Facebook, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 12, 2021

2020001792 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 12, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/524,870 10/27/2014 Stephen Moore Davis 19487.527 7468
107193 7590 04/12/2021
Keller Jolley Preece/Facebook
1010 North 500 East
Suite 210
North Salt Lake, UT 84054
EXAMINER
NORMAN, SAMICA L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/12/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@kjpip.com
gjolley@kjpip.com
ljohnson@kjpip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Ex parte STEPHEN MOORE DAVIS

Appeal 2020-001792
Application 14/524,870
Technology Center 3600
BEFORE RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, FRANCISCO C. PRATS, and
ULRIKE W. JENKS, Administrative Patent Judges.
PRATS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–9 and 18–28. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest Facebook, Inc.
Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to processes for performing electronic peer-to-
peer payment transactions that allow a payment sender to initiate a
transaction while deferring input of payment information. See Spec. ¶ 202.
The system implementing the process provides a transaction identifier
(“transaction ID”) to the payment recipient upon an indication by the
payment sender to defer input of payment information. See id. ¶¶ 203–204.
The transaction identifier can be associated with information
regarding the transaction; “[f]or example, the system 100 can store
identification information for the sender and the recipient, a payment
amount, and other information that will allow the system 100 to quickly
resume processing the same payment transaction initiated upon request by
the sender, and without requiring the sender to re-enter information.” Spec.
¶ 203.
Claim 1 is representative and reads as follows:
1. A method comprising:
[1] receiving, by one or more servers from a client device
of a sender, a request to initiate a peer-to-peer payment
transaction, the request comprising transaction information;
[2] providing, by the one or more servers to the client
device of the sender, an option to enter payment information;
[3] receiving, by the one or more servers from the client
device of a sender, an indication to defer input of the payment
information;
in response to receiving the indication to defer input of
the payment information:
[4] generating, by the one or more servers, a
transaction identifier for the peer-to-peer payment
transaction; and
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[5] storing, by the one or more servers, the
transaction information with the transaction identifier;
and
[6] providing, by the one or more servers to a client
device of a recipient of the peer-to-peer payment transaction, an
electronic message comprising a notification of the peer-to-peer
payment transaction prior to receiving payment information
from the client device of the sender, the notification comprising
the transaction identifier.
Appeal Br. 17 (bracketed numbering added to show claimed steps).
REJECTION(S)
The sole rejection before us for review is the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1–9 and 18–28 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to an abstract
idea without significantly more. Final Act. 2–3;2 Ans. 3–4.
DISCUSSION
The Examiner’s Rejection
The Examiner found that the claimed steps of generating a transaction
identifier (step [4] of claim 1 seen above), storing transaction information
with the transaction identifier (step [5] of claim 1), and providing an
electronic message including the transaction identifier to the recipient of the
transaction (step [6]) are steps in “a process that manages interactions
between people using one or more servers which are generic computer
components. This falls into the abstract idea grouping of certain methods of
organizing human activity. Therefore, the claim recites an abstract idea.”
Final Act. 2.

2 Final Office Action entered February 4, 2019.
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The Examiner found that the abstract idea recited in claim 1 is not
integrated into a practical application because the server recited in claim 1
that performs the claimed process is “recited such that it amounts no more
than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer
component. The additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on
practicing the abstract idea.” Final Act. 2–3. Therefore, the Examiner
reasoned, claim 1 “is directed to an abstract idea.” Id. at 3.
The Examiner determined that claim 1 does not include additional
elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception
because the “additional element of using a server to perform the generating,
storing and providing steps amounts no more than mere instructions to apply
the exception using a generic computer component. Instructions to apply an
exception using a generic computer does not provide an inventive concept.”
Final Act. 3. Therefore, the Examiner concluded, claim 1 “is not patent
eligible.” Id.
Standard of Review
[T]he examiner bears the initial burden . . . of presenting a
prima facie case of unpatentability. . . .
After evidence or argument is submitted by the applicant in
response, patentability is determined on the totality of the
record, by a preponderance of evidence with due consideration
to persuasiveness of argument.
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also In re Jung, 637
F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that requiring an applicant to
identify “reversible error” in an examiner’s rejection is consistent with long
standing Board practice).

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Principles of Law—Patent Eligibility
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit
exceptions, however: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories., Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012) and Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In
accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim
is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims
before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use
of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 611 (2010)); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
69 (1972)).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
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In January of 2019, the USPTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (January 7, 2019) (“2019 Office
Guidance” or “Office Guidance”). In light of comments received in
response to the Office Guidance, the USPTO subsequently issued the
October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update (“October 2019
Update”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency
management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October
2019 Update at 1.
Following the Office Guidance and the October 2019 Update, under
Revised Step 2A, we first look to whether the claim recites the following:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B of the Office Guidance, to whether the claim:
(3) adds specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that
are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 56).

3 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_
update.pdf.
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Analysis
As seen above, Appellant’s representative claim 1 recites a “[a]
method” composed of a series of six steps. Appeal Br. 17. We find,
therefore, that the subject matter recited in claim 1 is a process, which falls
within one of the broad statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Accordingly, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong One, of
the Office Guidance to determine the claim’s subject matter eligibility in
accordance with guidance under Mayo/Alice.
Office Guidance—Revised Step 2A, Prong 1
Applying Revised Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Office Guidance, we
agree with the Examiner that Appellant’s representative claim 1 recites a
judicial exception, in the form of a method of organizing human activity.
Consistent with the Examiner’s determination, the 2019 Office
Guidance explains that abstract ideas include “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
The 2019 Office Guidance further explains that methods of organizing
human activity include “commercial or legal interactions (including
agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising,
marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including
social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).” 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52.
Appellant’s claim 1 recites a series of steps that are performed
pursuant to executing a peer-to-peer payment. Specifically, in claim 1’s step
[1], one or more servers receive a request to initiate a peer-to-peer payment
transaction from a payment sender’s device, and in step [2] the server(s)
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provide, to the payment sender’s device, the option to enter payment
information. Appeal Br. 17. In step [3], the server(s) receive from the
payment sender an indication to defer input of the payment information.
Thus, steps [1]–[3] of claim 1 govern the initial activities between a payment
sender seeking to execute a peer-to-peer payment transaction, and the
server(s) that implement the transaction.
In step [4], the server(s) generate an identifier for the peer-to-peer
payment transaction requested by the payment sender, and in step [5] the
server(s) store transaction information with the transaction identifier.
Appeal Br. 17. Lastly, in step [6], before receiving payment information
from the payment sender, the server(s) provide to the payment recipient an
electronic message, which includes the transaction identifier that notifies the
recipient of the payment transaction. Id. Thus, steps [4]–[6] of claim 1
govern the activities performed by one or more servers, pursuant to
executing a peer-to-peer payment transaction, like steps [1]–[3].
Accordingly, as is evident from the language used in claim 1, all of
the steps of the claimed process recite activities performed pursuant to
executing a peer-to-peer payment transaction. A peer-to-peer payment
transaction falls within a number of examples listed in the Office Guidance
as being a method of organizing human activity. See Office Guidance (84
Fed. Reg. at 52 (methods of organizing human activity include “commercial
or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; . . . business relations); managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people”)). Accordingly, we agree with
the Examiner that, under Revised Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Office
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Guidance, claim 1 recites an abstract idea in the form of a method of
organizing human activity, which constitutes an abstract idea.
Appellant does not persuade us of reversible error in the Examiner’s
determination that representative claim 1 recites an abstract idea. In
particular, Appellant does not persuade us that the Examiner erred by not
following the guidelines in the USPTO Memorandum of May 4, 2016, and
by not comparing Appellant’s claim 1 to claims in court cases considering
the issue of eligibility for patenting under § 101. See Appeal Br. 14–15.
The Examiner states expressly that the rejection was made under the
2019 Office Guidance. See Ans. 6 (“The instant claims were [r]ejected
according to the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidelines
which supersedes the May 2016 Update.”); see also 2019 Office Guidance
(84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal
agency management, expected to follow the guidance.”)). Appellant does
not persuade us, therefore, that the Examiner erred by not following proper
agency directives.
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in determining that
representative claim 1 recites an abstract idea because the Examiner did not
consider all claim limitations, and because the Examiner provided only
conclusory statements rather than detailed analysis as to why claim 1 recites
a method of organizing human activity. Reply Br. 3–5. These arguments do
not persuade us of reversible error on the part of the Examiner.
Our reviewing court explains as follows:
[T]he PTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima
facie case when its rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132, in
“notify[ing] the applicant . . . [by] stating the reasons for [its]
rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such
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information and references as may be useful in judging of the
propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application.”
35 U.S.C. § 132. That section “is violated when a rejection is
so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing
and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.” Chester v.
Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
In re Jung, 637 F.3d at 1362 (internal quotes, omissions, and bracketing in
original).
In the present case, the Examiner stated expressly in both the Final
Office Action and in the Examiner’s Answer that claim 1 is “rejected under
35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea
without significantly more.” Final Act. 2; Ans. 3. The Examiner’s rejection
concludes by stating that “[t]he claim is not patent eligible.” Final Act. 3;
Ans. 4.
As noted above, moreover, in evaluating the steps in Appellant’s
claim 1, the Examiner made the express determination that the claimed
process “falls into the abstract idea grouping of certain methods of
organizing human activity. Therefore, the claim recites an abstract idea.”
Final Act. 2; Ans. 3.
Thus, in addition to identifying the statutory basis for the rejection
presently on appeal (ineligibility for patenting), and explaining the category
of patent-ineligible judicial exception recited in the claim (abstract idea), the
Examiner’s rejection identifies the subject matter grouping of abstract idea
recited in the claim (method of organizing human activity) in accordance
with the relevant directives of the 2019 Office Guidance. Indeed, we note
that, despite the alleged lack of sufficiently detailed analysis in the rejection,
Appellant presents extensive argument traversing the Examiner’s rejection.
See Appeal Br. 6–15; Reply Br. 2–9.
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Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner’s rejection was
“so uninformative that it prevent[ed] the applicant from recognizing and
seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.” In re Jung, 637 F.3d at 1362.
Appellant also does not persuade us that, based on the October 2019
Update, claim 1 fails to recite any abstract ideas. See Reply Br. 5. Other
than restating the steps of claim 1, and stating that the claimed steps “do not
align” with the examples presented alongside the October 2019 Update,
Appellant does not explain why the claimed steps do not fall within a subject
matter grouping of activities that constitute an abstract idea. See Appeal Br.
5.
As discussed, moreover, all of the steps of claim 1 recite activities
performed pursuant to executing a peer-to-peer payment transaction, and a
peer-to-peer payment transaction falls within a number of subject matter
groupings of activities listed in the Office Guidance as constituting a method
of organizing human activity. See Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 52
(methods of organizing human activity include “commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; . . . business relations); managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people”)).
In sum, for the reasons discussed, Appellant does not persuade us of
reversible error in the Examiner’s determination that, under Revised Step
2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Office Guidance, claim 1 recites an abstract idea in
the form of a method of organizing human activity, which constitutes an
abstract idea.
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Office Guidance—Revised Step 2A, Prong 2
Having determined under Revised Step 2A, Prong 1, of the Office
Guidance that Appellant’s claim 1 recites judicial exceptions, we turn to
Revised Step 2A, Prong 2, of the Office Guidance to determine whether
Appellant’s representative claim 1 recites additional elements that integrate
the judicial exceptions into a practical application. See Office Guidance (84
Fed. Reg. at 54–55).
As discussed above, when the overall sequence of steps in claim 1’s
process is viewed as a whole, claim 1 recites a process of organizing human
activity, in the form of a peer-to-peer payment transaction, which falls
within a number of the examples of such activity listed in the Office
Guidance as being a method of organizing human activity. See Office
Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 52). We are not persuaded that claim 1 recites
any additional elements beyond the judicial exception that integrate the
process into a practical application.
Specifically, although part of the claimed peer-to-peer transaction
process, Appellant’s claim 1 recites “one or more servers,” “a client device
of a [payment] sender,” and “a client device of a recipient of the peer-to-peer
payment transaction.” Appeal Br. 17. Because claim 1 does not recite any
specific limitations in relation to the claimed servers and devices, we agree
with the Examiner’s determination that the elements recited in claim 1 in
addition to the recited abstract idea, i.e., the claimed servers and devices, are
merely generic computing devices.
Indeed, consistent with the Examiner’s determination, Appellant’s
Specification states that the claimed process may be performed using many
different types of computing devices:
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As illustrated in FIG. 4A, the client device 400 is a handheld
device, such as a mobile phone device (e.g., a smartphone). As
used herein, the term “handheld device” refers to a device sized
and configured to be held/operated in a single hand of a user.
In additional or alternative example, however, any other
suitable computing device, such as, but not limited to, a tablet
device, a handheld device, larger wireless devices, laptop or
desktop computer, a personal-digital assistant device, and/or
any other suitable computing device can perform one or more
of the processes and/or operations described herein.
Spec. ¶ 153 (emphasis added).
Because the elements recited in claim 1 in addition to the abstract
idea, i.e., the claimed servers and devices, are merely generic computing
devices capable of communicating with each other, and are recited at a high
level of abstraction, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not
include elements in addition to the abstract idea that integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application. See Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 55
(example in which a judicial exception is not integrated into a practical
application includes situation in which claim “merely includes instructions
to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a
tool to perform an abstract idea”).
Appellant does not persuade us of reversible error in the Examiner’s
determination that representative claim 1 does not integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. In particular, Appellant does not
persuade us that, based on our reviewing court’s decision in Amdocs (Israel)
Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the
Examiner erred in determining that claim 1 does not integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Appeal Br. 7–11.
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In Amdocs, the claimed process at issue “entail[ed] an unconventional
technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a
technological problem (massive record flows which previously required
massive databases).” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300. Thus, although the claim
at issue only required generic computing components, “the claim’s
enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components
operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in
computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–1301.
In the present case, in contrast to Amdocs, rather than solving a
technological problem by improving computer functionality, all of the
improvements identified by Appellant relate to improving a peer-to-peer
payment transaction, which is the abstract idea itself, as the Examiner
indicated. See Appeal Br. 9 (deferring input of payment information allows
for “faster processing of the payment transaction when the sender enters the
payment credential at a later time” (emphasis added)); see also id.
(“Initiating the payment transaction allows the payment system to notify a
recipient of the payment transaction via the recipient’s client device and
receive an acceptance of the payment transaction request prior to the sender
entering the payment credential.”); see also id. at 10 (“[T]he claimed
limitations improve the efficiency of the payment system . . . .” (emphasis
added)); see also id. (“[T]he claimed limitations improve the flexibility of an
electronic peer-to- peer payment transaction process by allowing a sender to
input payment credentials at any time . . . .” (emphasis added)); Reply Br. 6
(“These limitations provide technological benefits that improve the
efficiency, flexibility, and security of a payment system implementing
electronic peer-to-peer payment transactions.”).
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Our reviewing court has consistently held that claims reciting
electronic or computer-mediated transactions involving payments between
parties are directed to abstract ideas, rather than a technological field. See
Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding methods of processing payments for purchasing
goods as well as method of submitting payment for purchase of goods
“manifestly directed to an abstract idea”); see also buySAFE, Inc.v. Google,
Inc., 765 F.3d. 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding computer-implemented
method of providing performance guaranty service for an online commercial
transaction as being “directed to an abstract idea”); Solutran, Inc. v. Elavon,
Inc., 931 F.3d 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that a method of
electronically processing paper checks in which merchant’s account is
credited as early as possible is an abstract idea and explaining that “certain
transaction claims performed in a particular order or sequence are directed to
abstract ideas”).
Because our reviewing court has consistently held that claims reciting
electronic or computer-mediated transactions involving payments between
parties are directed to abstract ideas, and not a technological field, the fact
that claim 1’s process may improve a peer-to-peer payment transaction does
not persuade us that claim 1’s process improves a technological field.
Indeed, a central improvement alleged by Appellant, generating the
transaction identifier in claim 1’s step [4], which is then stored with
transaction information in step [5], and sent to the recipient in step [6],
involves only the creation, storing, and sending of information, i.e., data,
which is merely extra-solution activity insufficient to integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg.
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at 55 n.31 (additional element that merely adds insignificant extra-solution
activity to a judicial exception includes “mere data gathering such as a step
of obtaining information about credit card transactions so that the
information can be analyzed in order to detect whether the transactions were
fraudulent”)). The improvements described by Appellant are recited in the
claim in a “result-oriented way.” ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc.,
920 F.3d 759, 769 Fed. Circ. 2019) (explaining that an invention may not be
patent eligible if the “claims ‘were drafted in such a result-oriented way that
they amounted to encompassing the ‘principle in the abstract’ no matter how
implemented’” (quoting from Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d
1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018). As explained in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016), we must “look to
whether the claims . . . focus on a specific means or method that improves
the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself
is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.”
In sum, for the reasons discussed, Appellant does not persuade us of
reversible error in the Examiner’s determination that Appellant’s claim 1
does not recite additional elements that integrate the recited abstract idea
into a practical application.
Office Guidance—Step 2B
Having determined that Appellant’s representative claim 1 recites a
judicial exception (abstract idea in the form of a method of organizing
human activity) under Revised Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Office
Guidance, and does not integrate that judicial exception into a practical
application under Revised Step 2A, Prong 2, we turn to Step 2B of the
Office Guidance. In Step 2B, we must determine whether (a) claim 1 recites
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specific limitations beyond the judicial exceptions that are not well-
understood, routine, or conventional in the field, or (b) whether claim 1
simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. See Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 56).
In the present case, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. As discussed above, all of claimed steps [1]–[6] recite actions
performed pursuant to executing a peer-to-peer payment transaction, which
is a method of organizing human activity, constituting an abstract idea.
That is, none of the activities recited in the steps of claim 1 requires
performing any action beyond the abstract idea. While claim 1 does recite
using servers and sender and recipient devices to perform the claimed steps,
the servers and devices are recited in a generic fashion encompassing
conventional computing devices. See Spec. ¶ 153 (“[A]ny . . . suitable
computing device, such as, but not limited to, a tablet device, a handheld
device, larger wireless devices, laptop or desktop computer, a personal-
digital assistant device, and/or any other suitable computing device can
perform one or more of the processes and/or operations described herein.”).
Appellant argues that, because claim 1 recites a series of steps that are
unconventional in the field of peer-to-peer payment transactions, claim 1
recites an inventive concept that is something more than the abstract idea
itself. Appeal Br. 11–14 (citing McRO); Reply Br. 6–7. We are not
persuaded.
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As our reviewing court has explained, “merely reciting an abstract
idea by itself in a claim—even if the idea is novel and non-obvious—is not
enough to save it from ineligibility.” Solutran v. Elavon, 931 F.3d at 1169.
Thus, by itself, the fact that the steps in Appellant’s claim 1 might be
unconventional, that is, novel and unobvious, does not demonstrate that the
claims recite an inventive concept sufficient to confer eligibility for
patenting.
As seen in McRO, the unconventional manipulation of information
ultimately yielded a tangible, specific result, beyond the abstract information
itself—an animated character with improved voice synchronization. See
McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315 (holding eligible for patenting claims directed to
process using “a combined order of specific rules that renders information
into a specific format that is then used and applied to create desired results:
a sequence of synchronized, animated characters”) (emphasis added).
Here, in contrast, the steps of claim 1 recite only receiving
information (steps [1], [3]), sending information (steps [2] and [6]),
assigning a label (a transaction identifier) to information (step [4]), and
storing the labeled information (step [5]). That is, unlike the situation in
McRO, Appellant’s claim 1 does not recite using and applying the
manipulated information to create a specific desired tangible result.
Appellant does not persuade us, therefore, that under McRO, claim 1 recites
an inventive concept, beyond the abstract idea, sufficient to render the
claimed process eligible for patenting.
Eligibility for Patenting—Conclusion
As discussed above, we are persuaded that Appellant’s representative
claim 1 recites a judicial exception under Revised Step 2A, Prong 1, of the
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19
2019 Office Guidance, and does not integrate that judicial exception into a
practical application under Revised Step 2A, Prong 2. As also discussed
above, we are persuaded that, to the extent claim 1 recites additional
elements beyond the judicial exception recited in the claim, claim 1 simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.
Accordingly, applying the principles set forth in the 2019 Office
Guidance and October 2019 Update, we find that the preponderance of the
evidence supports the Examiner’s determination that Appellant’s claim 1 is
directed to subject matter that is ineligible for patenting. We, therefore,
affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 on that ground. Claims 2–9 and
18–28 fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–9, 18–28 101 Ineligibility for
Patenting
1–9, 18–28
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED