla During the trial par V(e) of the first complaint which alleged other threats, and par V(c) and (f) of that complaint which alleged interrogation violations of Sec. 8(a)(I) were dismissed During the trial par V(b), (c), (d), and (e) and VIII(a) of the Upon the entire record," upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, and upon careful consideration of the arguments made? and the briefs submitted by the General Counsel and respond- ent," I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT" 1. JURISDICTION Respondent, a Colorado corporation"' whose principal place of business is located in Denver, Colorado, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of electronic equip- ment. Respondent annually ships products valued at more than $50,000 to customers located outside the State of Colorado. Accordingly, I find that respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that the assertion of jurisdiction over this matter by the National Labor Relations Board (herein called the Board) is warranted. Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, 85. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 452 (herein called the Union), is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act." As is more fully set forth below the Committee was elected by employees of respondent, is composed of such employees, and was formed to deal with respondent concerning employees' work-related grievances. I con- clude, therefore, that, like the Union, the Committee is also a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Company, etc., 360 U.S. 203, 213.12 second complaint were dismissed insofar as they alleged that the dis- charge of employees other than Armstrong violated Sec 8(a)(I) and (4) ` Issued simultaneously is a separate order correcting obvious inadvert- ent errors in the stenographic transcript of this proceeding ' Although all the arguments of the General Counsel and respondent in support of their respective positions , whether appearing in their briefs or made orally during the trial, will not be discussed in this Decision, each has been weighed and studied " Upon due deliberation, the General Counsel's motion to strike respondent's brief is denied " Respondent 's motions to dismiss the complaints made on June II and September 19 upon which decisions were reserved are disposed of in accordance with the findings and conclusions set forth in this Decision. "' Respondent is a wholly owned subsidiary of Walter Kidde and Company, Inc , whose headquarters are in Belleville , New Jersey " As defined in Sec. 2(5) a labor organization is "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan , in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part , of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes , wages, rates of pay, hours of employment , or conditions of work " " Respondent contends that the Committee is not a labor organization Its principal argument in support of this position is that the Committee has not engaged in collective bargaining and was not established for this purpose. An identical argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Cabot Carbon. In addition, respondent urges me to consider certain other facts; namely, that the Committee has no constitution or bylaws, does not meet regularly , and does not require the payment of dues FIRE ALERT CO. 913 III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction Briefly, this case concerns itself with three matters: statements made by Donald Stroh, respondent's presi- dent; respondent's relationship to the Committee; and respondent's discharge of Betty Armstrong. The General Counsel contends that Stroh' s statements were threats uttered to forestall the organization of respondent's employees by the Union and, therefore, violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act; that respondent dominated and interfered with the Committee in violation of Section 8(a)(2); and that Armstrong's discharge falls within the ambit of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4).13 Respondent has taken issue with the General Counsel on all these points. Insofar as the first is concerned, Respondent ' s position is that Stroh 's statements were privileged and not violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respecting the Committee, respondent's main argu- ment, that the Committee is not a labor organization within the meaning of the Act, has already been rejected. Alternatively, respondent argues that the Committee was voluntarily organized by its employees and not dealt with in a manner which contravened Section 8(a)(2). Finally, respondent asserts that it discharged Armstrong for a variety of reasons, none of which are proscribed by the Act. B. Preliminary Findings[' dent, holds a patent. The components for these devices are assembled on boards by female employees, groups of whom work at tables located in a large room. The assembled units are commonly termed boards in respond- ent's plant and will be so referred to in this Decision. Upon completion of the assembly work the boards are tested. Where a defect is found in a board it is returned to the employee who assembled it for correction. Assembling a board involves, among other things, the snipping of wires. Employees are instructed to per- form this operation so as to cause the cut ends of the wires to fall into receptacles provided for that pur- pose and not to permit them to fly about the room or to accumulate on the floor. These instructions, howev- er, are not always complied with by all assemblers. Respondent's employees engaged in assembly work are hourly rated. Notwithstanding the absence of an incentive system, assemblers are expected to produce, as a group, a daily average of 25 boards per employee. In this regard, Betty Armstrong, whose discharge is alleged to have been violative of the Act, was one of respondent's best assembly workers, having turned out well in excess of 25 boards a day. In June respondent found itself with a large inventory of boards and a paucity of orders from customers. Accordingly, to avoid a layoff supervisors were directed to be liberal in granting employees' request for time off. In this regard, as Al Talbott, respondent's sales manager, testified, during this period people were "encouraged . . . to take off, if [they had] any [personal] business to conduct." 1. Respondent 's product , manufacturing methods, and business conditions in June Among the products manufactured by respondent are fire alarm devices for which Stroh, respondent's presi- or initiation fees by respondent' s employees The absence of such formalism , however, does not deprive a body in which employees participate of status as a labor organization within the meaning of the Act if other elements set forth in Sec 2(5) are present Walker Process Equipment Inc , 163 NLRB 615, 616, 620 " In pertinent part these sections provide: Sec 8 (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (1) to interfere with, restrain , or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7, (2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it. . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza- tion (4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act, Sec. 7, insofar as relevant , provides as follows: Sec. 7 Employees shall have the right to self -organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. " The purpose of these findings is to furnish a frame of reference within which to consider the facts relating to respondent ' s alleged unfair labor practices and the conclusions to which they may give rise. To the extent that the contentions of'the parties relate specifically to the findings made here they will be treated here , although they may again be considered in other contexts 2. Respondent's employees, their relationship to each other, and some conditions under which they worked The evidence makes clear that there was a lack of harmony among respondent's assemblers. There were repeated references by witnesses including Stroh, respondent's president, to trouble and troublemaking in the assembly room. In this regard, respondent asserts on brief that one of the grounds for Armstrong's dis- charge was "her failure to discontinue the role of trouble- maker." Respondent's assemblers, all women, fall into two ethnic groups. Most of them are white, about half being of Spanish-American extraction. A few, about four, are black. There was much bickering and gossip within and among these various groups. Thus, as Shirley Howell, a former employee of respondent, testified, the employ- ees would "run someone else down constantly." Some would complain about being outproduced by others. There was "hackling" and "stab[bing] . . . in the back. . . . If your hair is blond, you bleached your hair blond; well, you're terrible, and it goes on and on." Employees would not only complain about being out- produced by others, but would also do so about rejected boards returned to them for correction. Some, as Stroh, respondent's president, testified, would even accuse oth- ers of "sabotaging [their] boards to make [them] look bad." 914 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Furthermore, assemblers would snip wires in a manner which would cause them to hit other employees As Stroh related in this connection, "when one of these wires are snipped and they hit you it's about like being his with a BB Girls have a nice little habit of aiming these things " There was also bickering between the Spanish-Ameri- can employees on the one hand and the black employees on the other, particularly about the use of a telephone located in the assembly room Each group would accuse the other of excessive use of this telephone In this and in the matter of rejected boards, Stroh stated that Armstrong, who is herself of Spanish-American extrac- tion, was "pretty much the spokesman for all the Spanish girls at her table " Employees in the assembly room worked under the immediate supervision of a leadgirl " Employees who desire to take off for any reason are required to obtain permission from their leadgirl Requests for time off by leadgirls must be approved by persons higher up in respondent's supervisory hierarchy, including Jacque- line Cameron, respondent's office manager While daylight saving time is in effect employees start work at 7 a in During other times of the year the starting time is 8 a in Although there is a formal break at 9 30 a in , employees may, without penalty, stop work to get coffee at any time Likewise, there seems to be no special penalty for tardiness The assembly, and other hourly rated, employees are required to punch a timeclock at the beginning and end of each workday They are also required to punch the timeclock if they leave respondent's premises for lunch 3 The Union' s organizing campaign About mid-January the Union began to seek members among respondent's employees As will be seen, the Union's efforts in this regard had an impact on respon- dent Insofar as the employees were concerned the Union s campaign generated much talk, but evoked little enthusiasm To the extent shown by the record only one employee, Armstrong, signed an authorization card She also spoke to about 10 employees respecting the Union and about having them meet with a representative of the Union Whether the meeting which Armstrong sought to bring about was ever held does not appear from the evidence The Committee was established on January 29 Wheth- er for this reason, or whatever the reason, there is no doubt that, as put by Stroh, respondent's president, the "Union became a dead issue by the end of January " " As will be more fully set forth below in April two employees Armstrong and Rose Dubray were made leadgirls in the assembly room Armstrong was demoted on May 28 and resumed her status as a rank and file employee Dubray however continued to serve as leadgirl C Facts Concerning Respondent's Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act Unrelated to Armstrong's Discharge The complaint alleges that respondent violated section 8(a)(l) of the Act by warning "its employees that [it] would change existing conditions of employment by modifying [its] rules with regard to tardiness and by discontinuing the past practice of providing employees with free coffee," and by threatening to close "its Denver, Colorado, operation if its employees gave assist- ance or support to the Union " Testimony concerning these allegations was given by Armstrong, Howell, a former employee, and Stroh, respondent's president While there appear to be conflicts between the testimony given by Armstrong and Howell, on the one hand, and that given by Stroh, on the other, the conflicts seem to be more apparent than real Armstrong and Howell related that at meetings with employees held on about January 25 and 29 Stroh made threatening statements respecting tardiness, coffee, and the closing of respondent's plant Stroh did not deny that he spoke to respondent's employees on the same subjects His testimony, however, contains qualifying glosses which, in some cases, were not mentioned by Armstrong or Howell Respondent urges me to disregard the testimony given by Armstrong and Howell and rely only on that given by Stroh This, I will do My doing so, however, is not to say that I consider Armstrong and Howell to be unworthy of belief It is merely to say that my findings on this branch of the case will be based only on evidence given by Stroh The meetings in question were held while the Union's membership campaign, rumor of which had come to Stroh's attention, was in progress The "topic of the meeting[s]" was to remind the employees "of the advantages they [then] had compared to what they would have if they were Union" and had to work under a union contract In this regard, Stroh called the attention of the employees to three matters, lateness- es, coffeebreaks, and respondent's economic condition As to the first, Stroh stated that "many girls have been late many times with no reprisal whatsoever," but that "if they wanted to go right by the book that then if they went Union, then they'd get a warning each time, and after the third time of being late they would be fired " Concerning coffeebreaks, Stroh told the employees that "if we went Union," the existing practice of having "coffee any time [at] any hour of the day would be discontinued and they would go on a regular coffee break [at] a certain period in the afternoon " Also, in the general context of the "topic of the meeting[s]," namely, a comparison of the advantages the employees then enjoyed with "what they would have if they were Union," Stroh, respondent's president, First complaint par V(a) (b) and (d) " The quotations appearing in this and the following two paragraphs are taken from testimony given by Stroh respondent s president FIRE ALERT CO discussed respondent's economic condition In this regard, Stroh first ' reminded' the employees that respondent had not increased its prices for 3 years He then stated that "if we had to raise prices and would lose our competitive standing, undoubtedly pro- duction would go down, and if this were the case and it became a not as profitable operation as it now is, very probably the plant would be moved to Belleville, New Jersey "I' Furthermore, and in this vein, Stroh remarked that ' if the Union came in [he] personally would quit, because financially [he did] not need the job D Contentions and Concluding Findings Concerning Respondent's Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act Unrelated to Armstrong's Discharge Respondent makes a two fold attack on the complaint's allegation that it violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in the manner here under consideration It contends, first, that Stroh, its president, did not threaten to close the plant, or to change working conditions upon the advent of the Union, but was merely making predictions as to the consequences of the organization of respond- ent's employees by the Union Respondent's second contention, dependent in part on its first, is that Stroh's statements concerning changes in respondent's practices as to coffeebreaks, latenesses, and the movement of the plant to New Jersey, should the Union become the collective-bargaining agent for the employees, were privileged as free speech I reject both arguments Stroh's statements were, in my opinion, little more than the most thinly veiled threats, rather than predictions,"' as respondent con- tends, that, if the Union succeeded in its efforts to become the employees' bargaining agent, respondent would move its plant from Denver to Belleville, New Jersey, or, less drastically, impose stricter working condi- tions respecting latenesses and coffeebreaks Such threats, it is well settled, do violence to the rights guaranteed to employees in Section 7 of the Act, and, consequently, contravene Section 8(a)(1) Even had Stroh not uttered these implicit threats but had only said at meetings called by him to advise employees of working conditions which might be expect- ed should the employees choose the Union as their representative that in that event he would "quit, because financially [he did] not need the job," a finding that Section 8(a)(l) of the Act had been violated would be warranted This, "because the tendency of such statements may reasonably be expected to have inter- '" It will be remembered that the headquarters of respondent s parent corporation Walter Kidde and Company Inc are in Belleville New Jersey ,x When statements [as to the consequences which might follow adherence to a union ] are made by [the president of a corporation] who has the power to change prophecies into realities such statements whether couched in language of probability or certainty tend to impede and coerce employees in their right of self organization and therefore constitute unfair labor practices N L R B v Nabors etc 196 F 2d 272 276 (C A 5) 915 fered with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act Uranga, etc , 173 NLRB No 99 The threats made by Stroh, respondent's president, defeat respondent's free speech argument As respondent recognizes on brief, "an employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism or any particular union so long as the communications do not contain a threat of reprisal "[Emphasis supplied ] Accordingly, I conclude that by threats that existing practices concerning tardiness and coffeebreaks would be made stricter, that respondent's plant would be moved to Belleville, New Jersey, and that Stroh would quit his job, should employees assist or support the Union, respondent committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act E Facts Concerning Respondent 's Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act Having heard rumors of the Union's organizing cam- paign, Stroh, respondent's president, convened a meeting of all hourly rated employees on January 29 As Stroh testified, he "told" and "instruct[ed]" the assembled employees "to go to another location in [respondent's] plant where the supervisors would be absent" and there "elect a committee of three employees " As to the function to be performed by the Committee which the employees were directed to elect, Stroh, as he further related, informed the employees that its "purpose was to present employee grievances and complaints to the management " Stroh also told the employees that later in the day he would confer with the Committee which they would select Stroh's reason for meeting with the Committee, as he put it, was that he "wanted a representation of all the employees through these three committee members to come to the office at which [he] and Al Talbott, the Sales Manager, were present for purposes of finding out just what the grievances were Concerning the import of the words he used in connec- tion with the Committee's election, Stroh testified that they were intended as "a suggestion" rather than a "mandatory order from management " It does not appear, however, that the employees were informed of this In accordance with Stroh's instructions, the employees elected three of their number to serve as their Committee At the same time the employees discussed among them- selves the matters which the Committee should raise at its forthcoming meeting, which was held as announced, with Stroh Among these were wage increases, sick leave, vacations, seniority, job classifications, overtime, bonuses and coffeebreaks Shortly after the Committee had been selected Talbott, respondent's sales manager, assigned each employee to a particular committee member A notice setting forth these assignments was posted on respondent's bulletin board Employees were thereafter required to take up grievances and complaints related to their employment only with their assigned committee member 916 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Shortly after the January 29 meeting between the Committee and Stroh, respondent's president, respon- dent issued to employees a draft copy of a document entitled "FIRE ALERT COMPANY POLICIES AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR HOURLY EMPLOYEES' (herein called Company Policy), with instructions that within 3 days it be reviewed by the recipients and discussed by them with their respective committee members .2" The draft Company Policy set forth the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment which would obtain in respondent's plant after February 17. It also contained the following provi- sions: EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 1,. Purpose: A committee to act as an individual or collective voice for all hourly employees. Com- mittee members will meet with Company represent- atives to help formulate policy, alter existing policy, or voice employee grievances. Committee members are bound by the interests of the employees regard- less of their personal inclinations. 2. Committee to consist of three hourly employ- ee's [sic] chosen by write-in ballot. All employees having served probationary period are eligible to serve. The three employees receiving highest num- ber of votes shall serve as committee members for a period of one year. A tie in voting shall be reconciled by subsequent ballots. 3. The Company shall post and update as neces- sary a list showing the equal distribution of commit- tee member representation. (i.e. each employee shall be assigned a committee member as their representative) 4. All actions pertaining to committee selection, committee-employee meetings, or committee-Com- pany meetings shall be conducted on Company premises and Company time. 5. The Company is bound to grant Committee- employee or Committee-Company meeting time within 24 hours after request has been made. 6. Committee members may resign at any time. Election time to fill committee vacancies shall be granted by the Company within 24 hours. 7. A simple majority of all employees shall be required to hold' unscheduled elections for the pur- pose of recalling any committee member. Majority shall be determined by signature petition which may be circulated by any employee. The members of the Committee after considering the draft Company Policy, with the employees in their individual groups met again with Stroh, twice before February 17. The discussion at these meetings related to the reaction of respondent's employees to the contents of the draft. 21 Whether the draft Company Policy was issued to all employees or only to committee members is not too clear It appears, however, from the tenor of testimony on this subject and from the text of the document itself, which is in evidence as G C Exh 2 and 5(A), that each employee received a copy At one of these meetings that section of the draft headed "EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION," the terms of which appear above, was briefly mentioned. However, Barbara Woolfolk, a member of the Commit- tee who was present at the time, testified that she did not remember what was said on this subject.21 A few days before February 17, on which date the Company Policy, as ultimately promulgated by respond- ent, became effective, copies, in final form, were distrib- uted to employees. The provisions of this document were still in effect at the time of the trial in this case. Although differing in some respects from those which were set forth in the earlier draft, no difference appears in the "EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION" section. Concerning the relationship of respondent's employees toward the Committee, Woolfolk, a committee member, testified that no employee made a direct complaint to her about the manner in which the Committee was selected. She further testified that, although the employ- ees could "disestablish [the] committee if they wanted to by a majority vote," she didn't know whether "they want to disestablish [the] committee." Betty Armstrong also gave testimony22 in this regard. She stated that she did not remember any employees saying "they didn't like [the] committee"; that she didn't know whether "a majority of the girls in the plant are enthusiastic and wholeheartedly support [the] committee"; and that she was likewise without knowledge as to whether, on the day the Committee was elected, "all but about four, of the girls were enthusiastically in favor of forming a committee. "23 F. Contentions and Concluding Findings Concerning Respondent's Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act The General Counsel ' contends 'that respondent"s involvement in the affairs of the Committee amounted to domination and interference within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act. Taking a contrary position, respondent's main argument is one which has already been rejected; namely, that the Committee is not a 21 No other committee member, all of whom were present at these meetings, was called as a witness and Stroh gave no testimony on this point. 22 This testimony by Armstrong, who was never a member of the Committee, was given on June 10, while she was still in respondent's employ As has already been noted and as will be discussed in detail below, the General Counsel contends that Armstrong's discharge 2 days after she testified concerning this and other allegations of the first complaint issued against respondent was violative of Sec 8(a)(I), (3), and (4) of the Act 23 I have recounted this testimony given by Woolfolk and Armstrong because of the defenses raised by respondent to the complaints' allega- tions that it violated Sec. 8(a)(2) of the Act by "assist[ ing], dominat[ing], contribut[ing] to the support of, and interfer[ing] with, the administration of [the] Committee " Even if a finding as to the reaction of respondent's employees toward the Committee could be based on this testimony, which does not appear to be the case, such a finding would not be made As will appear below, whether or not respondent's employees supported the Committee, or whether the Committee would be disestabl- ished in the absence of such support, has no bearing on the question of respondent's alleged contravention of Sec 8(a)(2) in the manner set forth in the complaint FIRE ALERT CO. labor organization, as defined by Section 2(5) and as intended in Section 8(a)(2). On the premise that the Committee might be found to be a labor organization respondent further argues that it merely suggested that the Committee be formed; that its organization was completely voluntary on the part of the employees; that the Committee was in the sole control of the employ- ees; that the employees were satisfied with it; and that the Committee can be disestablished if a majority of the employees vote to do so.24 For these reasons respond- ent submits that no violation of Section 8(a)(2) is present. In the very first case decided by the Board, Pennsylva- nia Greyhound Lines, Inc., et al., I NLRB 1, 13-14, affd. 303 U.S. 261, one of the questions for determination was whether a labor organization was employer dominat- ed. In concluding that it was, the Board noted that the labor organization in question "was planned by the management , initiated and sponsored by it, and foisted upon employees who had never requested it [and that the organization's] functions were described and given to it by the management ." The Board still adheres to these factors as indicia of employee-dominat- ed labor organizations. See, e.g., St. Joseph Lead Com- pany, etc., 171 NLRB No. 74; Hydraulic Accessories Company, 165 NLRB 864; Whirlpool Corporation, etc., 126 NLRB 1117, 1118, 1133; Ben Corson Manufacturing Co., et al. 112 NLRB 323, 324, 345; Standard Coil Products Co., Inc., 110 NLRB 412, 413, 420, 421, enfd. in this regard 224 F.2d 465 (C.A. 1); and Carpenter Steel Company, 76 NLRB 670, 687; cf. Coastal States Petrochemical Company, 175 NLRB No. 92. The Board has also pointed to other criteria as being indicative of a dominated labor organization. Thus, where a "Policy Statement" is issued to employees which "purports to set forth management 's policies and practices . . . with respect to such matters as wages, hours, and other conditions of work" the Board has held that the "mere inclusion of [an] employee represen- tation plan" in such a statement demonstrates the employer's domination of the plan. This is so, the Board concluded, because it "suggests to the employees that the plan is something imposed upon them by management and not subject to their acceptance or rejection." St. Joseph Lead Company, etc., 171 NLRB No. 74. Where a labor organization consists of a committee of employees there is yet an additional element which may be taken into account in determining its domination by an employer. That element is the power which resides in, the employer to transfer , promote, or discharge a committee member and thereby control the composition and acts of the committee . Hydraulic Accessories Com- pany, 165 NLRB 864; Sharples Chemicals, Inc., 100 NLRB 20, 33, enfd . 209 F.2d 645 (C.A. 6); General Shoe Corporation, 90 NLRB 1330, 1332, enfd. 192 F.2d 504 (C.A. 6), cert. denied 343 U.S. 904; Carpenter Steel Company, 76 NLRB 670, 688: 2' Some of these contentions appear in respondent's brief Others were made in oral argument during the course of the trial 917 All of the foregoing criteria, and more , of domination by an employer over a labor organization are present here. The first is the self-evident fact that the committee members, being employees of respondent, are subject to transfer, promotion, or discharge. That the Committee was "planned . . '. initiated and sponsored" by respondent ano toisted upon employ- ees"25 is clearly apparent from the testimony given by Stroh, respondent's president. In this regard, he "told and "instruct[ed]" respondent's- employees to "elect a committee of three employees" whose "pur- pose" would be "to present . . . grievances and com- plaints to . . . management ." Further. in this connection. nowhere in the record does it appear that respondent's employees requested that respondent deal with them through the medium of a committee. Likewise absent from the record is evidence that respondent informed its employees that Stroh's instruction to them to "elect a committee" was not mandatory. After the Committee was formed pursuant to respond- ent's directive respondent issued its Company Policy. This document sets forth respondent's practices insofar as they pertain to wages, hours, and other employment conditions. It also contains a detailed description of the Committee, it's functions, and the manner of its operation. In this way respondent brought home to its employees, as St. Joseph Lead Company, etc., 171 NLRB No. 74, teaches, that the Committee was "some- thing imposed upon them by management and not subject to their acceptance or rejection." In this connection, it is noteworthy that the matter relating to the Committee was included in respondent's Company Policy, as finally promulgated, after such a brief and inconsequential dis- cussion between respondent and the Committee that a committee member who was present at the time could not even remember what was said. There is one further fact which shows the extent of respondent's interference with, and control over, the affairs of the Committee. As I have found, shortly after the Committee was selected by the employees respondent assigned each employee to a particular com- mittee member. The employee so assigned was required to discuss such grievances as might arise or any other employment-related matter only with the committee member appointed by respondent to took after him. To counter this strong array of facts showing respond- ent's domination over, and interference with, the Com- mittee respondent argues that the employees seem sat- isfied with, and support, the Committee, and that it could be disestablished if a majority of the employees wanted to do so. This' argument, like a similar one made in Whirlpool Corporation, etc., 126 NLRB 1117, 1118, 1133, which received short shrift from the Board, must be rejected. As was said in Whirlpool: The short answer to these contentions is that the Respondent caused the formation of the Council [a labor organization and] fixed the areas in which it operates. . . . Even if we- assume that a majority 25 Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., et al , I NLRB 1, 13-14, affd 303 U S. 261 918 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of the employees favor continued existence of the Council, the fact remains that there is no case which supports the proposition that an employer acquires a valid defense to his establishment of a labor organization simply because later there develops employee support for the organization or because the employer is willing to discontinue the organization in the absence of such support Accordingly, I conclude that respondent dominated and interfered with the formation and administration of the Committee and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act G Facts Concerning Armstrong's Discharge Betty Armstrong was hired by respondent in about January 1968 At all material times, except for a period starting in April 1969 and ending on May 28, 1969, during which she was a leadgirl, Armstrong worked as a rank-and-file assembler As has already been noted, Armstrong was a most productive employee, turning out well in excess of 25 boards a day, the daily average which respondent expected of its groups of employees engaged in assembly work On June 10, 1969, Armstrong testified as a witness for the General Counsel in connection with the first complaint issued against respondent Two days later June 12, she was discharged On January 22, while the Union' s organizing campaign was in progress, Armstrong signed an authorization card In addition, and at about the same time , she spoke to about 10 employees in an effort to have them meet with a union representative On February 13, Armstrong and Shirley Howell, who then also worked for respondent as an assembler, were involved in some sort of a fracas in the plant Whether this disagreement arose because they snipped wires at each other or whether it consisted just of general bicker- ing both of which were prevalent in respondent's estab- lishment, does not appear Armstrong and Howell were reprimanded for this conduct by Paul Ziegler, respond- ent's production manager Both were told they would be discharged unless they discontinued their troublemak ing Howell quit her employment the next day On the same day, February 14, Ziegler notified Armstrong, in writing, "that should she have to be reprimanded one more time for the same problem [disrupting her cowork- ers and, in general , causing disturbance and tension between and among personnel] she would be dis charged "21i In April Armstrong and Rose Dubray, another assem- bler, were promoted to leadgirl positions Although Arm- strong was demoted on May 28, Dubray continued in that capacity Sharon Brown, also employed as an assembler by respondent, testified that on one occasion, in about 11 Ziegler s memorandum to Armstrong is in evidence as Resp Exh 1 the middle of May, while Armstrong was still a leadgirl, Armstrong "and several other girls went out for lunch and they didn't punch out " Brown further testified that on another occasion, between March and May 19, Armstrong told her, in Dubray's presence, that punching the clock at lunchtime was unnecessary "if you get back on time " Darlene Araujo, another employee, gave contrary testimony as to Armstrong s attitude in this respect She stated that Armstrong enforced "the rule about clocking in and out when going to lunch " As between the two witnesses I credit Araujo and disbelieve Brown 27 Accordingly, I find that Armstrong complied with respondent's rule concerning clocking out at lunchtime 211 I further find that there is no credible evidence in the record to support the statements appear- ing in respondent's brief "that, Betty Armstrong, while a lead girl, did her best to frustrate the application of this rule ' During her service as a leadgirl Armstrong, in conform- ity with respondent's practice, cleared her own requests for time off with either Stroh, respondent's president, or Jacqueline Cameron, respondent's office manager Because of unfriendliness between Armstrong and Dubray, who continued on as leadgirl after Armstrong's demotion, Armstrong, following her demotion, was per- mitted, unlike other rank-and-file assemblers, to apply to Cameron, rather than Dubray, for permission to absent herself from the plant Excusing Armstrong from the requirement of seeking authorization to leave early from Dubray was for Arm- strong's benefit As Cameron testified in this respect, allowing Armstrong to "report" to her instead of Dubray in this situation "was [to] grant a favor to Betty Arm- strong" and done "as a matter of convenience to" her because "it seemed that she sort of resented having to ask Mrs Dubray for leave " On June 10 Armstrong and Stroh, respondent's presi- dent, testified as witnesses for the General Counsel in connection with the first complaint issued in this case 29 Stroh testified again , on the morning of the following day This time , however, he was called by 27 Because of her demeanor while testifying Brown who had been called as a witness by respondent did not impress me as being truthful Nor was her testimony in connection with the matter under discussion corroborated by any other witness Even Dubray who appeared to be overly anxious to testify as favorably to respondent as possible did not confirm the second incident recounted by Brown although according to Brown she was present On the other hand unlike Brown s Araujo s demeanor was above reproach I have also taken into account in assessing Araujo s testimony in this and other respects that at the time of the trial she was giving evidence against respondent although in its employ and therefore was in a sense testifying under peril of reprisal See Georgia Rug Mill 131 NLRB 1304 1305 modified on other grounds 308 F 2d 89 (C A 5) '" Although this finding is based on a choice between conflicting testimony-Araujo s and Brown s-I might have been persuaded because of her demeanor to make the finding solely on Brown s contrary testimony Respecting this see Dyer v MacDougall 201 F 2d 265 269 (C A 2) which was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in N L R B v Walton Manufacturing Co et al 369 U S 404 408 iN The examination of Stroh as a witness for the General Counsel was conducted in accordance with Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure FIRE ALERT CO. ' respondent and was respondent's last witness. His testi- mony was completed shortly' before the trial- on the first complaint was closed at 10:50 a.m. on June 11. Armstrong worked during the morning of June 11. At about 1 p.m. on that day, having a private matter to attend to, Armstrong approached Dubray, her immedi- ate supervisor, and, in the presence of other employees, including Araujo, said to Dubray, that she had "some personal business to take, care of" and had "to leave." In response Dubray told her to "go ahead ."311'Having thus received permission from Dubray, her leadgirl, to do so, Armstrong left respondent's premises.31 Stroh, respondent's president, returned to the plant on June 11 about 1:30 p.m., after Armstrong had already left. Noting Armstrong's absence, he asked Cameron, respondent's office manager, whether she had given Armstrong permission to leave. Receiving a negative answer he ordered Cameron to discharge Armstrong for this reason. When Armstrong came to work the next day, June 12, Cameron informed her' of her discharge, telling Arm- strong, as Cameron testified, that she had been instructed by Stroh to "fire [her] because [she] left without permis- sion." Later that day Cameron sent Armstrong a letter32 in "confirmation of [Cam'eron's] verbal notice of [Arm- strong's] termination as an employee of [respondent]." This letter set forth "the following specific reasons" for Armstrong's discharge: 1. It has been noted by myself and others that you have left the premises for lunch or-other reasons without clocking out and in which [sic] is against the company policy. , 2. After being directed specifically by melto report to me directly when it was necessary to be late or absent, you had continued to fail to do so. 3. It has also been noted that your absenteeism has increased greatly in the past few months, that you have been tardy numerous times, and have left before quitting time on several occasions. . Concerning her inclusion in this letter of the several "specific reasons" for the termination of Armstrong's employment Cameron testified that upon being ordered by Stroh to discharge Armstrong for having left the plant on June 11 without permission, she "just looked up all of the reasons [she] could think of and included them in the letter." "' The quotations appearing in the text are taken from Armstrong's recital of her conversation with Dubray Araujo and other witnesses gave similar testimony 31 Although Dubray admitted that Armstrong said to her that she was "leaving to take care of business ," Dubray denied making the reply attributed to her and also expressly denied giving Armstrong permission to leave In view of the corroboration given to Armstrong's version of her conversation with Dubray by other witnesses, including Araujo, I do not believe Dubray's denials In this regard, I -have, in fn 27 above, already expressed my opinion concerning the credibility of Araujo and Dubray What I said there applies equally here. ar G C Exh. 20 in evidence `919 H. Contentions and Concluding Findings Concerning Armstrong's Discharge The second complaint alleges that Armstrong's dis- charge contravened Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act. Considering, first, th'e claimed violation of Section 8(a)(4), respondent contends that Armstrong's dismissal was not engendered by the testimony she gave as a witness for the General Counsel in this proceeding. In support of this argument respondent asserts many reasons for terminating Armstrong's employment, none, it submits, having any relationship to her appearance as a witness. Thus, Stroh, respondent's president, testified that he ordered Armstrong's discharge because she left the plant without permission on June 11. In a letter to Armstrong, Cameron, respondent's office manager, stated that Arm- strong's "termination as an employee" had "been decid- ed upon" specifically because she "left the premises for lunch or other reasons without clocking out"; her "continued" failure after "being directed specifically" to do so "to report to [Cameron] when it was necessary to be late or absent"; the great increase in, her absences and latenesses "in the past few months"; and her leaving "before quitting time on several occasions." Respond- ent's brief also sets forth a number of reasons, one similar and others different from those in Cameron's letter, for Armstrong's discharge; namely, "her failure to adhere to the Company policy regarding clocking out, her failure to discontinue the role of troublemaker, and her general attitude of insubordination." Insofar as 'respondent's claim that Armstrong left the plant without permission on June 11 is concerned, I have already found as a fact that she had been author- ized to do so by Dubray, respondent's leadgirl and Armstrong's immediate supervisor. Although Armstong, unlike other employees, could seek permission from Cameron, rather than Dubray, when she wanted to leave early, doing this was not mandatory. It was a privilege accorded Armstrong because she and Dubray were unfriendly toward each other. Having instituted this procedure for Armstrong's benefit, she could seem- ingly waive it, as she did'on June 11. Furthermore, assuming for the sake of argument that Armstrong did not receive permission to absent herself from the plant during the afternoon of June 11, it can hardly be said that respondent was prejudiced by her departure. June 11 fell within a period during which respondent's business was in a state of decline. Because of this employees were encouraged to take time off to attend to personal matters. This is exactly what Armstrong did. As she testified, she left early on June 11 because she had "some personal business to take care of." It seems quite unlikely therefore, that Arm- strong's claimed unauthorized absence was a real reason for Armstrong's discharge. Especially is this-conclusion warranted when it is borne in mind that Armstrong's production was well above average. Little need be said about the reasons set forth in Cameron's letter as being grounds for Armstrong's "ter- mination as an employee." They`were obviously made 920 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD up out of whole cloth. As Cameron, respondent's office manager testified, when she was directed by Stroh to discharge Armstrong she took it upon herself to include in the "termination" letter "all of the reasons [she] could think of. " The basis for Armstrong's discharge contained in respondent's brief are equally without substance. The first, "her failure to adhere to the Company policy regarding clocking out," tracks, substantially, the first ground stated in Cameron's letter and suffers from the same infirmity. The second deals with Armstrong's "role of trouble- maker." Whatever Armstrong did in this regard was known to respondent at least as early as February 13. Yet respondent did not discharge her on this alleged ground until June 12. Because respondent suffered what- ever troublemaking Armstrong engaged in for this long period of time and dismissed her only after she appeared as a witness against respondent I am satisfied that Arm- strong's "role of troublemaker" was not an actual reason for her discharge. Cf. Nitro Super Market, Inc., 161 NLRB 505, 506, 517. The last ground asserted in respondent's brief to justify Armstrong's discharge, "her general attitude of insubordination," finds no support in the record. If this contention is based on Armstrong's having left the plant on June 11 without seeking permission from Cameron, respondent's office manager, it is without merit, as I have already pointed out. If it is based on the story related by Brown, one of respondent's employees, that Armstrong urged her to disobey respond- ent's'rule requiring employees to punch out upon leaving its premises for lunch and that Armstrong, herself, did not comply with this-rule, it is likewise' without merit because, as I have found, Brown's testimony in this regard is unworthy of belief, . The many grounds advanced by respondent in "expla- nation of [Armstrong's] discharge [failing] to stand under scrutiny"' an inference arises which is "unfavorable to respondent." N.L.R.B. v. Dant, et al., etc., 207 F.2d 165, 167 (C.A. 9). Where, as in this case, reasons are asserted to justify an allegedly violative discharge which are found to be without basis the Trial Examiner "can infer that there is another motive. More than that, he can infer [as I do] that the motive is one that the employer desires to conceal-an unlawful motive-at least where . .. the surrounding facts tend to reinforce that inference.'" Shattuck Denn Mining Cor- poration, etc. v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466, 470 (C.A. 9).33 Here, as in Shattuck Denn, "the surrounding facts tend to reinforce [the] inference" that Armstrong's employment was unlawfully terminated. Thus, Arm- strong's discharge hard on the heels of her appearance as a witness for the General Counsel in a proceeding under the Act is, in my opinion, more than a mere coincidence of two unconnected events. As was said in this regard in N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & as This statement of the law was specifically adopted by the Board in Atlantic Metal Products, Inc., 161 NLRB 919, 922 Co., Inc., 242 F.2d 497, 502 (C.A. 2) "the abruptness of a discharge and its timing are persuasive evidence as to [unlawful] motivation."34 Furthermore the assign- ment of a multiplicity of alleged reasons for a discharge, itself, gives rise to a conclusion that the discharge is unlawful. N.L.R.B. v. Schill Steel Products, Inc., 340 F.2d 568, 573 (C.A. 5). Accordingly, as alleged in the second complaint, I find that respondent discharged Armstrong because she gave testimony under the Act as a witness for the General Counsel in a proceeding brought against respon- dent. I conclude, therefore, that in this manner respondent engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act. The second complaint further alleges that by discharg- ing Armstrong respondent also violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act and, independently, Section 8(a)(1). I find, however, that the evidence does not support either allegation. Insofar as the former is concerned, although it was to forestall the advent of the Union in its plant which prompted respondent, in January, to threaten employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and to dominate and interfere with the Committee in violation of Section 8(a)(2), the Union, as Stroh testified, "became . . . a dead issue by the end of January." Moreover, no relationship has been established between Armstrong's discharge on June 12 and her activity in support of the Union which, as I have found, occurred 5 months earlier .35 Concerning the allegation that the termination of Arm- strong's employmerii violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the second complaint sets forth that "Respondent . . discharged . . . Armstrong . . . based on [its] belief that [she] was the spokesman for a certain group of [its] employees and represented them .in regard to matters concerning their working -conditions." - The-- General Counsel's brief contains no argument directed to this allegation , nor does it point to evidence which sustains it. However , in opposition to respondent's motion, made during the trial, to dismiss this portion of the second complaint the General Counsel stated that it was support- ed by testimony given by Stroh , respondent ' s president, having to do with Armstrong's being "the spokesman for . . . the Spanish girls at her table," in connection with their disputes with black employees over the use of a telephone and respecting rejected boards which they produced. Even if it be thought that being "spokes- man" for employees in matters of this type constitutes representing "them in regard to . . . their working condi- " See also, to the same effect, American Art Industries, Inc , 170 NLRB No 70, and Marion Manufacturing Company, 167 NLRB 213 Respondent recognizes , on brief, "that the timing of [Armstrong's] discharge might appear suspicious ," but urges , citing Superior Gas Service, Inc , 167 NLRB 155, ' that this "alone is not sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the discharge was caused by her testimony " The instant case , however, differs from Superior in a most important area In Superior the innocent reason advanced for the discharge was well founded in the evidence That is not so here 'S It will be remembered, in this regard , that Armstrong signed an authorization card on January 22 and shortly thereafter spoke to several employees about meeting a union representative FIRE ALERT CO 921 tions," the record does not show that Stroh ' s belief that Armstrong was such a representative was an element which he took into account when he ordered her dis- charge Accordingly , upon consideration of the entire record, I conclude that the General Counsel has not sustained his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that by discharging Armstrong respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) or Section 8(a)(3) of the Act I shall, therefore, recommend that paragraphs V, V(a), VII, IX, and X of the second complaint be dismissed IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE Respondent ' s activities , to the extent found violative of the Act , occurring in connection with its operations set forth in section I, above , have a close , intimate, and substantial relation to trade , traffic, and commerce among the several States , and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce V THE REMEDY Having found that respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1), (2), and (4) of the Act, my Recommended Order will direct respondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of the Act Any backpay found to be due to Armstrong shall be computed in accordance with the formula set forth in F W Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and shall include interest in the amount and manner provided for in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co , 138 NLRB 716 Because the unfair labor practices engaged in by respondent go "to the very heart of the Act,"36 broad cease -and-desist provisions will be included in my Rec- ommended Order Upon the basis of the foregoing ,findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case , I make the following CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act 2 The Union and the Committee are labor organiza tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act 3 By threatening employees that if they assisted or supported the Union , stricter rules concerning tardiness and coffeebreaks would be imposed , that its plant would be moved to Belleville , New Jersey , and that its president would quit his job, respondent has engaged, and is engaging , in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 4 By dominating and interfering with the formation and administration of the Committee , respondent has engaged , and is engaging , in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2) and ( 1) of the Act 5 By discharging Betty J Armstrong because she gave testimony under the Act, respondent has engaged, and is engaging , in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(4) of the Act 6 Respondent did not engage in independent unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) or Section 8(a)(3) by discharging Betty J Armstrong 7 The unfair labor practices engaged in by respon- dent , as set forth in Conclusions of Law 3, 4, and 5, above , affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case , I hereby issue the following ` [Recommended Order omitted from publication ] " Reed Rolled Thread Die Co etc 179 NLRB No 6 (domination of a labor organization in violation of sec 8 (a)(2) of the act) M Eskin & Son NLRB 666 672 modified on other grounds 312 F 2d 108 (C A 2 ) (Sec 8(a)(4) of the Act) M Eskin & Son 135 NLRB 666 672 modified on other grounds 312 F 2d 108 (C A 2) (Sec 8(a)(4) of the Act )