Exxon Chemical Co

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 10, 1992

307 N.L.R.B. 1254 (N.L.R.B. 1992)

1254
307 NLRB No. 186
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolution unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d
362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find
no basis for reversing the findings.
The Respondent does not except to the judge’s finding no merit
in its affirmative defenses invoking Sec. 10(b), due process, waiver,
and deferral to arbitration.
2 We grant the General Counsel’s exception and modify the
judge’s recommended remedy to provide that the Union’s access to
the Respondent’s plant be granted, as requested, by its designated
expert.
3 Union President Elizabeth Bettinger, a witness whose testimony
was generally credited by the judge, testified without contradiction
that she had been informed by employees working in the multiskill
craftsman classification that the description of the job given to them
before they bid on it was different from the tasks they were assigned
after they began working in that classification. The employees be-
lieved the job was assigned too low a grade.
4 The test also specifies that any order directing an employer to
grant access must be ‘‘limited to reasonable periods so that the
union can fulfill its representation duties without unwarranted inter-
ruption of the employer’s operations.’’ The Respondent does not
argue that any grant of access would necessarily constitute an ‘‘un-
warranted interruption’’ of its operations; and our modification of
the Order (fn. 2, supra) merely substitutes the ‘‘Union’s designated
expert’’ for the ‘‘Union’’ and leaves intact the reasonable time limi-
tations.
Exxon Chemical Company and Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union, AFL–
CIO–CLC, Local 8–719. Case 4–CA–19288
July 10, 1992
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND OVIATT
On October 31, 1991, Administrative Law Judge
Claude R. Wolfe issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel filed an exception and a supporting
brief, and the Respondent filed an answering brief. The
Respondent also filed exceptions and a supporting
brief. The General Counsel and the Charging Party
each filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modi-
fied below.2
The judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to grant
the Union’s designated expert access to its plant in
order to gather data relevant to the processing of the
Union’s contractual grievance. In so finding, the judge
applied the test set out in Holyoke Water Power Co.,
273 NLRB 1369 (1985), enfd. 778 F.2d 49 (1st Cir.
1985), cert. denied 477 U.S. 905 (1986). The Respond-
ent concedes that Holyoke states the applicable legal
test for determining the access issue; but it contends
that the judge misapplied the test and that a proper ap-
plication would lead to a finding that the Respondent
acted lawfully in denying the requested access. For the
following reasons we disagree.
The Union’s access request was made in connection
with a contractual grievance in which it alleged that
the Respondent had changed the skill requirements for
a job classification titled ‘‘Multiskill Craftsman’’ in
such a way that it was no longer assigned the proper
‘‘Labor Grade . . . in relation to all other job classi-
fications established.’’ This was a classification that,
although included in both the 1987–1990 and the
1990–1993 collective-bargaining agreements, had never
been filled until February 1990. The particular skills
included in the classification were not specified in the
agreement. The Union’s grievance, which was filed in
August 1990, cited ‘‘actual experience in the position’’
as the basis for the Union’s belief that the classifica-
tion was misgraded.3 The grievance invoked article
24.3 of the bargaining agreement, which provides as
follows:
The Company has the right, during the terms of
this Agreement, to add any job classification or
change the duties of existing job classifications.
The Company will set a rate for a new job classi-
fication or materially changed job classication. In
setting the rate, the Company will set a rate that
is consistent with the rates of pay in the hierarchy
of job classifications and rates already established
in the plant by taking into account the relationship
between relative skills in existing job classifica-
tions and the new job classifications or the materi-
ally changed job classification. If the Union dis-
agrees with the rate set by the Company, the
union has the right to process a grievance starting
at the second grievance step within thirty (30)
days after the setting of the new rate. Any future
grievance involving materially changed jobs will
involve changes which occur after October 26,
1990.
The Holyoke test, which all agree applies here, is a
balancing test under which access is to be granted if
‘‘responsible representation of employees can be
achieved only by the union’s having access to the em-
ployer’s premises’’ and under which access can be
lawfully denied if ‘‘a union can effectively represent
employees through some alternate means other than by
entering on the employer’s premises.’’ Id. at 1370.4
The Respondent contends that the judge considered
only whether its property rights would be ‘‘com-
promised’’ and failed to determine whether the Union
could achieve its representational objectives without
1255EXXON CHEMICAL CO.
having its expert gain access to observe the skills the
employees were using in the job classification. In par-
ticular, the Respondent argues that the judge improp-
erly ignored ‘‘uncontested testimony’’ by the Respond-
ent’s human resources manager that the multiskill em-
ployees fill out daily logs recording the work done and
that the Union could have satisfied its representational
needs simply by requesting those logs. We disagree.
The judge made a finding that there was ‘‘no ade-
quate substitute for actual on-the-job observation of the
work performed for the purpose of ascertaining what
skills are actually utilized.’’ Although the judge did
not specifically advert to the employee logs, we see
nothing in that evidence that undermines his finding.
The manager’s testimony does not indicate that the
logs would provide any information beyond ‘‘the type
of job [and] number of hours.’’ This is far from a suf-
ficient basis for an assessment of the skills employed.
Such logs would be inadequate also because the
Union’s grievance called for evaluating the job in rela-
tion to others ‘‘in the hierarchy of job classifications.’’
Logs filled out by multiskill employees could not show
how their skills compared with those of employees in
other labor grades, whereas on-the-job observation
could. In sum, nothing in the record shows that the
Union could obtain the complex data that an expert
could collect on the basis of observing the employees
at work in the plant.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Exxon
Chemical Company, Marlin, Pennsylvania, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
‘‘(a) Denying the Union’s request for access by its
designated expert to the Respondent’s Marlin, Pennsyl-
vania plant for reasonable periods of time at reasonable
times in order to permit him to make an evaluation of
the multiskill job classification that is relevant and nec-
essary to the Union’s performance of its responsibil-
ities as the collective-bargaining representative of the
Respondent’s employees in a production and mainte-
nance unit.’’
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a).
‘‘(a) On request, grant the Union’s designated expert
access to the Respondent’s Marlin, Pennsylvania plant
for reasonable periods of time at reasonable times in
order for the expert to evaluate the multiskill position,
which evaluation is relevant and necessary to the
Union’s processing of the August 20, 1990 grievance
relating to the appropriate placement of the multiskill
classification within the hierarchy of all unit classifica-
tions.’’
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the ad-
ministrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith with
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union, AFL–CIO–CLC, Local 8-719, by denying its
request for access by its designated expert to our Mar-
lin, Pennsylvania plant for reasonable periods of time
at reasonable times in order to permit the expert to
make an evaluation of the multiskill job classification
that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s perform-
ance of its responsibilities as the collective-bargaining
representative of our employees in the production and
maintenance unit.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, grant the Union’s designated
expert access to our Marlin, Pennsylvania plant for
reasonable periods of time at reasonable times in order
for the expert to evaluate the multiskill position, which
evaluation is relevant and necessary to the Union’s
processing of its August 20, 1990 grievance relating to
the appropriate placement of the multiskill classifica-
tion within the hierarchy of all unit classifications.
EXXON CHEMICAL COMPANY
Monica McGhie-Lee, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Charles E. Beck, Esq., for Exxon Chemical Company.
Neal Goldstein, Esq., for Local 8-719.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CLAUDE R. WOLFE, Administrative Law Judge. This pro-
ceeding was litigated before me at Pottsville, Pennsylvania,
on July 15, 1991, pursuant to charges filed on October 15,
1990, and complaint issued on January 10, 1991, and amend-
ed at hearing. The amended complaint alleges Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (the Act) by failing and refusing to give the
Union’s timestudy expert access to Respondent’s plant for
the purpose of evaluating a multiskill job classification. Re-
spondent denies the commission of unfair labor practices.
1256 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 All motions to strike and objections still outstanding are denied
or overruled.
2 See, e.g., New Jersey Esso Employees Assn., 275 NLRB 216
(1985).
3 All dates are 1990 unless otherwise indicated.
On the entire record,1 and after considering the testimonial
demeanor of the witnesses and the posttrial briefs filed by
the parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges and Re-
spondent admits it is a division of Exxon Corporation, a New
Jersey corporation, and is engaged in manufacturing poly-
ethylene and polypropylene blown film at a plant in Marlin,
Pennsylvania. It is further alleged and admitted that, during
the year preceding the issuance of the complaint, Respond-
ent, in the course and conduct of these business operations,
sold and shipped goods valued in excess of $50,000 from
points directly outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
It is alleged, admitted, and I find noting the Board has pre-
viously exerted its jurisdiction over various divisions of
Exxon Corporation,2 that Respondent is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Respondent and the Union were party to a collective-
barganing agreement effective October 26, 1987, to October
26, 1990, and are now party to an agreement effective Octo-
ber 26, 1990, to October 26, 1993. Both agreements cover
production and maintenance employees including those clas-
sified as multiskill craftsmen. No employees were assigned
this classification until February 1990.3 The employee so as-
signed in 1990 received a pay raise pursuant to an across-
the-board wage increase negotiated for the entire unit during
the 1990 negotiations for the current agreement. There is no
evidence of any negotiation concerning the required skills,
duties, or any other item peculiar to the multiskill classifica-
tion. A grievance was filed by the Union on August 20 con-
cerning this classification and reading, in pertinent part, as
follows:
The Job Description written did not actually describe
all the skills required to perform the multiskilled job.
Based on actual experience in the position it has been
apparent the Company has materially changed the clas-
sification and as a result the Labor Grade assigned is
not in relation to all other job classifications estab-
lished.
Respondent’s answer to the grievance reads: ‘‘No contract
violation. Grievance denied.’’
There followed an exchange of letters. By letter of Sep-
tember 16 from its president and its chief steward, the Union
notified Respondent the Union would pursue the grievance to
arbitration and further stated: ‘‘The Union is requesting to
bring in our own time study expert to investigate the multi-
skill job.’’
This drew the September 21 response from A. J. Bauer,
human resources manager for Respondent, that ‘‘Your re-
quest to bring in a time study expert to investigate the multi-
skill job (Grievance 125K) is denied.’’
Then, by letter of September 2, Liz Bettinger, the Union’s
president, notified Bauer as follows:
Re: Grievance #125
The Company denied the Union’s request to bring
our own time study expert into the plant to evaluate the
Multiskilled job pertaining to Grievance #125.
However, you failed to give the Union any expla-
nation why you denied our request for the evaluation of
the Multiskilled Job.
The Union has requested to bring this expert in to
studythe job to further investigate this grievance and
make a determination if we should pursue this griev-
ance any further in the arbitration process.
If the Company denies this second request please
give us your explanation in writing when you have de-
nied the Union’s request to further investigate this
grievance.
To this Bauer responded by letter of September 8 as fol-
lows:
Dear Ms. Bettinger:
Although I was unaware of any requirement to fur-
ther explain my denial of your request for evaluation of
the multi-skilled job, in the interest of open commu-
nication, I will elaborate on my initial response.
The Company’s denial of your request to bring a
Union time study expert into the plant to evaluate the
multi-skilled job (Grievance 125) is based on the fact
that this job is not a piece work or incentive-based rate
classification. Use of a time-study evaluation would
have no impact on the current rate.
Since this rate was negotiated in good faith and we
are currently engaged in bargaining a new agreement,
I would suggest that the proper forum to address your
concerns regarding the appropriate rate for the multi-
skilled classification is collective bargaining and not
through the grievance procedure.
On October 15, the Union filed a charge with the Board
alleging Respondent interfered with ‘‘complainant’s reason-
able requests to investigate a grievance in order to evaluate
whether or not the grievance should be pursued to final and
binding arbitration.’’ The complaint subsequently issued by
the Regional Director for the Board’s Region 4 alleges Re-
spondent failed and refused to ‘‘permit the Union access to
the Marlin plant for an evalnation by a timestudy expert.’’
Neither the charge nor the complaint nor the Union’s request
assert a timestudy would be conducted. Respondent contends,
however, that the Union clearly requested a timestudy be
performed, and that the complaint clearly alleges ‘‘denial of
access to permit a time study to be performed.’’ The conten-
tions are not persuasive. That Respondent chooses to argue
that a request for access to enable a timestudy expert to in-
vestigate necessitates a conclusion the investigation can only
1257EXXON CHEMICAL CO.
4 Sec. 10(b) provides in relevant part that ‘‘no complaint shall
issue based on any unfair labor practice occurring more than 6
months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the serv-
ice of a copy thereof on the person against whom the charge is
made.’’
be a timestudy does not make it so, nor does it necessarily
follow that a timestudy expert is incapable of conducting an
appropriate investigation using methods other than a time-
study. There is no showing whatsoever the Union’s expert
lacked the expertise to evaluate the multiskill job. Respond-
ent knew from the language of the grievance that the ques-
tions it raised were the accuracy of the job description and
the appropriateness of the labor grade assigned to the
multiskill classification. I do not believe Respondent was
misled by the Union’s labeling of its expert as a timestudy
expert into believing the Union was about to engage in an
investigation inappropriate to the issues raised by the griev-
ance. Furthermore, Union Officers Bettinger and Guidas
credibly testified that Bettinger advised Albert Bauer, Re-
spondent’s human resources manager, in October that the
Union wanted an evaluation rather than a timestudy. Bauer’s
bare denial that the Union ever explained the purpose of its
request is not credited. Even if the prior requests had been
deficient, which they were not, the request in October was
clear and sufficient though made after the charge was filed.
Compare Hawkins Construction Co., 285 NLRB 1313, 1316
(1997), enf. denied on other grounds 857 F.2d 1224 (8th Cir.
1988), in which the Board held that a demonstration at the
hearing concerning the relevancy of the information sought
was sufficient to trigger the employer’s obligation to furnish
the information.
The Union has the responsibility of administering the col-
lective-bargaining agreement and evaluating and processing
grievances. Clinchfield Coal Co., 275 NLRB 1384 (1985).
Respondent is required to furnish requested information
which is relevant and reasonably necessary to the Union’s
performance of those duties. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,
385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truit Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149
(1956). The standard for determining relevancy is a liberal
one and it is only necessary to show a ‘‘probability that the
described information is relevant, and that it would be of use
to the union in carrying out its statutory duties and respon-
sibilities.’’ NLRB v. Acme Industrial, supra at 437.
An evaluation of the actual skills necessary to the perform-
ance of the multiskilled classification is relevant to the griev-
ance allegation that the job description and labor grade for
that classification are erroneous, and would clearly be useful
to the Union in evaluating the grievance.
The remaining question is whether Respondent need grant
access to the Union’s expert to enable the evaluation of the
job to take place. The answer requires the application of the
Board’s test set forth in Holyoke Water Power Co., 273
NLRB 1369, 1370 (1985), enfd. 778 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1985),
as follows:
Where it is found that responsible representation of
employees can be achieved only by the union’s having
access to the employer’s premises, the employer’s prop-
erty rights must yield to the extent necessary to achieve
this end. However, the access ordered must be limited
to reasonable periods so that the union can fulfill its
representation duties without unwarranted interruption
of the employer’s operations. On the other hand, where
it is found that a union can effectively represent em-
ployees through some alternate means other than by en-
tering on the employer’s premises, the employer’s prop-
erty right will predominate, and the union may properly
be denied access.
There is no adequate substitute for actual on-the-job obser-
vation of the work performed for the purpose of ascertaining
what skills are actually utilized and what operations are actu-
ally performed by employees in the multiskilled classifica-
tion. Inasmuch as Respondent’s human resources manager,
Bauer, knows of no company policy prohibiting non-
employees from access to its facility, it would not com-
promise Repondent’s property rights to permit the Union’s
expert to enter the premises to evaluate the multiskilled job
dates and for periods of reasonable duration to be agreed on
by the Respondent and the Union in good-faith negotiations.
Respondent offers the following affirmative defenses:
1. The charge is barred by the statute of limitations
The charge was filed on October 5. The first request for
permission to bring in an expert took place in September. All
events with which this case is concerned took place within
6 months of the filing of the charge or after the filing of the
charge. The charge is broad enough to cover the complaint
allegations. Respondent repeatedly asserts that a timestudy
was requested. This is simply not accurate, nor is its claim
that paragraph 8 of the complaint is predicated on a refusal
to grant access to have a timestudy performed and does not
cover a request for an evaluation. Paragraph 8 plainly states
that Respondent failed and refused ‘‘to permit the Union ac-
cess to the Marlin plant for an evaluation by a timestudy ex-
pert.’’ That allegation does not limit an evaluation to a time-
study nor is there any probative evidence that was the
Union’s intention. Respondent’s repeated references to a
‘‘time stldy’’ request are unpersuasive argument.
Respondent further argues that the passage of more than
6 months since the denial of access, the closing of the
record, the apparent abandonment of ‘‘its request for a time
study,’’ and no appropriate amendment of the complaint, re-
quires that ‘‘prosecution of Respondent’s denial of access to
have a timestudy performed is barred by the statute of limita-
tions, and the complaint must be dismissed.’’ I perceive no
need to perform a lengthy dissection of less convoluted and
mistaken argument. Suffice it to say, neither this nor the ear-
lier argument establishes that Section 10(b) of the Act4 in
any way suggests that the compIaint before me should be
dismissed in whole or in part.
2. The complaint fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted since the information requested
is not relevant
The information requested is relevant for reasons recited
above, and this defense has no merit.
1258 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
3. Finding a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act based on Respondent’s refusal to grant access for
a ‘‘job evaluation’’ violates Respondent’s right
to due process
Contrary to Respondent, it was given timely notice of the
violation alleged, proceeded to trial, had opportunity to call
and examine and cross-examine witnesses, was in no way
restritcted in its defense, and may not now be heard to erro-
neously complain it was not accorded due process.
4. Assuming arguendo that the Union’s request for
information is relevant, Respondent’s property right
must predominate and Respondent’s denial of access
did not violate the Act
Respondent has presented only argument, no evidence, that
its property rights are at hazard, and Baller’s acknowledge-
ment there is no policy of excluding nonemployees militates
against that argument.
5. The Union has waived its right to the requested
information, settled the dispute, and is therefore bound
by Section 8(d) of the Act
Respondent argues the negotiation of a new collective-bar-
gaining agreement which contains a wage increase for the
multiskilled classification is a waiver of the Union’s right to
access. Respondent makes a misleading argument by assert-
ing the agreement contained a ‘‘bargained-for increase in the
wage rate for the multiskill classification.’’ In fact there was
no bargaining specifically related to the multiskilled classi-
fication. Instead, there was a negotiated across-the-board in-
crease for all classifications. This had nothing to do with
whether the job is correctly classified or graded or whether
the Union is entitled to the relief the complaint seeks. What
Respondent has here done is misstate the facts. There was
no ‘‘bargaining which included, under Section 8(d) of the
National Labor Relations Act, agreement on the multiskill
craft classification and an appropriate rate therefor.’’ As
General CounseI correctly notes, a contractual waiver of a
right to information must be in clear and unmistakable lan-
guage. Clinchfield Coal Co., 275 NLRB 1384 (1985). No
such waiver is here present.
6. The complaint must be dismissed as the underlying
charge should have been deferred to arbitration
Respondent misconstrues the complaint before me and the
law pertaining thereto. The issue of the merit of the griev-
ance is not before me. The only issue to be here decided is
whether Respondent violated the Act by refusing access to
relevant information sought for the purpose of determining
whether to further press the grievance. It is well settled that
the requirement that employers furnish a union relevant and
reasonably necessary information on request in order to en-
able the union to evaluate the merit of the grievance is nec-
essary to avoid a two-tiered arbitration process and lengthy
delays in grievance resolution. Acme Industrial Co., supra;
General Dynamics Co., 268 NLRB 1432 (1984); and com-
pare Frank Chervan, Inc., 283 NLRB 752 fn. 2 (1987), in
which an alleged settlement of the grievance and additional
issues other than the failure to furnish information were de-
ferred to arbitration should the union decide to pursue the
grievance after receiving the information.
In addition to the foregoing, Respondent, in its answer to
the complaint, raised but did not discuss laches as a defense,
and did not discuss laches in its posttrial brief. Inasmuch as
there is no showing concerning why the doctrine of laches
is applicable, and it has long been settled that laches does
not apply in Board proceedings, W. C. Nabors Co., 134
NLRB 1078, 1079 fn. 3 (1961), the laches defense must be
and is rejected.
Conclusion
The evidence preponderates in favor of a finding, which
I make, that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act for the reasons alleged in the complaint.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all material times, the Union has been the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of Respondent’s employ-
ees in a production and maintenance unit covered by collec-
tive-bargaining agreements between Respondent and the
Union.
4. By denying the Union’s request for access to the Re-
spondent’s plant to evaluate the multiskilled job, the Re-
spondent has failed and refused to bargain with the Union in
good faith, and has thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act.
5. The above unfair labor practice affects commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended5
ORDER
The Respondent, Exxon Chemical Company, Marlin,
Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Denying the Union’s requests for reasonable access to
Respondent’s plant to make an evaluation of the multiskilled
job that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance
of its responsibilities as the collective-bargaining representa-
tive of Respondent’s employees in a production and mainte-
nance unit.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On the Union’s request, grant it access to Respondent’s
Marlin, Pennsylvania plant for reasonable periods of time at
reasonable times, in order to permit the Union to evaluate the
multiskilled position, which evaluation is relevant and nec-
essary for the Union’s processing of the August 20, 1990
grievance relative to the multiskill job classification.
1259EXXON CHEMICAL CO.
6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
(b) Post at its facilities in Marlin, Pennsylvania, copies of
the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’6 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
4, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized rep-
resentative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.