Fawcett Printing Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 21, 1973

201 N.L.R.B. 964 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

964 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Fawcett Printing Corporation and Louisville Graphic
Arts International Union , AFL-CIO, CLC, Local
No. 255, Graphic Arts International Union,
AFL-CIO, CLC.' Case 9-CA-6808
February 21, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On November 15, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
Nancy M. Sherman issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief , the General
Counsel filed exceptions, and the Charging Party
filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt her recommended Order, as modified
below.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent , Fawcett Printing
Corporation , Louisville, Kentucky , its officers,
agents , successors , and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Administrative Law Judge 's Order, as
modified below:
Substitute the following paragraphs for paragraphs
2(a)(2) and (3) of the Administrative Law Judge's
recommended Order:
"(2) The names of plants or printing companies to
which printing work contracted to be or normally
performed at Respondent 's Louisville facilities was
sent between April 1, 1971, and Thanksgiving 1971.
Respondent is required only to disclose the names of
plants within its possession.
"(3) Copies of provisions in contracts in effect
between Respondent and its customers during the
period from April 1, 1971 , to Thanksgiving 1971,
setting forth the respective rights and duties of the
parties to assure that printing work covered by such
contracts is performed . Respondent is required only
to disclose documents 1 through 8 of Administrative
Law Judge 's Exhibit I with the exception of the
fourth paragraph in document 3 and the last two
lines of document 5. Only the Union's attorneys,
officers , or other agents directly participating in the
processing of the subcontracting grievance shall be
permitted access to those provisions , only one copy
of each such provision shall be made for the Union's
use, and all such copies shall be returned to
Respondent following the arbitration proceeding. If
the Union should gain access to these provisions
from some other source , it will not be limited by the
terms of this Order in its use of those contracts."
i The Lithographers and Photoengravers International Union, AFL-
CIO, and the International Brotherhood of Bookbinders merged to form the
Graphic Arts International Union , AFL-CIO , CLC, effective September 4,
1972.
2 Contrary to the Respondent , we find that the Administrative Law
Judge was quite specific in that part of her order relating to which
contractual provisions should be turned over to the Union . Respondent is to
give the Union documents I through 8 of the ALJ 's Exh. I with the
exception of the fourth paragraph in document 3 and the last two lines of
document 5
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NANCY M. SHERMAN , Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding (heard at Louisville , Kentucky , on June 27,
1972, pursuant to a charge filed on February 15, 1972, and
a complaint issued on April 4, 1972, and amended on June
22, 1972) presents the question of whether Respondent
violated Section 8(aX5) and ( 1) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended (herein called the Act), by its
admitted refusal to comply with the Charging Party's
demand for certain information in connection with a
grievance which was to be heard by an arbitrator.
Upon the entire record , including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses , and after due consideration of
the briefs and supplemental briefs filed by the General
Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respondent, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS AND THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent is a Kentucky corporation which prints
magazines and catalogs at its facilities in Louisville,
Kentucky . It annually sells and ships goods and products
valued at more than $50,000 from its Louisville plant
directly to points outside Kentucky . Upon these facts I
find that , as Respondent admits, it is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and
that assertion of jurisdiction over such operations will
effectuate the policies of the Act. Louisville Lithographers
and Photo-Engravers Union , Local No. 255, Lithographers
and Photo-Engravers International Union , AFL-CIO, the
Charging Party (herein called the LPIU), is a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act.
201 NLRB No. 139
FAWCETT PRINTING CORPORATION 965
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent's employees are represented by seven
different Unions (the LPIU, the Pressmen, the Typographi-
cal Union, the Bookbinders, the IAM, the Teamsters, and
the Electrotypers), one of which has four contracts with
Respondent. At all times relevant here, the LPIU was
concededly the exclusive statutory representative of an
admittedly appropriate unit consisting essentially of all
photoengraving employees.'
Between April 1971 and October 1971, all 10 of these
contracts came up for renewal . Industrial Relations
Director Robert P. Saxer, who assumed that post on
Respondent's staff in April 1971, testified that because of
strikes by the Bookbinders in 1968 and the Machinists in
1970, Respondent's customers "wanted to be kept posted
on the status of the negotiations because they didn't want
to be caught again in a situation where they were going to
have trouble getting their magazines printed during all
these negotiations." Saxer further testified that over a
period of several weeks prior to May 4, 1971, "Fawcett
Publishing Company," MacFadden-Bartell Publishing
Company, Golf Digest, and other publishers notified
Respondent that they were withdrawing the printing of
their magazines from Respondent's shop.
In early May 1971, Respondent posted a notice that
owing to a loss of work, the workweek of the employees in
the LPIU unit was to be reduced from 35 to 30 hours and
certain unit employees were to be laid off. At the LPIU's
request , on May 4 LPIU representatives (including
International Representative Bob Lee) met with Respon-
dent's representatives to discuss the reasons for the layoff.
Joseph Gast, who is president of the local, asked Saxer the
reason for the layoff. Saxer replied that "it was because of
lack of work because customers were withdrawing their
work from the plant; that [Respondent] had been having
trouble with the Book Binders." 2 Saxer added that "the
customers had insisted that [Respondent ] keep them up to
date on everything and the progress of negotiations."
Specifically mentioning Woman's Day, True, Sports, and
Mechanics Illustrated, the LPIU asked how long the work
was going to be out of the plant. Saxer's reply was not
sufficiently "definite" to satisfy the LPIU, which asked to
speak to Frank Whatton, Respondent's executive vice
president. Saxer said that he would talk to Whatton about
setting up a meeting for the next day and would be back in
touch with the LPIU.
On the following day, the parties met again, with
Whatton not in attendance. The LPIU asked what
magazines were out and how long they would be gone,
without naming specific magazines or specific publishers.
I The unit consists of all employees employed in the processing, cut
mounting and offset departments operated by Respondent at its Louisville,
Kentucky, facilities and who are engaged in the process of photoengraving,
cut mounting , offset and attendant work thereto, including all parts of the
process pertaining to the production of photoengraving from copy as
received by Respondent up to the finished cylinders or plates, but excluding
all office clerical employees , professional employees , guards , supervisors as
defined in the Act , and all other employees of Respondent.
2 Gast added in his testimony that this trouble "was no secret to
anybody the way the negotiations were going."
Saxer stated that Woman's Day was gone for at least 3
months, that True and Mechanics Illustrated would be
gone for at least a month,3 that Sports would be gone until
July at least, and that beyond that Respondent did not
know. Saxer did not mention the names of any magazines
not previously mentioned by the LPIU .4 Saxer stated that
this loss of work might continue for the rest of the year
because of the other contracts that were coming up to be
negotiated that year, and suggested an attempt to get
earlier agreements . The LPIU stated that it was particular-
ly concerned with the magazines published by Fawcett
Publications (including Woman's Day, True, and Mechan-
ics Illustrated) because Respondent Fawcett Printing
Corporation had been printing Fawcett Publications
magazines for 20 years and the LPIU felt there was some
connection between the two corporations. The LPIU took
the position that "the customer was not withdrawing the
work but having it subcontracted and that these Fawcett
Publications magazines that we had been doing for 20
years . . . should be printed in [Respondent's] plant .. .
[The LPIU] took the position that they were subcontract-
ing."5 Saxer stated that there was no connection between
Fawcett Printing Corporation in Louisville and Fawcett
Publications in New Yorke that they were separate
entities, that they were two separate corporations , and that
..we run our business and they run their business." The
LPIU knew that several magazines normally printed by
Respondent for customers other than Fawcett Publications
were also being printed elsewhere , but did not ask
Respondent where they were being printed . Respondent
eventually gave some of this information to the LPIU.7
During this meeting, the LPIU stated that the reduction
of the workweek to 30 hours was acceptable, but suggested
that the employees' vacations be scheduled in a manner
which would avoid the proposed layoff . Saxer replied that
this would be all right if it could be worked out with the
plant superintendent , but that he could not guarantee that
there would not be a future layoff. The LPIU did succeed
in working out such a vacation schedule with the
superintendent, and the projected layoff did not take place
at that time . Moreover, on June 21 the employees went
back to a 35-hour week.
Beginning sometime prior to April 1971 and continuing
through June 16, 1971, Respondent conducted joint
meetings with various Unions, including the LPIU, to
discuss contract provisions regarding holidays, health and
welfare , and pensions. At meetings attended by LPIU
President Gast, he or representatives of other Unions asked
Respondent what work would be and would not be in the
shop that month , what the work schedule would be, where
the Fawcett Publications work was, how many people
would be working , and how many people would not. In
response, Respondent posted a production schedule,
s These three magazines are published by Fawcett Publications.
4 Saxer testified that he gave the LPIU all the information he had.
However , see infra In. 8.
5 This finding is based on Gast's credited testimony . See infra In. 9.
6 This finding is based on Gast's credited testimony . I do not credit
Saxer's implicit denial that he made such a statement . See infra fns. 8 and 9.
r Namely, that McCall had signed a contract with MacFadden -Bartell to
do a series of magazines and that work was being done in Baird Ward, a
nonunion shop . See infra In. 8.
966 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
during one meeting advised Gast that it knew Woman's
Day was being printed in about eight plants, and at one
meeting advised the LPIU that work was being done in
Baird Ward (a nonunion shop).8 Gast testified that if
questions were asked of Respondent, they were answered.
Although the existing contract did not expire until
October 1971, Respondent and the LPIU agreed to a new
contract in July 1971 in an effort to keep Respondent's
business by stabilizing its labor relations. Thereafter and
through October 1971, Respondent had periodic meetings
with all the Unions regarding the status of negotiations and
work. In July and August, Respondent also posted
production schedules.
B. Relevant Provisions of the Collective-Bargaining
Agreement
Article XX of the collective-bargaining agreement then
in effect between Respondent and the LPIU provided:
Section 1. The Fawcett-Haynes Printing Corpora-
tion, Louisville, Kentucky, agrees that it will not
subcontract work, (a) while there is any unemployment
of any kind among the employees doing such work in
the plant, or (b) where any reduction in the work force
is contemplated among the employees doing such work
in the plant, or (c) within thirty (30) days after there has
been any such unemployment.
Section 2. The Company agrees that it shall
terminate any such subcontracts before any layoffs
occur providing there is no monetary "penalty clause"
involved for such cancellation. The Company will not
lay off any employee during at least thirty (30) days
after such subcontracts have been terminated.
Article XXII provided, in part:
Settlement of Disputes
Section 1. No Strikes or Lockouts. It is agreed
between the parties hereto that fruitless disputes must
be avoided and every effort made to maintain good and
harmonious relations. During the term of this Agree-
ment the Union agrees that it will not sanction or
engage in strikes, walkouts, or any form of concerted
interference over which it has control and the Employ-
er agrees that it will not engage in any lockouts against
members of the Union; and that both parties agree that
they will in good faith endeavor to settle differences by
conciliation and arbitration in the manner hereinafter
set forth. The Chapel Chairman shall be the recognized
official representative of the Union in the shop. The
Foreman shall be the recognized official representative
of the Employer in dealing with the Chapel Chairman.
Section 2. Chapel Chairman. Disputes or disagree-
ments arising under this Agreement in an individual
workroom shall first be taken up and, if possible,
settled by the Chapel Chairman with the Foreman, or
vice versa.
B Saxer testified that he advised Gast of the identity of two (on direct
examination ) or three (on cross-examination ) of the plants which were
printing Woman's Day However, I credit Gast 's denial of this testimony, in
view of the specificity of Gast's testimony about how he learned of the
identity of three of these plants (including the two named by Saxer) and
Saxer's variations as to how many he allegedly named Because Saxer
If not settled satisfactorily and promptly by these
parties , then the matter shall be reduced to writing and
referred to the Industrial Relations Director by the
Chapel Chairman. If not satisfactorily and promptly
settled by these parties, the matter in dispute shall be
answered in writing and referred to the Joint Industrial
Council for settlement.
Section 3. A Joint Industrial Council shall be
created , consisting of two representatives selected by
the Employer , and two representatives selected by the
Union. All disputes or misunderstandings , including
breach of contract , which cannot be settled as outlined
in the above section shall be referred to the Joint
Industrial Council for consideration , adjustment or
decision.
Failing to reach a decision within ten ( 10) days after
submission of all facts , a fifth member shall be added
to the Council . Should the Council fail to agree on the
fifth member , the service of the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service shall be used to select the fifth
member.
A majority decision of the Council , as thus constitut-
ed shall be final and binding and must be rendered
within seven (7) days.
The expenses of the fifth member shall be shared
equally by the Employer and the Union.
Section 4. The limits in this Article may be extended
by mutual agreement. Pending final decision, condi-
tions existing prior to the dispute shall remain in effect.
Section 5 . In the event of the arbitration of a layoff
or discharge case , the arbitrator shall have the
authority to determine the amount of pay, if any, or
time lost, if in his judgment the case so warrants. In no
event shall the arbitrator have the power to modify the
terms , the meaning, or application of the terms of this
Agreement.
C. The Grievance regarding the August 1971 Layoff
On August 13, 1971, Respondent posted notices on the
bulletin board that 25 employees in the LPIU's unit were
going to be laid off. By letter dated August 16, the LPIU
alleged that Respondent was "subcontracting work thus
violating Article 20, Subcontracting, by laying off 25
members covered under the terms of the contract." The
LPIU asked for a meeting "to settle this dispute in
accordance with Article 22, Settlements of Disputes." The
LPIU further demanded that "Pending a final decision by
the arbitrator," Respondent "recognize Section 4 of Article
22 and rehire" the employees without loss of pay. The
letter stated that the LPIU "will be represented" by Gast
and by Karl Blasi, who is chairman of the employees' shop
committee.
The parties met on August 18. The LPIU was represent-
ed by Gast , Blasi , and Chapel Chairman Ayers; Respon-
dent was represented by Saxer and Production Manager
admittedly knew the identity of three plants which were printing Woman's
Day, to this extent I reject his testimony that to the extent Respondent knew
where the work was, it advised the LPIU. On the other hand , I credit Saxer's
testimony (not specifically discussed by Gast) that Respondent told Gast
about Baird Ward
FAWCETT PRINTING CORPORATION 967
Art Young. The LPIU asserted, and Respondent denied,
that Respondent was subcontracting work. The LPIU
reiterated its belief of a connection between Fawcett
Publications and Respondent Fawcett Printing Company .9
Saxer advised Gast of the August 12 dismissal of a charge
(Case 9-CA-6241) filed against Respondent by the
Bookbinders (see infra fn. 47) "involving the sub-contract-
ing work in relationship to Fawcett Printing Company and
Fawcett Publishing Company . . . and that there was no
finding that sub-contracting had been done and that
Fawcett Publications had the same right as any other
publisher." Gast replied that he knew about this ruling but
he felt the LPIU would have a stronger case.i° The LPIU
also produced a copy of the first page (which Respondent
had given it 2 years earlier) of a contract between
Respondent and (inter alia) MacFadden-Bartell Corpora-
tion, effective until 1980, which listed a number of
magazines to be printed by Respondent and, further,
provided that, if MacFadden-Bartell acquired any addi-
tional magazines, Respondent "shall have the right of first
refusal to print such magazines." LPIU stated that it was
taking the position that because some of the magazines
named in the MacFadden-Bartell contract were "out of the
plant," they were being "subcontracted out of the plant."
Saxer stated that the "first refusal" clause applied to new
work only, and had nothing to do with the customer's right
to take his work elsewhere because of Respondent's labor
problems. The parties agreed to proceed to arbitration. No
mention was made in that meeting about waiving the
grievance procedure.ii
On August 19, primarily because of a desire to speed up
Respondent's negotiations with the Bookbinders, LPIU
representatives met with Saxer alone. In the course of the
discussion, the LPIU asked Saxer to reconsider the layoff.
Saxer replied that he would let the LPIU know but he did
not think there was any possibility that this would happen.
The LPIU replied that if the men were laid off, it would
proceed to arbitration and try to recover whatever
damages the employees had incurred. Thereafter, the
matter was handled by counsel.
The layoff was put into effect on August 23. By letter
dated August 24, 1971, counsel for the LPIU advised
Respondent that "pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement and the grievance and arbitration clause set
forth therein, [the LPIU] hereby requests arbitration of the
9 This finding is based on Gast's credited testimony In effect , Saxer's
testimony about the discussions of the Fawcett Publications question
attributes to the LPIU an unfilled gap between its assertions of a close
intercorporate relationship between Fawcett Publications and Respondent,
and LPIU's contention that Fawcett Publications ' transfer of the work to
other shops constituted subcontracting within the meaning of the bargain-
ing agreement I find that Saxer's testimonial failure to connect these two
contentions was deliberate , and that this concealment reflects on his
credibility generally I cannot believe that Gast-an intelligent, experienced,
quick , and articulate union official-failed to make this connection clear to
Saxer, himself a professional labor negotiator. I found particularly
unpersuasive Saxer's testimony about his conclusions from the LPIU's
comments on this issue * " . the feeling I relied on was the feeling I got
from the other Unions that . . regardless of whatever [other customers]
could do, [ Fawcett Publications is] tied to this plant , and it didn' t matter
what I said , or what information I gave them , they just had the set opinion
that [Fawcett Publications was] tied to this plant " Whatever may be the
truth of this testimony as to the position taken by other Unions during
negotiations with Respondent , Saxer's alleged conclusions as to the LPIU's
grievance heretofore filed on August 16, 1971 protesting
the sub-contracting by the Company in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement." The letter requested that
the parties proceed to select an arbitrator. By letter dated
August 25, Saxer requested union counsel to forward to
Respondent's counsel all correspondence relating to the
arbitration. The letter further stated, "The Company finds
it difficult to determine on what basis the Union is alleging
breach of Contract, because the Union is not citing specific
instances of violation." By letter to Respondent's counsel
dated September 17, 1971, LPIU counsel stated that the
grievance which the LPIU intended to arbitrate "concerns
the contracting out provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement and the violation of Article XX entitled
Subcontracting and the Status Quo section of the collective
bargaining agreement (Article XXII, Section 4)." The letter
further stated that employees in addition to the first group
of 25 had also been laid off as a result of the "subcontract-
ing of work," and that the grievance should include all of
them. In addition, the letter asked Respondent's counsel to
"write a request for a panel of arbitrators so that we can
proceed to arbitration as soon as possible."
By letter dated October 1, 1971, Respondent's counsel
stated:
We are willing to arbitrate an issue that we understand.
From discussions in the grievance procedure, we
understand that Mr. Gast's complaint is that the
contract was violated because of the alleged acts of
Fawcett Publications in having their work done
elsewhere. We are willing to arbitrate that question. We
are also willing to arbitrate the question of whether any
status quo provision of the contract has been violated.
The letter concluded by requesting LPIU counsel to send
Respondent's counsel a "statement of the issue so I can
submit it with my request for an arbitration panel."
Respondent's counsel averred at the hearing herein that he
had never received such a statement.
As a result of correspondence between the parties and
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, by letter
dated November 22, 1971, Carl A. Warns, Jr., Esq., was
selected by the parties and named by the FMCS director as
the arbitrator to hear and decide the dispute. By letter
dated December 21, 1971, Warns confirmed February 21
and 22, 1972, as hearing dates.
position simply do not square with his admitted failure specifically to advise
the LPIU (under circumstances which invited such disclosures) about
whether Respondent and Fawcett Publishing had the same stockholders,
officers, or directors, or were members of the same corporate family. In the
absence of such disclosures, Saxer could not have honestly felt that the
LPIU's opinion was "set" "no matter what I said, or what information I
gave " See also supra fn 8, infra fns. I i and 18.
10 Saxer had previously advised Gast by telephone about the disposition
of this charge.
11 This finding is based on Gast's credited testimony. On the basis of the
witnesses' demeanor and because I have found Saxer an unreliable witness
as to other matters (supra fns 8-9), 1 do not believe Saxer's testimony that
he advised the LPIU that steps I and 2 of the established grievance
procedure had not been followed but Respondent "would agree to waive
this requirement if the Union would agree on the basis that we had
discussed this issue on prior occasions and we knew where both parties
stood." However, for the reasons stated infra, my conclusions herein would
be the same even if I had credited Saxer's version of the conversation.
968 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
D. The LPIU's Request for Information in
Connection With the Arbitration Proceeding
By certified letter dated February 1, 1972, LPIU counsel
stated:
As attorneys for the . . . LPIU, we hereby demand
that Fawcett Printing Corporation provide us with
certain information relative to the arbitration which is
scheduled before Professor Warns on February 21,
1972. This information is necessary in order for the
Union properly to present its case and properly to
represent its members. We need this information by
February 14, 1972, one week before the hearing.
Please advise us who are the Company's customers
who have printing work done at your plant in
Louisville, Ky., and attach copies of your contracts, if
any, with these customers.
Please advise us what magazines or other work (and
who publishes them) which is normally done in your
Louisville plant and which was done elsewhere during
the period from April 1, 1971, to December 31, 1971.
Please advise to what other plants or other printing
companies this work was sent.
Please attach copies of all correspondence between
your company and the publishers of the following
magazines relative to the publication of these maga-
zines from April 1 to December 31, 1971: True
Confessions, True Story, True Love, True Romance,
True Experience, Motion Picture, Photo Play, TV,
Radio Mirror , Sports , S & H Catalogue , RCA Medley,
American Legion, Kiwanas, Golf Digest, Woman's
Day, True, Mechanics Illustrated, Electronics Illustrat-
ed, and Startling Detective.12
Please advise what is the corporate relationship
between Fawcett Printing Corporation and Fawcett
Publications, if any, specifically advising the degree of
ownership and the degree of control exercised by either
company by the other. Also, if both are owned by the
same parent corporation , please so advise.
I thank you in advance for your prompt attention in
this matter.
Respondent's counsel received this letter on February 3,
1972. By letter to the arbitrator dated February 11, 1972
(with a copy to LPIU counsel), Respondent's counsel
stated that he had arranged for a hearing room in a
Louisville hotel and for the presence of a court reporter. By
hand-delivered letter to LPIU counsel dated February 14,
1972, Respondent's counsel answered the LPIU's demand
for information as follows:
Fawcett Printing Corporation herewith refuses to
provide the information you requested. You are not
entitled by law or contract to receive such information
at this stage of the proceedings. Since . . . LPIU is
pursuing this matter to arbitration, we assume the
demand for arbitration was made in good faith and on
12 The first eight of these publications were named in the first page (in
the Union 's possession ) of the contract between Respondent and MacFad-
den-Bartell . Woman 's Day, Mechanics Illustrated , and True are Fawcett
Publications magazines.
13 The letter states that an "Enclosure " is attached , without specifying its
nature Because the LPIU's letter to Respondent enclosed a copy of its letter
the basis of information already available to your
client.
On February 15, 1972, the LPIU filed its charge herein,
alleging that Respondent had violated Section 8(aX5) and
(1) of the Act on February 14 by refusing "to provide
information to the [LPIU] which was and is relevant and
necessary to the [LPIU's] bargaining function and to
evaluate and prepare for the arbitration of a pending
grievance ." By letter to Respondent 's counsel dated
February 17, 1972, LPIU counsel formally requested
postponement of the arbitration proceeding "because the
Company has failed and refused to furnish us with certain
information and documents which we feel are necessary
for the preparation of this case." By letter to Arbitrator
Warns also dated February 17, the LPIU requested an
indefinite postponement of the arbitration case.13
By letter to Warns dated February 18 , 1972, with a copy
to LPIU counsel , Respondent's counsel stated:
This is to advise you that the company is ready for
the arbitration . However, in view of the union's
position, we will go along with the arbitrator 's [sic]
decision . We do feel that the union should bear the sole
costs of delay and would request any statement of the
arbitrator for such costs should be forwarded to [LPIU
counsel ].
Right after Thanksgiving 1971, after Respondent had
reached an agreement with the Bookbinders, the employees
whose layoff was put at issue in the arbitration proceeding
came back to work.
E. The General Counsel 's Evidence Bearing on the
Relevance of the Information Requested
Paragraph 8(J) of the complaint (as amended) attacks
Respondent 's failure to provide "copies of correspondence
between Respondent and its customers regarding the
removal from Respondent's Louisville, Kentucky facilities
during the period from April 1, 1971 to December 31, 1971,
of printing work contracted to be or normally performed at
Respondent's Louisville facilities during that period." Gast
testified that the LPIU made the demand which included
this material14 because the LPIU wanted to ascertain
whether Respondent had been telling the truth when it
advised the LPIU that the customers were "in fact
withdrawing the work and requesting it so that we would
know whether they wanted the work pulled out of the
plant."
Paragraph 8(c) of the complaint attacks Respondent's
refusal to provide "the names of plants or printing
companies to which such bargaining unit work was sent"
(which I read as meaning, to which printing work
contracted to be or normally performed at Respondent's
Louisville facilities was sent between April 1, 1971, and
December 31, 1971). Gast testified that the LPIU had
requested this information because, although the LPIU
had already obtained from its sister locals some informa-
to the arbitrator, and because no explanation for the postponement request
appears on the face of the letter to the arbitrator , I infer that the enclosure
was a copy of the LPIU's February 17 letter to Respondent.
14 The LPIU had requested "copies of all correspondence between your
company and the publishers or, 19 specified publications "relative to the
publication of these magazines" during the April -December period
FAWCETT PRINTING CORPORATION 969
tion about where some of the magazines were being
printed, "if we knew where the magazines were going there
was a possibility that our relationship with the customers in
our areas with our sister locals, we could find out whether
in fact this work was brought in by the customer or in fact
was it brought in as subcontracted from" Respondent.
Paragraph 8(e) of the complaint (as amended) attacks
Respondent's refusal to give the LPIU "copies of provi-
sions in contracts in effect between Respondent and its
customers during the period from April 1, 1971, to
December 31, 1971, setting forth the respective rights and
duties of the parties to assure that printing work covered
by such contracts is performed." Gast testified that the
LPIU made the demand which included this material15
because of the portions of the contract between Respon-
dent and MacFadden-Bartell in the LPIU's possession;
". . . we've got to assume that the other contracts that
[Respondent] has with their customers also have provisions
in there stating the specific magazines that are to be
printed in the Louisville plant. Until we get the copies of
these contracts and see if they have these provisions in
there, we won't know." He further stated that if there are
"right-of-refusal" provisions in the other contracts like that
in the MacFadden-Bartell contract, "then it would be my
opinion that [Respondent's] customers do not have the
arbitrary right to go to [Respondent] and pull this work
out; that it would have to be put out by [Respondent]
which in turn would be subcontracting."
Paragraphs 8(a) and 8(b) of the complaint attack Respon-
dent's refusal to provide "(a) the names of its customers
who have printing work performed at the Louisville,
Kentucky plant; [and ] (b) the names of magazines or other
publications, and their publishers, printed in Respondent's
Louisville, Kentucky plant during the period from April 1
to December 31, 1971." 16 Gast testified that the LPIU had
asked for this information as a "check list" to determine
whether Respondent had in fact complied with the LPIU's
request as to all contracts with its customers. He further
testified that the LPIU had asked for the names and
publishers of the publications in order to enable it to know
(in cases where the contracts failed to specify) which
15 The LPIU had demanded "copies of your contracts, if any, with . .
the Company's customers who have printing work done " at the Louisville
plant.
16 The LPIU's February I letter had specifically requested the material
set forth in par. 8(a) of the complaint. In addition , the LPIU had asked
"what magazines or other work (and who publishes them) which is normally
done in your Louisville plant and which was done elsewhere during the
period from April 1, 1971, to December 31, 1971." At the heanng,
Respondent's counsel pointed out that , at least arguably , some of the
material specified in par. 8(b) of the complaint was not within the scope of
the LPIU's February I demand , but stated , "I don't think it's of any great
moment "
17 1 fail to understand why other circumstances mentioned by Gast
contributed to his belief of an intercorporate relationship. However, because
there is no contention that this reasoning was ever tendered to Respondent,
Respondent 's conduct could not have been affected by any deficiencies
therein
is On August 31, 1972, 1 issued to the parties an "Order to Show Cause
Why Official Notice Should not be Taken of Certain Material in Poor's
Register of Corporations Directors and Executives , and Invitation to
Consider Filing Additional Papers." The material of which I proposed to
take official notice was the fact (1) that certain statements appear in that
publicly available reference manual , and (2) on the basis of such statements,
that Fawcett Publications owns all of Respondent 's stock and that certain
contracts covered the specific magazines whose printing
was being "subcontracted out."
Paragraph 8(d) of the complaint attacks Respondent's
refusal to provide "the facts concerning the corporate
relationship between the Respondent and Fawcett Publica-
tions, specifically as to the degree of ownership and control
by one firm of the other and their parent corporation."
From the credited testimony about the prior discussions
between the parties, from Gast's testimony directly
responsive to this issue, and from counsel' s statements at
the hearing, I infer that the LPIU requested this informa-
tion because it believed the intercorporate relationship to
be so close that a decision made (technically speaking) by
Fawcett Publications to transfer work from Respondent
Fawcett Printing to another printing shop was the
equivalent under the collective-bargaining agreement to
such a transfer decision by Respondent itself. Gast
explained that he had inferred the likely existence of this
relationship from (1) the fact that Respondent's executive
vice president (Whatton) periodically went to Fawcett
Publications in New York to discuss what was going to
happen with Respondent Fawcett Printing Company's
plant in Louisville; (2) the fact that sometime between 1968
and 1970 during a weeklong strike by the Machinists at
Respondent's Louisville plant, the assistant to the president
of Fawcett Publications in New York came to Louisville,
called a meeting of all the Unions, and "said he wanted to
talk to us about where this plant in Louisville was going to
go, whether or not they were going to build it up and the
problems they had been having in negotiations"; and (3)
the fact that a "Bruce Beston" (whose position is
unexplained in the record) had gone to New York to work
for Fawcett Publications for 3 years and was now back in
the Louisville plant. 17 I also infer that the presence of the
somewhat unusual name "Fawcett" in the titles of both
corporations contributed to the LPIU's conclusions. In
addition, the parties' discussions with respect to this issue
show that Gast's suspicions were based partly on the fact
that Respondent Fawcett Printing had printed Fawcett
Publications magazines for more than 20 years.18
officers of Fawcett Publications constitute three of Respondent 's four-man
board of directors . In their response to this Order, the General Counsel and
the LPIU both took the position that the issues in the case would remain
substantially unaffected should I take the proposed official notice . Further,
Respondent 's response includes an affidavit that Respondent is a different
corporation from the corporation named in the Register.
Under the circumstances , I do not take the official notice suggested in my
August 31 Order . However , I do not agree with Respondent 's contention
that I would have had no power to do so absent its offer to prove that the
two "Fawcett Printing Corporations" are different entities . DeCew v. Union
Bag & Paper Corp., 59 F. S. 301, 313 (N.J.); United States v . Two Obscene
Books, 92 F. S. 934, 934 (N.D. Calif., S.D.).
My failure to take the proposed official notice thus leaves the hearing
evidence unaugmented, and Respondent's subjective bad faith is, therefore,
no more at issue now than prior to my August 31 Order . Accordingly, I
hereby deny Respondent 's motion to reopen the record to prove "that the
[LPIU] was told substantially that Respondent and Fawcett Publications,
Inc., were separate corporations and operated separately from one another,
although there was a common ownership." Respondent makes no
contention that this evidence should now be received in the absence of a
newly raised contention of bad faith . To the extent that the motion may
seek a reopening of the record to adduce further testimony from Industrial
Relations Director Saxer about his statements to LPIU President Gast, it is
denied on the additional ground that at the hearing Saxer testified that he
(Continued)
970 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
F. Analysis and Conclusions
1. Relevance of the requested information
a. Introduction and controlling principles
"It is now well established that a labor organization
obligated to represent employees in a bargaining unit with
respect to the terms and conditions of their employment is
entitled, upon appropriate request, to such information
from the employer as may be relevant and reasonably
necessary to the proper execution of that obligation. And
the right to such information exists as well for the purposes
of administering a collective-bargaining agreement after it
has been negotiated as for the purposes of negotiating the
agreement in the first instance." Vertol Division, Boeing
Company, 182 NLRB 421, 425. The bargaining representa-
tive's right to obtain such information is not dependent on
a showing that in withholding it the employer was acting in
subjective bad faith.19 Accordingly, the initial question
presented is whether the information specified in the
complaint was reasonably and probably relevant to the
issues raised in the LPIU's grievance 20 "This discovery-
type standard decide[ s] nothing about the merits of the
union's contractual claims," since their eventual rejection
by an arbitrator "would clearly not be precluded by the
Board's threshold determination concerning the potential
relevance of the requested information." Acme, supra, 385
U.S. at 437-438; see also General Electric, supra.
b. Relevance of the information other than that
regarding the Respondent 's relationship with Fawcett
Publications
As to the information set forth in the complaint other
than that regarding Respondent's relationship with Faw-
cett Publications (with which I deal below), I conclude that
most of it is relevant to the not untenable theory that the
collective-bargaining agreement's limitations on subcon-
tracting were breached by the removal from Respondent's
plant of some customers' work because the decision to
remove such work either really proceeded wholly or partly
from Respondent (rather than from the customers alone, as
Respondent asserted) or was acquiesced in by Respondent
even though some or all of its contracts with customers
made certain statements to Gast regarding the intercorporate relationship
and that that was all Saxer told him (see pp 119- 121 of the transcript)
19 Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. N L R B, 234 F.2d 227, 231 (C A 7),
cert denied 352 U S 942, relying on N L R B v J H Allison & Company,
165 F 2d 766 (C A 6), cert denied 335 U S 814, and cited with approval
Old King Cole, Inc v N L R.B, 260 F 2d 530, 532 (C A 6)
20 N L R B v. Acme Industrial Co, 385 U S 432; Vertol Division , supra,
182 NLRB at 425, Herk Elevator Maintenance, Inc, 197 NLRB No. 20
(TXD), Rockwell-Standard Corp, 166 NLRB 124, 132, enfd 410 F 2d 953
(C A 6), General Electric Co v NLRB , 466 F 2d 1177 (C A 6)
2i See , e g, Pure Milk Association v Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 57 LRRM 2354, 2355, 2357, judgment modified , on petition for
rehearing , on ground immaterial here . 58 LRRM 2742 (Wis Cir Ct, Dane
Cty ); Electro Physical Laboratories, Inc, 7 LA 474, 476, Pittsburgh Brewing
Co, 53 LA 470, 476, 69-2 Arb. par 8794, H K. Porter Co, 70-I Arb. par
8251 Needless to say, I express no opinion on whether such a showing
would establish a violation of the instant bargaining agreement
22 Cf Local No 742, United Brotherhood of Carpenters [J L Simmons
Co 1 v NLRB , 444 F 2d 895 (C A D C ), cert denied 404 U S 986; Ohio
Valley Carpenters District Council v N L R B, 339 F 2d 142, and cases cited
covering such work afforded Respondent the right to
perform it.21 Thus, the correspondence between Respon-
dent and its customers regarding the removal of such work
might reveal who really decided on such removal; the
extent to which Respondent instigated , acquiesced in, or
opposed such removal ; whether Respondent participated
in the selection of the shops to which such work was to be
sent ; and whether Respondent shared in the cost of such
arrangements . Similarly , as Gast pointed out, the names of
the establishments to which the work had been sent would
help the LPIU to find out through its sister locals "whether
in fact this work was brought in by the customer or in fact
was it brought in as subcontracted from " Respondent.
Further, Respondent's contracts with its customers not
only might tend to cast light on work removal arrange-
ments touched on in the correspondence, but also might
show whether the LPIU would have a factual basis for
asserting that Respondent breached the bargaining agree-
ment's limitation on subcontracting by failing to insist,
when its customers wanted to have printing work per-
formed elsewhere, that they comply with contracts with
Respondent affording it the right to perform such work.22
Further , as Gast pointed out, the names of Respondent's
customers , the names of magazines punted in the plant,
and the names of their publishers were relevant as a means
of checking whether Respondent had in fact provided all
contracts with its customers.23
Respondent plainly errs in contending that, in any event,
information about what took place before the August 23
layoff is irrelevant . Such an arbitrary limitation would
interfere with the LPIU's ability to learn about the very
work transfers which assertedly caused at least the initial
25 layoffs (and which were almost certainly decided upon,
at least , before these layoffs)24 Rather, on the basis of the
"discovery type standard" approved in Acme, supra, 385
U.S. at 437, I conclude that the relevant period with respect
to all the information discussed in this section begins to
run on April 1, 1971 , as alleged in the complaint. In so
finding, I rely on Company Industrial Relations Director
Saxer's testimony that it was on or about this date that
certain specified publishers notified Respondent that they
were withdrawing the printing of their magazines from
Respondent's shop. While it appears unlikely that any loss
of work in the spring of 1971 would itself lead to an August
layoff for lack of work, some or all of such spring
at 145 , In 7 (C A 6).
Further , as Gast pointed out, if it transpired that Respondent had no
contract with Fawcett Publications , this circumstance might tend to show
that the relationship between them was more than a printer -customer
relationship-information which I find relevant infra
23 Respondent cannot defend its refusal to provide a list of the
magazines punted by it on the basis of Gast 's concession that the LPIU
knew "basically what magazines are in the plant." In the absence of a list
provided by Respondent , the LPIU could not be sure that it knew the
names of all the magazines , and a possibly incomplete list would be a less
than satisfactory means of checking the completeness of the information as
to Respondent's contracts with its customers . Cf. International Association of
Machinists (Frank W Nix), 172 NLRB No 239 (TXD), affil. 418 F 2d 1001
(CA 5) Moreover, because the LPIU might need to establish before the
arbitrator the fact that particular magazines were ordinarily punted in the
plant , I find apt the observation in the LPIU's brief that ". . knowledge of
facts is one thing , proof is another."
24 The layoff notices were posted 10 days before the initial layoff took
place
FAWCETT PRINTING CORPORATION 971
withdrawals might either have continued throughout the
intervening period, or have been renewed for the reasons
which led to them originally. I note, moreover, that the
bargaining agreement forbids subcontracting within 30
days after "unemployment of any kind among the
employees doing such work in the plant" (which arguably
forbade subcontracting between the June 21 return to a
regular workweek and July 20) and forbids layoffs for 30
days "after such subcontracts have been terminated."
Accordingly, the August 23 layoffs arguably breached the
bargaining agreement if subcontracting arrangements in
effect during the June 21-July 20 period had not been
terminated prior to July 24.
However, I agree to some extent with Respondent's
challenge to the relevance of information about events
after the Thanksgiving recall. I am unable to perceive the
relevance to the grievance of the names of plants or
printing companies to which bargaining unit work was sent
after the recall, or the provisions of Respondent's contracts
with its customers which were in effect only after the recall.
Further, because the names of Respondent's customers, of
the publications printed by it, and of the publishers
thereof, were sought merely to check whether Respondent
had furnished provisions of all its contracts with custom-
ers, whose relevance has not been shown with respect to
the post-recall period, I conclude that such verifying
material with respect to the postrecall period has likewise
not been shown to be relevant.
Nevertheless, I conclude that a showing of relevance has
been made with respect to Respondent's correspondence
with its customers regarding the 1971 post-Thanksgiving
removal of punting work contracted to be or normally
performed at the plant during this period, as well as
correspondence regarding work removals between April 1,
1971, and Thanksgiving. The parties' correspondence with
respect to any work transferred during a period of
approximately 6 weeks after the recall might cast some
light on the reasons for transferring work prior to the
recall.
c. Relevance of the information regarding
Respondent 's relationship with Fawcett Publications
On the basis of the standards previously set forth, I
further conclude that a showing of relevance has been
made with respect to "the facts concerning the corporate
relationship between the Respondent and Fawcett Publica-
tions, specifically as to the degree of ownership and control
by one firm of the other and their parent corporation"
(Par. 8(d) of the complaint).25 Sufficient evidence of such a
relationship (if it does exist) would make tenable the
assertion that Fawcett Publications' admitted transfer of
25 Respondent's amended answer advanced , inter aha, the "affirmative
defense" that " Fawcett Publications , Inc., is not a party to the collective-
bargaining agreement with the [LP1U ], nor does it have any statutory duty
to bargain with the [LPIU I or to respond to any order issued by the Board."
However, Respondent's counsel conceded at the hearing that Respondent
had "some information" about the relationship . The General Counsel
disavowed any contention that Respondent had a statutory obligation to
make inquiries of Fawcett Publications about the matter
26 Cf Employing Plasterers ' Association of Allegheny County, 181 N LRB
142, 143-145; Herk Elevator, supra, 197 NLRB No. 20 (TXD), In re
Undergarment & Negligee Workers Union, Local 62 (Contessa Lingerie, Inc),
such work from the plant of Respondent Fawcett Printing
was equivalent under ' the collective-bargaining agreement
to such a transfer decision by Respondent itself.26
Under the "discovery" standard , Respondent cannot
resist the LPIU's request for information about this
relationship on the ground that the language of and
bargaining history which led up to the subcontracting
clause establish that Fawcett Publications' conceded
transfer of work could not give rise to subcontracting
(within the meaning of the agreement) regardless of their
intercorporate relationship . Respondent points to the fact
that the LPIU initially proposed that section 1 of the
subcontracting clause provide , "The Company agrees that
no work will be subcontracted nor shall any subcontracting
be in effect" under the conditions set forth in that section
as eventually agreed to. Respondent further points out that
instead of this quoted language, section 1 of the clause as
eventually agreed to provides that "The Fawcett -Haynes
Printing Corporation ,27 Louisville , Kentucky, agrees that it
will not subcontract work" under such conditions. While
this claim may eventually be accepted by the arbitrator, I
cannot regard it as being so unanswerable as to disentitle
the LPIU to information at this point. See P. R. Mallory &
Company, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 411 F.2d 948, 952-956 (C.A. 7).
Without expressing any view as to the ultimate merits of
Respondent 's interpretation of the agreement , I note that
certain considerations might support a different construc-
tion . Thus, section 2 of the subcontracting article provides
that " The Company agrees that it shall terminate any such
subcontracts before layoffs occur" (emphasis supplied) and
that "The Company" will not lay off any employee for 30
days after "such subcontracts have been terminated." An
arbitrator might perhaps conclude that the change in
section 1 on which Respondent relies did not enlarge
Respondent 's right to lay off employees upon a transfer of
work elsewhere by Respondent 's corporate affiliate, on the
ground that (1) read as a whole , article XX imposes the
duty not to subcontract , and to terminate subcontracts
before laying off, upon the same entity, which section 2
refers to as "the Company"; (2) so far as material here, the
contract names as a party the "Fawcett-Haynes Printing
Corporation of Louisville, Kentucky" and is signed by
"Fawcett-Haynes Printing Corporation"; and (3) the
bargaining agreement elsewhere refers to both the "Faw-
cett-Haynes Printing Corporation, Louisville, Kentuc-
ky," 28 and "the Company," 29 in contexts where it is
perhaps unlikely that the parties specifically intended to
exclude corporate affiliates of Respondent who were
bound by the rest of the agreement.
I attach no significance to the General Counsel 's failure
specifically to adopt the LPIU's contention that Fawcett
Publications was a party to the bargaining agreement. The
55 LRRM 2783 (N.Y.S. Ct., Spec . Term , Part 1 , N. Y. County); N.LR B v.
Deena Artware, Inc, 361 U.S. 398 , 402-404 ; Textile Workers Union v.
Darlington Mfg Co, 380 U .S 263 , 275-276 . See also the last three cases
cited supra, fn. 21.
27 Respondent 's counsel stated on the record , and the briefs of both
Respondent and the LPIU assert , that this was Respondent's corporate
name at the time the agreement was entered into.
28 Art XIII , secs 5 and 6 . But see art. XXI.
29 Art IV, sec 2 : art IX , sec. I; art X , sec 4 ; art. XIV, secs . 2-4; arts.
XVI-XVII ; art. XVIII , sec. 2 ; art. XXIII , sec. 5(c); art. XXVII, secs. I, 3,
and 4, art XXXII But see art . V, art. XXXI ; art. XXXIII, secs. 1-2
972 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
information herein would remain relevant assuming
arguendo that the LPIU could not have maintained an
arbitration or breach-of-contract proceeding against Faw-
cett Publishing directly; for this would not necessarily
foreclose a finding by the arbitrator that, because of the
intercorporate relationship, Respondent could not defend
the layoffs by relying on Fawcett Publishing's transfer of
the work. The statutory limitations on the LPIU's right to
urge a theory different from that imposed by the General
Counsel do not, of course, extend to arbitration or breach-
of-contract proceedings to which the General Counsel is
not a party. In any event, the evidence introduced herein
was relevant to either theory, and the General Counsel did
not specifically disavow the theory advanced by the
LPIU.30 Rather, such differences as do appear are
attributable to the inherent difficulty of reaching legal
conclusions on the basis of largely unknown evidence-the
very reason why the instant proceeding was brought.
2. The LPIU's right to obtain information
relevant to a grievance after agreeing to submit it
to arbitration
I find no merit to Respondent's contention that the
LPIU's agreement to submit the grievance to arbitration
deprived it of any right which it otherwise may have had to
obtain information relevant thereto from Respondent.
Respondent's brief expressly admits that no existing
decision finds such an agreement to effect a forfeiture of
such rights. Rather, both before and after the Supreme
Court's decision in Acme, supra, 385 U.S. 432, the statute
has been interpreted to require the provision, after as well
as before a grievance has been submitted to arbitration, of
requested information necessary to its intelligent evalua-
tion and processing.31
Respondent's contention in this respect not only is
inconsistent with the settled proposition that the effective
waiver of a statutory right must be clear and unmistaka-
ble,32 but also wars with the spirit, if not the letter, of
Acme 's holding that the bargaining representative 's agree-
ment to an arbitration clause does not constitute a waiver
of its statutory right to information relevant and reason-
ably necessary to the intelligent evaluation of an arbitrable
grievance. Like requiring the production of such informa-
tion during earlier stages of the grievance procedure,
requiring its production on request made after arbitration
has been sought, "[f ]ar from intruding upon the preserve of
the arbitrator," would "aid ... the arbitral process"
(Acme, supra, 385 U.S. at 438). Thus, here, as in Acme, the
burden on the arbitral system would be lessened if
information provided by Respondent either persuaded the
30 Cf American Boiler Manufacturers Assn v N LR B, 366 F .2d 815,
821 (C.A 8)
31 Prior to Acme The Timken Roller Bearing Company, 138 NLRB 15,
enfd 325 F 2d 746 (C A 6), cert denied 376 U S 971, Lewers & Cooke, Lid,
153 NLRB 1542, 1544 46; see also The Fafnir Bearing Co, 146 NLRB 1582,
1586, enfd. 362 F.2d 716 (C.A. 2) (relying on the benefit to the Union of the
information "for the purpose of preparing its cases for arbitration"). After
Acme Gulf States Asphalt Co, 178 NLRB 405 , see also Zenith Radio Corp,
177 NLRB 366, 366, 375-376; Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg Co., Inc, 169
NLRB 621, The Kendall Co., Oakland Plant, 196 NLRB No. 102 (T XD).
32 North Carolina Finishing Division of Fieldcrest Mills, Inc, 182 NLRB
764, 770, relying on Timken, supra, 325 F.2d at 751 (C A. 6).
LPIU that its grievance lacked merit and should be
dropped, or induced the LPIU to offer a compromise
which might prove acceptable to Respondent . Indeed, the
entire class of cases which impose the duty to provide
relevant information are based on the view that such
information will contribute to the resolution of industrial
differences by mutual agreement-a principal statutory
purpose. Fulfillment of this purpose would be impeded by
withdrawing from the parties at any stage the rights and
duties calculated to promote the possibilities of settle-
ment .33 Further, as the LPIU points out in its brief,
because a bargaining agreement 's procedural provisions
governing the grievance-arbitration proceeding may sub-
stantially limit the time available for investigation of a
grievance before the grievant must decide whether to take
the case to arbitration,34 and because of other considera-
tions such as the need to make what may be complicated
arrangements for the arbitration hearing, the time available
for investigating and for settlement discussions may be
longer between the submission to arbitration and the
arbitration hearing than between the grievance and the
submission .35 Accordingly, the period during which Re-
spondent would exclude any duty to provide information
might well be the very period during which its provision
might contribute the most toward settlement of the
grievance without arbitration . Moreover, as the LPIU
further points out in its brief, " ... in the early steps of the
grievance procedure, grievances are often handled by less
skilled and sophisticated representatives of the parties (for
example , foremen or shop stewards) than at the later stages
and the arbitration stage (for example , Union business
agents, industrial relations directors, and attorneys). At the
early stage of the grievance procedure , it may not even be
clear precisely what information is necessary to the Union,
particularly if the grievance is somewhat complex and
involves more than a simple question of good cause for
discharge." Finally, at the very least, the production of
relevant information after the case is submitted to
arbitration would assist the parties in preparing the case
for arbitration36 and thereby tend both to shorten the
arbitration hearing and to make the evidence received at
the hearing more complete.
Although conceding, as it must ,37 that arbitration is a
part of the collective-bargaining process, Respondent
contends that the adversary nature of arbitration proceed-
ings renders inappropriate the requirement (indisputably
imposed during contract negotiations38 and during earlier
stages of the grievance procedure) that relevant informa-
tion be supplied. Respondent overlooks the frequently
ambivalent relationships characteristic of the collective-
bargaining process generally. N.LR.B. v. Insurance Agents'
33 Thus, in the instant case, the parties made some efforts to settle the
grievance the day after agreeing to arbitrate it.
34 See , e.g, Vertol Division, supra, 182 NLRB at 423 , In. 3, Zenuh, supra,
177 NLRB at 375
35 For example , in the instant case , the LP1U 's request for arbitration
was made the day after the layoff and I l days after its announcement. The
arbitration hearing was originally scheduled for a date almost 6 months
after the Union requested arbitration.
38 See Fafnir, supra, 146 NLRB at 1586; The Kendall Company, Oakland
Plant, 196 NLRB No 102 (TXD)
37 United Steelworkers v Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co, 363 U.S 574
38 Timken, supra, 325 F 2d at 750 (C.A 6)
FAWCETT PRINTING CORPORATION 973
International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-490, 495-496;
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers [Illinois
Bell Telephone Co.f v. N.LR.B., 487 F.2d 1113
(C.A.D.C.); American Enka Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 119 F.2d 60,
62-63 (C.A. 4).39
This is not to say, of course, that the statutory duty to
supply relevant information may never be affected by the
procedural stage reached by the underlying grievance. See
Sinclair Refining Co., 145 NLRB 732. However, I see
nothing to warrant modification of the normal duty under
the circumstances of the instant case. Respondent conced-
ed at the hearing that compliance with the LPIU's request
by the date specified therein would not have been
burdensome; that date preceded the date of the arbitration
hearing by a full week; and it was not until after
Respondent rejected this request (thereby in effect compel-
ling the LPIU to proceed either without the information or
not at all) that the LPIU asked for postponement of the
arbitration hearing. While it is possible that the LPIU
might have improved the chances for settlement by
requesting the information earlier (although a supposition
that the Respondent would have supplied it then is difficult
to square with Respondent's other defenses herein), the
disposition of the grievance might have been furthered (nor
is there reason to suppose it would have been delayed) had
Respondent provided the information when it was asked
for. As Respondent recognized by advising the arbitrator
that the LPIU "should bear the full costs of delay" (even
though more than a week elapsed between Respondent's
receipt of the LPIU's demand for information and
Respondent's letter advising that it had arranged for a
hearing room and a court reporter and even though-as
39 Because the LPIU's charge does not allege that the grieved layoffs
constituted an unfair labor practice, Respondent errs in relying on General
Electric Company, Battery Products, Capacitator Department, 163 NLRB 198,
205, 210, as modified 400 F.2d 713 (C.A. 5). The Board there found that
until after the distrussal of the union's charge that certain discharges
violated the Act, the employer was justified in withholding information
regarding the reasons therefor , because to require earlier disclosure would
require the disclosure of evidence concerning the employer's defenses
which , owing to the unavailability of discovery procedures in proceedings
before the Board, the General Counsel would be legally unable to obtain
until the hearing on the complaint . (I need not and do not consider General
Electric's continued vitality in light of Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB
No. 150.) " . . the fact that the information needed by the Union to
process grievances would also constitute evidence presented before the
arbitrator . . is not a valid reason for denying the Union such
information ." Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 150 NLRB 1478, 1485-86
40 Thus, in Zenith, supra, 177 NLRB at 375, simultaneously with
requesting information relevant to certain grievances, the Union filed
requests for arbitration of such grievances and advised the employer that
the arbitration request was made to comply with the contractual time
limitations . In Wilson, supra, 169 NLRB 621, the Union first advised the
employer that it wished to proceed to arbitration, but later advised the
employer that it did not wish to proceed to arbitration without the requested
information
41 Cf. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No 70
(National Biscuit Co), 198 NLRB No. 4, where the Board applied its
arbitration deferral policy to a case where arbitration could be compelled
only by a majority vote of a bipartite panel, in the interest of the statutory
policy- of remitting the contracting parties in the first instance to the
procedure which they had devised for determining the meaning of their
agreement . This policy is, of course, a principal policy which is effectuated
by requiring the production of requested information relevant to handling a
grievance under a contractual procedure. See also Denver-Chicago Trucking
Company, Inc, 132 NLRB 1416. where the Board applied its then
arbitration deferral policy to the majority decision of a bipartite grievance
panel which had no disinterested member . And compare Hilton-Davis
found infra-the LPIU was entitled to much of the
information it wanted), any losses incident to unreasonable
delay in requesting relevant information may well be
allocable between the parties through grievance-arbitration
proceedings.
The approach indicated by Sinclair (under which the
parties' obligations are determined by considerations of
statutory policy) obviates a problem inherent in Respon-
dent's reading of the parties' statutory obligations-name-
ly, ascertaining the point at which the grievance procedure
becomes the arbitration procedure for the purpose of
terminating the duty to provide relevant information.40
The statute itself presents no independent standards for
making such a determination; nor, as shown, can a
distinction relevant to the problem herein be drawn on the
basis of statutory policy.41 Troublesome enough when the
contract procedure has been followed to the letter, the
problem becomes still more complex where, as may well
have been the case here, the parties have tacitly agreed to
prearbitration proceedings somewhat different from those
contractually specified.42 Further, such variations by the
parties are not uncommon in situations where the parties
are ordinarily able to resolve their differences on an
informal basis, or where the contract procedure appears
unadapted to the particular grievance involved.43
3. The alleged confidentiality of certain
information
In its answer as amplified by Industrial Relations Saxer's
testimony and Respondent's brief, Respondent asserts that
its refusal to provide the LPIU with copies of certain
Chemical Co, 185 NLRB No. 58, holding that an employer's duty to process
through the contractually established grievance procedure certain griev-
ances which arose during a contractual hiatus did not include the duty to
process them through the arbitration procedure of the expired contract The
considerations there relied on-that arbitration is a consensual surrender of
the economic power which the parties are otherwise free to utilize-are
plainly immaterial to the instant case , where the existing contract 's no-strike
provisions forbade the LPIU to use such power to support the grievance.
42 Thus , although Gast testified that "i don't think that we did bypass
the grievance procedure ," there is no specific denial of Saxer 's testimony
that the first step (discussion between the chapel chairman and the foreman)
and the second step (discussion between the chapel chairman and Saxer)
were not followed . Nor is there evidence that Respondent answered the
grievance in writing before referral to the Joint Industrial Council. Indeed,
it is not wholly clear from the record whether the persons who attended the
August I8 conference constituted the contractual Joint Industrial Council,
although Gast's testimony suggests that they did. Moreover, there is no
evidence that the Council attempted to agree on the fifth member before the
FMCS was consulted.
To be sure , even under Respondent 's legal approach, these possible
discrepancies are probably irrelevant on the particular facts of the instant
case , where the LPIU did not seek the information at issue until after the
arbitrator had been named and the arbitration hearing date set. However,
Respondent 's analysis would likely have rendered such discrepancies highly
material if (for example) the information had been sought before the FMCS
had been consulted, Respondent had refused to provide the information in
reliance upon the August 18 arbitration agreement , and the LPIU had
refused at that point to continue processing the grievance without the
information.
43 For example , the LPIU 's possible failure to follow the first steps of the
contract grievance procedure may have been due to the fact that the
management representative at that step ( the foreman ) would probably have
been unable to resolve it. On the other hand , although Saxer's testimony
(supra, fn. 11) implies otherwise, that step may have been irrelevant because
applicable only to grievances "in an individual workroom."
974 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
contract provisions and of certain correspondence with
customers was not unlawful because such material alleged-
ly contains "confidential" information. On the basis of the
evidence received at the hearing , I was unable to determine
whether (and if so, exactly how) Respondent could provide
the LPIU with portions or summaries of such material so
as to withhold the allegedly confidential material while
supplying information in such documents to which the
LPIU would be entitled if they did not contain the
allegedly confidential material. Accordingly, on September
19, 1972, I issued an order to show cause why Respondent
should not submit in camera, or risk an adverse finding and
order, (I) copies of provisions in contracts in effect
between Respondent and its customers during the period
from April 1, 1971, to December 31, 1971, setting forth the
respective rights and duties of the parties to assure that
printing work covered by such contracts is performed, and
(2) copies of correspondence between Respondent and its
customers regarding the removal from Respondent's
Louisville, Kentucky, facilities during the period from
April 1, 1971, to December 31, 1971, of printing work
contracted to be or normally performed at Respondent's
Louisville facilities during that period.44 Under dates of
September 29, 1972, and October 4, 1972, Respondent's
counsel submitted certain documents which come within
the scope of my September 19 order. These documents are
hereby received in evidence, in camera, as Administrative
Law Judge's Exhibit 1.45
a. In his opening statement , Respondent 's counsel
stated on the record that Respondent did not want to
provide the LPIU with the contractual excerpts described
in the complaint because they "have terms, pricing,
information we don't want other customers to have, let
alone any other disinterested third party. .. we would be
hurt by having some disinterested party like a Union look
at our prices." Saxer testified that Respondent did not
want to give the LPIU copies of customers' contracts
because:
. . . there is information in there that I am sure many
of our competitors would be interested in getting
information on contract terms and etc., confidential
between us and the contracting party and I am sure the
Union would like to get some of this information and if
it got into the wrong hands it could go all over plus
some of our customers might want to see what other
customers have as far as contracts go.
There are a number of reasons why we wouldn't
want contract information to get into other people's
hands.
In support of the statement in Respondent's brief that the
"LPIU simply should not see" the contract material
described in the complaint, Respondent cites the foregoing
testimony by Saxer without further amplification.
After considering Saxer's somewhat vague testimony, the
difficulties inherent in any effort by Saxer to give a clear
explanation of why Respondent regarded contract provi-
44 This is the material described in pars 8 (e) and 8 (f) of the complaint as
amended
45 I hereby overrule the General Counsel's objection to the receipt of
such material, which objection is based on Respondent' s failure to tender
this material to me at the hearing for inspection in camera Such action by
Respondent might have jeopardized its then contention , since withdrawn,
sions as confidential without at the same time revealing
their contents , Saxer's general unreliability as a witness,
and the contract provisions submitted to me in camera, I
conclude that the usefulness of the submitted contract
excerpts to the LPIU's handling of the grievance would not
be affected by Respondent 's withholding of the following
excerpts , which Respondent might reasonably wish to keep
confidential for the reasons tendered by it: the fourth
paragraph in Document 3; the last 2 lines of Document 5.
A different problem is presented by the second section of
Document 6. While Respondent might reasonably wish to
keep this material confidential for the reasons tendered by
it, knowledge thereof might , in my judgment , be useful to
the LPIU in handling the grievance. Of course , the fact
that the employer may regard particular information as
confidential for some purposes does not automatically
privilege him to withhold it from the Union; as Respon-
dent points out in its brief, "the conflicting interests of the
parties should be reasonably dealt with ." 46 After weighing
such conflicting interests in the particular circumstances of
this case , I conclude that as to the second section of
Document 6 the balance tips in favor of the LPIU. In so
concluding I have taken into account ( 1) the degree of its
possible usefulness to the LPIU; (2) the somewhat
speculative character of any advantage which knowledge
thereof might afford to Respondent 's competitors and its
other customers ; (3) the parties' long-standing bargaining
relationship , which increases the likelihood that the LPIU
would honor a request by Respondent to keep the
existence of this clause to itself ; (4) LPIU counsel's
professional obligation to withhold from other clients any
information which the LPIU has promised to keep
confidential ; and (5) Respondent 's failure specifically to
urge that knowledge of this clause might increase the
LPIU's bargaining power in future labor disputes.
b. Respondent states that it does not wish to give the
LPIU the requested copies of correspondence with
customers because it deals with Respondent 's bargaining
strategy and its evaluation of concessions given and
received . After considering Respondent's position and the
correspondence submitted to me in camera, I conclude that
the usefulness of such correspondence to the LPIU's
handling of the grievance would not be affected by
Respondent's withholding of the following excerpts which
Respondent might reasonably wish to keep confidential for
the reasons tendered by it: the last 23 words in the fourth
paragraph of the letter which constitutes Document 9; the
third and fourth paragraphs of the letter which constitutes
Document 11; the last two sentences in the second
paragraph of the letter which constitutes Document 12; the
sixth and seventh paragraphs of the letter which constitutes
Document 13; the last 23 words in the fourth paragraph of
the letter which constitutes Document 14; the last sentence
in the fifth paragraph of the letter which constitutes
Document 16; the second paragraph, the last 14 words in
the fourth paragraph , and the second sentence in the fifth
that the documents were legally privileged See also International Union,
United Automobile . Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America [Gyrodyne] v N L R B , 459 F 2d 1329, 1346-48 (C A D C.) (relied
on by the General Counsel).
46 See Kroger Co v N L R B, 399 F 2d 455, 457 (C A 6), General
Electric, supra
FAWCETT PRINTING CORPORATION 975
paragraph, of the letter which constitutes Document 17;
the material following the third paragraph through page 2,
the second sentence on page 3, and the first 13 words of the
third sentence on page 3, of the letter which constitutes
Document 18; the sixth and seventh paragraphs of the
letter which constitutes Document 22; the last sentence in
the fifth paragraph of the letter which constitutes Docu-
ment 25; the second paragraph, the last 14 words in the
fourth paragraph, and the second sentence in the fifth
paragraph, of the letter which constitutes Document 26;
the material following the third paragraph through page 2,
the second sentence on page 3, and the first 13 words of the
third sentence on page 3, of the letter which constitutes
Document 27; the sixth and seventh paragraphs of the
letter which constitutes Document 28; the last 23 words of
the fourth paragraph of the letter which constitutes
Document 29; the last sentence in the fifth paragraph of
the letter which constitutes Document 31; the second
paragraph, the last 14 words in the fourth paragraph, and
the second sentence in the fifth paragraph, of the letter
which constitutes Document 32; the material following the
third paragraph through page 2, the second sentence on
page 3, and the first 13 words of the third sentence on page
3, of the letter which constitutes Document 33; the seventh
word in, and the last 23 words in, the second sentence of
the fourth paragraph of the letter which constitutes
Document 34; the material following the third paragraph
through page 2, the second sentence on page 3, and the
first 13 words of the third sentence on page 3, of the letter
which constitutes Document 36. I find no other material in
the letters included in Administrative Law Judge's Exhibit
I which Respondent might reasonably wish to withhold for
the reasons tendered by it.
47 Over the General Counsel's and the LPI U's objections as to relevancy,
I accepted Respondent 's offer into evidence of certain documents contained
in the agency's public case files-namely , the charges , dismissal letters, and
General Counsel's letters on appeal in two cases (Case 9-CA-6241 and
9-CA-6402) initiated against Respondent by the Bookbinders through the
same law firm which represented the LPIU in the instant proceeding These
documents disclose May 3, 1971, charges alleging, inter aha, that
Respondent had violated Sec. 8(a)(5) by subcontracting work previously
performed by the Bookbinders and refusing "to reveal any details on the
extent , duration or amount of said subcontracting , or furnish any
information , data or figures or statistics as to same " (9-CA-6241), and by
on and after April 27, 1971, unilaterally subcontracting work previously
performed by the Bookbinders (9-CA-6402). The General Counsel
sustained the Regional Director's June 25 dismissal action in case
9-CA-6241 on August 12, 1971, and the Regional Director's September 8
partial dismissal action in Case 9-CA-6402 on October 13,197 1. The August
12 letter, on which the October 13 letter specifically relied , stated, inter aha,
that Respondent's customers , "including Fawcett Publications , chose to
have their printing work done by printing shops other than Fawcett Printing
because of the possibility of disruptions in the printing schedule in the event
the [Bockbinders ] struck the latter ," and that "Fawcett Printing had no
control over its customers ' decisions to remove the work."
At the hearing , Respondent disavowed the contention that the LPIU's
alleged knowledge that these charges had been dismissed cast an adverse
light on the good faith of the LPIU's August 13 grievance or of its February
1972 action in filing the charges here . Further , although Respondent's
supplemental brief asserts that , "Implicit in the disposition of the unfair
labor practice charges filed by the [Bookbinders ] was the recognition that
despite any other relationship between Respondent and Fawcett Publica-
tions, Fawcett Publications was a customer and had the right to be treated
4. The LPIU's alleged lack of good faith in
requesting the information
Respondent's contention in its brief that the LPIU's
"bad faith" in demanding the information herein "has
been positively demonstrated" is based largely on conten-
tions which I have previously resolved against Respon-
dent.47 Its remaining contentions in this respect boil down
to reliance on the LPIU's action in requesting more
information than it was entitled to as a matter of right. Of
course, the mere fact that a Union's request encompasses
information which the employer is not legally obligated to
provide does not automatically excuse him from complying
with the Union's request to the extent that it also
encompasses information which he would be required to
provide if it were the sole subject of the demand.48 On the
other hand, excessive breadth of the Union's demand,
either standing alone or in combination with other
considerations, may in particular circumstances relieve the
employer from the obligation to provide some or all of
information to which the Union would be entitled on
proper demand.49 Under the facts presented herein, I
conclude that the variance herein does not call for
dismissal of the instant complaint.
Thus, in initially refusing on February 14, 1972, to
provide the requested information, Respondent tendered
grounds almost as general as could be imagined-namely,
that the LPIU was "not entitled by law or contract to
receive such information at this stage of the proceedings."
Such a reply did not afford the LPIU either a guide to
assist it in framing a more limited demand , or an incentive
to do so in the expectation that a more limited demand
would be honored. So far as this record shows, until filing
its answer to the complaint herein Respondent in no
respect elaborated on its February 14 position .50 Further,
during the instant proceedings Respondent not only has
insisted that entirely apart from the breadth of the
like any other customer ," at the hearing Respondent disavowed the
contention that the dismissal of the Bookbinders ' charges was in the nature
of res judicata as to the charges here . 46 Am . Jur. 2nd, Judgments, § 394,
404, 407-613, pp. 558-559, 571-573, 575-580 ( 1969); Audio Industries, Inc.,
135 NLRB 1008, In . 2. Respondent's briefs do not specifically urge
Respondent's hearing allegation that the LPIU's alleged knowledge about
the disposition of the Bookbinders ' charges reflected on the LPIU's good
faith in demanding the information at issue herein . In any event , knowledge
that Board investigators had failed to find facts showing that Respondent
was answerable under the statute for pre-August 13 work transfers and had
withheld from the Bookbinders certain information (not specifically alleged
to include Respondent's intercorporate relationship with Fawcett Publica-
tions) assertedly relevant thereto seems wholly consistent with a good-faith
belief by the LPIU that discovery type procedures specifically directed at
the intercorporate relationship might uncover evidence that Respondent
was answerable under its contract with the LPIU for an August 23 layoff
assertedly resulting from work transfers of unknown date , and had failed to
provide the LPIU in February 1972 with information relevant to that layoff
I note that during the period encompassed by the Bookbinders ' charges,
that Union had no contract with Respondent limiting Respondent's right to
subcontract work.
48 Pine Industrial Relations Committee, 118 NLRB 1055 , 1057-61, enfd.
and affd . 263 F . 2d 483 (C.A.D.C.); Curtiss-Wright Corp., 145 NLRB 152,
enfd . 347 F.2d 61 (C.A. 3); Shell Oil Co., 167 NLRB 243, 248-249.
49 See cases cited infra, fns. 50-53.
so Cf. American Cyanamid Co., 129 NLRB 683. While Respondent's
February 14 letter did arguably suggest that the entire request came too late,
reliance on such an uncorrectable alleged total defect would tend to indicate
to the LPIU that narrowing the scope of the request would be futile.
976 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
demand, the LPIU is not entitled to any of the information
requested , but also has based this contention on thereto-
fore unrevealed grounds which, in my view, the LPIU
could not be expected to divine on the basis of facts within
its knowledge. Thus, Respondent contended in its answer
to the complaint and at the hearing that some of the
information sought was privileged in a legal sense-a
defense which, far from being self-evident, has since been
abandoned by Respondent itself . Nor could the LPIU be
expected to foresee Respondent 's contention in its answer
that the customers ' correspondence described in the
demand included confidential material regarding Respon-
dent's labor relations 51 Further, the LPIU could not have
been expected to anticipate Respondent 's baseless conten-
tion in its brief to me that prelayoff information was
irrelevant to a grievance whose merits probably turned on
the sufficiency of the reasons for the layoff decision.
Respondent has never offered to provide any of the
information requested, and I see nothing in the record to
suggest an inference that Respondent would have complied
with a demand limited to the information to which (I find)
the LPIU was entitled under the statute . 52 Moreover, the
LPIU needs such information to process a pending
grievance which puts at issue the job rights of more than 25
unit employees for periods ranging up to 3 months.53
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The LPIU is a labor organization within the meaning
of the Act.
3. The unit set forth in footnote 1 above is appropriate
for collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times material to this proceeding, the LPIU
was, and continues to be , the exclusive representative of
the employees in the appropriate unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of
the Act.
5. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act by failing and refusing to honor the LPIU's
demand for certain information relevant and reasonably
necessary to the processing of a grievance.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
7. Respondent has not violated Section 8 (a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by failing and refusing to honor the LPIU's
demand for certain information which is not relevant and
reasonably necessary to the processing of a grievance.
THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent has violated the
Act by failing and refusing to supply the Union with
certain information , I shall recommend that Respondent
cease and desist therefrom and supply the LPIU, upon
51 Cf Curtiss-Wright, supra, 347 F.2d at 66
52 Cf American Cyanamid Co., supra, 129 NLRB 683.
53 Cf. Kroger, supra, 399 F 2d at 457, 459
59 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
request , with the information in question . I shall also
recommend that Respondent post appropriate notices.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, upon the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:54
ORDER
Respondent Fawcett Printing Corporation, its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Louisville
Lithographers and Photo-Engravers Union, Local No. 255,
Lithographers and Photo-Engravers International Union,
AFL-CIO, by refusing to furnish it with information
relevant and reasonably necessary to the processing of the
grievance filed by it on August 16, 1971.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Furnish the LPIU , upon request , with the following
information:
(1) Copies of correspondence between Respondent and
its customers regarding the removal from Respondent's
Louisville, Kentucky, facilities during the period from
April 1, 1971, to December 31, 1971, of printing work
contracted to be or normally performed at Respondent's
Louisville facilities during this period , including (without
limitation) Documents 9 through 42 of Administrative Law
Judge's Exhibit I with the exceptions set forth in section II,
F, 3, of this Decision.
(2) The names of plants or printing companies to which
printing work contracted to be or normally performed at
Respondent 's Louisville facilities was sent between April 1,
1971, and Thanksgiving 1971.
(3) Copies of provisions in contracts in effect between
Respondent and its customers during the period from April
1, 1971 to Thanksgiving 1971, setting forth the respective
rights and duties of the parties to assure that printing work
covered by such contracts is performed, including (without
limitation) Documents I through 8 of Administrative Law
Judge's Exhibit I except those not in effect during this
period and with the further exceptions set forth in section
II, F, 3, of this Decision.
(4) The names of its customers who had printing work
performed at Respondent's plant between April 1, 1971,
and Thanksgiving 1971.
(5) The names of magazines or other publications, and
their publishers, printed in Respondent's plant between
April 1, 1971, and Thanksgiving 1971.
(6) The facts concerning the corporate relationship
between the Respondent and Fawcett Publications , specifi-
cally as to the degree of ownership and control by one firm
of the other and their parent corporation.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
FAWCETT PRINTING CORPORATION 977
(b) Post at its office and place of business at Louisville,
Kentucky, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."55 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 9, after being duly signed by
the Respondent 's authorized representative , shall be posted
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places , including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found.
phers and Photo-Engravers Union, Local 255, Lithog-
raphers and Photo-Engravers International Union,
AFL-CIO, with information relevant and reasonably
necessary to the processing of the grievance filed on
August 16, 1971, regarding the layoff of employees.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with that
Union by refusing to furnish it with such information.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
55 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL, upon request, furnish Louisville Lithogra-
Dated By
FAWCETT PRINTING
CORPORATION
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material . Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board 's Office , 1695 Federal Office
Building, 1240 East Ninth Street , Cleveland, Ohio 44199,
Telephone 216-522-3739.