Federal Pacific Electric Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsNov 26, 1969179 N.L.R.B. 734 (N.L.R.B. 1969) Copy Citation 734 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Federal ' PacUic ' Electric Company and Communicatfoes `Workers of America , AFL-CIO. Case 10-CA-7630 November 26, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND ZAGORIA On July. 29, 1969, Trial Examiner William F. Scharnikow issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had not engaged in unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint, and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner only to the extent consistent with our Decision herein. The -complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging Harold J. Davis. The Trial Examiner found that Respondent discharged Davis because he made misstatements to management, and hence, that it did not engage in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. We do not agree. Davis was hired by Respondent on September 19, 1966, and was employed as a spot welder in the brake-weld department when he was discharged on November 19, 1968.' Davis joined the Union during an organizational drive in the summer of 1967 and was an active member. He regularly attended union meetings and openly told other employees what had taken place. Davis was a good worker. The events surrounding his discharge, which are more fully set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision, are summarized below. On Friday, November 15, employees in the brake-weld department asked to meet with top management to protest the appointment of White as supervisor. Because top management was not available, Superintendent Christianson met briefly with the employees. Davis commented at the 'Unless otherwise indicated , all dates are 1968 meeting that group leader Rollins, whom the employees favored, was not made a supervisor because he was too valuable as an employee.2 After the meeting, some of the employees discussed incentive pay problems and asked for their paychecks so they could engage in a walkout. They could not get their checks, but a meeting with plant manager Salsman was set for Monday morning. Salsman, who was admittedly concerned about the unrest in the brake-weld department, talked to the employees on Monday, November 18. He explained why he had promoted White and that appointing a supervisor was a prerogative of management. He said that either the employees were with him and would go to work or they were not with him and could leave. Immediately thereafter, and in the course of the meeting, Davis went to group leader Rollins and got permission to see a doctor about an eye injury he had received Friday evening. He then left the premises. The meeting continued another 20 minutes, during which time the employees complained about incentive pay problems. Immediately after the meeting, Salsman asked Rollins why Davis had left and was told that Davis went to a doctor. Salsman asked Rollins to find out which doctor. When Davis returned to work on Tuesday, November 19, Salsman had Davis' absence investigated. Salsman testified that usually absences are checked by lower level management, but he himself investigated Davis' absence because there might be a workmen's compensation problem and he was concerned about Davis' leaving the meeting. The facts surrounding Davis' absence and the ensuing investigation show that after leaving the meeting and punching out, Davis went to the office of Dr. Moses. As Dr. Moses was not in, Davis, after getting some "medicine" from his mother, went home. That night, Davis' wife, Willa Benie Davis, went to Partin's drug store and purchased eye medication for her husband. However, the next morning, after reporting for work, Davis, in response to Salsman's questions, stated that he had gone to see Dr. Moses. When Salsman later informed Davis that he discovered this was untrue, Davis said the Doctor was not available so he had got some medicine from Partin's drug store. Druggist Partin was contacted and stated that he had no record of dispensing medicine to Davis. After this, Rollins told Davis that Respondent knew he had not gone to the druggist, and that they wanted the truth because Salsman thought he had left "on a walkout." Davis said that his wife had gone to the drug store for him. Davis then went to see Salsman concerning Rollins' statement that he was suspected of leaving the plant "on a walkout." Salsman conceded having asked 'Davis testified that his comments were directed to the other employees, not to Christianson, but that Christianson was able to hear them Davis' testimony that he spoke at the meeting is uncontroverted Thus, we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Davis spoke at the meeting 179 NLRB No. 127 FEDERAL PACIFIC ELECTRIC COMPANY Davis why he walked out of the meeting and, "why is there unrest in the department." Davis admitted that he made mistakes in his statements concerning Dr. Moses, but that his wife had in fact got the medicine from Partin. Salsman said that if any part of this story were true, Davis would not be discharged. Salsman then telephoned the drug store, and was informed by the druggist that he did not know Mrs. Davis, whereupon Davis then asked if Benie had been in. Salsman , listening on an extension, then asked who Benie was. There was no response and the conversation apparently ended at that point. At the end of the work day Salsman discharged Davis allegedly because of his "misrepresentations" in explaining his leaving the meeting of September 18. During the following week Salsman was asked by the president of the Local Union, in the company of two other employees, as to the reasons for Davis' discharge. Among the reasons, Salsman referred to the misstatements and the fact that he walked out of the meeting. Salsman gave the same reasons on two other occasions, when he was asked by the vice president of the Local and by another employee. In recommending that the complaint be dismissed the Trial Examiner found that the discharge was not unlawfully motivated, but based upon the misrepresentations made by Davis in explaining his whereabouts on September 18. We disagree. Davis, in his 2 years of employment, was concededly a good worker and does not appear to have engaged previously in any misconduct. There is no dispute as to his having obtained permission from an authorized representative of Respondent before leaving the meeting of November 18. Although Davis' absence was concededly justified, and the reasons underlying it were fully known, Respondent claims that he was discharged for misreporting his whereabouts that day. In our opinion, Respondent' s action , through Plant Manager Salsman;, in investigating and then discharging Davis ' was 'not for' the reasons Respondent assigned, but was precipitated by a desire to deal 'firmly with unrest in the weld department. Salsman was admittedly disturbed over the employment-related demands made ,by Davis' fellow employees in the weld department. Davis' presence at both meetings, culminated by his seemingly abrupt departure from the second meeting following Salsman 's statement that those who • believed in management were "an asset" and were wanted by the Respondent but others could "leave," identified him with the dissident, group. The pretextual nature of the reasons assigned by the Respondent for Davis' discharge is amply shown by the following. On November 19, after Salsman was informed that Davis _ left the meeting with Rollins' permission , Salsman refused to close the matter. Instead he conducted an investigation, though such matters were normally left to lower 735 levels of management. Although Salsman discovered that Davis misrepresented the visit to Dr. Moses - a discrepancy that appears minor considering the fact that the absence was excused - his final investigation of the statement concerning the drug store visit by Davis' wife was more consistent with a preconceived intention to discharge, than discovery of the truth. During that last phone call, the name "Benie" was mentioned in a conversational context that reasonably would lead anyone to believe that she was the wife of Davis. Yet, Salsman asked who Benie was, and without getting a response, allowed the phone conversation to end abruptly. Salsman made no further effort to determine Benie's identity or whether Davis was in fact telling the truth at that time. It is implausible that Respondent, before discharging an employee of substantial tenure and with a good work history, would not press for clarification of this incident. But, in any event, it is our opinion that the key to Respondent's motivation in this case lies in Salsman's repeatedly accusing Davis of having walked out of the November 18 meeting, his questioning of Davis as to the "unrest", and his postdischarge statements to three employees that Davis, in part, was discharged because he walked out of the meeting. These latter statements, made on three separate' occasions, were obviously calculated to foster the belief among employees that the discharge was related to their demands concerning employment conditions. These factors, together with the threat of a walkout by weld department employees, Respondent's opposition to their demands, and the timing of the discharge in relation to Salsman's statement demonstrating that employees who opposed management were unwanted, renders the conclusion inescapable, that Davis was discharged as an object lesson to others in the weld department and a step in Respondent's effort to thwart employees from pressing their demands. Accordingly, we find that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.3 As we have found-that Davis' discharge violated the Act, we shall order that Respondent cease and desist therefrom and offer Davis full reinstatement. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Federal Pacific Electric Company, a New Jersey corporation doing business in Georgia, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.4 2. By discharging employee Harold J. Davis on November 19, 1968, in order to discourage employees from engaging in protected activity, Respondent has interfered with, - restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights 'As the remedy will not be affected in any event, we find it unnecessary to and do not pass upon the allegation that said discharge was also violative of Sec 8(a)(3). 'At the hearing the complaint was amended to state, and we find, that Respondent is a New Jersey Corporation doing business in Georgia 736 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. The unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Federal Pacific Electric Company, Vidalia, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging concerted activities of employees within the protection of Section 7 of the Act by discharging, laying off, or otherwise discriminating against any employee in regard to his hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. (b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection or to refrain from such activity. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Harold J. Davis immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges. (b) Make Harold J. Davis whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimination against him by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he normally would have earned as wages from the date of the discrimination to the date of Respond`ent's offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings during said period , in accordance with the formula prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum , as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. (c) Notify Harold J. Davis if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents , for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time cards , personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) Post at its plant in Vidalia, Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of such notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. MEMBER ZAGORIA, dissenting: I disagree with the majority's interpretation of Respondent's conduct, and would affirm the Trial Examiner's dismissal of the complaint. 'in the event this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board an Agency of the United States Government After a Trial at which all sides had the chance to give evidence, the National Labor Relations Board found that we, Federal Pacific Electric Company, violated the National Labor Relations Act. The Board therefore ordered us to post this notice. The Act gives all employees these rights: To engage in self organization, To form, help or join unions, To bargain collectively through a representative of their own choosing; To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and To refrain from any or all of these things. WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. The National Labor Relations Board found that we fired Harold J. Davis because we wanted to discourage you in the exercise of your rights as employees. The Board ruled that our firing him for this reason interfered with your rights and violated the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL therefore offer to give him back his job with full seniority, and all other rights and privileges. WE WILL also make up any pay he lost, with 6 percent interest. If Harold J. Davis is presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, we will notify him that he will be reemployed if he applies after his discharge. FEDERAL PACIFIC ELECTRIC COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative ) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. FEDERAL PACIFIC ELECTRIC COMPANY Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, 730 Peachtree Street, NE., Atlanta, Georgia 30308, Telephone 404-526-5760. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE WILLIAM F. SCHARNIKOW, Trial Examiner: The complaint alleges, but the answer of the Respondent denies, that the Respondent committed unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) and 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C., Sec 151, et seq. (herein called the Act), by discharging employee Harold J. Davis on November 19, 1968, and thereafter failing and refusing to reinstate him, because of his union membership and concerted activities.' Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Vidalia, Georgia, on April 15, 1969, before me The General Counsel and the Respondent appeared by counsel and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence upon the issues in the case. Since the hearing, briefs have been received from the General Counsel and from counsel for the Respondent and have been duly considered. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent, Federal Pacific Electric Company, is a Georgia corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of electrical equipment at a plant in Vidalia, Georgia. During the past calendar year, the Respondent sold and shipped finished products of a value exceeding $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of Georgia I conclude and find that the Respondent is, and has been, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to entertain the jurisdiction in the present case. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (herein called the Union ), is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Evidence and the Facts Harold J. Davis was a spot welder in the Respondent's employ from the time of his hire in September 1966 until his discharge on November 19, 1968. He joined the Union sometime before a Board representation election was conducted in July 1967, attended Union meetings, and informed nonattending employees of what had happened at these meetings. The result of the representation election 'The original charge was filed by the Union and served on the Respondent on January 21, 1969 An amended charge was filed on February 13, 1969 and served upon the Respondent on February 14, 1969 The complaint was issued by the Acting Regional Director and served upon the Respondent on February 28, 1969 The Respondent's answer was filed on March 10, 1969 737 is not shown by the record. Nor does it appear from the record that the Respondent knew anything of Davis' Union membership or concerted activity except possibly through his attendance with other employees at two meetings at the plant first with Superintendent Arthur Christianson on the afternoon of Friday, November 15, 1968, and then on Monday morning, November 18, 1968, with Plant Manager Robert Salsman, in which the other employees (but not Davis) spoke in protest against the Respondent's promotion of Elmer White to a foreman's job rather than Wallstin (Walt) Rollins, a group leader whom the employees favored. President Robert Fuller of the Union's Local had requested Group Leader Rollins to arrange a meeting with General Manager Deas on Friday, the 15th, but, since both Deas and Plant Manager Salsman were not at the plant that day, Superintendent Christianson met with the men that afternoon. Apparently the men were not satisfied with what Christianson told them concerning the reasons the Respondent had promoted White instead of Rollins, and after the meeting President Fuller asked Rollins to get them their week's paychecks so that they could go home before the end of the afternoon and come back on Monday when Salsman or Deas could speak to them. Rollins came back to Fuller and told him he could not get the men's checks but that they could meet with Plant Manager Salsman on Monday morning. Davis had not spoken during the short meeting with Christianson that Friday afternoon. But, on the urging of another employee, he did attend a gathering of three or four employers later in the afternoon and listened to their complaint that they had not gotten a 10-cent raise It does not appear that the Respondent knew either of this gathering or the complaint discussed by the men about their not getting the raise Moreover, Davis, according to his testimony, was not concerned about the matter since he had in fact received the raise On Saturday, November 16, Superintendent Christianson told Plant Manager Salsman that he had had a meeting with the employees on the previous day, that "there was a lot of unrest in the weld department," that a number of the men (two of whom he mentioned by name without including Davis) had requested their checks saying they would come back on Monday to see Salsman, and that Christianson had "put [them] off with the promise that [Salsman] would meet with them on Monday at 8:30." Salsman told Christianson to go ahead and set up the meeting for him. In the meantime, on Friday night, November 15, Davis injured his eye in a basketball game. By Monday morning, his discomfort was so great that he had decided by the time he reported for work at 8 a.m to go to see a doctor at about 9 o'clock and so informed fellow employees but not Group Leader Rollins, nor Manager Salsman, nor any of the Respondent's other supervisors Davis came to work at 8 a.m on Monday, the 18th, wearing dark glasses to cover and protect his injured eye. At 8:30 he was in the group of about 30 employees including Local President Fuller and Group Leader Rollins, when they met with Salsman to find out why White instead of Rollins had been made a foreman. Salsman said first that it was "the prerogative of management" to select its foremen but that although White had been its initial selection because of the breadth of his experience, Rollins was also being considered for an additional foreman's job. Salsman then said something to the effect that if the employees believed "in management," they were "an asset" and were "wanted" 738 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD by the Respondent , but that otherwise "you can leave." Finally, after a lull in which the men asked him questions, Saisman told them-he had been plant manager only for about 2 months and "was working very hard to resolve . . . problems" which had arisen in connection with an incentive pay system and a fair flow of materials to the men, and also in connection with the development of fair criteria for the granting of merit raises. The meeting had begun `at 8:30 a.m. and ended between 9:20 and 9:30 a.m. A few minutes after 9 o'clock, however, and just after Salsman had said that the men "could leave" if they did not "believe in management," Salsman saw Davis (who had said nothing) go over and speak to Group Leader Rollins, and then leave the cafeteria where the meeting was being held. Davis had in fact told Rollins that his eye was bothering him and he wanted to go to a doctor, and Rollins, whose authority in such cases was conceded during the hearing, had given him permission to leave the plant. Accordingly, Davis punched the timeclock, and went to the office of a Doctor Moses in Uvalda where Davis himself lived. But Doctor Moses was not in his office and so Davis, after getting some "medicine" from his mother, went home. That night, Davis' wife, Willa Benie Davis went to the drugstore of T. R. Partin in Uvalda and got some eye medication for her husband. On the next morning, Tuesday, November 19, Davis returned to work at the plant. In the meantime, after Salsman had finished speaking with the employees on Monday morning, November 18, he asked Rollins why Davis had left. Rollins replied that Davis had an eye injury and had a doctor's appointment and that Rollins had-therefore excused him. According to Salsman , he was somewhat relieved because he had thought Davis might have left in reaction to Salsman's remarks. But he also thought there might be a workmen's compensation problem and therefore asked Rollins to find out the name of the doctor when Davis came back to work. When Davis did report to work the following day, Tuesday, November 19, Rollins asked him for the doctor's name and Davis, according to his testimony as well as Rollins', replied, "I went to Doctor Moses." Starting with this initial misleading information from Davis, it took Rollins, Foreman White, and Manager Salsman much of the rest of the day to find out just what Davis had actually done to treat his eye injury. For, as they made a succession of telephone inquiries first of Doctor Moses and then of Druggist Partin and came back to Davis for an explanation of discrepancies, Davis made additional statements to them that were equally puzzling and misleading . What could have started and ended with a simple statement from Davis as to what he had actually done, became a time -consuming , senseless farce which obviously nettled Salsman , interrupted his "hectic" workday and finally caused him to order Davis' discharge at the end of the day. Moreover, the testimony of the witnesses concerning the details, the number and sequence of the conversations was so confusing and disjointed that only a skeleton of the 'facts is clear and a discussion of the many inconsistencies in'the rest of the testimony (although I have considered them)'would be practically impossible and certainly unprofitable. Salsman himself appeared to be a generally credible witness although even he was at times confused in details. But, in my opinion, Davis was less reliable in his recollection and showed a tendency to draw unwarranted conclusions and present them as the substance of the material events and statements in the case. In view of the General Counsel's burden of proof, I have resolved doubts in favor of Salsman's general testimony and have based supporting and consistent findings upon the testimony of other witnesses only to the extent that such evidence seems clear. The first inquiry made by Salsman in his concern about a possible workmen's compensation claim was in a telephone call to Doctor Moses who informed him that Davis had not visited him for treatment. When Rollins on Salsman's request, told Davis of this, and asked why he had said he had gone to Doctor Moses, Davis answered merely that the doctor was not in and so he had gotten some medicine from Partin's Drugstore in Uvalda. Rollins reported this to Manager Salsman. Foreman White, who was with Salsman at the time and also lived in Uvalda, immediately telephoned Druggist Partin whom he knew. White asked Partin whether Davis had gotten medication for his eye the previous day After checking his prescriptions because he did not know Davis, Partin told White he had no record of having dispensed any medicine to Davis. White reported this to Salsman and at the same time also told Rollins. Rollins went out into the plant and told Davis that they knew he had not gone to the druggist and that "they wanted the truth," because Salsman thought he had left "on a walkout." Davis said that "my wife is the one that went out and got the medicine from the druggist." Rollins thereupon reported this to Foreman White and White made a second call to Druggist Partin and asked if Davis' wife had gotten any medicine for her husband Partin knew Willa Benie but did not know she was Mrs Davis Accordingly, Partin told White that so far as he knew, Davis' wife had not gotten any medicine for her husband.' After having told Group Leader Rollins that it was his wife who had gone to the druggist for him, Davis went to the office to speak to Manager Salsman. Foreman White was with Salsman at the time. Davis referred to Rollins' statement that he was suspected of leaving the plant "on a walkout." In his testimony, Salsman admitted asking Davis "Why did you walk out of the meeting?" and "Why is there unrest in the department?" But I credit his testimony, contrary to the implications of Davis' testimony, that he did not accuse Davis of appearing to lead a plant "walkout" but merely of "walking out of the meeting " In the rest of the conversation, Salsman pressed Davis for his reasons in making two misstatements to Rollins by claiming first that he had seen Doctor Moses for treatment and then that he had gone to the drugstore for medication. Davis admitted that he had made "mistakes" in making such statements but that he had said "he went to the doctor because . . . when I was out sick I wanted to have a pretty good excuse"' and that his wife had in fact gotten him medicine from the drugstore. Salsman then said "if [Davis'] story was true that [his] wife did go [to the druggist]," he would not be discharged. At Davis' suggestion, Salsman thereupon put a telephone call through to Druggist Partin and had Davis-speak to Partin, with Salsman listening on an extension. Davis, Partin, and Salsman testified concerning the substance of this conversation and what Salsman may have heard or understood from it. This finding is based upon White 's testimony and Salsman's testimony that White later reported such a telephone call and Partin 's answer Partin testified that he did not recall any such second telephone inquiry from White 'This particular quotation is from the testimony of Davis himself FEDERAL PACIFIC ELECTRIC COMPANY According to Davis and Partin, Davis asked Partin whether " Benie" had gotten any medicine for Davis and Partin said he remembered she had From Davis' version, it would appear that he did not identify " Benie" as his wife but that, when Salsman made his presence known on the extension, Partin told Salsman that although he knew both Davis and Benie he did not know they were married. According to Partin, however, Davis had said " Benie" was his wife, but when then told by Salsman he was on the line and had overheard the conversation, Salsman had nevertheless still asked, "Who is Benie9" Salsman 's version so far as it bears upon the critical point in the conversation was quite different. He testified that Davis asked Partin "Did my wife come into the store"; that Partin said , "I don't know your wife"; that Davis then asked, "Well, did Benie come into the store?"; that, after a pause, Partin said "Is someone else listening on the line?"; that Davis told him Salsman was on the line and Salsman then asked, "Well, who is Benie?" and that there was no response. Although the matter is not free from doubt, upon consideration of these three versions, I credit that of Salsman and further credit his testimony that, because of Partin's failure to answer his specific question as to Benie, he did not regard the conversation as substantiating Davis' final statement to him and to Rollins that his wife had actually gotten medicine for him from Partin. Following Davis' telephone conversation with Partin, Salsman told Davis to go back to work. But later in the afternoon, Davis saw Salsman again and reopened their earlier conversation. Davis testified that at the time, he was at work and Salsman was passing by. But Salsman testified that Davis came to the office while there were two or three other people there and the telephone was ringing and, all in all , it was a "hectic" day during which "two and a half or three hours" had already been spent in trying to unravel Davis' statements. I credit Salsman's testimony to this effect and also his testimony that in these circumstances he at first rebuffed Davis for coming to the office again without permission from his supervisors, i.e., as Salsman rather stuffily expressed it, without going "through the chain of command" before coming to him. As to the rest of this second and last conversation between the two men on Tuesday, November 19, there was again the same difference in their versions as to why Salsman was displeased by Davis' conduct in leaving the employee-meeting on November 18 and the successive explanations he had given to the Respondent's supervisors. Davis testified that he told Salsman, "You accused me of trying to lead a walkout or something. The position I was in I couldn't lead no walkout or nothing. I had a sick mother, children, and two nieces I am taking care of. If I was going to lead a walkout, I would have stuck with the guys," and that in response to this, Salsman merely replied, "You should think," and then walked off. But Salsman testified, and I credit his testimony, that in both his conversations with Davis on November 19, "1 said that he was walking out of my meeting, I didn't accuse him of a walkout, I said he was walking out of the meeting." After this second conversation with Salsman on Tuesday, November 19, Davis again returned to work. Against this background, Salsman testified that he decided to discharge Davis because of his "misrepresentations" in explaining his leaving the meeting that Salsman was holding with the employees at the request of Union Local president on Monday, September 18. Accordingly, at the 739 end of the afternoon, Davis was notified by Group Leader Rollins on Salsman's instructions, that he was discharged and he was given his paycheck at 5 o'clock. On three different occasions in the next week or so, Salsman was asked first by employee James Mitchell, then by Mitchell and Local Vice President Charles Day, and finally by Local President Robert Fuller and Vice President Day, why he had discharged Davis, but had not checked on employees Hubert Lumley and Billy Joe Harville who left work at about noon the same day and thus several hours after Salsman's meeting with the employees on Monday, September 18. There is actually no conflict between the testimony given by these employees and Salsman's testimony as to the substance of each of these conversations although the General Counsel and the Respondent disagree concerning the implications to be drawn therefrom. Accordingly, upon consideration not only of Salsman's testimony but also of the consistent details of the employees' testimony which are summarized in the margin,' I find as Salsman testified, that in the course of these conversations Salsman told the inquiring employees and officials of the Local that "if Davis had not left that meeting [on September 8] . there would have been no reason for my having checked" his story and then discharging him, that Davis was discharged because of his "misrepresentations," i.e., because "he didn't tell the truth", that "if any part of his story had been true, I would have retained him"; and that the two other employees who left the plant at noon the same day "had proper excuses. One of them [Hubert Lumley] had to have a tooth pulled, his jaw was swollen, and the other one (Billy Joe Harville) had a statement that he had to be in court" in response to a garnishment order B. Conclusions In his brief, the General Counsel argues in substance that in attending Manager Salsman's meeting with the employees on September 18 at the request of the Union, Davis was engaged in a concerted Union activity protected by the Act, and that Salsman discharged Davis for leaving this meeting because he believed that Davis was leading or attempting to lead, or might have triggered, a general 'With respect to the first of these conversations which occurred between employee Mitchell and Salsman on Wednesday, September 20 (the day after Davis' discharge ), Mitchell testified that he asked Salsman "why did he fire [Davis] for telling him a story and didn't check on two more guys [Lumley and Harville] that left that day," and that Salsman replied that "if [Davis] had not of left during that meeting [with Salsman], he wouldn't have checked on him " As to another later conversation with Salsman when Local Vice President Charles Day and employee Mitchell went together to the office, Day and Mitchell testified that they again asked Salsman in the presence of Superintendent Christianson and Foreman White why Salsman fired Davis and did not even check on the other two men's leaving the plant the same day According to Mitchell , Salsman said that "if any part of [Davis 's] story would have been true he would not have fired him," and Foreman White added that "they checked the drugstore and nobody did come and get medicine" According to Local Vice President Day, Salsman said that "had it not been that [Davis] gave them false information about going to the doctor , he would not have fired him," and that when Salsman called the druggist , the druggist did not know Mrs Davis Furthermore , according to Day, Superintendent Christianson chimed in, saying that although Davis was a good worker and they did not want to fire him , he had given " false information " Finally , as to a third and still later conversation between Salsman and Local President Fuller and Vice President Day, Day testified that Salsman's explanation of Davis' discharge "was the same thing over and over again, about [Davis '] leaving the meeting [giving] false information," and Fuller, too, testified that Davis told them that "if [Davis] had not got up and walked out of the meeting, there would have been nothing said about it " 740 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD "walkout " of employees which would also have been a concerted activity protected by the Act . Because of this asserted intended interference with the employees ' freedom to engage in concerted activities , the General Counsel contends that Salsman ' s discharge of Davis was a violation of both Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act. But the facts already found upon the evidence, do not support the General Counsel ' s contention . Salsman did not discharge Davis simply because he left Salsman's meeting with the employees on September 18, nor even because he left work that day. Nor is there any reason to believe from the credible evidence and the findings already made , that he discharged Davis because of Davis' Union membership , his apparent support of the Union in attending the meeting with Salsman , his actual or apparent exercise of any right to engage in or refrain from engaging in any concerted activity protected by the Act, or even the possibility that his leaving work during Salsman ' s meeting with the employees on September 18 might have triggered a protected general "walkout" by the employees . Instead , as Salsman ' s credited testimony indicates and I conclude , he discharged Davis because he was annoyed by having to take time to consider Davis' senseless misstatements concerning what he had done to treat his eye injury in his attempt to explain his leaving work on September 18. Accordingly, I conclude, contrary to the General Counsel's complaint that the Respondent did not discharge Davis because of his Union membership or support , or because of his engagement in, or the Respondent 's belief that he had engaged in, any concerted activities protected by the Act. I therefore recommend dismissal of the complaint that the Respondent engaged in any unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(l) or (3) of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case , I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Federal Pacific Electric Company, a Georgia corporation , is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 3. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law , and the entire record in the case, it is recommended that the complaint herein be dismissed in its entirety. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation