Ex Parte Zawacki et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 23, 2016

12552417 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 23, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 12/552,417 0910212009 Jennifer Greenwood Zawacki 63203 7590 06/27/2016 ROGITZ & AS SOCIA TES 750B STREET SUITE 3120 SAN DIEGO, CA 92101 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. RPS920090027-US-NP 4588 EXAMINER LE, THU NGUYET T ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2162 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/27/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): Noelle@rogitz.com eofficeaction@appcoll.com J ohn@rogitz.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JENNIFER GREENWOOD ZAWACKI, WSTIN TYLER DUBS, HOW ARD JEFFREY LOCKER, JULIE ANNE MORRIS, STEVEN RICHARD PERRIN, AXEL RAMIREZ FLORES, JAMES JOSEPH THRASHER, and SEAN MICHAEL ULRICH Appeal2014-009889 Application 12/552,417 Technology Center 2100 Before JON M. JURGOVAN, JOHN F. HORVATH, and ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges. JURGOVii .. N, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants 1 seek review under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1, 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, and22-29. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 6(b ). We affirm-in-part.2 1 Appellants identify Lenovo Singapore PTE. Ltd. as the real party in interest. (App. Br. 2.) 2 Our decision refers to the Specification filed Sept. 2, 2009 ("Spec."), the Final Office Action mailed Nov. 22, 2013 ("Final Act."), the Appeal Brief filed Feb. 26, 2014 ("App. Br."), and the Reply Brief filed Sept. 10, 2014 ("Reply Br."). Appeal2014-009889 Application 12/552,417 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The claims are directed to reconstructing an application session when changing between devices. (Spec. Title, Abstract.) Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A machine-implemented method comprising: receiving captured session data generated by a first device at a second device, the captured session data including one or more session data records that each correspond to one or more application sessions executing on the first device, the captured session data being established in response to a triggering event at the first device, the triggering event being a change in the power state of the first device; selecting, at the second device, at least one of the session data records and extracting data from the selected session data record; and reconstructing, at the second device, at least one of the application sessions that corresponds to the at least one selected session data record using the extracted data. (App. Br. 16-Claims App'x.) REJECTIONS Claims 1, 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, 23, 25, and 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 102(b) based on Arling (US 2005/0097618 Al, May 5, 2005). (Final Act. 2---6.) Claims 22 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) based on Arling and Fogle (US 2003/0074590 Al, Apr. 17, 2003). (Final Act. 6-7.) Claims 26 and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) based on Arling and Bryar (US 2006/0168510 Al, July 27, 2006). (Final Act. 8-9.) Claim 28 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) based on Arling and Song (US 2005/0066037 Al, Mar. 24, 2005). (Final Act. 9-10.) 2 Appeal2014-009889 Application 12/552,417 ANALYSIS Â§ 102(b) "A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference." Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). To establish anticipation, every element and limitation of the claimed invention must be found in a single prior art reference, arranged as in the claim. Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Claim 1 Appellants argue Arling fails to disclose the limitation of claim 1 reciting "the captured session data being established in response to a triggering event at the first device, the triggering event being a change in the power state of the first device." (App. Br. 5-7; Reply Br. 1-2 citing Arling i-fi-13, 19.) Specifically, Appellants argue that Arling's appliances do not change their power state when playing, pausing, or resuming media playback. (Id.) Thus, according to Appellants, Arling does not disclose a triggering event that is a change in power state causing saving of media, device, or content states for later playback on a different appliance, as required by the claim. (Id.) Claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). As the Examiner correctly notes, the claimed phrase 3 Appeal2014-009889 Application 12/552,417 "power state" does not appear in Appellants' Specification.3 (Ans. 3.) The Examiner further notes the Specification mentions hibernation mode, suspend mode, and low battery mode, and finds these are examples of power states. (Ans. 3--4 citing Spec. i-fi-f 18, 27.) The Examiner interprets the "suspend mode" to encompass Arling's pausing of playback on an appliance, concluding Arling anticipates claim 1. (Ans. 4 citing Arling i-fi-13, 18.) We agree with Appellants' argument that claim 1 is not anticipated by Arling. The Examiner does not show that Arling discloses, explicitly or inherently, that pausing an appliance changes its power state as claimed. Although it is possible Arling's appliance consumes less power when paused, the cited paragraphs of Arling do not establish this proposition, and the Examiner makes no finding that a person skilled in the art would understand Arling' s appliance consumes less power when paused. Furthermore, the Examiner does not show that entry into the pause state by Arling's appliance triggers capture of session data. Thus, we do not sustain the anticipation rejection of claim 1. Claims 7 and 13 Claim 7 recites "the captured session data that is received includes data only for applications executable by the information handling system as determined by the external device." (App. Br. 16-17 - Claims App'x.) Claim 13 recites "the captured session data that is received includes data only for applications executable by the second device as determined by the 3 The Examiner is advised that a claimed phrase lacking written description or enablement in the Specification is properly rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 112, first paragraph (pre-AIA). 4 Appeal2014-009889 Application 12/552,417 first device." (App. Br. 17-18 -Claims App'x.) Appellants argue these limitations require the captured session data that is received includes data (1) only for applications executable by the second device (2) as determined by the first device. (App. Br. 8, Reply Br. 2-3.) We note that Arling mentions a user may initiate a save state command for saving and recalling state data for media and appliances, and further mentions the save state command may apply to a particular media rendering system from which a movie, music, television broadcast, slide show, image, or other media element is being played. (Arling i-f 6; see also Final Act. 4.) Arling's media elements may be regarded equivalent to the claimed application data. As the Examiner notes, Arling teaches that a recall state command may be issued to a set of appliances, and if a determination is made the recall operation is to apply to the same or analogous set of appliances, then no significant data conversion is necessary. (Ans. 5-7 citing Arling i-fi-16, 18, 28, 31, 37, 38, see also i-f 20.) Thus, in the case of state recall involving the same or a similar set of appliances, the source appliance( s) determines media state (including the application state) for the same or analogous appliance(s) on which recall is effected. Thus, we agree with the Examiner Arling anticipates claims 7 and 13. Â§ 103(a) "Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when 'the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains."' KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 5 Appeal2014-009889 Application 12/552,417 (2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). An obviousness rejection underÂ§ 103(a) requires that "there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness." KSR at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441F.3d977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Claims 22 and 24 Claim 22 recites "the change of the power state is entering a hibernation mode," and claim 24 recites "the change of the power state is entering a low battery mode." (App. Br. 18-19 - Claims App'x.) Appellant argues the Examiner admits these claims are not disclosed by Arling, and that Fogle mentions hibernation and low battery "modes," but in the simple context that computers can hibernate and enter low battery modes. (App. Br. 10-12.) To the contrary, the Examiner finds the claims obvious over the combination of Arling and Fogle, stating Fogle teaches hibernation mode, including a low battery state, which involves saving hardware state information and memory contents. (Ans. 8-9 citing Fogle i-f 5.) Fogle also teaches that the hibernation mode can be activated by the computer due to a critically low battery condition, which triggers the saving of hardware state information and memory contents. (See Fogle i-f 5.) Thus, in Fogle, the entry into hibernation mode due to a critically low battery condition is a "triggering event" causing the saving of state information as claimed. This teaching of Fogle overcomes the deficiency of Arling as applied to claim 1. We agree with the Examiner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would realize that Arling and Fogle similarly teach saving state information in response to a triggering event (namely, Arling's pause feature and Fogle's hibernation mode) and would thus be led to combine these references. Also, 6 Appeal2014-009889 Application 12/552,417 as the Examiner notes, Arling and Fogle are from the same field of endeavor and address similar problems relating to saving state information upon the occurrence of a triggering event. Thus, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in the rejection of claims 22 and 24. Remaining Claims Our decision on the foregoing arguments renders it unnecessary to reach Appellants' remaining arguments. The claims for which no arguments were presented stand or fall with the claims from which they depend. 3 7 C.F.R. Â§ 41.37(c)(iv). DECISION We reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1, 6, 23, 25, and 29 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 102(b). We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 7, 12, 13, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 102(b). We reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claims 26-28 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a). We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 22 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. Â§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 7