Federal Paper Board Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 30, 1973

206 N.L.R.B. 681 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

FEDERAL PAPER BOARD CO., INC. 681
Federal Paper Board Company , Inc. and Atlanta Print-
ing Specialties & Paper Products Local Union
# 527, affiliated with Southeastern Printing Special-
ties District Council S-7, subordinate to Internation-
al Pressmen & Assistants' Union of North America,
AFL-CIO. Cases 10-CA-10035 and 10-CA-10081
mitted certain allegations but denied that it committed any
unfair labor practices. After the trial, the General Counsel
and Respondent filed briefs which have been carefully con-
sidered.
Upon the entire record herein, and consideration of the
beefs and from my observation of the demeanor of the
witnesses as they testified, I make the following:
October 30, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS KENNEDY
AND PENELLO
On June 21, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Joel
A. Harmatz issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent, Federal Paper Board Com-
pany, Inc., Thomaston, Georgia, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was tried in Thomaston, Georgia, on May 15, 1473, pur-
suant to charges filed on March 9, 1973, and April 5, 1973,
a complaint issued thereon by the Regional Director for
Region 10 on April 20, 1973, an amended charge dated
April 24, 1973, and a consolidated complaint, issued by said
Regional Director, on April 26, 1973, alleging that Respon-
dent independently violated Section 8(a)(1) by coercively
interrogating employees concerning their union activities,
and by threatening employees with reprisals because of their
union activities, and Section 8(a)(3) by refusing to hire a job
applicant, James Williams, because he was related to a
union supporter.' In its duly filed answer, Respondent ad-
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Respondent is a Georgia corporation, with an office and
plant located at Thomaston, Georgia, where it is engaged in
manufacturing paper board. During the past calendar year,
a representative period, Respondent sold and shipped fin-
ished products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to cus-
tomers located outside the State of Georgia.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
Atlanta Printing Specialties & Paper Products Local Union
# 527, affiliated with Southeastern Printing Specialties Dis-
trict Council S-7, Subordinate to International Pressmen &
Assistants' Union of North America, AFL-CIO, herein re-
ferred to as the Union, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
For the past 7 years, the Charging Union has been en-
gaged in an, as yet, unsuccessful organization drive among
Respondent's Holly Spring employees. Dating back to 1966,
there -have been three elections involving said employees,
and as of the date of the hearing, a fourth was scheduled for
May 24, 19732
The bulk of the alleged misconduct which forms the basis
of the instant complaint occurred in mid-March 1973.3 The
General Counsel adverts to no evidence that a history of
unfair labor practices exists at the plant or that Respondent
engaged in any unlawful conduct with respect to past orga-
nizational campaigns. The record contains little evidence
bearing upon the nature of the more recent campaign, but
it does appear that the Union, by mail, sent Mr. Kenneth
' At the hearing, the Respondent's unopposed motion to strike certain,
allegations, of the complaint, as to which no evidence was adduced, was
granted. The stricken allegations consisted of an instance of interrogation
attributed to Supervisor 'Bonnie =Burgess, an expression by Weaver as to -the
futility of employee organization allegedly made in cenjunotion with,prom-
ises of benefit, and solicitation of surveillance and antiunion activity by
emzployees attributed to both Weaver and Burgess.
Although there is some controversy as to; whether the Union's organiza-
tion campaign was an,ongoing venture over the past 7 years, or whether it
most recently commenced again in the fall of L972, I am satisfied that it had
a resurgence in the latter part of 1972
3 Unless otherwise indicated all dates refer to 1973.
206 NLRB No. 100
682 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Johansen, Respondent's plant manager a notification dated
March 15, 1973, indicating that certain employees, 41 in all,
whose signatures were affixed to that document, had desig-
nated the Union. It further appears that, on or about March
19, 1973, the Union circulated a leaflet expressing prounion
propaganda and also bearing the signatures of the 41 em-,
ployees. Respondent concedes that, following distribution
of this literature, various supervisory officials, namely, Plant
Superintendent Douglas Weaver, Night Superintendent Bill
McClain, and Shipping Department Supervisor Gene Dor-
sey 4 participated in discussion with certain employees
whose signatures appeared on the above-mentioned docu-
ments. Those conversations and another related to the al-
leged discrimination against applicant Williams, a few days
thereafter, involving Weaver and employees Davis, James
Prater, Jr., and Bobby Bankston are the basis for almost all
of the allegations in the complaint that Respondent inde-
pendently violated Section 8(a)(1) by engaging in coercive
interrogation and threats.
B. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
1. The circulation of the union leaflet; management's
reaction thereto
On March 19, the above-described leaflet was passed out.
During that afternoon employee Melvi Fagan, whose signa-
ture appeared on that document, was_working, when her
machine jammed. Weaver, the plant superintendent, called
her off to the side, told her he knew her personally, and
asked why she had signed with the Union. Fagan described
her reason as based on her interest in job status and her
objection to certain working conditions including women
being required "to pull out jams." Weaver, being of the
opinion that her complaints were "serious," felt that the
plant manager should hear of them first-hand. He therefore
asked Fagan if she would report these conditions to Plant
Manager Johansen. She did so; the conversation with Plant
Manager Johansen was limited to her complaints about
shop conditions and the Union was not referred to.' Under
the circumstances, since Fagan was aware that Weaver
knew that she had signed the leaflet circulated that day, I
do not find that this questioning either tended to create the
impression or was designed to reveal whether or not Fagan
was a union member. On the other hand, judging from the
entire discussion, I find that Weaver's solicitation of the
reasons behind Fagan's union support, having been fol-
lowed by a request that she report her grievances to the
plant manager, occurred under conditions tending to imply
to Fagan that Weaver viewed her complaints favorably. The
solicitation of grievances under such circumstances consti-
tutes a form of interrogation which tends to unlawfully
impede the exercise of Section 7 rights, and I find that
Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 6
4 The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Weaver, Mc-
Clain, Dorsey, and Ed Wilson (cutting department foreman), are agents of
Respondent and supervisors within the meaning of the Act.
s Based upon a composite of testimony of Weaver and Fagan which is not
the subject of significant conflict
6 See e .g Associated Mills, Inc, 190 NLRB 113.
Employee Alton Harris and his immediate supervisory,
McClain testified to an encounter they had on the day after
the leaflet was distributed? Thus, McClain called Harris to
the stock area, where he, in effect, asked Harris his reasons
for union affiliation.8 Harris answered by indicating that he
needed better insurance. Apparently, to defend against this
assertion, McClain took Harris to his office where he
showed the latter a pamphlet concerning the Company's
existing insurance program. Harris also testified, but with-
out contradiction, that at some point during this conversa-
tion, McClain (quite obviously, as an argument against
union affiliation) related his experience in another job
where, as a pressman in an organized shop, he quit because
accused of taking work away from another craft when he
himself attempted to replace a blade after the die he was
working with broke. Harris further testified that McClain
also said that if the Union happened to get into the shop,
a cutback in available work for Harris, would necessitate
Harris' being sent home. McClain does not deny this aspect
of Harris' testimony and it is credited .9
In my opinion, the validity of McClain's questioning of
Harris is subject to analysis corresponding fully to the issue
arising from similar allegations based on almost contempo-
raneous conversations between (1) Weaver and employees
James Parker, Archie Snead, and Horace Cleveland and (2)
Archie Snead and Shipping Supervisor Gene Dorsey. Ac-
cordingly, my conclusions as to the alleged unlawful inter-
rogation based on the McClain-Harris conversation will be
discussed, infra.
In the Dorsey-Snead confrontation, which occurred on
March 19, Dorsey, referring to the leaflet, told Snead he was
surprised to see his name on it, and asked him why he was
for the Union and whether he had anything against the
Company. The conversation ended with Snead responding
that he signed as a means of getting more money and that
he had nothing against the Company.10
In another incident occurring at the close of work on
March 19, 1973, Weaver engaged Horace Cleveland, Archie
Snead, and James Parks in a conversation at the time-
clock.ll Weaver then had the leaflet in his hand which bore
7 As for the timing of this incident, I credit McClain. Harris initially
testified that this occurred on March 20, which would be the day after the
leaflet's distribution. On cross-examination, however, Harris indicated that
the conversation took place on the same day as, and before, the leaflet was
distributed I find on the basis of demeanor, and the pattern of conduct
revealed through the testimony of other witnesses with which McClain's
testimony conforms, that McClain is the more credible of the two witnesses
on this point.
8 Harris is discredited insofar as he asserts that he was questioned as to his
union membership. I believe that at the time of this incident McClain was
fully aware of Harris' union sympathies, and am satisfied that it is unlikely
that he would question Harris in this regard. Furthermore, here again, the
version of the conversation which I credit is the more plausible when consid-
ered against the events as described by the other witnesses for both the
General Counsel and Respondent.
9 These final remarks attributed to McClain are not alleged in'the com-
plaint to constitute independent unfair labor practices. Nor does the General
Counsel make any such argument in its brief. Accordingly, I do not consider
the presence of this evidence as a basis for such litigation . However, if such
issues were before me, I would find that McClain's remarks were in the
nature of legitimate antiunion argument and protected by Section 8(c).
10 Based on a composite of the testimony of Snead and Dorsey. Although
Dorsey does not specifically admit or deny that he asked Snead why he was
for the Union, I am satisfied and find that he did so.
11 I credit Weaver's version of this incident Cleveland did not testify.
FEDERAL PAPER BOARD, CO., INC. 683
the, signature of these three employees. Parks, apparently,
under the impression that the leaflet was not in the form he
signed, asked Weaver how the latter thought it would be
used.12 Weaver replied that he thought that the Union was
trying to use the signatures as a basis for creating a band-
wagon effect, and that if successful in getting a majority, it
was possible that the Union could come into the plant with-
out an election. Although Weaver's testimony includes a
denial that he asked directly why employees were for the
Union, I am satisfied that he did raise the issue at least to
Snead, and within earshot of Cleveland. Snead answered,
stating that he wanted better wages. Cleveland then in-
formed Weaver that he was told by the Union that he
should be making $1.60 more per hour. Weaver laughed and
said that would be completely out of line, and, in addition,
made some computations, explaining that the plant must
operate at a certain level of profit to remain competitive. He
further stated that if the total payroll exploded by the per-
centage figure that Horace Cleveland was talking about, it
would be impossible to operate the plant. Finally, Weaver
stated that this explosion in wages would get to Mr. Kenne-
dy, Respondent's president, and he would not go along with
it.
The complaint alleges that by Weaver's questioning
Cleveland, Parks, and Snead, by McClam's questioning of
Harris, and by Dorsey's questioning of Snead as to the
reasons behind their union support, Respondent engaged in
coercive interrogation in violation of Section 8(a)(1). I find
that these allegations are not substantiated.
As I understand Board precedent, the questioning of em-
ployees, who previously have openly declared their union
membership to management, concerning their reasons for
jointing the Union, does not constitute a per se violation of
the Act.13 Accordingly, the totality of the circumstances
must be scrutinized to determine whether solicitation of
such information would have a tendency to impede employ-
ees in the exercise of their statutory right to join, form, or
assist labor organizations. I do not find this to be the case
here.
The interrogation in issue occurred at a time when em-
ployees knew that management had learned of their openly
declared union affiliation- Unlike the questioning of Melvi
Fagan, which I have heretofore found to have been unlaw-
ful, no action was taken by Weaver, Dorsey, or McClain
that tended to suggest that the responses of the employees
would be aired by and favorably received by management.14
Nor did the questioning occur ? , a context of widespread or
serious unfair labor practices, or under conditions which
could reasonably be considered as coercive. Instead, the
atmosphere in the plant, despite prolonged efforts at organi-
zation by the Charging Union, was one of open discussion
and debate of the issue, without fear of intimidation.
It is true that the complaint alleges an independent 8(a)(1)
violation based on a threat of plant closure imputed to
Weaver during the conversation with Cleveland, Parks, and
Snead. However, I shall recommend dismissal of this allega-
tion; for, it is apparent from the credited testimony, that this
was not the equivalent of an unconditional threat of plant
closure on unionization," but an unambiguous, argumenta
tive retort tailored to meet specifically Cleveland's represen-
tation as to what the Union had told him in an obvious
effort to elicit his vote. This statement by Weaver amounted
to the type of argument that the Board has permitted as
legitimate campaign dialogue.16 I find that Respondent did
not violate Section 8(a)(1) by the statement concerning a
possible close down.
On balance, and considering the foregoing, and the fact
that the Union was a general topic and the subject of free
and open discussion in the plant, it is my opinion that the
supervisory attempts to elicit the reasons why Harris, Parks,
Snead, and Cleveland had signed the leaflet would be taken
by these employees, as a casual, nonsystematic personal
effort on the part of certain supervisors to combat union
propaganda. Where employees are questioned as to their
reasons for joining a union, and where, as here, the sole
objective conveyed to them through the entire conversation
is no more than that management representatives are seek-
ing to refute union representations or promises through le-
gitimate propaganda, I see these conversations as typical of
the temperate and noncoercive everyday dialogue between
employees and supervisors as to the pros and cons of union-
ization, which this Act does not condemn. The fact that in
the course of such a discussion, a prounion employee is
questioned as to the basis for his position, should not auto-
matically taint the legitimacy of management's participa-
tion therein . In sum, since, through the conduct in issue,
employees would not assume that the questions were a de-
vice whereby management sought to elicit their union lean-
ings, and as the conversations were otherwise -free of
coercion,17 I shall recommend dismissal of the 8(a)(1) alle-
gation based on the questioning of Harris, Parks, Snead,
and Cleveland.
Parks' testimony was a bareboned account , outlining statements that would
substantiate the allegations of the complaint , but reflecting an almost com-
plete lack of recollection for the context in which they were made. Archie
Snead, on direct examination , simply testified that Weaver asked hun why
he was for the Union , making no reference to other comments , including a
threat of closedown, attributed by Parks to Weaver. On examination by me
Snead did testify to matters generally corroborative of Parks. On balance, I
believe that there is no real inconsistency between Weaver's version and that
of Parks and Snead; but I regard the former's as being a more complete
account, which places certain superficially coercive statements in a context
which permits fair evaluation. The General Counsel offered no rebuttal of
Weaver's testimony on this regard , and I find it entirely credible.
12 Parks testified that he thought he remembered that Weaver asked him
if he signed the leaflet . In view of the vagueness of this testimony and the
hazy recollection of Parks apparent from his testimony as a whole, I do not
re4ard this portion of his testimony as worthy of credence.
3 See e.g. Flight Safety, Inc, 197 NLRB 223.
2. Weaver's statements concerning the application of
James Williams
The complaint alleges that Weaver, in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1), threatened employees that Respondent would
not hire job applicants related to employees who supported
the Union. This concerns the effort of James Williams to
14 Cf. The Miller press, 197 NLRB 574.
15 Cf. Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, 160 NLRB 746, relied upon by the
General Counsel , where the threats found unlawful were not predicated upon
unreasonable union demands or assertions, as in the instant case, but state-
ments of reprisal based upon employee organization.
16 See e.g. B.F. Goodrich Footwear Company, 201 NLRB 353, Birdsall Con-
struction Company, 198 NLRB No. 20.
17 Cf. American United Inns, Inc. d/b/a/ Ramada Inn, 201 NLRB 431.
684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
obtain employment with Respondent which later proved
fruitless, and which is the subject of an 8(a)(3) allegation.
Williams is the nephew of Bobby Bankston, an employee of
Respondent and known union supporter. Following Wil-
liams' formal appearance at the plant and application for a
job on March 15, he received no response from Respondent.
On or about March 21, 1973, Bankston, Alton Harris, James
Prater, Charlie Montgomery, and certain other employees
were on their afternoon break in the canteen. Weaver ap-
peared, and at some point a discussion ensued between him
and Bankston, portions of which are in conflict . Harris,
though called as a witness by the General Counsel was not
examined as to this incident. Of the remaining individuals
present, only Bankston, Prater, and Weaver testified in this
regard.
Prater's recollection of this incident was limited to his
assertion that Weaver said that "he wasn't for anybody that
was for the union . And it wasn't his intention to hire anyone
that had anything to do with the union." Weaver and Bank-
ston, on the other hand, gave more definitive accounts. Both
agree that the conversation opened with an interchange
between Weaver and another employee, Montgomery, con-
cerning,reported favoritism that was practiced in the plant.
According to Bankston, Weaver then addressed the other
employees, asking if any one else had anything to say. Bank-
ston spoke up, asking what Weaver asks of a person who
comes to Federal Paper Board for a job. Weaver said that
all he asks is that "they be there and do the job." Bankston
then said that Foreman McClain had promised his nephew
a job and when the nephew came in to check on it, and
informed Weaver that Bankston had recommended him,
Weaver replied that "a bad person" had made the recom-
mendation. Weaver admitted to Bankston that these were
his words to the nephew, and when Bankston asked, why,
Weaver accused Bankston of just going around keeping the
"union s-t . . . stirred up." Bankston asked if that was
why Weaver did not lure his nephew to which Weaver re-
plied in the affirmative, stating "I would be a fool to hire
your nephew knowing you are for the Union ... your
nephew would be for the Union too."
According to Weaver, following his conversation with
Montgomery, Bankston, caught his attention, stating "I un-
derstand that you wouldn't hire my nephew because you
think I am involved in union activity." Weaver admits to`
responding ". . . why should I hire a man knowing that it
would be a union vote." Bankston then turned to other
employees, asking them if they heard what Weaver said. At
that point, Weaver having second thoughts, retracted by
telling Bankston that "the union thing doesn't predicate our
hiring practices."
I credit Weaver's account of this conversation, but find
that his initial remark tended to leave the employees with
the impression that- Respondent was inclined to give consid-
eration to the union issue on matters of employment,18 and
iP I was more favorably impressed with Weaver's demeanor than that of
Bankston. Weaver's testimony was forthright and direct, even as to certain
matters unfavorable to the defense. On the other hand, I was not impressed
with Bankston'v demeanor and I wasdoubtful as to his capacity for. recollec-
tion of specifics . In my opinion, the faulty recollection of Prater , inherent on
the face of his testimony, makes his account of the incident useless in assess-
ing the versions given by Weaver and Bankston.
that the effects of this statement, being a spontaneous reac-
tion, would not necessarily be neutralized by Weaver's sub-
sequent explanation to the contrary. Accordingly, though I
believe the issue to be "borderline," I find that Respondent
by the remark that it would not hire the relative of a union
supporter, coerced and restrained employees in violation of
Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act.
3. Miscellaneous interrogation
The complaint alleges an additional instance of 8(a)(1)
interrogation placed in mid-November 1972, some 4
months prior to and having no direct connection with the
other events in issue here. Thus, according to the testimony
of Alton Harris, he was routinely checking load tickets in
the office of Cutting Department Foreman Ed Wilson on
November 17 or 18, 1972, when the latter asked him, while
they were alone, about some union meetings including one
held the night before. Wilson also asked Harris whether he
had signed a card; Harris indicated that he had.
Wilson denied ever asking Harris whether he had signed
a card, but his testimony as to the conversation he had with
Harris concerning the Union appears limited to an entirely
different incident than that to which Harris makes refer-
ence. According to Wilson, employees Harris, Bankston,
and James Waynewright were talking, apparently about the
Union, when he said "why don't you ask Alton [Harris]
about it. He says he has signed a card. He goes to union
meetings." According to Wilson that was the sum total of
the discussion.
I credit Harris, since I do believe that the conversation
which he testified to, occurred. There is no specific denial
in Wilson's testimony , of such a conversation concerning
the Union. Furthermore, I regard it as entirely probable that
it was through this incident, that Wilson acquirred knowl-
edge of Harris ' execution of a card and attendance at union
meetings. Accordingly, and as this questioning of an em-
ployee concerning his union activity and membership was
not conducted pursuant to reasonable safeguards , assur-
ances against reprisal, and for any legitimate objective, I
find that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
C. The Alleged Discrimination
The complaint alleges that James Williams applied for
employment on or about March 20, 1973, and that Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(3) by refusing to hire Williams
because he was related to and recommended by an employ-
ee who was sympathetic towards and active on behalf of the
Union.
James Williams is the nephew of Bobby Bankston, a
known union supporter. He is a young man of 19 years, with
a sixth grade education and was not shown to have any
special skills or qualifications for employment. From the
record, all that appears with respect to, his employment
record, since he left school, is that he held two jobs, One,
with the Howell Home Hotel, Atlanta, Georgia, where he
worked as a janitor from August 1969 until January 1970.
FEDERAL PAPER BOARD CO., INC. 685
A second with Beaudry Ford, Atlanta, Georgia, where he
worked from February 1, 1972, to January 29, 1973, as a
new car "get ready" man. From his application for employ-
ment, it appeared that Williams did not work between Janu-
ary 1970 and February 1972, and when questioned, on
cross-examination as to what he was doing in the interim,
Williams merely replied: "I don't know ... I probably
wasn't working anywhere."
Williams had no direct contact with the Employer until
March 15, 1973. Prior to that time, however, it appears that
his uncle, Bankston, brought him an application, which he
filled out and gave to Bankston to take back to the Compa-
ny. Bankston testified that, in mid-February, he gave this
application to Bill McClain. Although McClain did not re-
call receipt of same, or that he gave the application to Bank-
ston initially, an application dated February 26, 1973,
bearing Williams' name, was discovered in a supervisor's
desk in the production area some time after the unfair labor
practice charge involving Williams was filed. That applica-
tion contained no references.
After turning this application over to Bankston, and re-
ceiving nothing from the Respondent, Williams went to the
plant on March 15. It is noted that this was the only occa-
sion on which Williams had direct contact with
Respondent's officials or made an appearance at the plant.
At that time, Williams entered the employees' entrance to
the plant and ran into Weaver, who stopped him and asked
whether he could help Williams. Williams said that he was
looking for Weaver. Weaver then identified himself. Wil-
liams told Weaver that Bankston told Williams to come
over and see Weaver and he could get a job. Weaver told
Williams that Bankston was a poor recommendation, but
directed Williams to the personnel office where he could
make application.19
Apparently, when Williams arrived at the personnel of-
fice, Williams mentioned the earlier application that he had
given Bobby Bankston. An effort was made to find that
application. When the search proved unsuccessful, Williams
agreed to fill out another. He was informed that this appli-
cation would be good for 30 days. After completing the new
application, Williams left the premises, did not again hear
from the Company, and never returned to the plant or
otherwise inquired as to the status of his application .20
The main thrust of the General Counsel's case with re-
spect to Williams, as I view the record , rests upon Weaver's
19In connection with the statement by Weaver that Williams had a poor
recommendation , the Respondent adduced evidence to show that Bankston's
work record was marginal. On the basis of the written warnings issued to
Bankston which are a part of this record, and my favorable impression of
Respondent's witness who testified to his work deficiencies , I find that
Bankston's work record was less than desirable and that he was regarded as
a subpar employee by his superiors. Therefore I do not regard the "poor
recommendation" remark as based upon Bankston's union activity.
20 The foregoing is based essentially on a composite of the testimony of
Weaver, Williams, and McClain . The latter was engaged in a conversation
with Weaver when Williams entered the plant on March 15. A conflict exists
as to whether Weaver personally escorted Williams to the personnel office
or merely gave the latter directions as to how to get there . I find the former
to have been the case since I believe it unlikely that Weaver would have
stopped what he was doing to accommodate Williams and insure his arrival
at the personnel office. It is more probable, that Weaver would have given
the easily conveyed instructions , as both he and McClain testified . Ldiscredit
Williams in this regard.
March 21 comment to Bankston to the general effect that
he could not hire another union vote. Otherwise the record
contains no affirmative proof supporting the General
Counsel's claim that Respondent would have acted favora-
bly upon the Williams' application had he not been the
nephew of a known union adherent. No effort was made to
establish that Williams was possessed of special qualifica-
tions or that Respondent was in dire need of manpower
during times material, nor has any other evidence been
offered that would suggest that Williams was a preferred
prospect for employment. At the same time, Williams did
not impress me personally, and from his testimony and
employment application Williams' work experience and ref-
erences are less than attractive. In addition, a serious ques-
tion is raised as to his employment potential by the absence
of any sensible explanation for the 2-year break in his em-
ployment history. The evidence simply fails to support affir-
matively any reasonably based inference that Respondent
would have hired Williams under any circumstances. 1
Furthermore, there is no credible evidence in the record
that other applicants of like qualification were newly hired
after Williams' application 22 Indeed the only evidence ad-
duced to this effect in support of the complaint was through
the testimony of Bobby Bankston, who asserts that he re-
calls three individuals having been hired after Williams filed
his application. They were Willis Joe Reed, Walter Johnson,
and Louis Searshie. All worked on different shifts from that
of Bankston, and the basis for his knowledge of their em-
ployment was his observation of them reporting to work at
shift changes. On cross-examination, Bankston showed a
lack of clear knowledge as to the specific dates and circum-
stances under which these individuals were hired. He did
not testify that any of these individuals were hired by Bill
McClain, who, according to Bankston, had been given Wil-
liams' application dated February 26 .21
21 Louise Gaddy, Respondent's personnel clerk, took Williams' application
on March 15 , as is the usual practice under Respondent's hiring procedure.
According to her testimony , which I credit en tots, when an application is
filed she grades it and then files it in one of two separate files. Those with
acceptable,or good.grades go into a "likely prospect" file, and others into an
"alphabetical" file. There is no chance of favorable action on-an application
in the "alphabetical" file at tunes when applications are on hand in the "likely
prospect" file. At the time Williams applied, and thereafter, the Company
received about 100 new applications, with about 45 on hand in the "likely
prospect" file. Williams' application was ultimately located in the "alphabeti-
cal" file, and I find that it was placed there originally by Gaddy after she
received it an completed form from Williams on March 15 , and graded it
pursuant to uniformly applied considerations.
22 Although Respondent concedes to hiring about five employees since
March 15, this offers little solace to the General Counsel, for there is no
evidence as to the nature of the jobs filled, nor a showing as to the qualifica-
tions of all those selected for hire. Considering the absence of such proof, the
serious question in my mind as to whether Williams' record indicates that he
presented agood risk as an employment prospect , and the credited testimony
of Mrs. Gaddy as to her rating of his application,'I am unwilling to assume
that Williams was qualified for any of these jobs.
23 Gaddy credibly testified that under the hiring practice at the plant,
almost exclusive discretion is vested in the foremen . Thus, when a vacancy
exists in a department, the foreman , will come to her, and obtain about three
applications from the "likely prospect" file, conduct interviews and make a
choice. Gaddy acknowledged that it was possible for a foreman to take
applications directly and hire without using the file in the personnel office
This exception to the usual procedure is an explanation of the additional
applications found by McClain in the desk used by several supervisors, when
he located the February 26 incomplete application made on behalf of Wil-
Continued
686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In any event, any assumption of discrimination that may
be made on the basis of this evidence is negated by Weaver's
credible testimony that these individuals were not preferred
arbitrarily over Williams. Thus, according to Weaver, Willis
Joe Reed was hired on March 12, 1973, a date in advance
of Williams' application for employment. Walter Johnson
was'initially hired on September 12, 1972, but subsequently
was absent for a 2-week period and the Company assumed
he had quit. However, after 3 weeks, Johnson returned,
requested reinstatement, and after explaining his absence,
was reinstated with full seniority in early March or April
1973? Searshie was hired on April 1, 1973, following a
phone call from his employer, a local veterinarian, who
indicated that due to a change in his business he was going
to have to terminate Searshie. Weaver was informed by the
veterinarian that Searshie worked regularly, and had an
aptitude for mechanics. On this recommendation, and be-
cause of Respondent's need for employees with a mechani-
cal aptitude, Weaver passed the information on to McClain,
who hired Searshie. Based on the foregoing, I find that the
record is lacking in evidence that Respondent disparately
hired individuals, following Williams' application, to avoid
the hiring of an equally qualified relative of a known union
member.
Against this background, I do not find that Weaver's
March 21 statement to Bankston was an admission of im-
proper motivation. In my opinion this unlawful expression
is insufficient to supplant the missing elements in the Gener-
al Counsel's case. The alleged discriminatee was not shown
to be a desirable applicant for employment, and there is no
competent proof that a position was available following his
application to which he was entitled to be preferred, or,
indeed, to which he was equally suited with those hired for
such jobs. I regard this failure of proof to be fatal to the
General Counsel's case. I am unwilling to base a finding of
discrimination, where no actual loss of employment has
been established, solely on the basis of an ill-advised expres-
sion of hostility in the course of one of many discussions
between supervisors and employees especially where the
statement was made in response to an accusation, in a con-
text otherwise free of serious unfair labor practices, and
under conditions which, to the undersigned, create substan-
tial doubt as to whether Weaver actually was possessed of
an intention of discriminating against job applicants who
were related to supporters of the Union. Accordingly, I find
that the General Counsel has not established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) by its refusal to hire Williams.
hams. I credit McClain's denial that he ever promised Bankston a job for his
nephew, and I further find that McClain was under no obligation to act on'
the incomplete application of Williams dated February 26. Finally, it is my
opinion that no effective application by Williams was made until March 15,
1973.
24 Johnson was called as a rebuttal witness on behalf of the General Coun-
sel, and testified , contrary to Weaver, that in seeking reinstatement he gave
no explanation to Weaver for his absence. I was not impressed with
Johnson's demeanor and considering the probabilities, I find it unlikely that
Respondent having also previously fired Johnson, on one occasion, would
have reinstated him without good reason . I credit Weaver.
III CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
3. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
interrogating Melvi Fagan as to her reasons for supporting
the Union and Alton Harris as to his union membership and
activities under conditions interfering with, restraining, and
coercing them in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, and
by threatening employees that it would not hire relatives of
union supporters.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Respondent has not violated Section 8(a)(3) by refus-
ing to hire James Williams.
6. Except as specifically provided herein, Respondent
has not violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
IV THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I
shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:
ORDER25
Respondent, Federal Paper Board Company, Inc., Thom-
aston, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating employees as to their union member-
ship, union activities, or reasons for supporting the Union,
in a manner violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(b) Threatening employees that itwould not hire the rela-
tives of union supporters.
(c) In any like or related manner, interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization, to form, j om, or assist the Atlanta
Printing Specialties & Paper Products Local Union #527,
affiliated with Southeastern Printing Specialties District
Council S-7 subordinate to International Pressmen & Assis-
tants' Union of North America, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any or
25 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
FEDERAL PAPER BOARD CO., INC. 687
all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
'(a) Post at its Thomaston, Georgia, plant copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 26 Copies of said no-
tice, on forms to be provided by the Regional Director for
Region 10, shall, after being duly signed by a representative
of Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt
thereof and be maintained by it for a period of at least 60
consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily post-
ed. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found herein.
26 In the event the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
union supporters will not be hired.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with , restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization , to form, join, or assist
Atlanta Printing Specialties & Paper Products Local
Union #527, affiliated with Southeastern Printing
Specialties District Council S-7, subordinate to Inter-
national Pressmen & Assistants ' Union of North
America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any or all
such activities.
All of our employees are free to join, or refrain from
joining Atlanta Printing Specialties & Paper Products
Local Union # 527, affiliated with Southeastern Print-
ing Specialties District Council S-7, subordinate to In-
ternational Pressmen & Assistants' Union of North
America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NoT question employees as to their union
membership and activities or as to their reasons for
joining a union in a manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing them in the exercise of their rights
to form, join, or assist labor organizations.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees that relatives of
Dated By
FEDERAL PAPER BOARD
COMPANY, INC.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning
this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct-
ed to the Board's Office, Peachtree Building Room 701, 730
Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30308, Telephone
404-526-5760.