Fieldcrest Mills, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 26, 1970

182 N.L.R.B. 764 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

764 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
North Carolina Finishing Division of Fieldcrest Mills,
Inc. and United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO.
Case 11-CA-3841
May 26, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN AND JENKINS
On December 30, 1969, Trial Examiner Stanley N.
Ohlbaum issued his Decision in the above-entitled pro-
ceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in
certain unfair labor practices and recommending that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions
to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in con-
nection with this case to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the
Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial
error was committed.' The rulings are hereby affirmed.
The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision,
the exceptions and supporting brief, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,2
and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
of the National Labor Relations Board ' s Regional
Director for Region 11 (Winston -Salem , North Carolina)
dated April 30 as amended May I and further amended
July 23, 1969, based upon a charge filed with him on
March 5 , 1969, by the above Union , was tried before
me in Salisbury , North Carolina , on September 8-9,
1969. All parties participated throughout and were aff ord-
ed full opportunity to present testimonial and documenta-
ry evidence and arguments , cross-examine witnesses,
propose findings and conclusions , and file briefs . Subse-
quent to , the trial , a number of extensions of time
for that purpose having been allowed on application
of counsel , briefs were received.
The basic issue presented is whether Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing
since November 15, 1968, to allow the Union to conduct
its own timestudies, in order to test or counter timestud-
ies made by Respondent, of a job' concerning which
the Union had filed grievances challenging the propriety
of workloads assigned by Respondent as well as the
accuracy of timestudies conducted by Respondent.
Having carefully considered all of the evidence, testi-
monial' and documentary, as well as all arguments and
contentions advanced at the hearing and in the parties'
briefs, upon the entire record including my observations
of the testimonial demeanor of the witnesses, I make
the following:
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended
Order of the Trial Examiner , and orders that the
Respondent , North Carolina Finishing Division of Field-
crest Mills , Inc., Salisbury, North Carolina , its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns , shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner ' s Recommended Order.
' The Respondent excepts to the failure of the Trial Examiner to,
receive certain of the Respondent's exhibits into evidence After due
consideration we find that even if such exhibits had been received,
they would not change our decision herein
2 These findings and conclusions are based, in part, upon credibility
determinations of the Trial Examiner to which the Respondent has
excepted The Trial Examiner's credibility findings are not contrary
to the clear preponderance of all relevant evidence Accordingly, we
find no basis for disturbing those findings Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc , 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3)
The Respondent also excepts to the Trial Examiner's assumption
of the role of an advocate during the hearing Upon a careful analysis
of the whole record, we find that the Trial Examiner did not exceed
his authority Accordingly, this allegation is rejected, as lacking in
merit
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. PARTIES; JURISDICTION
At all material times, Respondent North Carolina
Finishing Division of Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., has been
and is engaged in the manufacture of textiles, with
a plant, being the facility here involved, in Yadkin,
near Salisbury, North Carolina. During the representative
12-month period immediately preceding the issuance of
the complaint, Respondent received at that plant, directly
in interstate commerce from places outside of North
Carolina, raw materials valued in excess of $50,000.
During the same period, Respondent also manufactured,
sold, and shipped from that plant, directly in interstate
commerce to places outside of North Carolina, finished
products valued in excess of $50,000.
I find that at all material times Respondent has been
and is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act; that
the above Union has been and is a labor organization
as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act; and that assertion
of jurisdiction in this proceeding is proper.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT; ISSUE
STANLEY N . OHLBAUM, Trial Examiner : This proceed-
ing under the National Labor Relations Act as amended
(29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq.; "Act"), on complaint
' Viz, range assistant servicing ranges numbers 5 , 6, 7, and 8, and
No 2 steam frame
2 Hearing transcript as corrected by my December 2, 1969, order
on notice
182 NLRB No. 115
N.C. FINISHING DIV. OF FIELDCREST MILLS 765
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts as Found
It is admitted that at all times since its formal certifica-
tion by the Board on September 11, 1952, the Union
has been and still is the statutory collective-bargaining
representative of an appropriate unit3 of Respondent's
Yadkin plant employees. One of the jobs-the one here
in issue-in that bargaining unit is or was' the job of
the range assistant servicing ranges numbers 5, 6, 7,
and 8. These ranges" are located in the narrow sanforizer
operation in the finishing department of Respondent's'
textile plant. As of the beginning of March 1968, there
was one range operator for ranges 5 and 6, and a
second range operator for ranges 7 and 8. There was,
also a separate operator for No. 2 steam frame.5 The
range operators are serviced by range assistants; in
this case, as of early March 1968, the range operator
for ranges 5 and 6, as well as the range operator for
ranges 7 and 8, were serviced by a single range assistant,
whose primary duties were to procure shells," boxes,
and covers for wrapping rolls of cloth, and to help
in doffing' and wrapping the rolls as well as in cleaning"
and starting the machine, and also during personal relief
periods. When a roll of finished textile has been doffed
and wrapped, the range assistant removes it from the
doffing table and hauls it to the proper destination for
further processing or, if no further processing is indicat-
ed, to the appropriate storage, holding, or shipping area.
There are substantial variations in the size, shape, and
weight of these rolls (up to a few thousand pounds,
it is said) as well as the distances (up to hundreds
of feet) to which they are required to be hauled by
the range assistant. At the time of the work grievance
about to be described, the hauling was accomplished
by a manually propelled handtruck." At least in the
case of hauling to a storage area, ancillary paperwork
or recordkeeping was involved on the part of the range
assistant. As described, the range assistant (who is hourly
3 Viz, all production and maintenance employees at Respondent's
Yadkin, North Carolina, plant, excluding supervisory employees, clerical
employees, watchmen, gatemen, stockroom and laboratory employees
As explained by General Counsel's witness, Orrell, a range, operated
by a "range operator," is a textile machine into which cloth is fed
in order to subject it to mixes, prior to its being dried and run through
a calender for finishing
5 As also described by Orrell, a steam frame is a device for correcting
errors, such as width deviations, on textile selvages.
'' A shell, upon which cloth emerging from the range is wound,
is a wooden spool 40 to 60 inches long and 2 or 3 inches in diameter
Some cloth is, however, deposited into boxes rather than rolled on
shells
' I.e., severing (by cutting) the rolls from the machines when wound
in the required length on the shells
" As also explained by Orrell, the cleaning process may be quite
time consuming , as when colors are required to be changed or in
case of a change from colored to white goods.
" In July 1968, a tractor -trailer or combination chain hoist and towmo-
tor was provided on a shared basis, resulting in at least partial mechaniza-
tion, for longer hauls, of the described manual lifting and hauling
operation . However, this device was apparently not always available,
and the handtruck was continued to be used for shorter hauls Even
when the new device was available, it was necessary first to move
the shells and boxed textiles manually and by handtruck to the towmotor
paid) has a large variety of specific, time-consuming
tasks, the amount . of expended time depending upon
specifically applicable factors involved in each case,
such as dimensional configurations of spools or other
loads to be manhandled and hauled, distances to be
traversed, waiting time, etc.
By letter of March 1, 1968, Respondent notified the
Union that on March 18 Respondent would place into
effect certain changes, involving elimination of an opera-
tor on each shift and revised job duties and workloads,
in its finishing department narrow sanforizer operation.
One of the announced revisions-the one here most
directly material-was the substitution of removing rolls
from No. 2 steam frame for that of removing rolls
from range No. 8, in the servicing duties and responsibili-
ties of the range assistant."' Respondent's personnel
manager, Bell, testified that the revision in question
was necessitated by other job revisions and was "for
economic reasons," and that it resulted in no pay
increase.
Upon expiration of the 4-week trial period following
Respondent's described March 1 notification of change,
as required by the parties' subsisting collective agreement
(art. XVI (b)), the Union by its letter of April 19,
1968, in accordance with that agreement (art. XVI (c)),
timely filed a grievance with Respondent protesting and
requesting to bargain concerning the change. At a confer-
ence held between the parties on May I regarding this
matter, the Union requested additional help for the
range assistant in question in view of his added duties,
and acceded to Respondent's request for time to conduct
further studies. By letter of May 15, Respondent, conced-
ing that the workload of the range assistant was "out
of line"-in Respondent's view "temporarily" due to
"congestion" as well as "shortage of shells"-agreed
to provide additional help "where supervision deems
necessary." However, Respondent simultaneously took
the position that the changes which it had instituted
in the job of the range assistant in question, comprising
the subject of the Union's grievance, "have been proper-
ly set and should remain as indicated."
The Union thereupon proceeded to the third and
final `step of the contractual grievance procedure; viz,
a conference between the Union's International repre-
sentative and top management of the Company. At
the conference, in the latter part of June 1968, the
Union agreed to Respondent's request for still more
time to restudy the situation after provision of a towmo-
tor, which was installed after some delays" and further
time extensions. In consequence of continuing dissatis-
faction on the part of the range assistants, a further
meeting was held with top company officials, including
its engineers, on November 15, 1968, in order "to go
over these studies that they [i.e., Respondent' s engi-
neers] had been making." At this meeting, when Union
International Representative and spokesman Silcox
"' As of this time, the indicated responsibility in relation to No
2 steam frame was a part of the Sanforizer Lineup function, the
No 2 steam frame operator was being serviced by' a range assistant
other than the range assistant servicing ranges 5, 6, 7, and 8
See fn 9, supra
766 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"asked for the time studies, the studies that had been
made on the range assistant," Respondent's Regional
Personnel Manager and spokesman O'Neal supplied the
Union with only a single-page document captioned
"Comparison of Methods for Delivering Rolls from
Ranges No. 5, 6, 7, & No. 2 Steam Frame." This
document (G.C. Exh. 8), dated November 14,1968, con-
sists largely of figures with headings or side legends.
It was conceded by Respondent at the hearing that
it is not a timestudy.12 It is also to be observed that
it contains neither comparison nor data in any way
concerning range No. 8, for which No. 2 steam frame
had been substituted by Respondent. When O'Neal sup-
plied the Union with this document (G.C. Exh. 8),
he "called it . . . the time study." In response to
Union International Representative Silcox's question,
"Is this all the sutdy," O'Neal replied, "Yes," "That's
all," or "That's it," and that the Company would answer
any questions. 13 After at least some portions of the
supplied "Comparison" document (G.C. Exh. 8) were
gone over, the meeting adjourned after the Union indicat-
ed the document would be thoroughly reviewed and
Respondent thereafter recontacted.
It is undisputed that on December 10 or 15, 1968
the Union notified Respondent that it desired to do
its own in-plant timestudy of the range assistant job
in question" ; and that Respondent refused to permit
it. Requesting a meeting to discuss this subject, the
Union instead received a letter in early January 1969
from Respondent's regional personnel manager , O'Neal
12 In the words of Respondent' s counsel at the hearing, it is "by
no means" a timestudy. (Tr., p 12 )
1' Upon careful evaluative comparison of testimonial demeanor as
observed, I credit the mutually corroborative testimony of General
Counsel witnesses, Orrell and Silcox, to this effect, and their denials
that Respondent in any way stated or indicated that Respondent was
then or at any time willing to display or make available to the Union
any timestudies made by Respondent or in fact any document other
than the "Comparison" (supra, G C Exh. 8) which it gave to the
Union at the described November 15 meeting I am unable to credit
that portion of the testimony of Respondent's witness Bell (its personnel
manager) wherein he stated that Respondent ' s original timestudies were'
offered to the Union at this (November 15) meeting and that Silcox,
declining to take them , said, "I don't believe that that will be necessary "
Silcox, corroborated by Orrell, strenuously denied that this occurred,
and they each successfully withstood vigorous cross-examination on
this point Moreover, without explanation , Respondent failed to produce
its spokesman at the November 15 meeting, its regional personnel
manager , O'Neal, or any of its engineers also present at that meeting
to testify to what was said or to corroborate Bell's testimony It
is also noted that on cross-examination Bell conceded that when O'Neal
gave Silcox the "Comparison" document (G C Exh 8) he said, "This
is the summary data from the time studies that were done" and that
Silcox may indeed have asked " if that was all " Conceding that the
Union "requested information concerning the [Company's] time study,"
Bell himself testified that "We gave them a summary document [i e ,
G C Exh 8 ("Comparison")] regarding the time studies that had
been performed " (Emphasis supplied ) No reason is suggested why
the Union should have declined to receive data which it had requested
Finally, in any event even an offer by the Company to the Union
of the^Company' s timestudies would not of itself operate to erase
any right the Union might have to conduct its own timestudies-the
central issue here (See infra )
" The Union had in prior years, before acquisition of the plant
by Fieldcrest Mills, Inc , been permitted to conduct at least rudimentary
stopwatch timing studies of its own at this plant
declining the Union's request for a meeting upon the
stated ground that "The Agreement between the parties,
dated March 31, 1968, provided adequate means for
settlement of grievances arising under this Agreement."
O'Neal's letter added that, nevertheless, "we shall be
happy to review with the Union again ", the time studies
upon which the Range Assistant Workload is based."
The Union' thereupon filed a formal grievance over
Respondent's refusal to permit it to conduct its own
timestudies "in accordance with the contract, past prac-
tice at the plant"' and labor rulings on the subject
of inplant time studies." At ensuing grievance meetings,
the Union continued to request, and Respondent contin-
ued to refuse to permit the Union, to be allowed to
conduct its own in-plant timestudies of the range assistant
job in question. Neither offering (nor being asked) to
supply any data, nor indicating there was any to be
supplied, other than that which it had already supplied
to the Union (i.e., G.C. Exh. 8-the "Comparison"),
and while continuing to indicate it "would be glad to
go over this study [i.e., G.C. Exh. 8] that they had
given us [i.e. the Union], or answer any further questions
regarding it that we might have," Respondent insisted
that the Union had no right to conduct such studies
and that it "had given up [its] rights to do that."
By its letter of January 31, 1969, Respondent formally
rejected the Union's grievance over Respondent's refusal
to permit an in-plant timestudy, upon the stated ground
that "The Union has been furnished, as required by
the contract, access to all original time studies or checks
which have been completed on the job involved"; that
the collective agreement "contemplates" (sic) that it
is "on the basis of this data"-apparently without corro-
borating or countervailing data of its own, or opportunity
for development thereof- that the "Union can then
determine under Article XVI whether it has, and desires
to process, a grievance"; and that the "Board of Arbitra-
tion" may require additional timestudies, but these may
be made only by personnel of or designated by the
Company alone. Respondent's January 31, 1969, letter
further points out that the contract provison (art. VIII)
guaranteeing union representatives access to the plant
was limited to "official business," which "would not
include independent time studies." Respondent accord-
ingly flatly rejected the Union's grievance and request
to conduct its own timestudies as "completely inconsis-
tent with the terms of the contract . . . contrary to
the contract, and not . . . arbitrable under the contract."
At a final meeting on this subject, on February 12,
1969, Union International Representative Silcox contin-
ued to maintain that the " time study [referring to G.C.
Exh. 8] that they had given us was not sufficient to
give us information we needed to make our own time
study to get the proper information." At this meeting,
" The work "again" may be said to support the Union's position
that Respondent had considered its November 14, I%8, "Comparison"
document (G C Exh 8) which it supplied to the Union as its "time
study," since it was concededly this document alone which it had
"reviewed " with the Union As already noted, at the hearing Respond-
ent's counsel conceded that this document is "by no means " a timestudy
", See fn 14, supra
N.C. FINISHING DIV. OF FIELDCREST MILLS
again, no reference was made by Respondent (or by
the Union) to the existence of any other documentation,
nor to possible access thereto. As credibly testified
by Union Business Agent Orrell, Respondent "still main-
tained that the information they had given us was
sufficient, that we didn't have any right, the union didn't
have a right to go in and make studies of their own."
For its part, the Union continued to maintain that it
did. Respondent insisted that the Union "had given
up that right" in article XVI (g) of the collective agree-
ment; the Union disagreed."
Credited testimony of General Counsel witnesses
Orrell and Silcox establishes that the data supplied to
the Union by Respondent in the latter's "Comparison"
document (G.C. Exh. 8) did not gibe with information
received by the Union from unit employees whom it
represented: and that the Union needed more information
and wanted to do its own checking. As stated by Orrell,
"The company maintained that they had, that the range
assistants had adequate time to help them [i.e., the
range operators]. The range assistants say they didn't,
and so did the range operators"; and the Union's purpose
in wanting to make its own timestudy was to resolve
this inconsistancy and ascertain the true facts for proper
grievance handling and bargaining purposes. Further-
more, according to Silcox as well as Orrell, the "Compar-
ison" document (G.C. Exh. 8) with which the Union
had been supplied by Respondent failed to give the
Union sufficient or proper information to "make an
intelligent appraisal as to the merits or demerits of
proceeding to arbitration" or to negotiate upon on an
informed basis.
At the hearing, when, for the first time, Respondent's
actual timestudies were produced and made available
to the Union on subpena (initially resisted and sought
by Respondent to be quashed),'" after General Counsel's
expert witness" had testified to various' inadequacies,
errors, and defects in those studies, the Trial Examiner's
inquiry as to whether Respondent is 'at this time willing
to permit the Union to conduct its own timestudy,
met with the following response from Respondent:
No, sir. Our position is still as stated in the answer,
that there has been an effective, clear, unmistakable
waiver, either as shown by the express language
of the contract or by extraneous information as
to Article 16(g). We submit that the Union has
been proffered the opportunity with information
sufficient to enable them to make an intelligent
14 In the parties ' 1966 2-year collective agreement there was added,
for the first time after accession of Fieldcrest to ownership of the
textile factory in question-the provision (art. XVI (g)) that additional
timestudies at the arbitration stage could be made only by the Company's
timestudy personnel According to General Counsel witnesses Orrell
and Silcox, whom I credit in this aspect, while the Union agreed
to this limitation it was expressly confined to the arbitration stage-
as indeed its language clearly shows-and the Union would not agree
to any other limitation of its right to conduct independent timestudies
Respondent's contention of "waiver" in this regard is discussed infra
18 At the hearing, Respondent conceded that it is obligated under
the collective agreement to show its "time studies" to the Union.
'" Gottlieb, whose "very outstanding" qualifications as a timestudy
engineering expert were conceded by Respondent
767
evaluation without the necessity of access to the
plant.
B. Rationale
1. Respondent's obligation to permit the Union to
conduct its own timestudies to corroborate or counter
those conducted by Respondent
The principle that a duly selected bargaining represent-
ative has the right to conduct its own in-plant timestudies
when required in discharge of its representational func-
tions in connection with timestudies which have been
conducted by the Employer, is by now so clearly estab-
lished as hardly to,merit more than mention . See, e.g.,
N.L.R.B. v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-436;
General Electric Company v. N.L.R.B., 414 F.2d 918
(C.A. 4); Alba-Waldensian, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 404 F.2d
1370 (C.A. 4), enf. 167 NLRB 691; Waycross-Sportswear,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 403 F.2d 832, 835-836 (C.A. 5); Fafnir
Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 716, 720-722 (C.A.
2), quoted with approval in N.L.R.B. v. Acme Industrial
Co., 385 U.S. 432, 438, fn. 8; The Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 325 F.2d 746, 750-751 (C.A. 6), cert.
denied 376 U.S. 971; Johns-Manville Products Corpora-
tion, 171 NLRB No. 65.20
Where, as here, the Employer seeks to justify unit.
job changes on the basis of its own in-plant timestudies,
and in consequence the unit employees' bargaining repre-
sentative needs to evaluate, corroborate, or controvert
the Employer's alleged facts and figures and to ascertain
the true underlying facts, the right of the bargaining
representative to conduct his own in-plant timestudies
is central to the collective-bargaining process. The bar-
gaining representative is not required blindly to accept
r" Respondent attempts to distinguish the thrust of these cases by
urging that , unlike the instant case, at least some of them involved
incentive wage rates I do not agree that this is a controlling distinction
under the circumstances presented The attempted alterations of job
duties here directly involved the amount of work that the immediately
affected unit employees ( i e , the range assistants), as well as the
secondarily affected employees (i e , the range operators and others),
were required to do Not only did this go to the heart of their jobs,
but, since ' it was imposed as a requirement , any failure on their part
to perform could well result in their discharge , or, if performed, possible
adverse effect on their health if the imposition was unduly onerous
These are classic subjects of grievances and collective bargaining ^Cf
e g , N.L R B v. Washington Aluminum Company, 370 U S 9, 17
(shop allegedly too cold for work), Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc
v. N.L R B , 418 F.2d 203 (C A 9, allegedly unsafe working conditions),
N L R.B. v Belfry Coal Corporation, 331 F 2d 738, 740 (C A 6;
allegedly unsafe mining area ), N L R B v. Walls Mfg. Co , 321 F 2d
753, 754 (C A D C, allegedly unsanitary restroom), N L R B v South-
ern Silk Mills, Inc , 209 F 2d 155 (C A. 6; shop allegedly too hot
for work), cert denied 347 U S 976, Olin Industries, Inc v N.L R B ,
191 F 2d 613,_615 (C A 5; changed work schedules), N L.R.B v
Greensboro Coca Cola Bottling Company, 180 F.2d 840, 843 (C A.,
4, proposed work changes), Hartwell Company, Inc., 169 NLRB 412
(miscellaneous grievances ) Nor is Respondent 's contention that no
affected employee was actually discharged or otherwise penalized persua-
sive The answer to this is that they could have been and could
be in the future, or, that the imposition may be wholly unreasonable,
or unduly onerous or burdensome Moreover , this argument on Respond-
ent's part appears to involve failure to distinguish between the bargaining
representative ' s right to information relevant to a grievance , and the
merits of the grievance itself, as pointed out by the Court in N L R B.
v Acme Industrial Co , 385 U S 432, 437
768 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Employer's own facts and figures or ipse dixit without
reasonable opportunity to test them through appropriate
equivalent procedures.21 It would seem that the Employer
whose true sole concern is avoidance of the inconven-
ience of a separate timestudy by the bargaining represent-
ative in duplication of the Employer's own22 (as distin-
guished from the Employer whose aim is to preclude
access by the bargaining representative to the true raw
facts) may minimize the likelihood of such inconvenience
by inviting the bargaining representative to participate
in, or at least witness, the Employer's own timestudies.
Cf. P.R. Mallory & Company, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 411
F.2d 948 (C.A. 7). But Employer refusal to allow the
bargaining representative opportunity to verify or contro-
vert the Employer' s figures, while at the same time
insisting that they be accepted as true, may render
wholly ineffectual the intelligent exercise of the bargain-
ing representative's statutory rights and responsibilities.
It could convert the good-faith collective-bargaining
process envisioned by the architects of the Act into
a frustrating donnybrook in which the Employer con-
stantly points to the "true facts" consisting of no more
than its own "figures " in response to any contention
raised by the employees' bargaining representative, who
has been placed by the Employer in the impossible
position of being unable to controvert those "facts"
and "figures" and for practical purposes even unable
to meaningfully appraise or comprehend their signi-
ficance, if any. Since the Employer has seen fit to
resort to specialized experts of its own to support its
position, it would seem that fairness would require that
it not insist that the employees' bargaining representative
be cut off from exercise of a similar prerogative.23
That the Union was justified here, under the circum-
stances described, in seeking to conduct its own
timestudies , scarcely admits of question. Respondent,
in attempted justification of allegedly substantial changes
in the job duties of its range assistants , had conducted
its own timestudies through its own engineers. These
timestudies were extensive, comprehensive, and
detailed. Respondent furnished to the Union only a
one-page purported' recapitulation or partial analytical
"Comparison" thereof-a document which it now con-
cedes is "by no means" a timestudy. Not until the
trial of this proceeding were the timestudies themselves
adduced, and then only when their production was
required by a subpena which Respondent had sought
to quash. In this posture of the matter, he parties
would have gone into an arbitration with only the
timestudies conducted by Respondent's own engineers
and none by the Union. How could the Union, in
such an "arbitration," intelligently represent the interests
21 Cf Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Wright Aeronautical Division v
N.L R B , 347 F 2d 61, 71 (C A 3), Fafnir Bearing Co v N L R B ,
362 F 2d 716, 721-722 (C. A. 2)
22 There is no contention by Respondent here that a union timestudy
would interfere with production Cf General Electric Company v
N L R. B , 414 F 2d 918,923 (C A 4)
23 Cf Fafnir Bearing Company, 146 NLRB 1582, 1593, enfd 362
F 2d 716, 722 (C A 2); Tex-Tan Welhausen Company and Tex-Tan
Western Leather Company, 172 NLRB No 93, TXD fns 15 and 35,
Wrought Washer Mfg Co , 171 NLRB No 85
of its constituents ( i.e., the unit employees) whom it
was under legal obligation to represent properly? The
same is true of the grievance stages preceding arbitration;
without its own timestudies and without first-hand knowl-
edge of the true facts, the Union was in no position
either to confirm or to controvert, in whole or in part,
the purported facts and figures put forward by Respond-
ent.
That Respondent's timestudies contained various sub-
stantial flaws, shortcomings, and errors is amply estab-
lished through the uncontradicted testimony of General
Counsel's expert witness, Bertram Gottlieb, whose
expertise in the field of timestudies was not only conced-
ed by Respondent but expressly characterized by its
counsel as "very outstanding."24 With regard to the
"Comparison" (G.C. Exh. 8) document furnished by
Respondent to the Union as described above, Gottlieb
testified that "Obviously there is insufficient information
. . . to make any kind of a determination as to whether
a production standard or a workload is adequate. Any
engineer who would try to make a determination from
this would have to be totally incompetent." Citing exam-
ples, he demonstrated the ambiguity and incompleteness
of, as well as various judgmental factors involved in,
the information charted on that document .2`1 He swore
that merely by looking at the document in question
(G.C. Exh. 8) he would have no way of knowing whether
the figures given thereon are accurate.
Concerning Respondent's subpenaed timestudies
themselves (G.C. Exhs. 15-26), Gottlieb's testimony
also indicates the necessity for conducting independent
timestudies, for a variety of reasons which he explicated
in detail: (1) Respondent 's timestudies involve numerous
variable elements; (2) they contain latent ambiguities
or involve subjective judgmental factors; (3) they would
not be an adequate substitute for an independent timestu-
dy, because (a) they would require simply assuming
the factual accuracy of the data shown, without any
2" The record amply supports this characterization Thus, for example,
in addition to formal education in this field, Gottlieb was for a substantial
period of time a university instructor and visiting professor in the
field, is the author of numerous publications on the subject, was on
the Editorial Board of the Journal of Industrial Engineering, and is
National Director for Industrial and Labor Relations of the American
Institute of Industrial Engineers He has conducted thousands of time
and motion studies over the course of the past 20 years, and has
served management as well as labor as a consulting industrial engineer.
He also testified as an expert on the subject of timestudies in the
leading cases of Fafnir Bearing Company, 146 NLRB 1582, enfd 362
F 2d 716 (C A 2), and General Electric Company, 173 NLRB 164,
enfd 414 F 2d 918 (C A 4)
2i Gottlieb additionally explained that even so supposedly objective
a matter as stopwatch timing is to a degree subjective , depending
upon when the stopwatch is clicked on and off (see General Electric
Company (Ohio Lamp Plant), 179 NLRB No 122 (TXD), and that
the resulting figures are then " treated " or "adjusted " so as, in the
judgmental opinion of the particular analyst, to be "normalized." Fur-
thermore, Respondent ' s "Comparison" chart (G C Exh 8) does not
indicate who or how many were timed, nor when nor over what period
they were timed Moreover , there is an apparent absence of indication
as to how miscellaneous interruptional artifacts (e g , stumbling while
hauling) were handled and reported on this document (G C Exh 8)
and therefore how they affect the meaning and accuracy of the "compari-
sons" made thereon Nor are the great divergences in textile roll
weights in any way reflected in the "comparisons" made
N.C. FINISHING DIV. OF FIELDCREST MILLS 769
corroboration, (b) they are incomplete, (c) they contain
discoverable errors in arithmetic and in copying, (d)
apparently they involved, or may have involved, an
inadequate sampling, and (e) "The Company's descrip-
tion which has been furnished of the work elements
are hopelessly inadequate," because among other things,
as to certain aspects of the observed operations, "there
are no beginning and ending points" as to time or
distance (in each case potentially if not probably varia-
ble), rendering the time reading undefined, imprecise,
and uninformative; (4) their overall accuracy and weight
depend upon the expertise of the person doing the
study, which has not been demonstrated and cannot
be evaluated without conducting an independent study;
(5) they contain demonstrable inconsistencies, errors,
and inaccuracies, of which examples were provided,
showing "something . . . wrong with the time study
man's judgment"; (6) "these studies do not justify the
Company's contention, if they make one, that their
standards are properly determined"; (7) among other
things, he (Gottlieb) would not have used the "snapback"
stopwatch method utilized by the Company in timing
the observed operations, but would instead have
employed a continuous watch reading; (8) "performance
rating" itself does not constitute a setting forth of
"facts," but, as defined by the Society for the Advance-
ment of Management,"' is merely "a concept," involving
numerous subjective judgmental elements on the part
of the rater; (9) "All time study work is subjective";2?
(10) Respondent's "Comparison" document (G.C. Exh.
8), given by it to the Union, is seemingly at least
in part inconsistent with Respondent's alleged basic
underlying timestudy data.28 Gottlieb concluded that "I
would not want to put any great value on those conclu-
sions [of the Company, upon its timestudies] based
on what I have seen in here," and that neither the
"Comparison" document (G.C. Exh. 8) supplied by
Respondent to the Union at the grievance stage nor
Respondent's underlying timestudies produced under
subpena at the hearing, would be an acceptable substitute
for independent timestudies by the Union. On the basis
of these documents, Gottlieb would have advised the
Union to review the Company's timestudy procedures
and persuade the Company of its shortcomings or "do
some more and better time study work than is exhibited
by these documents," by a "qualified industrial engi-
neer," as distinguished from a so-called mere timestudy
"' Gottlieb is also a member of the Central Committee on Standardiza-
tion of Industrial Engineering Terminology, of the United States of
America Standards Institute
27 Gottlieb further indicated that there also are factors of accuracy
and credibility These alone, without more, would appear to justify
the Union ' s insistence on conducting its own timestudies.
2" As an example, Gottlieb cited the average rated time for positioning
the roll truck, given in Respondent's "Comparison" (G C Exh 8)
as 134, whereas in Respondent's basic "supporting" timestudy data
(produced at the hearing), involving 233 values for positioning the
roller truck on all frames, only 13 showed an observed time less
than 134 , with the remaining 220 values 161 or higher , resulting in
an average of 219 and not 134, and, specifically in the case of No.
2 Steam Frame (seemingly central to the dispute here), 315 rather
than the 134 figure set forth in Respondent's "Comparison" (G C
Exh 8) supplied to the Union as its "time study "
man.24 If Gottlieb had been supplied with these docu-
ments (i.e., Respondent's "Comparison" (G.C. Exh.
8) and Respondent's underlying timestudies (G.C. Exhs.
15-26), he would for the reasons explained, have advised
the Union to conduct its own timestudies in order to
enable Gottlieb "to make an intelligent judgment of
advising them [i.e., the Union] as to whether . . . their
contention that the workloads are unreasonable is cor-
rect.. .
The testimony of General Counsel's expert witness,
Gottlieb, whose qualificational expertise is fully conced-
ed by Respondent, is in no way contradicted upon
the record."' Without explanation, Respondent failed
to produce any of its engineers who prepared or partici-
pated in the preparation of its "Comparison" document
(G.C. Exh. 8) or its timestudies. Thus, Gottlieb's testimo-
ny, substantial, weighty, and persuasive as it is, as
to the necessity for the Union to conduct its own inde-
pendent timestudies here, stands unrefuted. Here, as
in General Electric Company v. N.L.R.B., 414 F.2d
918, 921 (C.A. 4):
.. . there was substantial evidence to support the
finding that in order intelligently to participate in
the grievance procedures established by the contract
the union should be given the opportunity to conduct
independent time studies of production standards,
have its expert inspect General Electric's time study
data, and have its expert conduct independent evalu-
ations by personal observation.
2. Respondent's waiver contentions
Respondent urges that the Union has waived any
right it may have to conduct its own in-plant timestudies,
through (1) the provisions of the subsisting collective
agreement and (2) the Union's action or inaction in
the situation presented, by declining Respondent's
proffer of Respondent's timestudies. These contentions
will be separately reviewed after brief explication of
applicable principles.
21 According to Gottlieb, such a "qualified industrial engineer" would
have "at least a Bachelor's degree in industrial engineering or an
allied discipline " There is a total absence of evidence as to the qualifica-
tion, if any, of the persons who performed Respondent ' s timestudies
or who authored the "Comparison" document (G C Exh 8) supplied
by it to the Union As explained by Gottlieb, the qualifying educational
disciplines include engineering procedures , mathematics , and work physi-
ology, as well as factory personnel relationships and practices
"' In view of the conceded expertise of General Counsel's expert
and the absence of any controverting proof, it ill behooves Respondent
to characterize his testimony as "sheer tripe" (Resp br , p. 8), Cf
Bethel, Atwater, Smith, & Stackman, Essentials of Industrial Manage-
ment 319-25 (1954), Lehrer, Work Simplification Creative Thinking
about Work Problems 18-23 & passim (1957), Mundel, Motion and
Time Study (3d rev ed 1960), Neuner & Haynes, Office Management
Principles and Practice 269-271 & 679-680 (1953); Otis & Leukart,
Job Evaluation 215 (2d rev ed 1954), Reinfeld, Production Control
42, 54-55, & 185-186 (1959); Roethlisberger, Dickson, & Wright, Manage-
ment and the Worker 80-82 (1964), Schutt, Time Study Engineering
1-7, 8-9, 10, 13, 18-33, & 35-39 (1943); Shubm, Business Management
134-142 & 127-132 (1957), Terry, Principles of Management 271, 562-564,
& 566-568(1953)
770 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a. Applicable principles
It is an established principle that a waiver, or voluntary
relinquishment, of a right must be in " 'clear and unmis-
takable' language . Tide Water Associated Oil Company,
85 NLRB 1096; N.L.R.B. v. Item Company, 220 F.2d
956, 958-959, C.A. 5th, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836,
rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 905. Silence in the bargaining
agreement on such an issue does not meet this test.
This Court said in N.L.R.B. v. J. H. Allison & Co.,
165 F.2d 766, 768, C.A. 6th, cert. denied, 335 U.S.
814, 'Nor do we see logical justification in the view
that in entering into a collective bargaining agreement
for a new year, even though the contract was silent
upon a controverted matter, the union should be held
to have waived any rights secured under the act. . . .
. . . We are of the opinion that the execution of the
1960 bargaining agreement , which was silent on this
controversial question did not constitute a relinquishment
of the Union's statutory right to the wage information
which it now seeks." The Timken Roller Bearing Compa-
ny v. N.L.R.B., 325 F.2d 746, 751 (C.A. 6), cert. denied
376 U.S. 971.
A waiver "is not to be readily inferred and it should
be established by proof that the subject matter was
consciously explored and that a party has 'clearly and
unmistakably waived its interest in the matter' and has
'consciously yielded' its rights." Tucker Steel Corp.,
134 NLRB 323, 332, and cases there cited; accord,
C & C Plywood Corporation, 148 NLRB 414, 416-417,
enforcement denied 351 F.2d 224 (C.A. 9), reversed
385 U.S. 421. See also General Electric Company v.
N.L.R.B., 414 F.2d 918, 923-924 (C.A. 4); Fafnir Bearing
Company v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 716, 722 (C.A. 2);
N.L.R.B. v. Gulf Atlantic Warehouse Company, 291
F.2d 475, 477, (C.A. 5); Cloverleaf Division of Adams
Dairy Co., 147 NLRB 1410, 1412-1413.
b. "Waiver" through collective agreement provisions
Respondent contends that under the terms of its sub-
sisting collective agreement with the Union, the latter
has given up any right to conduct its own timestudies
and that only Respondent may conduct timestudies.
Respondent points to the provision (art. VIII) of the
collective agreement limitng the Union's access to the
plant to "official business." In view of the circumstances
here shown and the cases cited supra, B,1, regarding
the Union's right to make its own timestudies, it is
apparent that the cited access provision does not apply,
inasmuch as the conduct of such timestudies by the
Union is "official business" going to the heart of its
representative capacity and obligation. See cases cited
supra, B,1.
Respondent next points to the contract provision (art.
XVI) governing "Workloads" and alterations thereof.
A careful reading of the 8 subparagraphs comprising
that provision fails to disclose any surrender or waiver
of, or limitatin upon, the Union's right to conduct in-
plant timestudies, with a single exception. That excep-
tion, contained in subparagraph (g) of article XVI, is
that if in connection with any arbitration the "Board
of Arbitration [should] have need for additional time
study information, such studies shall be made only the
Employer's Industrial Engineers or an Engineer(s) desig-
nated by the Employer." (Emphasis supplied.) It is
perfectly plain that this limitation is applicable only
at the arbitration stage, if that stage is reached. There
is no comparable or other provision limiting the Union's
right to make its own timestudies at any stage prior
to arbitration. Although subparagraph (b) of article XVI
obligates the Employer to give "access by the Union
to all original time studies or checks which have been
completed on the job involved"-an obligation which
the Employer did not carry out here-it is clear that
this does not prohibit the Union from conducting its
own timestudies for corroborative or controvertive pur-
poses.
Respondent also argues that when the present subpara-
graph (g) was added to article XVI of the parties'
collective agreement in 1966, it was thereby intended
to eliminate any right of the Union to conduct its own
timestudies. I find that this was not in fact so. It is
clear from the evidence presented, and I find, that
the talk which took place at the 1966 negotiations relative
to subparagraph (g)-a new provision proposed by the
Employer-was, insofar as intended to institute a limita-
tion upon timestudies, within the frame of reference
of timestudies at the arbitration stage ,31 as, indeed,
the agreement plainly states. Testimony of General Coun-
sel witnesses Orrell and Silcox, which I credit, establish-
es that while the Union agreed to the limitation, as
contained in subparagraph (g), of further timestudies
at the arbitration stage, it was expressly limited (as
it plainly provides) to the arbitration stage , and that
the Union explicitly refused to agree to any other limita-
tion on its right to conduct its own in-plant timestudies
(as it indeed had done in the past) prior to the arbitration
stage. As testified by Silcox, ". . . we made it very
clear to them that prior to arbitration, we were not
surrendering our right to make time studies in the plant.
. . . We told them that. We made it very emphatic."
Respondent witness Haven H. Newton, its vice president
for industrial relations, who was present at the .1966
negotiations, conceded that at those negotiations, aside
from subparagraph (g) nothing was presented by the
Company to the Union which would have "ruled out
any right that the Union might have to make its own
" Upon comparative demeanor observations, and the contrary or
inconsistent testimony of General Counsel witnesses Orrell and Silcox,
as well as Respondent's witnesses Newton and Rochelle, I do not
credit the testimony of Respondent witness Wilkerson, who indicated
that at the 1966 negotiations, "as I recall it," "most" of the discussion
about timestudies was without specific reference to the arbitration stage
Even so, in view of the plain application of the newly proposed subpara-
graph (g) to the arbitration stage alone, there might well have been
no need for discussion of anything else, from the Union's point of
view, since it agreed to that provision, limited as it clearly was to
the arbitration stage Even Wilkerson finally conceded that at no time
did Silcox state that the Union would waive its rights to conduct
its own timestudies in the plant, and also that he could not unequivocally
deny that Silcox may have indicated that he did not consider the
new subparagraph (g) to be a "limitation on the Union's right to
make time studies at times other than the arbitration stage "
N.C. FINISHING DIV. OF FIELDCREST MILLS 771
time study." Newton also testified that he was unable
to recall any statement by Silcox or any other union
spokesman during the 1966 negotiation to the effect
that the Union would give up any right to conduct
any timestudies; and that the subject was not discussed
at the 1968 negotiations.32 Respondent's President and
General Manager Morton Rochelle, who was also present
at the 1966 negotiations, similarly testified as Respond-
ent's witness that at that negotiation Silcox stated that
he "didn't want to give up the right that he said he
had to allow union people in the plant and which had
been accorded him in the past" and that at no time
did Silcox "backtrack on that and say he was willing
to give up that right. "33
Under the circumstances, I find that the Union did
not under the subsisting or any prior collective agree-
ment, or negotiations relating to any thereof, waive
its right to conduct its own in-plant timestudies; except
that since March 27, 1966, as provided in article XVI(g)
of each of the collective agreements effective on and
since that date, the Union has had no right under said
article XVI(g) to conduct any additional timestudy at
the arbitration stage of a workload dispute.
c. "Waiver" through union action or inaction
Respondent contends , finally , that the union waived
any right it may have had to conduct its own timestudy
by failing to accept Respondent's timestudies proferred
to it during the grievance conferences . I have already
found , and here reiterate , that ( 1) at no time prior
to the trial of this proceeding did Respondent supply
or proffer to the Union any document other than the
"Comparison " document (G.C. Exh. 8) which Respond-
ent's counsel concedes is "by no means " a timestudy;
(2) it was at the trial of this proceeding , for the first
time-pursuant to subpena unsuccessfully sought by
Art XVI was carried forward from the 1966 into the 1968 contract
Respondent places emphasis upon an apparent inconsistancy in
a portion of a pretnal statement in which Silcox stated, concerning
the 1966 negotiation , "The Union accepted the article [XVI ] as offered
by the Company The formula accepted by the Union in no way
excluded the Union from making its own time study in the case of
a grievance There was no discussion whatsoever of the Union ' s right
to make such a time study if one was deemed necessary by the Union
Prior practice had been to make such studies " Respondent ' s emphasis
is on Silcox's reference to the absence of "discussion ," whereas his
testimony indicates there was some discussion To begin with, it is
unclear what Silcox meant in the pretrial statement by "discussion"
or what particular "discussion " was or was not being referred to
Thus, the testimony of Respondent ' s own witnesses , Wilkerson and
Newton , indicates there was little if any "discussion " of this particular
matter, in Newton' s words, "there was not a great deal of discussion
about 16 (g) at any time " Although thus not necessarily inconsistent
with Silcox ' s testimony , I have nevertheless considered the contents
of this pretrial affidavit, received into evidence at Respondent ' s behest,
in evaluating Silcox's credibility , which nonetheless impresses me as
high I have in this connection also considered the concessions of
Respondent ' s own witnesses , described above, that the Union explicitly
refused in the 1966 negotiations to surrender its right to conduct its
own in-plant timestudies prior to the arbitration stage-which, indeed,
the contract provision in question is clearly limited to It is, of course,
further the fact , that there is an absence of any surrender or waiver
in the contract of the Union ' s right to conduct in-plant timestudies
other than at the arbitration stage
Respondent to be quashed-that Respondent produced
for the Union's inspection Respondent's timestudies.
Thus, there was at no time, as contended by Respondent,
any proffer by it to the Union of Respondent's timestud-
ies. To this, however, I add that even if Respondent
had proferred and supplied the Union with its timestud-
ies, this would not have erased the Union's right to
conduct its own timestudies for reasonable corroborative
or refutational purposes.34 Cf. Wilson Athletic Goods
Mfg. Co., 169 NLRB 621. The evidence is clear that
the Union has been consistently requesting Respondent
for its timestudies, but was told about and suppplied
only with Respondent's "Comparison" (G.C. Exh. 8)
document; and that it has been consistently requesting
the right to conduct its own timestudies. It is difficult
to see how a party can be deemed to have waived
something which he has been continuously demanding,
or to have waived a right which he has been consistently
asserting and refusing to relinquish. No convincing rea-
son is suggested why the Union would decline to accept
that which it was seeking to obtain.
In this aspect of the case, I find that Respondent
has failed to establish by substantial credible evidence
that through nonacceptance of any timestudies proffered
to it by Respondent at any time, or otherwise, the
Union has waived its right to conduct its own in-plant
timestudies material to any work dispute under the sub-
sisting collective agreement.
Upon the foregoing findings and the entire record,
I state the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. North Carolina Finishing Division of Fieldcrest
Mills, Inc ., Respondent herein , is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
2. United Textile Workers of America , AFL-CIO,
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. Assertion of jurisdiction herein is proper.
4. On and at all times since September 11, 1952,
the following has been and is a unit of Respondent's
employees appropriate for collective bargaining purpos-
es:
All production and maintenance employees at the
Employer's [Respondent's] Yadkin, North Carolina,
plant, excluding supervisory employees, clerical
employees, watchmen, gatemen, stockroom and lab-
oratory employees.
5. On and at all times since September 11, 1952,
United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, the
Charging Party herein, has been and is the duly selected
and Board-certified exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the said unit described
in Conclusion of Law No. 4, supra.
" Indeed, the basic point here involved is the Union's right to conduct
its own timestudies rather than to have to accept the Employer's
See cases cited supra, B, 1
772 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
6 On and at all times since November 15, 1968,
Respondent has refused and now refuses to accede
to the request of the above Union, as such exclusive
collective bargaining representative of Respondent's
employees in the foregoing unit, to be permitted to
conduct its own timestudies of the job of range assistant
servicing Ranges Nos 5, 6, and 7 and No 2 Steam
Frame in Respondent's said plant, concerning which
job grievances had been filed raising issues relative
to the fairness or propriety of the workload pertaining
thereto, and also relative to Respondent's timestudies
or alleged time studies
7 By its actions and each of them described in Con
clusion of Law No 6, supra, Respondent has refused
and is refusing to bargain collectively with said Union,
in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
8 The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act
9 Respondent has failed to establish, in fact or in
law, its defenses of waiver or any other defense to
the violations of the Act alleged in the complaint as
amended and further amended
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged and is
continuing to engage in unfair labor practices in violation
of the Act, I shall recommend that it be required to
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action necessary to repair and remove the effects of
those violations so as to effectuate the policies of the
Act
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in the proceed
ing, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby
recommend that the National Labor Relations Board
issue the following
ORDER
Respondent North Carolina Finishing Division of
Fieldcrest Mills, Inc , its officers, agents, successors
and assigns, shall
I Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with
United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the
statutory bargaining representative of the production
and maintenance employees at its Yadkin, North Caroli-
na, plant, by refusing to permit the Union, through
its own experts and agents, to examine the Company's
timestudies relevant and necessary to the processing
of employee grievances arising under the parties' collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, and by refusing to permit
the Union to conduct its own timestudies (except during
arbitration) at Respondent's said plant, through the
Union's own experts or agents, relevant and necessary
to the processing of employee grievances arising under
the parties' collective-bargaining agreement, including
the Union's grievance concerning the workload of the
range assistant servicing Ranges Nos 5, 6, and 7 and
No 2 Steam Frame
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with
the rights of the Union to bargain collectively with
it on behalf of the production and maintenance workers
at its Yadkin North Carolina, plant
2 Take the following affirmative action necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act
(a) Upon request, permit the Union, through its own
agents or experts, to examine the Company's timestudies
and to perform independent timestudies in Respondent's
said plant, relevant and necessary to the processing
of employee grievances arising under the parties' collec-
tive bargaining agreement, including the Union's griev-
ance concerning the workload of the range assistant
servicing Ranges Nos 5 6, and 7 and No 2 Steam
Frame
(b) Post at Respondent's Yadkin, North Carolina,
plant, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix "3' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Board's Regional Director for Region 11, after being
signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall
be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt there-
of and maintained by it for 60 days thereafter, in conspic-
uous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said Notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material
(c) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within
20 days from receipt of this Decision, what steps have
been taken to comply therewith 31
Y In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46
of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board
the findings conclusions recommendations and recommended Order
herein shall as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations
be adopted by the Board and become its findings conclusions and
order and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes
In the event that the Board s Order is enforced by a judgment of
a United States Court of Appeals the words in the notice reading
Posted By Order of the National Labor Relations Board shall be
changed to read Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board
3i In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the
Board this provision shall be modified to read Notify said Regional
Director in writing within 10 days from the date of this Order what
steps have been taken to comply herewith
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all sides had the chance to present
evidence and arguments, the decision is that North
Carolina Finishing Division of Fieldcrest Mills, Inc ,
has violated the National Labor Relations Act, and
we have therefore been ordered to post this notice
N.C. FINISHING DIV. OF FIELDCREST MILLS
The National Labor Relations Act among other things
guarantees to employees the right to bargain collectively
through a representative of the employees ' own choice.
WE WILL respect this right.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
United Textile Workers of America , AFL-CIO,
by refusing to permit the Union, through its own
agents or experts , to examine the Company's
timestudies and to conduct independent timestudies
(except during arbitration ) in our plant , relevant
and necessary to the processing of employee griev-
ances under our collective-bargaining agreement,
including the Union ' s grievance concerning the
workload of the range assistant servicing Ranges
No. 5, 6 , and 7 and No . 2 Steam Frame.
WE WILL permit such timestudies by the Union
and access to the plant for that purpose.
Dated By
773
NORTH CAROLINA
FINISHING DIVISION OF
FIELDCREST MILLS, INC.
(Employer)
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's
Office, 1624 Wachovia Building , 301 Main Street, Win-
ston - Salem , North Carolina 27101, Telephone
901-723-2911.