Facebook, Inc.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardApr 12, 20212020001792 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 12, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/524,870 10/27/2014 Stephen Moore Davis 19487.527 7468 107193 7590 04/12/2021 Keller Jolley Preece/Facebook 1010 North 500 East Suite 210 North Salt Lake, UT 84054 EXAMINER NORMAN, SAMICA L ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3697 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/12/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@kjpip.com gjolley@kjpip.com ljohnson@kjpip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte STEPHEN MOORE DAVIS Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 Technology Center 3600 BEFORE RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, FRANCISCO C. PRATS, and ULRIKE W. JENKS, Administrative Patent Judges. PRATS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–9 and 18–28. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest Facebook, Inc. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to processes for performing electronic peer-to- peer payment transactions that allow a payment sender to initiate a transaction while deferring input of payment information. See Spec. ¶ 202. The system implementing the process provides a transaction identifier (“transaction ID”) to the payment recipient upon an indication by the payment sender to defer input of payment information. See id. ¶¶ 203–204. The transaction identifier can be associated with information regarding the transaction; “[f]or example, the system 100 can store identification information for the sender and the recipient, a payment amount, and other information that will allow the system 100 to quickly resume processing the same payment transaction initiated upon request by the sender, and without requiring the sender to re-enter information.” Spec. ¶ 203. Claim 1 is representative and reads as follows: 1. A method comprising: [1] receiving, by one or more servers from a client device of a sender, a request to initiate a peer-to-peer payment transaction, the request comprising transaction information; [2] providing, by the one or more servers to the client device of the sender, an option to enter payment information; [3] receiving, by the one or more servers from the client device of a sender, an indication to defer input of the payment information; in response to receiving the indication to defer input of the payment information: [4] generating, by the one or more servers, a transaction identifier for the peer-to-peer payment transaction; and Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 3 [5] storing, by the one or more servers, the transaction information with the transaction identifier; and [6] providing, by the one or more servers to a client device of a recipient of the peer-to-peer payment transaction, an electronic message comprising a notification of the peer-to-peer payment transaction prior to receiving payment information from the client device of the sender, the notification comprising the transaction identifier. Appeal Br. 17 (bracketed numbering added to show claimed steps). REJECTION(S) The sole rejection before us for review is the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9 and 18–28 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. Final Act. 2–3;2 Ans. 3–4. DISCUSSION The Examiner’s Rejection The Examiner found that the claimed steps of generating a transaction identifier (step [4] of claim 1 seen above), storing transaction information with the transaction identifier (step [5] of claim 1), and providing an electronic message including the transaction identifier to the recipient of the transaction (step [6]) are steps in “a process that manages interactions between people using one or more servers which are generic computer components. This falls into the abstract idea grouping of certain methods of organizing human activity. Therefore, the claim recites an abstract idea.” Final Act. 2. 2 Final Office Action entered February 4, 2019. Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 4 The Examiner found that the abstract idea recited in claim 1 is not integrated into a practical application because the server recited in claim 1 that performs the claimed process is “recited such that it amounts no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. The additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea.” Final Act. 2–3. Therefore, the Examiner reasoned, claim 1 “is directed to an abstract idea.” Id. at 3. The Examiner determined that claim 1 does not include additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the “additional element of using a server to perform the generating, storing and providing steps amounts no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. Instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer does not provide an inventive concept.” Final Act. 3. Therefore, the Examiner concluded, claim 1 “is not patent eligible.” Id. Standard of Review [T]he examiner bears the initial burden . . . of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability. . . . After evidence or argument is submitted by the applicant in response, patentability is determined on the totality of the record, by a preponderance of evidence with due consideration to persuasiveness of argument. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that requiring an applicant to identify “reversible error” in an examiner’s rejection is consistent with long standing Board practice). Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 5 Principles of Law—Patent Eligibility An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions, however: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) and Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 6 In January of 2019, the USPTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (January 7, 2019) (“2019 Office Guidance” or “Office Guidance”). In light of comments received in response to the Office Guidance, the USPTO subsequently issued the October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update (“October 2019 Update”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1. Following the Office Guidance and the October 2019 Update, under Revised Step 2A, we first look to whether the claim recites the following: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B of the Office Guidance, to whether the claim: (3) adds specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 56). 3 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_ update.pdf. Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 7 Analysis As seen above, Appellant’s representative claim 1 recites a “[a] method” composed of a series of six steps. Appeal Br. 17. We find, therefore, that the subject matter recited in claim 1 is a process, which falls within one of the broad statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Accordingly, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong One, of the Office Guidance to determine the claim’s subject matter eligibility in accordance with guidance under Mayo/Alice. Office Guidance—Revised Step 2A, Prong 1 Applying Revised Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Office Guidance, we agree with the Examiner that Appellant’s representative claim 1 recites a judicial exception, in the form of a method of organizing human activity. Consistent with the Examiner’s determination, the 2019 Office Guidance explains that abstract ideas include “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The 2019 Office Guidance further explains that methods of organizing human activity include “commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Appellant’s claim 1 recites a series of steps that are performed pursuant to executing a peer-to-peer payment. Specifically, in claim 1’s step [1], one or more servers receive a request to initiate a peer-to-peer payment transaction from a payment sender’s device, and in step [2] the server(s) Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 8 provide, to the payment sender’s device, the option to enter payment information. Appeal Br. 17. In step [3], the server(s) receive from the payment sender an indication to defer input of the payment information. Thus, steps [1]–[3] of claim 1 govern the initial activities between a payment sender seeking to execute a peer-to-peer payment transaction, and the server(s) that implement the transaction. In step [4], the server(s) generate an identifier for the peer-to-peer payment transaction requested by the payment sender, and in step [5] the server(s) store transaction information with the transaction identifier. Appeal Br. 17. Lastly, in step [6], before receiving payment information from the payment sender, the server(s) provide to the payment recipient an electronic message, which includes the transaction identifier that notifies the recipient of the payment transaction. Id. Thus, steps [4]–[6] of claim 1 govern the activities performed by one or more servers, pursuant to executing a peer-to-peer payment transaction, like steps [1]–[3]. Accordingly, as is evident from the language used in claim 1, all of the steps of the claimed process recite activities performed pursuant to executing a peer-to-peer payment transaction. A peer-to-peer payment transaction falls within a number of examples listed in the Office Guidance as being a method of organizing human activity. See Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (methods of organizing human activity include “commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; . . . business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people”)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that, under Revised Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Office Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 9 Guidance, claim 1 recites an abstract idea in the form of a method of organizing human activity, which constitutes an abstract idea. Appellant does not persuade us of reversible error in the Examiner’s determination that representative claim 1 recites an abstract idea. In particular, Appellant does not persuade us that the Examiner erred by not following the guidelines in the USPTO Memorandum of May 4, 2016, and by not comparing Appellant’s claim 1 to claims in court cases considering the issue of eligibility for patenting under § 101. See Appeal Br. 14–15. The Examiner states expressly that the rejection was made under the 2019 Office Guidance. See Ans. 6 (“The instant claims were [r]ejected according to the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidelines which supersedes the May 2016 Update.”); see also 2019 Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.”)). Appellant does not persuade us, therefore, that the Examiner erred by not following proper agency directives. Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in determining that representative claim 1 recites an abstract idea because the Examiner did not consider all claim limitations, and because the Examiner provided only conclusory statements rather than detailed analysis as to why claim 1 recites a method of organizing human activity. Reply Br. 3–5. These arguments do not persuade us of reversible error on the part of the Examiner. Our reviewing court explains as follows: [T]he PTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132, in “notify[ing] the applicant . . . [by] stating the reasons for [its] rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 10 information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application.” 35 U.S.C. § 132. That section “is violated when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.” Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In re Jung, 637 F.3d at 1362 (internal quotes, omissions, and bracketing in original). In the present case, the Examiner stated expressly in both the Final Office Action and in the Examiner’s Answer that claim 1 is “rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more.” Final Act. 2; Ans. 3. The Examiner’s rejection concludes by stating that “[t]he claim is not patent eligible.” Final Act. 3; Ans. 4. As noted above, moreover, in evaluating the steps in Appellant’s claim 1, the Examiner made the express determination that the claimed process “falls into the abstract idea grouping of certain methods of organizing human activity. Therefore, the claim recites an abstract idea.” Final Act. 2; Ans. 3. Thus, in addition to identifying the statutory basis for the rejection presently on appeal (ineligibility for patenting), and explaining the category of patent-ineligible judicial exception recited in the claim (abstract idea), the Examiner’s rejection identifies the subject matter grouping of abstract idea recited in the claim (method of organizing human activity) in accordance with the relevant directives of the 2019 Office Guidance. Indeed, we note that, despite the alleged lack of sufficiently detailed analysis in the rejection, Appellant presents extensive argument traversing the Examiner’s rejection. See Appeal Br. 6–15; Reply Br. 2–9. Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 11 Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner’s rejection was “so uninformative that it prevent[ed] the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.” In re Jung, 637 F.3d at 1362. Appellant also does not persuade us that, based on the October 2019 Update, claim 1 fails to recite any abstract ideas. See Reply Br. 5. Other than restating the steps of claim 1, and stating that the claimed steps “do not align” with the examples presented alongside the October 2019 Update, Appellant does not explain why the claimed steps do not fall within a subject matter grouping of activities that constitute an abstract idea. See Appeal Br. 5. As discussed, moreover, all of the steps of claim 1 recite activities performed pursuant to executing a peer-to-peer payment transaction, and a peer-to-peer payment transaction falls within a number of subject matter groupings of activities listed in the Office Guidance as constituting a method of organizing human activity. See Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (methods of organizing human activity include “commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; . . . business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people”)). In sum, for the reasons discussed, Appellant does not persuade us of reversible error in the Examiner’s determination that, under Revised Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Office Guidance, claim 1 recites an abstract idea in the form of a method of organizing human activity, which constitutes an abstract idea. Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 12 Office Guidance—Revised Step 2A, Prong 2 Having determined under Revised Step 2A, Prong 1, of the Office Guidance that Appellant’s claim 1 recites judicial exceptions, we turn to Revised Step 2A, Prong 2, of the Office Guidance to determine whether Appellant’s representative claim 1 recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exceptions into a practical application. See Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55). As discussed above, when the overall sequence of steps in claim 1’s process is viewed as a whole, claim 1 recites a process of organizing human activity, in the form of a peer-to-peer payment transaction, which falls within a number of the examples of such activity listed in the Office Guidance as being a method of organizing human activity. See Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 52). We are not persuaded that claim 1 recites any additional elements beyond the judicial exception that integrate the process into a practical application. Specifically, although part of the claimed peer-to-peer transaction process, Appellant’s claim 1 recites “one or more servers,” “a client device of a [payment] sender,” and “a client device of a recipient of the peer-to-peer payment transaction.” Appeal Br. 17. Because claim 1 does not recite any specific limitations in relation to the claimed servers and devices, we agree with the Examiner’s determination that the elements recited in claim 1 in addition to the recited abstract idea, i.e., the claimed servers and devices, are merely generic computing devices. Indeed, consistent with the Examiner’s determination, Appellant’s Specification states that the claimed process may be performed using many different types of computing devices: Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 13 As illustrated in FIG. 4A, the client device 400 is a handheld device, such as a mobile phone device (e.g., a smartphone). As used herein, the term “handheld device” refers to a device sized and configured to be held/operated in a single hand of a user. In additional or alternative example, however, any other suitable computing device, such as, but not limited to, a tablet device, a handheld device, larger wireless devices, laptop or desktop computer, a personal-digital assistant device, and/or any other suitable computing device can perform one or more of the processes and/or operations described herein. Spec. ¶ 153 (emphasis added). Because the elements recited in claim 1 in addition to the abstract idea, i.e., the claimed servers and devices, are merely generic computing devices capable of communicating with each other, and are recited at a high level of abstraction, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not include elements in addition to the abstract idea that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (example in which a judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application includes situation in which claim “merely includes instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea”). Appellant does not persuade us of reversible error in the Examiner’s determination that representative claim 1 does not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. In particular, Appellant does not persuade us that, based on our reviewing court’s decision in Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the Examiner erred in determining that claim 1 does not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See Appeal Br. 7–11. Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 14 In Amdocs, the claimed process at issue “entail[ed] an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases).” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300. Thus, although the claim at issue only required generic computing components, “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.” Id. at 1300–1301. In the present case, in contrast to Amdocs, rather than solving a technological problem by improving computer functionality, all of the improvements identified by Appellant relate to improving a peer-to-peer payment transaction, which is the abstract idea itself, as the Examiner indicated. See Appeal Br. 9 (deferring input of payment information allows for “faster processing of the payment transaction when the sender enters the payment credential at a later time” (emphasis added)); see also id. (“Initiating the payment transaction allows the payment system to notify a recipient of the payment transaction via the recipient’s client device and receive an acceptance of the payment transaction request prior to the sender entering the payment credential.”); see also id. at 10 (“[T]he claimed limitations improve the efficiency of the payment system . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also id. (“[T]he claimed limitations improve the flexibility of an electronic peer-to- peer payment transaction process by allowing a sender to input payment credentials at any time . . . .” (emphasis added)); Reply Br. 6 (“These limitations provide technological benefits that improve the efficiency, flexibility, and security of a payment system implementing electronic peer-to-peer payment transactions.”). Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 15 Our reviewing court has consistently held that claims reciting electronic or computer-mediated transactions involving payments between parties are directed to abstract ideas, rather than a technological field. See Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding methods of processing payments for purchasing goods as well as method of submitting payment for purchase of goods “manifestly directed to an abstract idea”); see also buySAFE, Inc.v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d. 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding computer-implemented method of providing performance guaranty service for an online commercial transaction as being “directed to an abstract idea”); Solutran, Inc. v. Elavon, Inc., 931 F.3d 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that a method of electronically processing paper checks in which merchant’s account is credited as early as possible is an abstract idea and explaining that “certain transaction claims performed in a particular order or sequence are directed to abstract ideas”). Because our reviewing court has consistently held that claims reciting electronic or computer-mediated transactions involving payments between parties are directed to abstract ideas, and not a technological field, the fact that claim 1’s process may improve a peer-to-peer payment transaction does not persuade us that claim 1’s process improves a technological field. Indeed, a central improvement alleged by Appellant, generating the transaction identifier in claim 1’s step [4], which is then stored with transaction information in step [5], and sent to the recipient in step [6], involves only the creation, storing, and sending of information, i.e., data, which is merely extra-solution activity insufficient to integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 16 at 55 n.31 (additional element that merely adds insignificant extra-solution activity to a judicial exception includes “mere data gathering such as a step of obtaining information about credit card transactions so that the information can be analyzed in order to detect whether the transactions were fraudulent”)). The improvements described by Appellant are recited in the claim in a “result-oriented way.” ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 769 Fed. Circ. 2019) (explaining that an invention may not be patent eligible if the “claims ‘were drafted in such a result-oriented way that they amounted to encompassing the ‘principle in the abstract’ no matter how implemented’” (quoting from Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018). As explained in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016), we must “look to whether the claims . . . focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.” In sum, for the reasons discussed, Appellant does not persuade us of reversible error in the Examiner’s determination that Appellant’s claim 1 does not recite additional elements that integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. Office Guidance—Step 2B Having determined that Appellant’s representative claim 1 recites a judicial exception (abstract idea in the form of a method of organizing human activity) under Revised Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Office Guidance, and does not integrate that judicial exception into a practical application under Revised Step 2A, Prong 2, we turn to Step 2B of the Office Guidance. In Step 2B, we must determine whether (a) claim 1 recites Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 17 specific limitations beyond the judicial exceptions that are not well- understood, routine, or conventional in the field, or (b) whether claim 1 simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Office Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 56). In the present case, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. As discussed above, all of claimed steps [1]–[6] recite actions performed pursuant to executing a peer-to-peer payment transaction, which is a method of organizing human activity, constituting an abstract idea. That is, none of the activities recited in the steps of claim 1 requires performing any action beyond the abstract idea. While claim 1 does recite using servers and sender and recipient devices to perform the claimed steps, the servers and devices are recited in a generic fashion encompassing conventional computing devices. See Spec. ¶ 153 (“[A]ny . . . suitable computing device, such as, but not limited to, a tablet device, a handheld device, larger wireless devices, laptop or desktop computer, a personal- digital assistant device, and/or any other suitable computing device can perform one or more of the processes and/or operations described herein.”). Appellant argues that, because claim 1 recites a series of steps that are unconventional in the field of peer-to-peer payment transactions, claim 1 recites an inventive concept that is something more than the abstract idea itself. Appeal Br. 11–14 (citing McRO); Reply Br. 6–7. We are not persuaded. Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 18 As our reviewing court has explained, “merely reciting an abstract idea by itself in a claim—even if the idea is novel and non-obvious—is not enough to save it from ineligibility.” Solutran v. Elavon, 931 F.3d at 1169. Thus, by itself, the fact that the steps in Appellant’s claim 1 might be unconventional, that is, novel and unobvious, does not demonstrate that the claims recite an inventive concept sufficient to confer eligibility for patenting. As seen in McRO, the unconventional manipulation of information ultimately yielded a tangible, specific result, beyond the abstract information itself—an animated character with improved voice synchronization. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315 (holding eligible for patenting claims directed to process using “a combined order of specific rules that renders information into a specific format that is then used and applied to create desired results: a sequence of synchronized, animated characters”) (emphasis added). Here, in contrast, the steps of claim 1 recite only receiving information (steps [1], [3]), sending information (steps [2] and [6]), assigning a label (a transaction identifier) to information (step [4]), and storing the labeled information (step [5]). That is, unlike the situation in McRO, Appellant’s claim 1 does not recite using and applying the manipulated information to create a specific desired tangible result. Appellant does not persuade us, therefore, that under McRO, claim 1 recites an inventive concept, beyond the abstract idea, sufficient to render the claimed process eligible for patenting. Eligibility for Patenting—Conclusion As discussed above, we are persuaded that Appellant’s representative claim 1 recites a judicial exception under Revised Step 2A, Prong 1, of the Appeal 2020-001792 Application 14/524,870 19 2019 Office Guidance, and does not integrate that judicial exception into a practical application under Revised Step 2A, Prong 2. As also discussed above, we are persuaded that, to the extent claim 1 recites additional elements beyond the judicial exception recited in the claim, claim 1 simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Accordingly, applying the principles set forth in the 2019 Office Guidance and October 2019 Update, we find that the preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s determination that Appellant’s claim 1 is directed to subject matter that is ineligible for patenting. We, therefore, affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 on that ground. Claims 2–9 and 18–28 fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–9, 18–28 101 Ineligibility for Patenting 1–9, 18–28 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation