Facebook, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 6, 2021

2020002691 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 6, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/669,763 08/04/2017 Michael James LeBeau 2006.016US1 3374
160546 7590 10/06/2021
Mannava & Kang, P. C.
3201 Jermantown Road
Suite 525
Fairfax, VA 22030
EXAMINER
WON, MICHAEL YOUNG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2449
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/06/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@mannavakang.com
fb-pdoc@fb.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MICHAEL JAMES LEBEAU,
SAMUEL WHARTON LESSIN, JOSEPH DAVID BARILLARI,
AMIR SHIMONI, ARLENE GABRIANA MURILLO,
MATEUSZ MAREK NIEWCZAS, MANISH MODI,
and CAITLIN E. KALINOWSKI
____________

Appeal 2020-002691
Application 15/669,763
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, CHARLES J. BOUDREAU,
and SHARON FENICK, Administrative Patent Judges.

DESHPANDE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–4 and 6–22.2 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)(1).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Facebook, Inc. as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claim 5 has been cancelled.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention “generally relates to exchanging information
over wireless communications sessions, particularly within the context of an
online social network.” Spec. ¶ 2. In particular embodiments, a social-
networking system sends social-networking information of a user to a third-
party content provider to enhance the user’s experience at the third-party
content provider’s business. Id. ¶ 6. For example, “if the third-party content
provider is a restaurant, the social-networking system may send social-
networking information of the user that includes food allergies and favorite
foods.” Id. The third-party content provider uses the social-networking
information of the user to personalize third-party content sent to the user’s
client system. Id.
Claims 1, 19, and 20 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the subject matter on appeal (emphasis added):
1. A method comprising, by one or more computing devices
of a third-party content provider:
sending, to one or more computing systems of an online
social network, session information between a first user of the
online social network and the third-party content provider, the
third-party content provider being associated with one or more
attributes, wherein:
the session information comprises information
indicating that a wireless communication session has been
established between a first client system of the first user
and a beacon associated with the third-party content
provider, wherein the wireless communication session
allows the online social network to send social-networking
information of the first user to the third-party content
provider via the beacon; and
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the beacon is physically proximate to the first client
system at the time of the wireless communication session;
in response to sending the session information, receiving,
from the computing systems of the online social network, a first
set of social-networking information of the first user, wherein the
first user is associated with privacy settings specifying types of
social-networking information of the first user that is permitted
to be shared with third-party content providers having particular
attributes, wherein the first set of social-networking information
of the first user is selected based on whether the privacy settings
associated with the first user permit sharing of the social-
networking information of the first user with the third-party
content provider based on the attributes associated with the
third-party content provider, and wherein the first set of social-
networking information is determined to be shareable with the
third-party content provider based on one or more social-
networking actions performed by the first user with respect to
the third-party content provider; and
sending, to the first client system from the one or more
computing devices of the third-party content provider via the
beacon, customized third-party content associated with one or
more suggested social-networking actions with respect to the
customized third-party content for display on the first client
system, wherein the customized third-party content is based on
the first set of social-networking information that has been
selected based on the privacy settings associated with the first
user, wherein the one or more suggested social-networking
actions are determined based on the first set of social-networking
information, and wherein the one or more suggested social-
networking actions cause the computing systems of the online
social network to update relational information between the first
user and the third-party content provider in a social graph of the
online social network, and wherein at least a portion of the
customized third-party content sent from the beacon is retrieved
from the computing systems of the online social network.
Appeal Br. 13–14 (Claims App.).
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REJECTION
The Examiner rejects claims 1–13 and 15–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Spencer3 and Rathod.4 Non-Final Act. 3–19.
OPINION
Appellant argues that the combination of Spencer and Rathod fails to
teach or suggest that specific types of social-networking information of the
first user are “permitted to be shared with third-party content providers
having particular attributes” and that “the first set of social-networking
information of the first user is selected based on whether the privacy settings
associated with the first user permit sharing of the social-networking
information of the first user with the third-party content provider based on
the attributes associated with the third-party content provider,” as recited in
independent claims 1, 19, and 20 (emphasis added). Appeal Br. 8–10.
For those limitations, specifically for the claimed “privacy settings”
that permit sharing the user’s social-networking information with third-party
content providers having particular “attributes,” the Examiner finds that
Rathod discloses privacy settings associated with a user dynamically
presenting an action, activity, status, or log item with dynamically attached
active links to determined receivers. Non-Final Act. 9–11 (citing
Rathod ¶¶ 22, 54, 60, 110); Ans. 6–7, 9 (citing Rathod ¶ 78 (“[U]ser can
share selective user profiles and user data with application and services of
network, 3rd parties’ application and services, connected & matched users

3 Spencer et al., US 2012/0192258 A1 (pub. July 26, 2012).
4 Rathod, US 2011/0276396 A1 (pub. Nov. 10, 2011).
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based on privacy settings and user preferences.”)); see Rathod Abstr. The
Examiner further finds that Spencer discloses “allowing the sharing of
personal profile/demographic information between registered users, groups
and/or third parties, generally based on one or more levels of association
defined between these users” and “making contacts with others who
share . . . same or similar attributes.” Spencer ¶ 30; see Non-Final Act. 4, 6;
Ans. 5, 8.
According to Appellant, “[w]hile Spencer in view of Rathod discloses
receiving user information based on commonalities and user privacy settings
specifying what information is shareable” (Appeal Br. 8 (citing
Spencer ¶ 30; Rathod ¶¶ 22, 110)), “the ‘commonalities’ disclosed in
Spencer are not equivalent to particular attributes associated with the third-
party content provider and the privacy settings disclosed in Rathod do not
specify that information is permitted to be shared with third-party content
providers having particular attributes” (id. at 9 (emphases omitted)).
Appellant further elaborates:
[T]he “levels of association” disclosed in Spencer (Para. 0030)
are not equivalent to the attributes associated with the third-party
content provider. For example, a user may have a high level of
association with restaurant A and a low level of association with
restaurant B. According to Spencer, information may be shared
with restaurant A but not with restaurant B. By contrast in the
method of independent Claim 1, the same types of social-
networking information may be provided to both restaurant A
and restaurant B since they are both associated with an attribute
of “restaurant.”
Id.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument because it is based on
an overly narrow construction of the term “attributes.” Although “[t]he
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attribute may be a type of good purveyed or service rendered by the third-
party content provider” (Spec. ¶ 68), the Specification does not provide a
special definition of “attribute” that limits the term to being a “type of good
purveyed or service rendered,” to thereby exclude a level of association (see
Appeal Br. 9). Rather, the Specification’s use of “attribute” suggests that the
term encompasses an array of characteristics potentially much broader than
the type of good purveyed or service rendered by a third-party content
provider. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 94 (describing Starboard Side Tavern as “a
nearby bar with similar attributes” to Johnny Brenda’s bar); see also id. ¶ 49
(“connection information [about users] may indicate users who have similar
or common work experience, group memberships, hobbies, educational
history, or are in any way related or share common attributes”), ¶ 77
(discussing various “demographic attributes . . . e.g., age, gender,
nationality, race, ethnicity, and/or locality” and “profile attributes” of a
user). Appellant acknowledges that Spencer and Rathod teach or suggest
privacy settings that permit sharing the user’s social-networking information
with third-party content providers based on commonalities or levels of
association. Appeal Br. 8–9; see Non-Final Act. 6–11. We find that
“attributes” of a third-party content provider encompass such commonalities
and levels of association.
Appellant argues that the claims recite “a more granular decision in
which the computing devices need to determine which specific types of
social-networking information among all the available social-networking
information are accessible,” as opposed to a “binary decision” where
“information is either shared with other entities or not shared with them.”
Appeal Br. 9; see id. at 10. However, Appellant acknowledges, and we
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agree, “Rathod discloses privacy settings specifying what information is
shareable.” Id. at 9–10; see, e.g., Rathod ¶ 78.
Thus, Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner’s finding that
Spencer and Rathod teach or suggest “privacy settings” that permit sharing
specific types of the user’s social-networking information with third-party
content providers having particular “attributes.”
Appellant further argues that the combination of Spencer and Rathod
fails to teach or suggest that “the first set of social-networking information is
determined to be shareable with the third-party content provider based on
one or more social-networking actions performed by the first user with
respect to the third-party content provider,” as recited in independent claims
1, 19, and 20 (emphasis added). Appeal Br. 9–10.
For that limitation, the Examiner cites, inter alia, Spencer’s disclosure
of “allowing the sharing of personal profile/demographic information
between registered users, groups and/or third parties, generally based on one
or more levels of association defined between these users,” as well as “user
profile information” including “interests, consumer loyalties and/or product
fan pages.” Spencer ¶ 30; see Non-Final Act. 6; Ans. 9–10. We agree with
the Examiner that Spencer satisfies the claim limitation because we
understand Spencer’s “sharing of personal profile/demographic
information . . . based on levels of association” to result, at least in part,
from some social-networking action performed by the user with respect to
the third-party content provider. Such user-performed social-networking
actions could include, for example, the user designating their own interests,
consumer loyalties, and/or product fan pages as disclosed by Spencer.
Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner’s finding that Spencer and
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Rathod teach or suggest sharing the user’s social-networking information
with the third-party content provider based on one or more social-
networking actions performed by the user with respect to the third-party
content provider.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection
of independent claims 1, 19, and 20 and dependent claims 2–4, 6–18, 21,
and 22 not separately argued by Appellant.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–4 and 6–22 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 is affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 6–22 103 Spencer, Rathod 1–4, 6–22