Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corp.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 24, 2003

No. 76154862 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 24, 2003)

Mailed: 24 APR 2003
Paper No. 9
AD
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________
In re Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation
________
Serial No. 76/154,862
_______
Jeffrey D. Sanok of Crowell & Moring, LLP for Federal
Agricultural Mortgage Corporation.
Brendan D. McCauley, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law
Office 101 (Angela Wilson, Managing Attorney).
_______
Before Bucher, Holtzman and Drost, Administrative Trademark
Judges.
Opinion by Drost, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (applicant)
filed an application to register the mark AGEQUITY in typed
form on the Principal Register for services identified as
“loan services, namely revolving lines of credit secured by
agricultural real estate” in International Class 36.
THIS DISPOSITION IS
NOT CITABLE AS
PRECEDENT OF THE
TTAB
Ser. No. 76/154,862
2
The application (Serial No. 76/154,862), based on an
allegation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in
commerce, was filed on October 26, 2000.
The examining attorney refused registration on the
ground that the mark was merely descriptive under Section
2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1),
because AG is an abbreviation for “agricultural” and
“equity” means the value of the property beyond any
mortgage. Therefore, “in relation to the applicant’s
services, the term indicates the value of the agricultural
real estate upon which the revolving line of credit is
secured.” Brief at 6.
The examining attorney relies on the following
evidence to show that the mark is merely descriptive.
First, the examining attorney submits a page from the
Acronyms, Initialisms & Abbreviations Dictionary to show
that “AG” can be an abbreviation for “agricultural.”
Another excerpt from The American Heritage Dictionary of
the English Language defines “equity” as “the residual
value of a business or property beyond any mortgage thereon
and liability therein.” Other evidence includes printouts
from the NEXIS/LEXIS database showing that “AG” is an
abbreviation for “agricultural.” Some of these excerpts
are set out below.
Ser. No. 76/154,862
3
Did you know that it is not properly zoned. It is
zoned (AG) Agricultural.
Arizona Republic, February 2, 2001.
“I’m not going to throw ag (agricultural interests)
under the bus simply for the sake of throwing ag under
the bus,” he said.
Palm Beach Post, January 9, 1999.
Of the nine districts, the bulk of the parish is zoned
AG, the agricultural classification.
The Advocate (Baton Rouge, LA), September 11, 1998.
Gingrich likes Matt Fong, and Dan Lungren could argue
that enthusiasm from ag (agricultural interests) could
help him become governor…”
San Francisco Chronicle, August 2, 1998.
“This way we can be more specific with our marketing
programs and go after the ag (agricultural)
distributor.”
National Home Center News, September 26, 1994.
Everybody, including a substantial part of the ag
(agricultural) leadership, has recognized that we have
to first set water quality standards for the Delta.”
San Diego Business Journal, May 30, 1994.
“The only thing we see south of Cairo is impact to low
ag (agricultural) lands,” said Dewey Jones, chief of
the hydraulics branch for the corps’ Memphis district.
Commercial Appeal (Memphis), July 21, 1993.
“Everybody knows that agricultural interests made Lake
County. Ag (agricultural) people need to become more
outspoken on county affairs.”
Orlando Sentinel Tribune, May 2, 1992.
The examining attorney also included copies of
registrations to show that the term “equity” has been
disclaimed in registrations involving loan services. See
Registration Nos. 1,580,487; 2,111,056; 1,996,650;
1,996,651; 2,322,018; and 1,988,717.
Ser. No. 76/154,862
4
Based on this record, the examining attorney concludes
that AGEQUITY merely describes applicant’s services as an
“equity loan in the nature of a line of credit secured by
agricultural real estate.” Brief at 7.
Applicant makes several arguments to support its
position that its mark is suggestive. Applicant maintains
that AG “does not remotely relate to loan services, and
that the term ‘equity’ does not refer to loan services.”
Brief at 6. Also, applicant maintains that the public
would view the mark as AGE QUITY. “When one first views
the mark AGEQUITY, and when one first ‘sounds out’ the
mark, the term AGE is first seen and/or pronounced before
the “QUITY” is considered.” Brief at 5. Applicant
concludes that its mark requires imagination, thought or
perception and that the mark is therefore suggestive.
We agree with the Examining Attorney that applicant’s
mark is merely descriptive and, therefore, we affirm the
refusal to register.
For a mark to be merely descriptive, it must
immediately convey knowledge of the ingredients, qualities,
or characteristics of the goods or services. In re Gyulay,
820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re
Quik-Print Copy Shops, Inc., 616 F.2d 523, 205 USPQ 505,
507 (CCPA 1980). Courts have long held that to be “merely
Ser. No. 76/154,862
5
descriptive,” a term need only describe a single
significant quality or property of the goods. In re
Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1987;
Meehanite Metal Corp. v. International Nickel Co., 262 F.2d
806, 120 USPQ 293, 294 (CCPA 1959). Descriptiveness of a
mark is not considered in the abstract, but in relation to
the particular goods or services for which registration is
sought. In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ
215, 218 (CCPA 1978).
We must consider whether the mark in its entirety is
merely descriptive. P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner,
252 U.S. 538, 545-46 (1920). However, “[i]t is perfectly
acceptable to separate a compound mark and discuss the
implications of each part thereof … provided that the
ultimate determination is made on the basis of the mark in
its entirety.” In re Hester Industries, Inc., 230 USPQ
797, 798 n.5 (TTAB 1986).
The evidence of record clearly supports a conclusion
that AG is an abbreviation of the term “agricultural,” and
it would be recognized as such by potential customers for
loans secured by agricultural real estate. Also, despite
applicant’s protestations, the term “equity” meaning “the
residual value of a business or property beyond any
mortgage thereon and liability therein” would be very
Ser. No. 76/154,862
6
relevant in the field of loan services. The fact that it
has been disclaimed in several registrations involving loan
services supports the descriptiveness of the term.
Obviously, equity would be the value of property that is
available on which to secure a loan. See, e.g., Barron’s
Dictionary of Real Estate Terms, 5th Edition (“Equity Loan
see Home Equity Loan, Second Mortgage”; “Home Equity Loan –
a loan secured by a second mortgage on one’s principal
residence, generally to be used for some non-housing
expenditure. Generally, two types are available. A Line-
of-Credit home equity loan establishes a credit line that
can be drawn upon as needed. A traditional second mortgage
provides lump-sum proceeds at the time the loan is
closed”). See also Barron’s Dictionary of Finance and
Investment Terms (“Homeowner’s Equity Account – credit line
offered by banks, savings and loans, brokerage firms,
credit unions and other mortgage lenders allowing a
homeowner to tap into built-up equity in his or her home”).1
When the terms “AG” and “equity” are used together for loan
services it is clear that the combined term immediately
tells potential customers that applicant’s services would
1 We take judicial notice of these definitions. University of
Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 213 USPQ 594,
596 (TTAB 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
Ser. No. 76/154,862
7
involve making loans secured by agricultural real estate in
a manner somewhat similar to a home equity loan.
The next question is whether the elimination of the
space between the terms AG and EQUITY results in the
creation of a suggestive term. When two descriptive words
are combined by eliminating the space, the resulting
combined term has often been held to still be descriptive.
See In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 5 USPQ2d 1017
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (SCREENWIPE generic for a wipe for
cleaning television and computer screens); Abcor Dev.
(GASBADGE at least descriptive for gas monitoring badges;
three judges concurred in finding that term was the name of
the goods); Cummins Engine Co. v. Continental Motors Corp.,
359 F.2d 892, 149 USPQ 559 (CCPA 1966) (TURBODIESEL generic
for a type of engine); In re Orleans Wines, Ltd., 196 USPQ
516 (TTAB 1977) (BREADSPRED descriptive for jams and
jellies that would be a spread for bread); In re Perkin-
Elmer Corp., 174 USPQ 57 (TTAB 1972) (LASERGAGE merely
descriptive for interferometers utilizing lasers).
Similarly, when the terms “AG” and “Equity” are combined,
they simply describe a type of equity loan secured by
agricultural real estate.
Perhaps applicant’s best argument is that its mark
would not be viewed as AG EQUITY, but AGE QUITY. However,
Ser. No. 76/154,862
8
we are not persuaded by this argument. First, applicant’s
argument is undercut by the fact that “quity” has no
meaning in the English language and it is not clear why
prospective purchasers of loan services would divide the
mark in that fashion. Second, applicant has presented its
mark as a typed drawing so it is not claiming any
particular style and applicant’s mark may be displayed as
AGequity, AGEQUITY or AGEQUITY. Third, it is unlikely that
customers for agricultural loans would “associate the mark
with a plan designed to invest or save money in line with
one’s AGE” as applicant maintains. Brief at 5.
Applicant’s services are loan services not savings plans.
What customers may think the term means in relation to
other goods or services is not relevant to the issue of
descriptiveness here.
The fundamental flaw in applicant’s argument is that
it applies the wrong test. Applicant argues that it
“requires imagination, thought or perception, to reach the
conclusion that the mark AGEQUITY might be for ‘loan
services; namely, revolving lines of credit secured by
agricultural real estate.’” Brief at 5. Obviously, this
is not correct. The test is not whether prospective
purchasers can guess what applicant’s goods or services are
after seeing applicant’s mark alone. Abcor Dev., 200 USPQ
Ser. No. 76/154,862
9
at 218 (“Appellant’s abstract test is deficient – not only
in denying consideration of evidence of the advertising
materials directed to its goods, but in failing to require
consideration of its mark ‘when applied to the goods’ as
required by statute”). We must look at the mark in the
context of applicant’s loan services involving lines of
credit secured by agricultural real estate to see if the
mark informs prospective purchasers of applicant’s services
of a feature or characteristic of those services. Viewed
in that light, the term AGEQUITY would immediately inform
customers that applicant’s revolving lines of credit are
loans secured by equity in agricultural real estate.
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.