Fan Zhang

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 9, 2019

13077816 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 9, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/077,816 03/31/2011 Fan Zhang 16113-2550001 6209
26192 7590 09/09/2019
FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
PO BOX 1022
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022
EXAMINER
BEHNCKE, CHRISTINE M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/09/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PATDOCTC@fr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte FAN ZHANG
____________________

Appeal 2018-005164
Application 13/077,8161
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, HUNG H. BUI, and JON M. JURGOVAN,
Administrative Patent Judges.

JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final
Rejection of claims 1–4, 9, 22, 24–27, and 32, which are all the claims
pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.2

1 Appellant identifies Google LLC, as the real party in interest. (App.
Br. 1.)
2 Our Decision refers to the Specification (“Spec.”) filed March 31, 2011,
the Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) mailed June 16, 2017, the Appeal
Brief (“App. Br.”) filed November 1, 2017, the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”)
mailed February 26, 2018, and the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed April 20,
2018.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
The claims are directed to a method and system for “inline data
validation” of “business data indicative of business performance measures”
by comparing a first set of metrics (obtained from a first set of business data
for a first time period) to a second set of metrics (obtained from a second set
of business data for a second time period). (Spec. ¶ 2; Abstract.) “In
response to determining that the second set of business data are valid, at
least a portion of the first business set of business data is overwritten with
the second set of business data,” however, “[i]n response to determining that
the second set of business data are invalid, an indication that the second set
of business data are invalid is provided.” (Abstract.)
Claims 1, 22, and 24 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer implemented method for inline data
validation, comprising:
receiving, by a processor, first data collected over a first
time period, wherein the first data is a first set of performance
data;
receiving, by a processor, second data collected over a
second time period having an overlapping period that partially
overlaps the first time period, wherein the second time period is
different than the first time period and ends after the first time
period, and wherein the second data is a second set of
performance data;
performing, during data collection, inline data validation
of the second set of performance data based on metrics calculated
using (i) less than all of the second data collected in the second
time period, and (ii) less than all of the first data collected in the
first time period, including:
determining that a first metric value calculated
using the first data collected during the overlapping period
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is the same as a second metric value calculated using the
second data collected during the overlapping period; and
validating the second set of performance data based
on the determination that the first calculated metric value
is the same as the second calculated metric value; and
in response to validating the second set of performance
data based on the determination that the first calculated metric
value is the same as the second calculated metric value, storing
the second data without dividing the second data including
overwriting at least some of the first data collected during the
overlapping period with the second data collected during the
overlapping period and deleting the at least some of the first data.
(App. Br. 9–14 (Claims App.).)

REJECTION
Claims 1–4, 9, 22, 24–27, and 323 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. (Final Act. 3–
8.)

ANALYSIS
Patent eligibility is a question of law that is reviewable de novo.
Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, we review the Examiner’s § 101 determinations concerning
patent eligibility under this standard.

3 Claim 32 is rejected (see Advisory Action dated September 8, 2017) but is
not listed in the Examiner’s Final Action under the § 101 rejection (see Final
Act. 3). However, we find this oversight on the Examiner’s part is harmless
error and interpret the rejection of dependent claim 32 to be rejected under
§ 101, because claim 32 includes the features of its base claim 24 (rejected
under § 101) as well as features similar to claim 9 (rejected under § 101).
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Patentable subject matter is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101, as follows:
[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.
In interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court emphasizes that patent
protection should not preempt “the basic tools of scientific and technological
work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Benson”); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012)
(“Mayo”); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18
(2014) (“Alice”). The rationale is that patents directed to basic building
blocks of technology would not “promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience” under
the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, but instead would
impede it. Accordingly, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas, are not patent-eligible subject matter. Thales Visionix Inc. v. U.S., 850
F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Alice, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2354
(2014)).
The Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for subject matter
eligibility in Alice (573 U.S. at 217–19). The first step is to determine
whether the claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept. Id. (citing
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76–77). If so, then the eligibility analysis proceeds to the
second step of the Alice/Mayo test in which we “examine the elements of the
claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to
‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72, 79). There is no need
to proceed to the second step, however, if the first step of the Alice/Mayo
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test yields a determination that the claim is directed to patent eligible subject
matter.
The Patent Office has recently revised its guidance for how to apply
the Alice/Mayo test in the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (January 7, 2019) (“the Revised Guidance”).
Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, mental
processes, or certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice or
managing personal behavior or relationships or
interactions between people); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application (see Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–
(h)). 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 55.
A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application
applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54. When the judicial exception is so integrated, then the claim is not
directed to a judicial exception and is patent-eligible under § 101. 84 Fed.
Reg. at 54. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate
whether the claim provides an inventive concept. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; Alice,
573 U.S. at 217–19, 221.
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Alice/Mayo—Step 1 (Abstract Idea)
Step 2A–Prongs 1 and 2 identified in the Revised Guidance

Step 2A—Prong 1 (Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?)
Turning to the first step of the Alice inquiry (Step 2A, Prong 1 of the
Revised Guidance), the Examiner finds independent claim 1 (and similarly,
claims 22 and 24) “is directed to the abstract idea of performing inline data
validation during data collection . . . which is comparing new and stored
information and using rules to identify options” and “collecting information,
analyzing it and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis.”
(Final Act. 4, 6.) The Examiner finds claim 1 recites abstract concepts
similar to concepts identified as abstract by the courts in Electric Power
Group, CyberSource, and Digitech. (Final Act. 4, 6 (citing Electric Power
Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016); CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Digitech
Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2014)).)
The Examiner then determines the claim elements, when analyzed
individually and as an ordered combination, do not amount to significantly
more than the abstract idea. (Final Act. 5–6; Ans. 4.)
Appellant argues independent claims 1, 22, and 24 together,
presenting arguments directed to independent claim 1, and Appellant does
not set forth separate arguments for patentability of independent claims 22
and 24. (App. Br. 3, 6; Reply Br. 1, 11.) As a result, we select independent
claim 1 as the representative claim for the group and address Appellant’s
arguments thereto. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017). Claims 22 and
24 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017).
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Appellant contends the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter because the
claims are not directed to an abstract idea. (App. Br. 4, 7; Reply Br. 3, 8.)
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Here, representative claim 1
recites a method that results in validating and storing collected business data.
More specifically, representative claim 1 recites the following limitations:
(1) “receiving . . . first data collected over a first time period, wherein the
first data is a first set of performance data” and “receiving, . . . second data
[(a second set of performance data)] collected over a second time period
having an overlapping period”; (2) “performing, during data collection,
inline data validation of the second set of performance data based on metrics
calculated using (i) less than all of the second data” and “less than all of the
first data” to validate the second data “based on the determination that the
first calculated metric value [(calculated using the first data collected during
the overlapping period)] is the same as the second calculated metric value
([calculated using the second data collected during the overlapping
period])”; and (3) in response to validating the second data, “storing the
second data without dividing the second data including overwriting at least
some of the first data collected during the overlapping period with the
second data collected during the overlapping period and deleting the at least
some of the first data.” (App. Br. 9 (Claims App.).) These limitations,
under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite analyzing business data
for commercial purposes (such as performance reporting and business
decision making) because the limitations all recite collecting, examining,
and storing business data, thereby describing operations that would
ordinarily take place when a business entity analyzes its (or its competitors’)
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business data.
For example, limitation (1) in claim 1 describes data collection
activities for gathering business data over multiple time periods, which are
activities ordinarily performed by a company’s business analysts. (See Spec.
¶ 1 (“data mining, business performance reporting, and decision making can
require data to be periodically received” and analyzed). Limitation (2) in
claim 1 describes processing the collected business data to determine
whether the data is valid or erroneous—an activity ordinarily performed by
companies while making commercial decisions and performance analyses
based on available data. (See Spec. ¶¶ 1, 45–47.) Further, limitation (3) in
claim 1 describes storing newer business data (determined to be valid) over
older stored business data, which is, again, an activity ordinarily performed
by a company’s business analysts that collect, analyze, and store the
analyzed business data.
Thus, Appellant’s method of collecting and analyzing business data
for commercial purposes (such as performance analysis and decision
making) is a known business activity and a fundamental economic practice
in our system of commerce, similar to concepts identified by the courts as
abstract ideas. That is, like the risk hedging in Bilski and the intermediated
settlement in Alice, the concept of analyzing business data to determine if
the data is not erroneous and is usable in business analytics and planning is a
known business activity and a fundamental business practice long prevalent
in our system of commerce. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010)
(risk hedging); Alice, 573 U.S. at 218–20 (intermediated settlement of traded
or exchanged financial obligations to mitigate the risk that one party will not
perform); Two-Way Media, Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC,
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874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed Cir. 2017) (measuring delivery of real-time
information for commercial purposes is an abstract idea); SAP America, Inc.
v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1021–23 (Fed Cir. 2018) (method for
display, dissemination, and analysis of financial information using
resampled statistical methods is an abstract idea). Thus, similar to the
concept of intermediated settlement in Alice and the concept of hedging in
Bilski, the concept of analyzing business data to determine if the data is valid
and usable for business analytics and planning (as in Appellant’s claim 1)
“[is] a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of
commerce.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 216–18; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611–12
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
We therefore conclude limitations (1)–(3) in representative claim 1,
and similar limitations in grouped claims 22 and 24, recite analyzing
business data to determine if the data is valid and usable for business
analytics, which is a fundamental economic practice and one of the certain
methods of organizing human activity identified in the Revised Guidance,
and therefore an abstract idea. See Revised Guidance (Revised Step 2A,
Prong One), 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54.
We further note limitations (1)–(3) in claim 1 recite steps readily
performable by a human being (e.g., by a business analyst analyzing
incoming business data). Particularly, claim 1 recites a set of calculations
that can be performed manually, by a person using a pen and paper to
validate “second data” (which could be as small as two data points, as
discussed supra) based on a comparison with “first data” (which, again,
could be a small data set) at an overlapping time collection point. Thus, we
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conclude limitations (1)–(3) in claim 1 recite concepts that can be performed
mentally and manually, which is another abstract idea identified in the
Revised Guidance. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54;
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d at 1372–73 (“[A]
method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract
idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101.”). Claim 1’s “processor”
automates such actions manually performable with pen and paper, however,
mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the
burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper.
See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be
unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
In conclusion, representative claim 1, and grouped independent claims
22 and 24, recite abstract ideas comprising mental processes and a certain
method of organizing human activities in the form of a fundamental
economic practice.
Step 2A—Prong 2 (Integration into Practical Application)
Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance, we discern no
additional element (or combination of elements) recited in Appellant’s
representative claim 1 that integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).
For example, Appellant’s claimed additional elements (e.g., “processor,”
“computer storage medium,” and “data store”) do not: (1) improve the
functioning of a computer or other technology; (2) are not applied with any
particular machine (except for a generic computer); (3) do not effect a
transformation of a particular article to a different state; and (4) are not
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applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the
claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Rather, Appellant’s
claimed hardware components are configured to perform numerous real-
world functions and operations that automate the processing of business
data, adding nothing of substance to the underlying abstract idea. (Ans. 5–
6.) It is clear from the claims and the Specification (discussing the use of
“all kinds of apparatus, devices, and machines for processing data, including
by way of example a programmable processor, a computer, a system on a
chip, or multiple ones, or combinations, of the foregoing,” “an FPGA (field
programmable gate array) or an ASIC (application specific integrated
circuit),” “general and special purpose microprocessors,” and “mass storage
devices for storing data, e.g., magnetic, magneto optical disks, or optical
disks”), the claimed hardware components require no improved computing
elements that Appellant claims to have invented. (See Spec. ¶¶ 103, 106;
Ans. 6.) Thus, the claims’ limitations are not indicative of “integration into
a practical application.” See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
Rather, the processors and other claimed hardware components are readily
available computing elements using their already available basic functions as
tools in executing the claimed validation of business data. See SAP Am., Inc.
v. InvestPic LLC, 898 F. 3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Appellant contends the claims are not directed to an abstract idea,
rather, they are “directed to ‘an improvement in computer-related
technology’” and “directed at improving computer validation of datasets in a
way that makes the computer implemented validation process more efficient,
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thereby improving the functioning of the computer.” (App. Br. 3, 6–7.)
Appellant asserts the claimed invention provides various improvements that
(i) “enable[] the computer system to ‘validat[e] data inline . . . by using [a]
small amount of metrics collected,’ which ‘can greatly improve the
efficiency of the data processing as well as the usage of computing
resources,’” (ii) enable data validation to be “performed during data
collection, such that a separate (e.g., parallel) validation process is not
required,” (iii) enable “validat[ion of] a set of data without requiring the
entire set of data be compared to a reference set of data” by “validat[ing] a
set of data based on . . . metrics that are obtained using a proper subset of the
set of data,” and (iv) “enabl[e] the system to more efficiently and quickly
validate a large set of data that would otherwise take more time and
computing resources and/or require a separate offline validation process.”
(App. Br. 4–6 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 20, 28, 49, 52–53, 70).) Appellant also argues
the claims are non-abstract because: (v) “like McRO, . . . the claimed
solution (i.e., rules) that improves over conventional processes” enable the
computer to “validate data more efficiently, thereby improving the
capabilities of the computer,” and (vi) similar to Enfish, the claims are
directed to an improvement in computer related technology, particularly in
light of Appellant’s Specification that “provides abundant discussion as to
how the claimed systems and methods improve computer-related
technology.” (Reply Br. 7–9 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); App. Br. 7.)
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Although the Specification
mentions “improv[ing] the efficiency of data processing as well as the usage
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of computation resources” by validating large amounts of data inline,
claim 1 is not directed to such an improved validation method or to
improved computer functionality for processing data. (See Spec. ¶¶ 1, 20,
48–49.) Claim 1 only recites validating “second data collected over a
second time period” by reference to “first data collected in the first time
period,” and does not recite or require “validat[ing] a large set of data” as
Appellant asserts. (See App. Br. 6; Reply Br. 1, 9.) That is, broadly claimed
“first data” and “second data” in claim 1 could each be as small as two data
points, and the broadly claimed “first time period” and “second time period”
could be time periods for collection of just four data points. Further, the
claimed comparison of a “first metric value” and a “second metric value”
includes “a comparison that determines whether there is a match between
two sets of data, which can be an exact match” determined by “a strict
comparison” of data points or of numbers of data points. (See Spec. ¶¶ 53,
73; see also Spec. ¶ 29 (“the metrics can be a number of accounts”).) The
broadly worded “validation” in claim 1 thus includes a determination that
sets of two data points include one overlapping data point at one overlapping
time point. However, claim 1 does not recite or require “efficiently and
quickly validat[ing] a large set of data that would otherwise take more time
and computing resources,” and does not preclude “a separate offline
validation process,” as Appellant asserts. (See App. Br. 6; Reply Br. 9.)
Although claims are interpreted in light of the Specification, limitations from
the Specification are not read into the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988
F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Appellant also asserts the claimed
invention advantageously “validate[s] a set of data based on . . . metrics that
are obtained using a proper subset of the set of data,” but claim 1 does not
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specify how the “metrics” are obtained or selected, and the Specification
broadly provides the “metrics” can be “metrics indicative of business
performance measures” or “a number of accounts . . . or other customizable
metrics of business data.” (See Reply Br. 3; App. Br. 4; see Spec. ¶¶ 29, 65,
73.)
We also note Appellant’s reliance on McRO and Enfish is misplaced.
For example, McRO’s ’576 patent (U.S. Patent No. 6,307,576) describes
computer software for matching audio to a 3D animated mouth movement to
provide lip-synched animation. McRO’s claims contain (i) specific
limitations regarding a set of rules that “define[] a morph weight set stream
as a function of phoneme sequence and times associated with said phoneme
sequence” to enable computers to produce “accurate and realistic lip
synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters” (McRO, 837
F.3d at 1313) and, when viewed as a whole, are directed to (ii) a
“technological improvement over the existing, manual 3–D animation
techniques” that uses “limited rules in a process specifically designed to
achieve an improved technological result in conventional industry practice.”
Id. at 1316. Enfish’s data storage and retrieval method and system recites a
“self-referential table . . . [for a computer database] [which] is a specific
type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and
retrieves data in memory.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336, 1339.
In contrast to Enfish and McRO, Appellant’s Specification and claims
do not describe technological improvements or a specific improvement to
the way computers operate or to the way computers store and retrieve data in
memory. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336, 1339. Rather, Appellant’s
Specification and claims describe techniques for validating “business data
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being collected associated with a particular business entity” by determining
data differences (e.g., data of a same time period not matching) or unusual
data fluctuations, the “business data” being “data indicative of business
performance.” (See Spec. ¶¶ 28, 47–48 (describing “business data”
including “performance measures for advertisements”), 53–56, 64
(describing “business data indicative of business performance measures,
such as advertisement presentations, advertisement clicks, sales, etc.”))
Appellant argues “like McRO, . . . the claimed solution (i.e., rules) that
improves over conventional processes” enables the computer to “validate
data more efficiently, thereby improving the capabilities of the computer”
and “improv[ing] computer-related technology” similar to Enfish; however,
Appellant does not explain why the broad specification of the claimed
“validating” (which may determine if just one data point collected at one
time is not erroneous) would improve a computer’s capabilities or a
computer-related technology. (Ans. 4–5; see Reply Br. 7, 9; Spec. ¶¶ 53,
73.)
Appellant also asserts the claims are not directed to an abstract idea
because they address “a problem that arises in the context of the computer
technology” and are “directed to a specific implementation of a solution to a
problem in the software arts,” similar to the claims in Enfish. (App. Br. 4, 7;
Reply Br. 10.) We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because
Appellant’s claim 1 addresses a business problem of identifying invalid or
erroneous business data to avoid using that data in business analytics and
decision-making. (See Spec. ¶¶ 1, 47.) Appellant also does not explain why
comparing two data sets and storing newer data over older data would
address “a problem in the software arts.” (See App. Br. 7.) Furthermore,
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Appellant’s recited abstract idea is not rooted in computer technology, as the
claims in DDR. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d
1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Nor does it provide any technical solution to a
technical problem as required by DDR. Appellant also has not demonstrated
their claimed generic processor is able to perform functions that are not
merely generic, as the claims in DDR. See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258.
Appellant also argues claim 1 “recites an unconventional combination
of features” similar to the claims in Bascom. (Reply Br. 2 (citing Bascom
Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2016)).) We remain unpersuaded because Appellant’s claim 1
merely recites data comparison and storage steps performable by a
conventional processor, or performable manually by a business analyst.
(Final Act. 4, 6.) In contrast, Bascom’s patent-eligible ordered combination
of claim limitations contains an “inventive concept [that] harnesses [a] . . .
technical feature of network technology in a filtering system by associating
individual accounts with their own filtering scheme and elements while
locating the filtering system on an ISP [(Internet Service Provider)] server.”
See Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1350. Bascom’s claimed ordered combination
“improve[s] the performance of the computer system itself” with a
“technology-based solution . . . to filter content on the Internet that
overcomes existing problems with other Internet filtering systems.” See
Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1351–52 (internal citation omitted). Appellant’s
abstract idea of analyzing business data to determine if the data is valid and
usable for business analytics does not provide any particular practical
application as required by Bascom, or entail an unconventional technological
solution to a technological problem as required by Amdocs. Instead,
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Appellant’s invention uses generically-claimed computing elements to
perform the abstract idea. (Ans. 4–5.) As our reviewing court has observed,
“after Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer
limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”
DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 221–22).
Appellant further argues the claims are “directed to a technological
solution to a technological problem” as they “solve the problem of how to
validate large sets of data that are collected and processed in distributed
computing systems in an efficient manner.” (Reply Br. 1, 3.) We remain
unpersuaded by Appellant’s non-commensurate arguments, as claim 1 does
not recite or require processing data “collected and processed in distributed
computing systems” or validating “large sets of data” as Appellant asserts.
(Reply Br. 1.) Rather, claim 1 covers comparisons of minimal data sets and
saving newer data over older data, as discussed supra.
With respect to preemption, Appellant argues “the claims do not
preempt all applications of the alleged abstract idea,” rather, they provide
“a particular solution to a problem or a particular way to achieve a desired
outcome.” (App. Br. 7; see also Reply Br. 10–11.) As noted by the
Examiner, however, “mitigation of preemption concerns alone do not
circumvent the prohibition against an abstract idea.” (Ans. 6–7.) We agree
with the Examiner. As the McRO court explicitly recognized, “the absence
of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” See McRO,
837 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788
F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Furthermore, “[w]here a patent’s claims
are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter” under the
Alice/Mayo framework, “preemption concerns are fully addressed and made
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moot.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379. We further note, while claims 1, 22, and
24 may not entirely preempt the abstract idea recited therein, these broad
claims pose significant preemption concerns in the field of business
analytics and data analysis, as the claims cover comparisons of minimal data
sets and storage of newer data over older data. Although Appellant argues
“the claimed subject matter improves data validation technology, as the
increase in data collection at the time gave rise to a need to improve the
validation technology such that data processing can keep up with the amount
of data that is collected” (see Reply Br. 11), Appellant’s broadly worded
claims 1, 22, and 24 do not require fast processing of large amounts of data.
For these reasons, we determine claim 1, and grouped claims 22 and
24, are directed to a judicial exception, namely, analyzing business data to
determine if the data is valid and usable for business analytics, which is a
fundamental economic practice and one of the certain methods of organizing
human activity identified as an abstract idea in the Revised Guidance.
Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Step 2B identified in the Revised Guidance

In the second step of the Alice inquiry, Appellant argues claim 1
recites significantly more than a judicial exception because the claim focuses
on “an improvement in computer related technology because it is enabling
the system to more efficiently and quickly validate a large set of data that
would otherwise take more time and computing resources and/or require a
separate offline validation process” and “there has been no showing that it
was conventional at the time of filing to validate data in an inline manner
(i.e., while the data is being collected) using metrics calculated using less
than all of the data.” (Reply Br. 2, 4, 6, 8.)
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Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. At the outset, we note
Appellant’s arguments are again not commensurate with the language
of claims 1, 22, and 24, which do not require validating “a large set of
data,” and do not preclude “a separate offline validation process” as
Appellant asserts. (See Reply Br. 8.)
As recognized by the Revised Guidance, an “inventive concept” under
Alice step 2 can be evaluated based on whether an additional element or
combination of elements:
(1) “[a]dds a specific limitation or combination of limitations
that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity
in the field, which is indicative that an inventive concept
may be present;” or
(2) “simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is
indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.”
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
In this case, however, we find no element or combination of elements
recited in Appellant’s claim 1 that contains any “inventive concept” or adds
anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-
eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. We are not persuaded by
Appellant’s argument that the “claims recite an ordered combination of
features beyond that which was ‘well-understood, routine, [or] conventional’
at the time of filing.” (Reply Br. 4.) Appellant has not provided evidence
that manually performable steps of comparing small data sets (as
encompassed by claim 1) and saving newer data points over older data
points are unconventional steps. Appellant also argues “there has been no
showing that it was conventional at the time of filing to validate data in an
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inline manner (i.e., while the data is being collected) using metrics
calculated using less than all of the data.” (Reply Br. 8.) We remain
unpersuaded because checking the data as the data is being collected can
also be manually performed, e.g., by a business analyst analyzing incoming
business data, and Appellant has not explained why such manually
performable techniques are unconventional. Additionally, Appellant’s
Specification describes generic processors and data storage performing
generic data processing and storage functions. (See Spec. ¶¶ 103, 106;
Ans. 4; Final Act. 4.) “[T]he use of generic computer elements like a
microprocessor or user interface” to perform conventional computer
functions “do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-
eligible subject matter.” FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d
1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256); see
also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or
more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible”); Bancorp
Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266,
1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“the fact that the required calculations could be
performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the
patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”).
Because Appellant’s representative claim 1, and grouped claims 22
and 24 are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract concept and do not recite
an “inventive concept” by providing a solution to a technical problem under
the second step of the Alice analysis, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101
rejection of independent claims 1, 22, and 24.
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No separate arguments are presented for dependent claims 2–4, 9, 25–
27, and 32, which fall with independent claims 1, 22, and 24.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We, therefore, sustain the rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 2–4, 9, 25–27, and 32.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–4, 9, 22, 24–27, and 32 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED