Facebook, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 31, 2020

14152920 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/152,920 01/10/2014 Barak Naveh 26295-24917 9036
87851 7590 03/31/2020
Facebook/Fenwick
Silicon Valley Center
801 California Street
Mountain View, CA 94041
EXAMINER
ANDERSON, SCOTT C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3694
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
fwfacebookpatents@fenwick.com
ptoc@fenwick.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BARAK NAVEH
Appeal 2019-003317
Application 14/152,920
Technology Center 3600
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JEREMY J. CURCURI,
IFTIKHAR AHMED, Administrative Patent Judges.
CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–27. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Facebook, Inc.
Appeal Br. 2.
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2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to “to advertising via a social networking
system.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A processor-implemented method comprising:
receiving, from an advertiser, a sponsor request
indicating that the advertiser is requesting to a social
networking system to locate one or more content items for
sponsorship in the social networking system, the content items
generated by users of the social networking system and having
embedded promotional information identifying the advertiser,
the sponsor request including a monetary bid amount and a
preselected list of advertiser-specified tags used to identify the
one or more content items to be sponsored in return for
payment of the monetary bid amount;
receiving, in conjunction with a viewing user, a plurality
of content items in the social networking system, each content
item generated by a posting user on the social networking
system, each content item associated with a ranking score
representing a measure of relevance of the content item to the
viewing user, the measure of relevance indicating at least a
level of affinity between the posting user and the viewing user;
identifying, by the social networking system,
promotional information embedded within each content item of
the plurality of content items by extracting a portion from the
content item and matching data within the portion of the
content item with a database of identifiers of promotional
information;
tagging, by the social networking system, the content
item with one or more tags identifying the promotional
information detected in the content item;
matching the one or more tags of the tagged content item
to one or more tags of the preselected list of advertiser-specified
tags included in the received sponsor request;
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responsive to the match, boosting the ranking score
generated by the social networking system of the tagged content
item by a value determined based on the monetary bid amount
specified in the received sponsor request; and
selecting one or more of the plurality of content items for
delivery to a viewing user based on the ranking scores of the
content items, including the boosted ranking score of the tagged
content item.
REJECTION
Claims 1–27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more. Final Act. 2–4.
OPINION
The Judicial Exception Rejection of Claims 1–27
The Examiner determines the following:
Claim(s) 1–27 are directed to the abstract idea of selecting
information to provide to someone based on inputs including
what is known about a person, which is similar to the concept
identified as abstract by the court in Affinity Labs of Texas LLC
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1270, 120 USPQ2d 1210
(Fed. Cir 2016). The process, collecting and analyzing
information in order to provide a desirable information-based
result, is similar to the concept identified as abstract by the court
in Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
Taking claim 1 as representative, receiving a sponsor
request, whatever its purpose, source and contents, is simply
collecting information, just as in EPG, as is the step of receiving
content items which are associated with ranking scores; it is
noted that the present invention does not produce the ranking
scores but at most collects them. Identifying promotional
information within content by comparing received data to stored
data is simply barely-specified analysis of information, again
similar to EPG, as is the step of matching tags of content to tags
from a preselected list. In fact, the Federal Circuit in SmartGene,
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Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs, SA (555 Fed. Appx. 950, Fed.
Cir. 2014) explicitly identified as abstract the step of “comparing
new and stored information and using rules to identify options”.
The steps of tagging a content items with tags, whatever they
represent, updating a ranking score based on inputs, and selecting
content for delivery based on ranking scores are all simply
provision of desirable information-based results, again similar to
EPG.
Final Act. 2–3; see also Final Act. 3–4 (determining that the claims are not
directed to significantly more than the abstract idea); Ans. 3–9.
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
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mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
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ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
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2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.

Are the claims patent-eligible?
Step 1
Claim 1 recites a method, which falls within the “process” category of
35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 20 recites a computer system, which falls with the
“machine” category of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 24 recites a non-transitory
computer-readable storage medium, which falls within the “manufacture”
category of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we must determine whether the claims
recite a judicial exception and fail to integrate the exception into a practical
application. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. If both elements are satisfied, the
claim is directed to a judicial exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo
test. See id.
Step 2A, Prong One
Independent claim 1 recites the following steps:

practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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[i] receiving, from an advertiser, a sponsor request
indicating that the advertiser is requesting to a social
networking system to locate one or more content items for
sponsorship in the social networking system, the content items
generated by users of the social networking system and having
embedded promotional information identifying the advertiser,
the sponsor request including a monetary bid amount and a
preselected list of advertiser-specified tags used to identify the
one or more content items to be sponsored in return for
payment of the monetary bid amount;
[ii] receiving, in conjunction with a viewing user, a
plurality of content items in the social networking system, each
content item generated by a posting user on the social
networking system, each content item associated with a ranking
score representing a measure of relevance of the content item to
the viewing user, the measure of relevance indicating at least a
level of affinity between the posting user and the viewing user;
[iii] identifying, by the social networking system,
promotional information embedded within each content item of
the plurality of content items by extracting a portion from the
content item and matching data within the portion of the
content item with a database of identifiers of promotional
information;
[iv] tagging, by the social networking system, the content
item with one or more tags identifying the promotional
information detected in the content item;
[v] matching the one or more tags of the tagged content
item to one or more tags of the preselected list of advertiser-
specified tags included in the received sponsor request;
[vi] responsive to the match, boosting the ranking score
generated by the social networking system of the tagged content
item by a value determined based on the monetary bid amount
specified in the received sponsor request; and
[vii] selecting one or more of the plurality of content
items for delivery to a viewing user based on the ranking scores
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of the content items, including the boosted ranking score of the
tagged content item.
These steps [i]–[vii] describe boosting the ranking of sponsored content in a
social networking system. In particular, a sponsor request is received from
an advertiser, and content including information identifying the advertiser
(the sponsored content) is given an increased ranking score. Thus, steps [i]–
[vii] describe a way of “advertising, marketing [] activities or behaviors,”
and are thus “commercial [] interactions.” Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52. Thus, these steps recite the abstract concept of “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity.” Id.
In addition, because these steps [i]–[vii] describe receiving data (“a
sponsor request,” “a plurality of content items”), processing the data (steps
[iii]–[vi]), and presenting the results (“selecting... content items for delivery
to a viewing user”), they are thus one or more of “observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion,” which are examples of “concepts performed in the
human mind.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Further, steps [i]–[vii] can be done by
human thought and a pen and paper.
The Federal Circuit has held that if a method can be performed by
human thought alone, or by a human using pen and paper, it is merely an
abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101. CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A] method
that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and
is not patent-eligible under § 101.”). Similarly, the Federal Circuit has
found claims directed to “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying
certain results of the collection and analysis” as directed to a patent-
ineligible abstract idea. Electric Power Group, LLC, v. Alstom, 830 F.3d
1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Accordingly, the various steps [i]–[vii] recited
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in independent claim 1 all describe the abstract idea. The abstract idea, even
when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have
been done with pen and paper, remains an abstract idea. CyberSource, 654
F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when
performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
Thus, we determine claim 1 recites a judicial exception. For these
same reasons, we also determine claims 20 and 24 recite a judicial
exception.
Step 2A, Prong Two
Because claims 1, 20, and 24 recite a judicial exception, we next
determine if the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application.
In addition to the limitations of claim 1 discussed above that recite
abstract concepts, claim 1 further recites “a social networking system.”
Claim 20 further recites “a processor” and “memory.” Claim 24 further
recites “a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium” and “a
processor.”
The Specification does not provide additional details that would
distinguish the additional limitations from a generic implementation. See
Spec. ¶¶ 19 (describing social networking system 140), 102 (describing a
processor, memory, and a non-transitory computer-readable storage
medium). There is no indication that the computers used in the invention are
anything other than general purpose computers. See Spec. ¶ 102 (“a general-
purpose computing device”).
We do not find the recited computer-related limitations are sufficient
to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Specifically,
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there is no improvement to the functioning of the computer, but, instead, the
computer merely implements the abstract idea. In this case, we do not see
any particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim; nor do
we see any transformation. That is, we do not see any of the additionally
recited elements applying or using the judicial exception in any meaningful
way beyond generally linking the judicial exception to the recited elements.
Accordingly, we determine that claim 1 is directed to a judicial
exception because it does not recite additional elements that integrate the
recited judicial exception into a practical application. Claims 20 and 24
recite similar limitations to those discussed with respect to claim 1, and
therefore also are directed to a judicial exception.
Is there something else in the claims that ensures that they are
directed to significantly more than a patent ineligible concept?
Step 2B
Because claims 1, 20, and 24 are directed to a judicial exception, we
next determine, according to Alice, whether these claims recite an element,
or combination of elements that is enough to ensure that the claim is directed
to significantly more than a judicial exception.
In addition to the limitations of claim 1 discussed above that recite
abstract concepts, claim 1 further recites “a social networking system.”
Claim 20 further recites “a processor” and “memory.” Claim 24 further
recites “a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium” and “a
processor.”
2019 Revised Guidance, Section III (B) (footnote 36) states:
In accordance with existing guidance, an examiner’s
conclusion that an additional element (or combination of
elements) is well understood, routine, conventional activity must
be supported with a factual determination. For more information
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concerning evaluation of well-understood, routine, conventional
activity, see MPEP 2106.05(d), as modified by the USPTO
Berkheimer Memorandum.
The Berkheimer Memorandum, Section III (A)(1) states:
A specification demonstrates the well-understood, routine,
conventional nature of additional elements when it describes the
additional elements as well-understood or routine or
conventional (or an equivalent term), as a commercially
available product, or in a manner that indicates that the additional
elements are sufficiently well-known that the specification does
not need to describe the particulars of such additional elements
to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). A finding that an element is well-
understood, routine, or conventional cannot be based only on the
fact that the specification is silent with respect to describing such
element.
Regarding the “social networking system,” the Specification describes
“the social networking system 140 may include additional, fewer, or
different components for various applications.” Spec. ¶ 19. Thus, the
Specification describes the “social networking system” in a manner that
indicates that these elements are sufficiently well-known that the
Specification does not need to describe the particulars of such additional
elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). See Spec. ¶ 19; see also Final Act. 4
(“The social-network limitations are simply a field of use which attempts to
confine the invention to a particular technological environment.”).
Regarding the “processor,” the Specification describes “any
computing systems referred to in the specification may include a single
processor or may be architectures employing multiple processor designs for
increased computing capability.” Spec. ¶ 102. Regarding the “memory”
and the “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium,” the
Specification describes “a computer program may be stored in a non-
transitory, tangible computer readable storage medium, or any type of media
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suitable for storing electronic instructions, which may be coupled to a
computer system bus.” Spec. ¶ 102. Thus, the Specification also describes
the “processor,” the “memory,” and the “non-transitory computer-readable
storage medium” in a manner that indicates that these elements are
sufficiently well-known that the Specification does not need to describe the
particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). See
Spec. ¶ 102; see also Final Act. 3 (“Generic computers performing generic
computer functions, without an inventive concept, do not amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea.”).
Further, the Specification does not provide additional details about the
computers that would distinguish the recited components from generic
implementation individually and generic implementation in the combination.
See Spec. ¶¶ 19, 102.
In view of Appellant’s Specification, the claimed computer
components are reasonably determined to be generic, purely conventional
computer elements. Thus, the claims do no more than require generic
computer elements to perform generic computer functions, rather than
improve computer capabilities.
Accordingly, we determine that claims 1, 20, and 24 are not directed
to significantly more than a patent ineligible concept.
Appellant’s principal arguments
Appellant presents the following principal arguments:
i. The claims are not directed to the abstract ideas in the court
cases cited by the Examiner. See Appeal Br. 5–11; see also Reply Br. 2–3.
For example, Appellant argues the “identifying” (claim 1) step “is a
computer-specific limitation which recites the use of a database and the
extraction of information.” Appeal Br. 8.
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For example, Appellant argues that in the “boosting” (claim 1) step,
“the data is being transformed and new data is created.” Appeal Br. 8.
For example, Appellant argues
extracting an image from the content item, the content
item being a still image file or a videographic file;
detecting an object embedded within the extracted image,
and
identifying, as the promotional information, a brand-
name displayed, in conjunction with the detected object, the
brand-name identifying an advertiser.
as recited in claim 5 is “squarely a technical limitation that is executed on a
computer” Appeal Br. 9.
For example, Appellant argues
extracting an audio recording from the content item, the
content item being an audiographic file or a videographic file;
detecting one or more portions of speech embedded
within the audio recording, and
identifying, as the promotional information, a spoken
representation of a brand-name or a trademark phrase in the
detected portions of speech, the brand-name or the trademark
phrase identifying an advertiser.
as recited in claim 6 “also recites a particular process executed by a
computer.” Appeal Br. 9.
ii. The claims perform a process that does not have a human
analog, and does not preempt all techniques. See Appeal Br. 11–12; see also
Reply Br. 3–7 (citing Claim 2 of Example 37 of “2019 PEG Examples 37
through 42” issued January 7, 2019; McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Claim 1 of Example 42 of
“2019 PEG Examples 37 through 42” issued January 7, 2019).
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iii. The claims recite significantly more than any abstract idea. See
Appeal Br. 12–15.
For example, Appellant argues the Examiner “ignor[es] the additional
claim limitations shown... to have meaningful limitations and specificity.”
Appeal Br. 13.
For example, Appellant argues “the Office Action does not present a
proper prima facie case regarding Step 2B.” Appeal Br. 13; see also Reply
Br. 7–10.
For example,
The claim limitations... describe a method to identify such
promotional information embedded in user-generated content,
and therefore improve upon prior techniques. The identification
of the promotional content further relies on a computer, and not
human, based process of extracting data from the content items
and matching to a database of identifiers of promotional content.
Appeal Br. 14.
Regarding Appellant’s arguments (i), (ii), and (iii) these arguments do
not show any error because, as we explain above, the argued elements of
claim 1 are the abstract concepts of “advertising, marketing [] activities or
behaviors,” and “observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion.” 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52. We also explain that the claims do not recite additional elements that
integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application, and are
not directed to significantly more than a patent ineligible concept.
Appellant’s identified improvements are improvements to the abstract idea
because, for example, the “identifying” (claim 1) step and the “boosting”
(claim 1) step describe parts of the abstract idea of boosting the ranking of
sponsored content in a social networking system. Similarly, the argued steps
from claim 5 and the argued steps from claim 6 also describe parts of the
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same abstract idea because they cover “collecting information, analyzing it,
and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis.” See Electric
Power Group, LLC, v. Alstom, 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Further, the argued steps can be done by human thought and a pen and
paper, and are not an improvement to a technology or computer
functionality. Thus, on the record before us, the claim limitations do not
improve the functionality of the various hardware components, nor do they
achieve an improved technological result in conventional industry practice.
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). More particularly, we do not agree the claimed invention
improves the technology as a whole.
Further, as our reviewing court has explained, “questions on
preemption are inherent in and resolved by the [section] 101 analysis,” and,
although “preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the
absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015); cf. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or
may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make
them any less abstract”).
Further, regarding Claim 2 of Example 37 of “2019 PEG Examples 37
through 42,” we do not agree with Appellant. For reasons explained above,
the argued steps can be done by human thought and a pen and paper, and are
not an improvement to a technology or computer functionality.
Further, regarding Claim 1 of Example 42 of “2019 PEG Examples 37
through 42,” we do not agree with Appellant. For reasons explained above,
the additionally recited elements are not applying or using the judicial
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exception in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the judicial
exception to the recited elements.
Further, regarding Appellant’s Step 2B argument, this argument does
not show any error because, as we explain above, the elements of claims 1,
20, and 24 beyond the abstract idea may be determined to be generic, purely
conventional computer elements. Thus, the claims do no more than require
generic computer elements to perform generic computer functions, rather
than improve computer capabilities. See Spec. ¶¶ 19, 102.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. We also
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2–27, which are not separately
argued with particularity.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection is affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–27 101 Judicial Exception 1–27

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED