Facebook, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 16, 2020

14509856 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/509,856 10/08/2014 Pierpaolo Abbatiello 19487.525 8404
107193 7590 06/16/2020
Keller Jolley Preece/Facebook
1010 North 500 East
Suite 210
North Salt Lake, UT 84054
EXAMINER
KAZIMI, HANI M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3691
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/16/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@kjpip.com
gjolley@kjpip.com
ljohnson@kjpip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PIERPAOLO ABBATIELLO, LAUREN BETH TUCKER, and
STEPHEN MOORE DAVIS
Appeal 2020-001350
Application 14/509,856
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and
SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject Claims 1–20. Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42 (2018). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Facebook,
Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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Application 14/509,856
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a performing risk checks for electronic
remittances. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
receiving a request, from a client device of a sender, to
electronically transfer funds;
accessing information from a social network about the
sender;
determining, by at least one processor, a first risk level
associated with the sender to transfer funds based on the
accessed information from the social network about the sender;
determining, by the at least one processor, that the first
risk level associated with the sender is below a first
predetermined threshold;
based on the first risk level associated with the sender
being below the first predetermined threshold:
determining, by the at least one processor, a list of
potential recipients comprising a plurality of potential
recipients likely to be selected by the sender to receive
the funds; and
providing the list of potential recipients to the
client device of the sender for display via a user
interface;
receiving, from the client device of the sender, a
selection of a recipient from the list of potential recipients,
wherein the sender and the recipient are associated via the
social network;
accessing information from the social network about the
recipient;
analyzing, by at least one processor, the information from
the social network about the sender and the recipient to
determine a level of activity of the sender relative to a
destination country associated with the recipient;
determining, by the at least one processor, a second risk
level associated with the request to transfer funds based on the
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determined level of activity of the sender relative to the
destination country associated with the recipient;
if the second risk level is below a second predetermined
threshold, proceeding with the request to electronically transfer
funds to the recipient; and
if the second risk level is above the second predetermined
threshold, canceling the request to electronically transfer funds
to the recipient.
Claim 1 (emphases added)
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Golan et al. (“Golan”) US 2005/0097320 A1 May 5, 2005
Sanin et al. (“Sanin”) US 2012/0159647 A1 June 21, 2012
Karpenko et al. (“Karpenko”) US 2013/0144785 A1 June 6, 2013
REJECTIONS
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Sanin in view of Golan in further view of Karpenko. 2
OPINION
35 U.S.C. § 101
Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of law that is
reviewable de novo. See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2012).

2 This § 103 rejection has been withdrawn by the Examiner. Final Act. 7;
Ans. 3. Therefore, this rejection is not before us.
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1. Legal Principles
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, under Step 2A, we first determine what concept the claim is
“directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before
us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a
third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
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252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If, under Step 2A, the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, then,
under Step 2B, “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine
whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must
include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.” Id.
On January 7, 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) published revised patent subject matter eligibility guidance. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,
2019 (“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, Step 2A of the
Alice two-step framework is divided in two prongs. For Step 2A, Prong 1,
we look to whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions falling into
certain groupings of abstract ideas (e.g., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes). For Step 2A, Prong 2, if the claim recites
such a judicial exception, we look to whether the claim recites any additional
elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–
(h)).
Only if a claim recites a judicial exception and does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then determine, under Step 2B
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of the Alice two-step framework, whether the claim adds a specific
limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood,
routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) or simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.
2. Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions
In the Final Action and Answer, for Step 2A of the Alice two-step
framework, and for Step 2A, Prongs 1 and 2 of the Revised Guidelines, the
Examiner maintains that Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of
“organizing human business activity” and that “[t]he claims here are not
directed to a specific improvement to computer functionality.” Final Act. 4;
Ans. 5. Specifically, the Examiner maintains, “other than reciting one or
more servers/processors and a client device nothing in the claim precludes
the limitations from practically being performed by organizing human
business activity.” Final Act. 4. The Examiner also maintains that the
claims “are directed to the use of conventional or generic technology
(computer/server) in a well-known environment.” Ans. 5. The Examiner
maintains that “the claim encompasses the activities that can be performed
manually between the users and a third party” and that “limitations are
directed to an abstract idea because they are business interactions/sale
activity that falls within the enumerated group of ‘certain methods of
organizing human activity’ in the [Revised Guidelines].” Final Act. 4. The
Examiner also maintains that the “servers/processors” recited in Claim 1 are
“recited at a high level of generality, i.e., as a generic processor performing a
generic computer function of processing data” and, as a result, “they do not
impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea.” Final Act. 5.
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In this light, the Examiner maintains that “[t]he technology implemented in
the instant application is useful to solve a business problem, but the
additional elements are not a technological solution to a technological
problem” and, instead, “simply limit the abstract ideas to a particular
technological environment.” Ans. 5.
In the Final Action and Answer, for Step 2B of the Alice two-step
framework, the Examiner maintains that the servers/processors are
“additional elements” and that, when viewed individually and in
combination, perform “purely generic computer functions.” Final Act. 5.
The Examiner further maintains that “there is no inventive concept sufficient
to transform the claimed subject matter into a patent-eligible application.”
Final Act. 5. The Examiner essentially maintains that claims do “not effect
an improvement to another technology or technical field … amount to an
improvement to the functioning of a computer itself … move beyond a
general link of the user of an abstract idea to a particular technological
environment.” Ans. 6. Thus, the Examiner maintains that “the claim does
not amount to significantly more than the recited abstract idea” and “is not
patent eligible.” Final Act. 6.
Additionally, the Examiner maintains that the Examiner’s analysis for
Claim 1 applies to “all statutory categories of invention including claims 11
and 19” and that “the dependent claims 2-10, 12-18 and 20 do not resolve
the issues raised in the independent claims.” Final Act. 6.
3. Appellant’s Arguments
In the Appeal Brief, for Step 2A of the Alice two-step framework and,
Prongs 1 and 2 of the Revised Guidelines, relying on Amdocs and Core
Wireless, Appellant contends that the claims “are not directed to an abstract
idea because the claims provide an unconventional technological solution to
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a technological problem” and “are directed toward an improved user
interface for electronic devices.”3 Appeal Br. 9, 14. Referencing Amdocs,
Appellant contends “the claims in the present case do not present a situation
where general-purpose computer components are merely added to ‘human
commercial or business or transactional activities/interactions,’” but instead
“determin[e] a system and user process for a remittance transaction based on
a plurality of risk checks associated with a sender and the transaction.”
Appeal Br. 11. Referencing Core Wireless, Appellant contends “the present
claims improve usability and efficiency of a user interface.” Appeal Br. 14.
Thus, Appellant contends that “the claims are not directed to an abstract
idea” and are eligible at least on this basis. Appeal Br. 15.
In the Appeal Brief, for Step 2B of the Alice two-step framework,
relying on McRO, Appellant contends that assuming, arguendo, that the
claims are directed to an abstract idea, “the independent claims, when
viewed as an ordered combination of steps, include non-conventional and
non-generic limitations that provide a way of performing an electronic peer-
to-peer payment transaction that is different than conventional systems.”4
Appeal Br. 15. Appellant contends that “conventional electronic funds
remittance systems” would not perform claimed limitations and, “under the
rationale for determining that the claims in McRO were eligible under § 101,
the present claims include significantly more than an abstract idea because
the claims include an ‘ordered combination of claimed steps, using

3 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2016); Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elec., Inc., 880 F. 3d 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2018)
4 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
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unconventional rules.’”5 Thus, Appellant contends that the claims include
significantly more than the abstract idea and are patent-eligible. Appeal Br.
18.
In the Reply Brief, for both Steps 2A and 2B, Appellant argues that
the Examiner misapplies the case law and reaches a conclusion without
providing an explanation of how the claims do not provide an
unconventional technological solution and comparing the claims to any
existing case law that supports the Examiner’s conclusion. Reply Br. 3.
Appellant further argues that the Examiner erroneously ignores the problem
and solution at issue. Reply Br. 6. Appellant specifically argues that the
claims solve a number of problems unique to electronic funds transfers and
do so by “performing multiple risk checks based on social network
information at various stages of a remittance transaction provides additional
security and improved user interface capabilities.” Reply Br. 6. Appellant
further contends that the Examiner miscomprehends the nature of the
claimed invention and the technical problems solved by the claimed
invention. Reply Br. 6. Appellant also argues that the claims describe a
system that
provid[es] a list of potential recipients for display, or prevent[s]
the display of the list, based on a risk level of the sender
customizes the sender’s experience within an application for
remittance transactions by making certain user interface
elements and capabilities available contingent on the sender's
risk level meeting a threshold.
Thereby, Appellant argues, the claimed invention thus enables or disables
certain application interfaces based on a sender’s risk level to prevent high-
risk users from accessing certain features of the application. Reply Br. 6.

5 Id. at 1095
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Finally, Appellant argues that “Appellant’s Specification (e.g., at ¶¶ [0011],
[0034]-[0035], [0089]-[0091])” describes how “the claimed invention
provides improved security and user interfaces for computing systems
involved in electronic remittance transactions.” Reply Br. 7.
4. Discussion
Appellant argues Claims 1–20 as a group. Appeal Br. 9. We select
Claim 1 to represent the group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
a. Step 2A, Prongs 1 and 2
For Step 2A, Prong 1, of the Revised Guidance, we agree with the
Examiner and find that the emphasized portions of Claim 1, reproduced
above (see supra at 2), recites elements that fall within the abstract idea
grouping of certain methods of organizing human activity. Final Act. 4.
The Revised Guidance requires us to evaluate whether the claim recites a
judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea). According to the Revised
Guidance, to determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea, we must
identify limitations that fall within one or more of the designated subject
matter groupings of abstract ideas. According to the October 2019 Patent
Eligibility Guidance Update produced by the USPTO, “a claim recites a
judicial exception when the judicial exception is ‘set forth’ or ‘described’ in
the claim.” See October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df (“October Update”). The Revised Guidance lists certain methods of
organizing human activity as one such grouping and characterizes certain
methods of organizing human activity as including, inter alia, “fundamental
economic principles or practices” and “commercial or legal interactions.”
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84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We find that the elements of Claim 1 describe this
judicial exception.
Specifically, we find that Claim 1 recites elements of an international
commercial funds transfer, which is a fundamental economic practice. For
example, Claim 1 recites, inter alia, “receiving a request, from a . . . sender,
to electronically transfer funds,” “accessing information . . . about the
sender,” “determining . . . a first risk level associated with the sender,”
“based on the first risk level . . . determining . . . a list of potential
recipients,” “receiving . . . a selection of a recipient,” “accessing information
. . . about the recipient,” “determine a level of activity of the sender relative
to a destination country associated with the recipient,” “determining . . . a
second risk level associated with the request,” and either “proceeding with
the request” or “canceling the request.” We find that these limitations
describe the basic/fundamental idea behind international commercial funds
transfers because international commercial funds transfers involve, to some
degree, a received request, an initial risk assessment, identification of
potential recipients, further refining of the initial risk assessment based on
characteristics of the transfer such as the parties and countries involved, and
a decision on whether to proceed with or cancel the transfer based on the
refined risk assessment. Thus, we find Claim 1 recites elements that fall
within the abstract idea grouping of certain methods of organizing human
activity, namely, fundamental economic practices.
For Step 2A, Prong 2, of the Revised Guidance, we find that Claim 1,
as a whole, does not integrate the recited mental process into a practical
application of the abstract idea. The Revised Guidance states that “[a] claim
that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply,
rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful
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limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
The Revised Guidance further states that integration should be evaluated by
“[i]dentifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception(s)” and, based on certain considerations,
“evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.”
84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. The Revised Guidance identifies considerations such
as whether additional elements yield an improvement to a particular
technology or a computer itself, correspond to the implementation of the
judicial exception with a particular machine, and/or apply the judicial
exception in some way beyond simply linking the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment. See MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Here, the limitations of Claim 1 require for the request to be received
“from a client device of a sender” and for the potential recipients to be
displayed on a “user interface” of a display of the client device. The
limitations of Claim 1 are also performed “by at least on processor” and
require for the “information” about the sender and selected recipient to be
accessed from social networks “about” the sender and recipient. However,
we find that these additional elements do not integrate the certain methods of
organizing human activity of Claim 1 into a practical application. For
instance, we do not find that these additional elements yield an improvement
in the functioning of a computer itself or to the particular technology of
electronic funds transfer, neither do we find that these additional elements
are any particular machine that is necessary to implement the judicial
exception or transform something to a different state. Additionally, we do
not find that these additional elements apply the abstract idea in a
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meaningful way to any particular technological environment. In this light,
we agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that these additional elements of
Claim 1 “do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract
idea.” Final Act. 5. Moreover, we do not agree with Appellant’s contention
that the limitations of Claim 1 “provide an unconventional technological
solution to a technological problem” and provide an “improved user
interface for electronic devices.” Appeal Br. 9, 14. Thus, we find that
Claim 1, as a whole, does not integrate the recited certain methods of
organizing human activity into a practical application of the abstract idea.
Therefore, based on our analysis under the Revised Guidance, we
agree with the Examiner that Claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. As a
result, we focus our attention on Step 2B of the Alice two-step framework.
b. Step 2B
For Step 2B, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that
Claim 1 recites significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Step 2B of
the Alice two-step framework requires us to determine whether any element,
or combination of elements, in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim
amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at
221. As discussed in the previous section, we agree with the Examiner’s
findings that the additional elements, when considered individually and in an
ordered combination, correspond to nothing more than a generic computing
structure used to implement the certain methods of organizing human
activity. See Final Act. 5. In other words, we find that the additional
elements, as claimed, are well-understood, routine, and conventional and
“behave exactly as expected according to their ordinary use.” See In re TLI
Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 615 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For
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example, Appellant’s Specification describes the computing environment in
which the invention is performed. See Spec. ¶¶ [44] “client devices include
computing devices such as mobile devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets),
laptops, desktops, or any other type of computing device,” [57] “Each of the
components 206-218, 230-240, and 236-254 can communicate with each
other using any suitable communication technologies,” [67], [129]
“Although this disclosure describes measuring relationship coefficient in a
particular manner, this disclosure contemplates measuring affinity
coefficient in any suitable manner,” [160] “any other suitable computing
device,” [161], [169], [339]-[357]. Moreover, Appellant’s Specification at
the proffered paragraphs (“e.g., at ¶¶ [0011], [0034]-[0035], [0089]-
[0091]”) merely identifies examples where the claimed invention provides
improved risk calculation and user interfaces for computing systems
involved in electronic remittance transactions. See Reply Br. 7. However,
even with such disclosure, Appellant’s Specification gives no indication that
the computing environment is anything other than a well-understood,
routine, and conventional computing environment. Thus, implementing the
abstract idea with these generic computer components “fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that Claim 1 does not provide
significantly more than the abstract idea itself.
5. Conclusion
Therefore, because Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of certain
methods of organizing human activity and does not provide significantly
more than the abstract idea itself, we agree with the Examiner that Claim 1 is
ineligible for patenting and affirm the Examiner’s rejections of Claims 1–20
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
Overall
Outcome
1–20
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED