Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJun 14, 1973

204 N.L.R.B. 173 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

FARAH MFG. CO. Farah Manufacturing Company , Inc. and Amalgamat- ed Clothing Workers of America , AFL-CIO, South- west Regional Joint Board . Case 23-CA-4389 June 14, 1973 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On January 30, 1973, Administrative Law Judge James M. Fitzpatrick issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respondent filed exceptions and supporting briefs and Respondent additionally filed a brief in answer to the General Counsel's brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge 2 and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Farah Manufacturing Com- pany, Inc., Victoria, Texas, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in said recommended Order. 1 The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibili- ty unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A 3, 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings2 Chairman Miller would not find on this record that Respondent had no legitimate interest in photographing the pickets and therefore dissents from the 8(axl) finding based thereon. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES M. FITZPATRICK, Administrative Law Judge: This proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended (herein called the Act), was initiated by charges filed June 6, 1972' (and amended July 17), by 1 All dates herein are 1972, unless otherwise noted 173 Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Southwest Regional Joint Board (herein called Union or Charging Party), against Farah Manufacturing Company, Inc. (herein called Respondent or Company). Based on these charges a complaint issued July 20 (and was amended August 28 and again amended at the hearing herein) alleg- ing that Respondent had engaged in a number of indepen- dent violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. These allegations included interrogation about union activity, banning prounion solicitation during nonworking time, threats of discharge for supporting the Union, promoting distribution of procompany badges, and photographing of picket line activity. The complaint also alleged that Respon- dent had discriminatorily discharged 24 employees on the union organizing committee in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. It also alleges that shortly after these discharges nine other employees engaged in an unfair labor practice strike. In answering, Respondent admitted certain allegations but it denied the independent violations of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) and the discharge of the 24 employees. Concern- ing the alleged unfair labor practice strike, Respondent admits the nine went on strike, but denies it was an unfair labor practice strike, and further contends that the allega- tions concerning the strike are not relevant to any conduct alleged to be an unfair labor practice. As set out hereinafter, I conclude that Respondent violat- ed Section 8(a)(1) by interrogating employees about union activities ; instructing an employee not to solicit other em- ployees to support the Union even though all were on their breaktime; threatening employees with discharge if they became union supporters; on one occasion soliciting an employee to wear a so-called "happy badge" favoring the Company in relation to the Union; and by photographing picket line activities. I conclude Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) by making available a supply of "happy badges" to employees desiring them, nor Section 8(a)(1) and (3) in that it neither discharged the employees on the union supporting committee nor said they were discharged. These issues were tried before me at Victoria, Texas, on September 19 through 22, 1972. Upon the entire record, my observation of the witnesses, and consideration of the briefs filed by the parties, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I THE EMPLOYER INVOLVED Respondent is a Texas corporation having its principal office at El Paso, Texas. It is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of men's and boy's pants, and operates plants manufacturing these products at El Paso, San Anto- nio, and Victoria, Texas, and Las Cruces and Albuquerque, New Mexico. Respondent annually sells and ships its prod- ucts valued in excess of $50,000 from its Texas plants direct- ly to customers outside Texas, and it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. The present mat- ter involves the Victoria plant where Respondent employs about 400 employees. 204 NLRB No. 31 174 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED AND ITS FARAH CAMPAIGN The Union is an organization which admits to member- ship employees engaged in the manufacture of men's cloth- ing, including employees of the Respondent. It is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. In 1969, long before the events in this case which took place at Respondent's Victoria plant, the Union launched continuing organizing campaigns at Respondent's other plants. During 1972 the continuing campaign at these other plants involved some concerted work stoppages by employ- ees. I make no finding as to the reasons for these work stoppages. The first of these beginning March 6 was a short stoppage at one of the plants in El Paso. Beginning in May a series of longer stoppages involving larger numbers of employees commenced. On May 3, a work stoppage, which the Union claims was precipitated by company unfair labor practices, commenced at the San Antonio plants and was continuing at the time of the hearing herein. On May 9, another work stoppage commenced in four of the five plants in El Paso and a few days later spread to the fifth El Paso plant. A week or 10 days after that a work stoppage began at the plant in Las Cruces, New Mexico, and around the same time at the plant in Albuquerque. In each of these work stoppages some, but not all, of the employees at the particular plant joined in the work stoppage. With the ex- ception of the Albuquerque plant, all plants have continued to operate. The record indicates that prior to the events involved in this case about 2,000 employees out of a total complement of 9,500 have joined the work stoppages. Around May 10, representatives of the Union began or- ganizing at Victoria. This took the form of handbilling out- side Respondent's plant, solicitation of employee signatures on union authorization cards, and small meetings of em- ployees during nonworking hours. The principal union adherent among Victoria employees was Daniel Delgado. III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Alleged Interference, Restraint, and Coercion 1. The conduct of Plant Manager Taylor The complaint alleges , and the answer denies , that on or about May 24 , Respondent's plant manager, Robert Taylor, interrogated employees about their union activities and also told employees they could not solicit other employees to support the Union even though they all were on their break- time. Daniel Delgado, the principal in-plant organizer at Victo- ria, was employed as a bundle boy and an inspector begin- ning October 1971 until May 31 , 1972. In his work he moved about the plant and had the opportunity to talk with many employees . Delgado , called by the General Counsel , testi- fied that about a week before his last day of work (which would make it around May 24) Taylor approached him while he was working and asked him about a rumor that he was working for the Union and was going to lead a walkout. Delgado replied he knew nothing about it . Taylor then said okay and left. In response to an inquiry from Respondent 's counsel as to whether the above testimony of Delgado was offered in support of any 8 (a)(1) allegation in the complaint , the Gen- eral Counsel 's counsel indicated on the record that it was not. Later in the hearing Respondent called Taylor to testify but he was not examined on this subject . In the circum- stances I conclude that the record does not sustain the alle- gation that the Respondent in the person of Taylor violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act on or about May 24 by interrogat- ing employees about their union activities. Delgado also testified without contradiction that in an additional conversation around the same time Taylor warned him about talking about the Union to employees on "their time ." Delgado explained to him that he had not been bothering employees or talking about the Union "on their time," but that he had discussed the Union with other em- ployees "on my break time ." Taylor then stated that he did not want Delgado "bothering the people anymore , just to leave the people alone ." Delgado replied that he would be talking with employees "on their break time , and . . . would not bother nobody while they were working ." The foregoing is ambiguous in that it is not clear whether Taylor was referring to breaktime or working time or both . All employ- ees take their break at the same time. Although Delgado said he only organized during nonworking time, other evi- dence in the record establishes , and I find , that he also organized during working time . Taking the reported conver- sation as a whole , it appears that Delgado understood Tay- lor to be referring to working time when he [Delgado] demurred that his union discussions had been "on my break time." But even so , Taylor's words were not free of ambigui- ty and Delgado could reasonably have understood that he was generally banning talk about the Union between Delga- do and other employees. The risks of such ambiguity are on the employer . Farah Manufacturing Company, 187 NLRB 601, enfd . 450 F.2d 942 (C.A. 5, 1971). Accordingly, I find that on or about May 24 , Respondent by Taylor violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by telling Delgado he could not solicit other employees to support the Union during break- time. Delgado also testified without contradiction about a fur- ther conversation with Taylor in which Taylor broached the subject of the union activity at Respondent's facilities in El Paso. Delgado placed the conversation "two weeks prior" without indicating prior to what . In his words Taylor said, ". . . if I was involved with the Union that I was fighting a lost cause and for me not to get involved because it would just get me in trouble ." It is not entirely clear that Taylor's words were in the form of a question . It is clear , however, that he approached Delgado . Delgado's description of the conversation warrants the inference that Taylor's purpose was not only to dissuade him from union activity if he were involved in it, but also to elicit from Delgado some indica- tion as to whether or not he was involved with the Union. I find , therefore , that the conversation occurred and that it amounted to an interrogation and a threat. Considering Taylor's supervisory position , the fact that the conversation apparently occurred in the plant, and the existence of an ongoing widespread dispute between the Company and the FARAH MFG. CO. Union at other facilities and the possibility that the dispute might spread to and involve employees at the Victoria plant, I find that Taylor was unlawfully interfering with employee Section 7 rights and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. The conduct of Porfirio Granado The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that on about May 26, a supervisor named Porfirio Granado inter- rogated employees about their union sympathies and de- sires and threatened them with discharge if they became supporters of the Union, and that Respondent thereby vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The record shows that throughout the events involved in this proceeding Granado (sometimes familarily referred to as Pilo) was Respondent's production supervisor at the Vic- toria plant. In support of the above allegation the General Counsel offered the testimony of employee Elvia Reyes to the effect that about a week prior to May 31 Granado approached her at her work station and asked her what she thought about the Union. When she replied that her father had told her to do what she thought was right, Granado told her not to get involved, that the Union was not going to win and if she liked her job not to get involved. The testimony of Elvia Reyes is uncontradicted. In the circumstances I find that on about May 26 Respondent in the person of Granado questioned her about what she thought of the Union and in effect threatened that union involvement could cost her her job. I further find that this conduct violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 3. The happy badges The complaint as amended at the hearing alleges, and Respondent denies, that on or about May 30 Respondent "permitted, encouraged and ratified" the distribution among employees of buttons bearing legends favorable to the Company in relation to supporters of the Union, thereby forcing employees to openly express their positions regard- ing the Union; that also on May 30, Granado solicited employees to wear such buttons; and that this conduct vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In connection with the union campaign at its other plants Respondent had obtained a supply of promotional buttons or badges indicating employee satisfaction with their em- ployment by Respondent. These were commonly called "happy badges." One such, received in evidence and typical of others used, is a small white card, bearing a red circular area with the legend "Yes! I'm satisfied at Farah-Those who are not are outside." The entire badge is enclosed in plastic with a pin on the back for affixing to the clothing. About the beginning of the last week in May, at a time when union organizing had already begun at Victoria, the Victoria plant received a supply of happy badges for use there. They were placed in a box in the front office near a window opening into the front corridor of the plant where they were available for employees, both supervisors and nonsupervisors, to pick up and use. The General Counsel contends that employees obtaining happy badges were re- quired to sign for them. However, I find to the contrary. 175 , While there is some evidence that a paper tablet or a pam- phlet may have been near the box containing the badges, there is no direct evidence that any employee was required to sign or in fact did sign, other than testimony of Delgado that he saw others pick up and sign for them. But he did not identify who these were. As indicated elsewhere herein, Del- gado was an unreliable witness. On the other hand, the testimony of some who obtained badges indicates that they did not sign . In any case, the existence of a paper near the supply of badges where recipients could sign cannot be said to have forced the employees to a choice between Company and Union. At Victoria employees actually began using the happy badges about Monday, May 29. Some supervisors wore them. Some rank-and-file employees wore them. One issue in the case is the extent to which Respondent permitted, encouraged, and ratified their distribution. By making them available to employees in a box in the office where anyone who wanted one could come and get it, Respondent plainly "permitted" their distribution. The fact that some supervi- sors wore them was some "encouragement" to rank-and-file employees to also use them Only two other items of evidence are relied on by the General Counsel to support the allegation that the happy badges violated Section 8(a)(1). Both of these instances oc- curred on Tuesday, May 30. In one incident an employee, while working, asked Taylor if the Company was going to bung in any more happy badges. He replied that they prob- ably would get some more. General Counsel does not con- tend that this comment in itself violated Section 8(a)(1) but he claims that it is evident that Respondent permitted, en- couraged, and ratified the use of the happy badges and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1). In the other incident, according to the uncontradicted testimony of Elvia Reyes, Granado asked Elvia Reyes while she was working why she did not have a happy badge. She replied she did not want one. He then volunteered to get her one. When she declined his offer, he insisted. However, she still declined. He then asked her why, and she indicated because she felt the wages were too low. Granado's conduct plainly was coercive interference with the Section 7 rights of Elvia Reyes in that it was an interro- gation as well as an application of pressure by a supervisor upon an employee in a work situation to openly express her views regarding the Union. Accordingly, I find that on that occasion Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Other than that one occasion, all Respondent did regard- ing the happy badges, so far as this record shows, was to make them available and to allow their use by any employ- ee, whether rank-and-file or supervisor. The complaint al- leges even this was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) because it forced employees to make an open choice between the Company and and the Union. Clearly the legend on the badge offered in evidence reveals a preference by those who wore it for the Company as against the Union. An employer who pressures employees to such a choice commits an un- fair labor practice. Garland Knitting Mills of Beaufort, South Carolina, Inc., 170 NLRB 821, enfd. in pert. part 414 F.2d 1214, fn. 4 (C.A.D.C., 1969). The question here is whether Respondent pressured any employee other than Elvia Reyes to make that choice when all it did was provide a supply of 176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD badges at a central location. I find it did not. The conclusion of the Board in Garland is based on the finding there that supervisors distributed tags to assembled employees thereby observing who accepted or rejected them. The facts here do not reach that far. Accordingly, a finding of a violation is unwarranted because the coercive element is absent. 4. The picturetaking The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that on May 31 and during June Respondent photographed em- ployees while they were picketing and handbilling in front of its plant and that this conduct violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. There is no substantial factual dispute about the picture- taking. Prior to May 31 Respondent's management learned that the Union, in connection with its campaign at other plants, had also distributed leaflets at Victoria. Respondent instructed its management at Victoria in the event picketing occurred there to take photographs of (a) any pickets if more than two were within 50 feet of each other or of company property or of the entrance to the plant (on the theory that such would be contrary to state law and the evidence thereof should be preserved), (b) the legend on any picket signs used, (c) any violent conduct or interference with ingress or egress to the plant, and (d) any strangers on the scene in order to later establish union responsibility for the activities. Kenneth Carr, Respondent's labor relations counsel, testified that the purpose of Respondent's picture- taking was to provide information to Respondent's attor- neys to determine whether state law was being violated and to document any illegal activity. Respecting the photo- graphing of leafleting he testified that Respondent's pur- pose was to identify who was distributing leaflets and to establish union responsibility in the event of illegal conduct, the theory being that state law forbade distribution of mate- rially misleading leaflets. Evidence in the record establishes that representatives of Respondent took pictures on May 31, June 1, June 6, July 11, and August 17. The photographs show both picketing and handbilling (including employees approaching the handbillers) and in some instances employees as well as nonemployees in the vicinity. In a few instances the subjects of the photograph posed. None of the photographs depict violence or interference with ingress to, or egress from, the plant. On some occasions photographs were also taken by the Union. Specifically, on June 1 and 6 Luis Chacon, on behalf of the Union, photographed employees with a supervisor in the vicinity of the picketing. Respondent contends that its photography did not inter- fere with employee rights and that, moreover, it was entitled to gather evidence. It further urges that it was entitled to take pictures because the Union was taking pictures. As to the latter point the record indicates that the Union took relatively few photographs while the Company took a great many (about 110). But in any case, considering that no violence or obstruction in fact occurred, I find "that the repeated photography, aside from the few posed . . . pic- ture, . . . was reasonably calculated to coerce and restrain striking employees by creating a fear among them that the record of their concerted activities might be used for some future reprisal against them, and that Respondent thereby violated their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act." Russell Sportswear Corporation, 197 NLRB 1116. Similarly, I find that the pho- tographing of the distribution of handbills, including those who were handing them out and those who were receiving them or might be receiving them, was unlawful. Uncontra- dicted testimony in the record indicates that prior to such picturetaking incidents nonstriking employees were accept- ing union leaflets but as soon as the photography began, such employees would turn away and not accept the leaflets. I deem it unnecessary to make a finding as to what Respondent's purpose actually was in taking the photo- graphs. Even if its purpose was gathering of evidence as a precautionary measure, the picturetaking was unwarranted under the Act absent the actual occurrence of violent or coercive conduct. Russell Sportswear Corporation, supra; cf. Cavalier Division of Seaburg Corporation, 192 NLRB 290; Radio Industries, Inc., 101 NLRB 912, 914, 925. It is also unnecessary to decide here whether Respondent would have been justified in engaging in a photographing duel with the Union by responding to widespread union photography with its own picturetaking. That clearly was not the case here. The minor amount of union picturetaking shown in the record does not warrant an inference that the context of employee activity was in any way affected. Respondent's reliance upon union picturetaking as a ground for justifying its own photography is misplaced. B. The Alleged Discrimination 1. The issues The complaint alleges that on May 31 Respondent dis- charged, and has since failed and refused to reinstate, 24 employees because of their union or concerted activities. Respondent admits the 24 employees involved ceased work- ing at that time, but denies they were discharged or that they have been denied reinstatement. Respondent claims they walked out and were not discharged or denied reinstate- ment because of their union activities or their concerted activities . Essentially the issue is a credibility conflict be- tween groups of witnesses called by the opposing parties. 2. The meeting in the office There is no dispute that on Wednesday, May 31, during the 9:30 morning coffeebreak a group of employees sup- porting the Union, with Daniel Delgado as their spokes- man, confronted Plant Manager Taylor in the office near the front of the plant. Respondent denies that all 24 individ- 2 The 24 employees alleged to have been discharged are Sylvia Castallena- da, Eustolia Castillo, Luis Chacon, Daniel Delgado, Jenoveva Flores, Delia Fonseca , Beatrice Garcia, Felix Garcia, Oraha Garcia , Sue Gonzales, Susie Gonzales, Dora Gonzales Guzman , Steven Guzman, Angelita Gutierrez, Maria Jacquez, Mary Alice Meza, Isabel Moreno , Carlota Mungia, Rosie Olguin, Ester Pena, Susie Perez , Elvia Reyes, Erminia Reyes, and Gloria Reyes . Of these the following I I were not called as witnesses. Chacon, Fonseca, Beatric Garcia, Susie Gonzales, Steven Guzman , Jacquez, Meza, Moreno, Mungia, and Pena and Erminia Reyes FARAH MFG. CO. uals named in the complaint in fact participated in that group action . No one was really sure who was in the group. No one counted them . The record contains some evidence that each of the named individuals was present in the office during that meeting . The presence in the office of Gloria Reyes , Erminia Reyes , Mary Jacques , and Carlota Mungia depends on the testimony of Gloria Reyes, the only one of these who testified . As indicated hereinafter , I do not credit her account of what transpired in the meeting . Other per- suasive evidence indicates at least she and Erminia Reyes were in the hallway rather than in the office . All in all I find the evidence insufficient to establish that these four were in the office. I find the others were. There is no dispute regarding what transpired during the first part of the meeting in the office . As the bell rang for the 9 : 30 break , employees began moving toward the office. A group entered the office . Daniel Delgado , acting as their spokesman , asked for Plant Manager Taylor. Taylor, who was not then in the office , was called over the plant inter- com system . Shortly thereafter he followed the group into the office and asked , "What is this?" Delgado advised him that those present were members of the union organizing committee and he proceeded to take from his pocket a union leaflet setting forth employee rights and either read therefrom or hand the leaflet to Taylor. Taylor refused to listen or to accept the leaflet. By his own admission he said, "I don't want it . I can 't take it . I don't want it . . . I can't discuss it with you at all, and I won't." Although the meeting lasted only a few minutes, there is a troublesome credibility conflict about what occurred dur- ing the balance of the meeting . Various witnesses gave dif- fering versions of what Taylor then said . I find that after he refused to confer with the organizing committee or to listen to or accept the paper which Delgado proffered to him, Taylor in effect told the group to either return to work or leave ; that this was followed by a brief period of confusion and discussion among members of the committee ; and that Taylor repeated at least once words to the effect that the members of the group should either return to work or leave and further indicated that if they left they should punch their timecards . Some in the group , including at least Delga- do and Perez , responding to Taylor's reference to the time- cards , stated that they would not punch out their own timecards but that Taylor would have to do so . He agreed. The group then left the office and the plant. I further find that Taylor did not discharge any of the employees who came in to the office on that occasion. I find that he left open to them the option of returning to work or of leaving the plant . I base this upon the credited testimony of Taylor, corroborated by that of Pete Figueroa , Madlen Charbula, Porfirio Granado , and John Rendon . Taylor's testimony standing alone would be subject to some question inasmuch as he admitted that in connection with a company suit in state court seeking a temporary restraining order against the Union , he signed a petition stating that violence and property damage had occurred. Respondent 's attorneys thereafter advised the court that no evidence of such was found . In the present proceeding , however, Taylor appeared to be a forthright witness and his testimony here is corrobo- rated , as noted above , by that of other credible witnesses. For the reasons discussed below I do not credit the testi- 177 mony of other witnesses indicating that Taylor fired those who were in his office on May 31 or said they were fired. These witnesses included Daniel Delgado , Elvia Reyes, Su- sie Perez , Gloria Reyes, Jenoveva Flores , Eustolia Castillo, Sylvia Castenada , Felix Garcia , Oralia Garcia, and Angelita Gutierrez. Delgado was a vacillating and at times evasive witness who had difficulty remembering many pertinent details. In describing a planning meeting of union adherents with a union representative on the evening of May 30 he first placed the meeting at one motel and later another . In fact, the meeting was held at neither motel but rather at the local Plumbers ' hall. In describing a conversation he had with Taylor around 8 or 8 : 30 on the morning of May 31 , he first reported he told Taylor that , "I" wish to meet with Taylor in the office at 9:30 . He then changed this , reporting that he said "We" wish to see Taylor. Still later in his testimony he changed back to the singular form . In describing the number of employees gathered in the hallway outside the office during the incident on May 31 , he was evasive. Fol- lowing the incident on May 31 the group of employees with Delgado proceeded to the motel room of a union represen- tative where they prepared picket signs . Delgado and anoth- er employee went out to a local lumber yard to buy the materials for the signs . He could not remember where they purchased the materials although at the time of the event he was a resident of the community . From about noon until the end of the workday on May 31 the union adherents , includ- ing Delgado , picketed at the plant . He could remember no photographing of the pickets although independent evi- dence establishes that such occurred . He applied to the Texas employment commission for unemployment com- pensation, signing and dating his application June 1. Yet, when he first testified about it he could not remember when he went to the commission to make the application and later in his testimony reported that , although he dated the appli- cation of June 1 , he made it several days later than that. In sum, I found Delgado an unreliable witness. Elvia Reyes could not remember the names of others in the group that confronted Taylor. She thought they were only a half dozen employees gathered in the hallway outside the office although other testimony which I credit indicates the hallway was quite crowded . Her recollection as to what was said inside the office seems inaccurate . She reported that the organizing committee advised Taylor it was there to be "recognized as the committee for the Union" although a preponderance of the evidence indicates the organizing committee was not seeking recognition . Finally , and most persuasive in my mind , is the fact that she recalled the company nurse , Mary Rendon (no relation to John Ren- don), as being present dunng the confrontation with Taylor on May 31 . Other evidence establishes beyond doubt that the nurse was not present. Susie Perez similarly recalled only a few people gathered in the hallway while in fact many were there . She did not recall Domingo Reyes being in the hallway although other credible evidence establishes he was there . She likewise re- called the nurse being at the meeting with Taylor when in fact she was not. Gloria Reyes similarly erroneously recalled the nurse being in the office . She also admitted that at the time of the 178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD meeting with Taylor she was nervous and not paying atten- tion. I do not credit her, and as found herein earlier I con- clude the evidence is insufficient to place her in the office. Jenoveva Flores likewise testified that the nurse was in the office, contrary to the fact. She also observed only a few employees in the hallway although there were many and like Perez did not recallemployee Domingo Reyes being in the hall although he was there. Eustolia Castillo recalled that the meeting lasted about 40 minutes although in fact it was much shorter than that, the entire morning break only being 13 minutes. She also, like Elvia Reyes, recalled contrary to the fact that Delgado told Taylor the group was there to be "recognized" as the union committee. Sylvia Castenada's memory of surrounding events also seemed imperfect. She could not recall that anyone was in the hall outside the office although in fact it was crowded and she had to pass through the group on leaving. Similarly, Oralia Garcia could recall only two or three employees sitting in the hallway. Angelita Gutierrez recalled, contrary to the fact, that the nurse was in the office during the meeting with Taylor. Moreover, her recollection while testifying on the stand varied from her description of events contained in her pre- trial statement. Felix Garcia was forthright in his demeanor and a good witness but I do not credit his testimony that Taylor fired the group. My reasons for not crediting him (as well as not crediting the others) are discussed hereinafter. The principal reason I find Taylor did not discharge the organizing committee out of hand is that he lacked authori- ty to do so. Uncontradicted evidence in the record estab- lishes that all Respondent 's plant managers , including Taylor, had standing instructions not to fire any employee for any reason without prior approval of Respondent's vice president of manufacturing in El Paso. This policy had been in effect at least since the opening of the Victoria plant. It applied to all employees of the Company except office cleri- cals in El Paso. Taylor, who managed the Victoria plant from the time it opened, had operated pursuant to these instructions. Prior to the events of May 31 he had dis- charged employees from time to time but never without prior approval from the appropriate official in El Paso. In addition, because prior to May 31 management had heard rumors of possible walkouts, all plant managers were instructed on what to do in the event of a confrontation. Kenneth Carr, Respondent's labor relations counsel, testi- fied without contradiction that on two occasions prior to May 31 he specifically instructed Taylor in this regard. These instructions were that under no circumstances was Taylor to fire anyone. He was first to ask the employee or employees involved what the problem was, then state to them that he would not discuss it at that time, ask them to return to work, and if they refused to return to work, ask them to punch out their timecards. If the employees then refused to punch out their timecards, Taylor should do it himself or have someone do it . These instructions were in substance reiterated to Taylor early in the morning of May 31. At Victoria work began at 7:30 in the morning. On the morning of May 31 Delgado arrived before starting time and on seeing Taylor told him he would like to see him in the office at 9:30.According to Delgado, Taylor declined, saying that he did not have time to return to the office at 9:30. Shortly thereafter, around 7:35 or 7:40, Taylor tele- phone Carr in San Antonio to report what Delgado had said. Taylor asked Carr for instructions, saying that there had been rumors about walkouts, probably to be led by Delgado, who apparently was the union leader at Victoria. Carr instructed Taylor to talk to Delgado at his work sta- tion, learn if he could the nature of the problem, and if it was a personal matter offer to help. If Delgado was propos- ing to walk out, Taylor was to follow his prior standing instruction. Carr again specifically directed Taylor not to tell Delgado he was fired but to ask what the problem was, put off discussing it at that time, and ask him to return to work; if he should refuse to return to work, to tell him to punch out and, if he refused, for Taylor to punch him out. Carr further testified that part of Taylor's standing instruc- tions were not to accept any union papers or authorization cards. Thereafter at 8 or 8:30 Taylor went to Delgado at his work station and specifically asked him what he wished to talk about. According to Delgado he did not answer the question; he just said he wished to see Taylor in the office. To this Taylor replied he did not do business in the office. The next time the two spoke was at the 9:30 confrontation in the office. There is no question but that the above described instruc- tions to Taylor existed prior to the confrontation. The Gen- eral Counsel's theory requires a finding that Taylor flew in the face of these instructions by summarily discharging 24 employees without prior clearance from El Paso. It is incon- ceivable to me that he would do so. Certainly he would not have intentionally flouted superior orders. And while he admittedly was "shook" by the apparent crisis, there is no evidence he was unnerved to the point that he did on a mass scale exactly what he had been ordered not to do. Accord- ingly, in assessing the credibility of those witnesses who testified that he fired them as against the testimony of those who testified he did not, I credit the latter as being more consistent with the standing instructions. I find that Taylor did not fire the 24 employees. I find he did tell those present to get out (which could have been interpreted to mean get out of the plant) but he also left them the option of returning to work. The above resolution of the basic credibility issue in the case is also supported to some extent by the numerous con- tradictions between the testimony of General Counsel's own witnesses on points about which they might be expect- ed to agree. The fact that a large group was present in the office on May 31 and there was considerable confusion during the crucial points of the short meeting, tends to explain such differing recollections but at the same time raises questions as to the reliability of the testimony. 3. Rumors and predictions of a walkout For some time prior to the events involved in this case Union Organizer Silvero Alva had been actively engaged in organizing in Victoria. While this organizing was in pro- gress , William Farah, the head of the Company, on May 22 FARAH MFG. CO. wrote a letter to the employees which apparently related to work stoppages at the other plants . It was posted in the Victoria plant as well as mailed to individual employees. The letter read: Dear Friend and Fellow Workers: This is a short note to tell you that we thank you for your help during the past two weeks. The walk-out is ended because of your efforts to keep the trouble mak- ers out . This is in your best interest , as you already know. You are among 8,200 dedicated people who have achieved this goal . It is a goal that we fully sup- port. You have won a sound victory for yourself, your fami- ly, your community, and your company. We are grateful to you for your good judgment. The General Counsel contends this was the initial founda- tion for a prefabricated defense that the employees walked out on May 31; that it shows the Company started the rumors of impending walkout . But I think he claims too much for this essentially irrelevant propaganda . Alva was continuing with his organizing , including meetings with in- terested employees and around the time of the Farah letter, or shortly thereafter, Delgado indicated to other employees that a walkout was imminent . Discussions among the em- ployees about an impending walkout persisted for a couple of days during which time striking employees from other plants of Respondent engaged in handbilling outside the Victoria plant . In spite of the rumors , no walkout in fact occurred during that week. On Monday , May 29, there were further rumors among the employees about a walkout to take place at 1 p.m., that day. It did not occur at that time . Some of the union adher- ents indicated that too few people were involved . Delgado stated to employee Joann Hildebrandt , when she asked him if they were going to walk out, ". . . we are going to wait awhile." Later that day he asked her, "Why don't you go with us when we walk out?" He indicated that he hoped she would get Anglo supporters for the Union because she knew so many Anglo employees . Hildebrandt 's assistance to com- pany counsel during the hearing indicates a procompany bias on her part. Nevertheless , she was an articulate and forthright witness and I credit her testimony. Also on Monday, May 29, according to the uncontradict- ed testimony of Figueroa , Delgado urged him to join in the union campaign on the ground that they were both Chica- nos and should stick together . Figueroa quoted him as further saying, "You don't have to worry, they ain't going to fire you . Robert Taylor can't do nothing about it . . . if you walk out you can come right back in. You still have your job. They can't do nothing because you are protected under the law." Although Figueroa's supervisory status in- dicates possible bias , I credit his uncontradicted account. The next day, Tuesday, May 30, Delgado came by Hildebrandt 's work station while she was working with fel- low employee Pam Felder. Felder did not testify . According to Hildebrandt , whom I credit , Felder asked Delgado about 179 the walkout. He replied they were' going to have one but they were going to first plan it. Hildebrandt and Felder apparently understood that there was to have been a walk- out at 9:30 that morning which had not taken place. They asked Delgado why he had not walked out then and he replied they had other plans to make. A short time later when he again approached Hildebrandt she again asked him, "Why didn't you all walk out?" He again said they had plans to make, that the union had told them at a meeting not to just walk out; to find a reason for walking out; to try to get fired or find some reason for walking out. Tuesday evening most, if not all, of the employees alleged to have been discharged the next day met with Union Rep- resentative Alva. The union adherents were concerned about the impact on the organizing drive of the "happy badges" being worn by some employees. Alva recommend- ed that they formally declare themselves to be the union organizing committee and meet with Taylor. They all agreed to do so and to follow Delgado (who was to act as spokesman) to the plant at 9:30 the following morning. Alva instructed them to inform Taylor that they were the union organizing committee , that they were going to continue or- ganizing in the plant, and hand him the leaflet setting forth employee rights under the Act. Some employees questioned whether they might be fired, but Alva said he did not think so. There is much dispute about whether the organizing com- mittee planned to walk out on the morning of May 31. Felix Garcia testified that they did not plan a walkout. He admit- ted, however, that at that time the committee members knew that over 2,000 employees at other plants of Respon- dent had already walked out. Early on the morning of May 31 there were more rumors that there was going to be a walkout. Before beginning work that day Jenoveva Flores and Erminia Reyes stated, according to Reynalda Aguirre, a fellow employee, that there was going to be a walkout and that both of them were going to go out. Based on this information Aguirre followed them toward the office when the bell rang at 9:30. Flores admitted talking with Aguirre but denied that Erminia Reyes was present and also denied saying there would be a walkout. She testified she told Aguirre they were going to the office to tell Taylor that they were members of the organizing committee . She also testi- fied that the purpose of going to the office was to respond to the "happy badges." Erminia Reyes did not testify al- ,though she is one of the persons allegedly discharged. In the circumstances I credit Aguirre. There appears to have been some confusion in the minds of some of the committee regarding the precise purpose of their intended meeting with Taylor. Thus when the bell rang at 9:30 Rosie Olguin told Eustolia Castillo to come on, that they were going to talk to Taylor, "to recognize the Union committee." Of course prior predictions of a walkout, or even a prior declared intent to walk out, do not establish that a walkout occurred on May 31. But the statements of committee mem- bers and the events preceding the May 31 confrontation afford some support for the finding that they were not dis- charged on that occasion. 180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4. Statements and events subsequent to the confrontation in advance is some indication that a need for them was not anticipated. That day (May 31), as well as later, rumors circulated among the employees that the organizing committee had been fired. Concurrently, other rumors circulated that they had walked out. On May 31 some nonstriking employees told those on the picket line that they had heard that they were not fired. I put no reliance on these rumors and state- ments. Still later that day Delgado, seeing Supervisor Figueroa in a local bar, asked why he did not come with him, saying that the Union was giving them strike benefits and they did not need to worry about working for awhile. But these words are not indicative one way or the other on the crucial issue. The next day, June 1, the Union distributed a handbill declaring that the 24 members of the organizing committee had been fired. As with company statements, I view this as a self-serving declaration entitled to little weight. Within a day or two following the confrontation Sue Gonzales, in the vicinity of the picket line, attempted to interest nonstriking employees Frances Aguirre and Mary Figueroa in signing union cards. When Aguirre declined, indicating some apprehension about her job, Gonzales (ac- cording to her own testimony) said, "you don't have to be scared to sign a union card." Gonzales also testified that, "I told her that I had signed a union card when I was in the plant and that I wasn't fired because I had signed a union card." Aguirre understood her to mean she was not fired for any reason. This might have been an admission that they walked out but I find the words as spoken too equivocal to sustain an inference. On June 2 nine other employees, who until then had continued working, went on strike in sympathy with those who were picketing. It is undisputed that they were not discharged. The question of whether this was an unfair la- bor practice strike is dealt with later herein. On Friday following the May 31 confrontation some of the employees involved returned to pick up their paychecks for an earlier pay period, and on the second Friday follow- ing some of them picked up their final paychecks. On nei- ther occasion did Taylor indicate to these employees they were not fired. But of course he had no duty to do so. He did ask for the tools issued some of them and received either the tools or payment in lieu thereof. On June 6 a group of company officials from El Paso, including Labor Relations Counsel Carr, met in the plant cafeteria with employees interested in hearing the Company's position. Questions were invited and in answer to them company officials stated that the 24 employees involved in the May 31 confrontation had not been fired and that they could have their jobs back on request. This was almost a week after the events. The self-serving state- ments of company planning officials, who were not present on May 31, should be given no weight in determining what actually happened. The statements might have operated as an offer of reinstatement if made to those on strike. But Respondent could not reasonably expect that the offer would necessarily be communicated to the strikers. Accord- ingly, I do not view it as an effective offer of reinstatement on June 6. On May 31, as the confrontation between Taylor and the organizing committee ended, the employees assembled in the office exited into the hallway dust inside the front door of the plant. Taylor followed them out, directing the guard to open the outside door for them. Elvia Reyes testified that while coming out through the hallway her sister Gloria Reyes stated she had to go back into the plant to retrieve her purse, but that Taylor ordered that, "Nobody goes back in." I do not credit their testimony. Gloria Reyes did not testify to this statement by Taylor, and it is clear that she, Mary Jacquez, Carlota Mungia , and possibly Erminia Reyes did go back into the factory before leaving without any question being raised. It is difficult to believe they would have done so if Taylor had ordered them not to. He did not instruct those leaving to turn in their employee identification badges (which all employees wear) or to turn in company tools issued them. But he did direct the guard to get the names of those leaving and to make sure they moved off company property. He and the guard then fol- lowed the group out of the building to the parking lot to insure this was done. Shortly thereafter Taylor returned to the building and thanked those employees still in the hallway for staying. He asked them to proceed to their work stations and remain there until an accurate count could be made of "who had walked out." Supervisors then made the count. About 9:50 a.m. Taylor telephoned the company person- nel director in El Paso, reported what had happened, and reviewed with him instructions received some 10 days earli- er about how to treat timecards of employees who left with- out punching out. In complying with these directives Taylor then had John Rendon, an office employee who kept the personnel records for the plant, pull the timecards of each employee who had left and type on the face thereof "9:30" as the employee's leaving time, with the further penciled notation "walk out." On the back of each card he typed "5/31/72 voluntarily walked off the job. J. Rendon." Tay- lor then initialed each card. The entire task was completed before noon that day. Like the statements preceding the confrontation, Taylor's statement and the entries on the timecards do not establish what happened at the confrontation. For one thing, they are essentially self-serving. Nevertheless Taylor's statement and the entries on the timecards occurred very close in time to the events in issue and provide some further, albeit less than overwhelming, support for the finding that the group was not fired. About midday on May 31 members of the organizing committee returned to the front of the plant and began leafleting and picketing. The picket signs read, "We protest the unfair labor practices of Farah Manufacturing Compa- ny. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL- CIO." While such a legend is consistent both with a protest of discharges as well as a protest of other conduct at Victo- ria and elsewhere, it is noteworthy that the picket signs omitted a specific reference to what is here alleged to have been a mass discharge of the union organizing committee. On the other hand, the fact that the signs were not prepared FARAH MFG. CO. On July 13 Carr sent identical letters on Company letter- head to each of the 24. The letters read as follows: As you know, you and 23 other employees voluntarily went on an economic strike on May 31, 1972. Notwithstanding your knowledge that the statement was untrue, some of you apparently told some people that you had been fired. The week after you walked out, I told a large number of employees that none of you had been fired and that, if any of you had any doubt about that, you could test me by returning to work. Although you were told about my statement, you not surprisingly failed to return. Again the following week, most of you were present when Robert Taylor reiterated in court that you were not fired and never had been. He again said, in the presence of the Union's attorney, that each of you could return to work if you desired. None of you did so. Once again, I am formally notifying you that Farah has never discharged you and that you can return to your former position immediately, if you so desire. There is no dispute that each of the 24 employees alleged- ly discharged received a copy of this letter. The court pro- ceeding referred to therein apparently was a hearing in a state court upon Respondent's application for an injunction banning picketing and other conduct at the Victoria plant. I do not consider that the record here adequately establishes what, if anything, was stated in the state court regarding reinstatement . Regarding the assertions in the letter as to what happened on May 31, I accord them no weight be- cause they are patently self-serving declarations. Respondent contends that this letter was an offer of rein- statement to the 24 employees whom it contends walked out on May 31. None of the 24 accepted the offer of reinstate- ment. Those who testified stated that their reasons for not accepting were twofold. First, because the letter inaccurate- ly (according to them) stated that they had walked out and that acceptance of the offer contained in the letter would amount to an admission by them of the correctness of the facts stated in the letter. Second, that the letter was signed by Labor Relations Counsel Carr and not by Taylor who had fired them. This second position necessarily implies that a valid reinstatement offer could only come from Tay- lor. It seems clear, and I find, that the letter of July 13 consti- tuted a valid offer of reinstatement to each of the 24 em- ployees. Certainly it was not essential to the validity of the offer that it come from the same company official who had participated in their May 31 departure. And even assuming that the letter contained inaccurate statements, since on its face the offer of reinstatement was not conditioned upon the truth of the alleged inaccuracies, acceptance of rein- statement would not have amounted to employee agree- ment to those statements. In this regard the letter differs from that in Curtis Manufacturing Co., Inc., 189 NLRB 192, relied on by the General Counsel. But in any case, a finding with respect to the validity or effectiveness of any offers of reinstatement is unnecessary because whether those who left on May 31 were fired or voluntarily walked out, in order for Respondent to be obligated to reinstate them they in some way must have indicated a willingness to return. Unit- 181 ed Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Local5571 [Stanley- Artex Windows] v. N.L.R. B., 401 F .2d 434 , 438 (C .A.D.C., 1968), cert . denied 395 U.S. 946 ( 1969). Such has not oc- curred in this case . In fact all indications in this record are that they are unwilling to return. C. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practice Strike The parties stipulate that on June 2, nine other employees ceased work concertedly and went on strike.' The complaint alleges , and the answer denies, that this strike action was caused and/or prolonged by the unfair labor practices of Respondent. Respondent also argues that since no allegations of unfair labor practice are based upon Respondent's conduct on June 2, the allegations regarding the events of June 2 have no place in this proceeding. However, findings with respect to unfair labor practice strikes are appropriate in circum- stances such as are present here. In support of the allegation the General Counsel offered the testimony of Joe Ray Ortiz to the effect that at 9:30 a.m. on June 2 the group of nine with himself as a spokesman presented themselves to Plant Manager Taylor in the office and told him they were protesting the firing of the group of employees on May 31. Taylor replied that he did not wish to discuss it, and said to them "get out or either go back to work." Ortiz then said they were going to sympathize with the strikers. Taylor again said "get out," and the group walked out. From this specific evidence of purpose it appears that the only purpose of the nine was to protest the alleged dis- charges on May 31 and did not relate directly to any other conduct of Respondent. For a strike to be labeled an unfair labor practice strike, it must be shown by substantial evi- dence to have a casual connection with the precipitating unfair labor practices, Winter Garden Citrus Products Coop- erative v. N.L.R.B., 238 F.2d 128, 129 (C.A. 5, 1956). Wheth- er the nine were engaging in an unfair labor practice strike depends, then, upon the finding as to whether on May 31 the 24 walked out or were fired. As found earlier herein, they were not fired and Respondent did not commit an unfair labor practice in connection with their cessation of work. In protesting the alleged May 31 discharges the June 2 strikers were, therefore, not protesting an unfair labor practice. Compare, Russell Sportswear Corporation, supra. Accordingly, the evidence fails to establish that the strike action of the nine on June 2 was caused and/or prolonged by the unfair practices of Respondent. IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations, have a close, intimate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and J The nine are Josephine Barrera, Fernando Cisneros, Johnny Cisneros, Lydia DeLosSantos, David Flores, Dora Flores, Robert Moreno, Joe Ray Ortiz, and Delores Poncio 182 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the free flow of commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. V THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(ax1) of the Act, I recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act including the posting of appropriate notices. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(2), and engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating employees about their union activities, instructing employees not to solicit other employees to sup- port the Union even though all such employees are on their break time, threatening employees with trouble or discharge if they become union supporters, soliciting employees to wear badges favoring the Respondent in relation to the Union, and photographing employees engaged in, and in the vicinity of, picketing and handbilling on behalf of the Union. 3. Such unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. Respondent did not on May 31, 1972, discharge and thereafter refuse to reinstate employees in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(3) of the Act. 5. By ceasing work concertedly on June 2, 1972, and going on strike, employees Josephine Barrera, Fernando Cisneros, Johnny Cisneros, Lydia DeLosSantos, David Flores, Dora Flores, Robert Moreno, Joe Ray Ortiz, and Delores Poncio did not engage in a strike caused and/or prolonged by unfair labor practices of Respondent. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER4 Farah Manufacturing Company, Inc., its officers , agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interrogating employees about their union activities. (b) Instructing employees not to solicit other employees to support the Union even though all are on their break- time. (c) Threatening employees with trouble or discharge if they become supporters of the Union. (d) Soliciting employees to wear badges favoring Re- spondent in relation to the Union. (e) Photographing employees engaged in, or in the vicini- ty of, picketing or handbilling on behalf of the Union. (f) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist a labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar- gaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its premises in Victoria. Texas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 5 Copies of said no- tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 23, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein be dis- missed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifi- cally found herein. In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 5 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted pursuant to a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board having found after a trial that we violated Federal law by interrogating employ- ees about their union activities, by instructing employees not to solicit other employees to support the Union even though all are on their breaktime, by threatening employees with trouble or discharge if they become union supporters, by soliciting employees to wear badges favoring the Compa- ny in relation to the Union, and by photographing employ- ees engaged in, and in the vicinity of, picketing and handbilling on behalf of the Union: WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about their union activities. WE WILL NOT instruct employees not to solicit other employees to support the Union while all are on their breaktime. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with trouble or dis- charge if they become union supporters. WE WILL NOT solicit employees to wear badges favor- ing the Company in relation to the Union. WE WILL NOT photograph employees engaged in, or in FARAH MFG. CO. the vicinity of, picketing or handbilling on behalf of the Union. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with , restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to form labor organiza- tions, to join or assist a labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos- ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activi- ties. FARAH MANUFACTURING COM. PANY, INC Dated By 183 (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct- ed to the Board 's Office , Dallas-Brazos , 1125 Brazos Street, Houston , Texas 77002, Telephone 713-226-4296.