Ex Parte Wilson et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 7, 201311339154 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 7, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/339,154 01/25/2006 Christopher S. Wilson 14528.00307 6477 16378 7590 08/07/2013 Broadcom/BHGL P.O. Box 10395 Chicago, IL 60610 EXAMINER AYASH, MARWAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2185 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/07/2013 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte CHRISTOPHER S. WILSON and VIRESH RUSTAGI ____________________ Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Before: JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, JASON V. MORGAN, and MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judges. STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 2 STATEMENT OF CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims 1-26. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. The claims are directed to access control using a file allocation table (FAT) file system. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method of accessing a FAT partition comprising: associating a shared directory to said FAT partition, said shared directory identified by using one or more variables; configuring a password to authenticate a user requesting access to said FAT partition; and providing a level of access to said FAT partition based on said password. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Ferguson US 5,933,826 Aug. 3, 1999 Liebman US 2008/0256242 A1 Oct. 16, 2008 REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: Claims 1-20, 22, 23, and 26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Ferguson. Ans. 3-4. Claims 21, 24, and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ferguson and Liebman. Ans. 5. Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 3 ISSUES ON APPEAL Based on Appellants’ arguments in the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 12-71) and Reply Brief (Reply Br. 4-37), the issues presented on appeal are: (i) whether Ferguson discloses the disputed limitations of claims 1-8, 12-15, 19-20, and 26; (ii) whether the combination of Ferguson and Liebman teaches or suggests the disputed limitations of claims 21 and 24; and (iii) whether the combination of Ferguson and Liebman is proper in rejecting claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’ conclusions as to all rejections. We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief. We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. For emphasis, we highlight Appellants’ arguments seriatim as they are presented in the Appeal Brief, pages 12-71 and Reply Brief, pages 4-37. We retain the Examiner’s labeling of arguments for purposes of reference. Rejection under § 112, First Paragraph 1st Argument (Now Moot) As recognized by Appellants (Reply Br. 6-7), the Examiner’s withdrawal of the rejection of claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph (Ans. 8) renders this issue moot. Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 4 Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) At pages 4-6 of the Reply Brief Appellants take exception to the Examiner’s Background Discussion and characterization of the invention. In particular, Appellants contend that the Examiner mischaracterizes the claims. However, as Appellants provide no indication of specific limitations ignored by the Examiner or statements unsupported by evidence, we find no reversible error. 2nd Argument – Claim 1 Appellants contend that Ferguson fails to disclose a method of accessing a file allocation table (FAT) partition. App. Br. 13. The Examiner responds that: Ferguson discloses a FAT file system in Col 9 lines 29-34 and by extension, that the partitions depicted in Fig. 2 of Ferguson would read on appellant’s FAT partitions since the operating system would be accessing files stored on the partitions in accordance with a FAT access protocol as disclosed and suggested by Col 9 lines 31-40 and the partitions would need to be formatted as FAT partitions in order for them to accommodate a FAT file system]. Ans. 8. Appellants argue that the cited portion of Ferguson discloses that an interpreter can be stored in the file system of a computer network, but that Ferguson does not disclose that such file system can be a “FAT file system.” Reply Br. 11. We disagree. Ferguson teaches that, when a file is requested Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 5 from computer readable medium 96 (also described by Ferguson as a hard disk drive) “the operating system checks the addresses in the FAT to find out where the file’s clusters are stored and then goes to the medium [e.g., hard disk drive] to get the cluster of the information.” Ferguson col. 9, ll. 34-38. That is, the file system disclosed by Ferguson includes a FAT used when accessing information on hard disk drive 96. While Ferguson also teaches that a program may be kept in place by not entering the program file into the FAT, this does not detract from the ordinary situation described by Ferguson wherein the FAT is used nor does it mean that the file system does not use a FAT, i.e., is not a FAT file system. Therefore, we agree that Ferguson discloses a FAT file system. The Examiner further finds that: the partitions depicted in Fig. 2 of Ferguson would read on appellant’s FAT partitions since the operating system would be accessing files stored on the partitions in accordance with a FAT access protocol as disclosed and suggested by Col 9 lines 31-40 and the partitions would need to be formatted as FAT partitions in order for them to accommodate a FAT file system]. Ans. 8. We agree with the Examiner. Fig. 2 of Ferguson depicts a distributed directory 30 organized in partitions, each partition comprising a plurality of objects organized as a logical subtree. Ferguson col. 5, ll. 16-19. Appellants’ Specification does not provide a definition of a “FAT partition,” while the ordinary and customary meaning of “partition”1 includes (i) a 1 Where no explicit definition for a term is given in the specification, the term should be given its ordinary meaning and broadest reasonable interpretation. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 6 logically distinct portion of memory or a storage device that functions as though it were a physically separate unit2 or (ii) a section of the storage area of a hard disk created for organizational purposes or to separate different operating systems.3 Ferguson describes a distributed directory 30 partitioning objects that are stored across network 40 (Ferguson col 5, ll. 16- 26) and storing using a FAT file system (Ferguson col. 9, ll. 34-38.) Thus, partitioning according to Ferguson results in storing objects in distinct portions of storage of a FAT file system. Therefore, under a broad construction of a FAT partition that is consistent with Appellants’ Specification4, we find that the partitions of Ferguson’s Fig. 2 disclose the claimed FAT partition. Furthermore, Ferguson discloses the operating system checks the address in the FAT to identify clusters associated with a file. Ferguson col. 9, ll. 34-38. One of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have known and understood that “[i]n data storage, [a cluster is] a disk- storage unit consisting of a fixed number of sectors (storage segments on the disk) that the operating system uses to read or write information”5, i.e., “the basic unit of data storage [including] two or more sectors.”6 Therefore, Ferguson’s description of using a FAT to identify clusters of a file standing question at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 2 Microsoft Computer Dictionary, Fifth Edition, Microsoft Press (2002), p. 392. 3 Webster’s New World Computer Dictionary, 10th Edition, Wiley Publishing (2003), pp. 274-275. 4 “[D]uring examination proceedings, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 5 Microsoft Computer Dictionary, p. 104. 6 Webster’s New World Computer Dictionary, p. 75. Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 7 alone discloses using a directory to access a FAT partition, i.e., a logically distinct portion of memory including clusters. Therefore, in the absence of sufficient evidence or argument, Appellants’ contention is not persuasive of Examiner error. Appellants further contend that Ferguson does not disclose associating a shared directory to said FAT partition, said shared directory identified by using one or more variables. App. Br. 16-19. Appellants support for their conclusion is based on repetition of corresponding portions of the Examiner’s rejection and cited portions of Ferguson, with Appellants merely asserting that the disputed claim language is not disclosed by those portions of Ferguson. Id. The Examiner responds that “[t]he shared & distributed directory (step 81 of Fig. 4) depicted in Fig. 2 and briefly described in Col 3 lines 30-31 is associated with several FAT partitions according to Fig. 2, and the directory must have an identifier in order for the computer system of which it is a part to reference and access it.” Ans. 8. We agree with the Examiner. As detailed supra, and contrary to Appellants’ argument, we find that Ferguson discloses a FAT partition. We further disagree that Ferguson fails to disclose the disputed “shared directory.” App. Br. 18. We instead agree with the Examiner (Ans. 8-9) and find that Ferguson’s description of a distributed directory spanning and shared by multiple networking server nodes (Ferguson, col. 1, ll. 6-9; col. 4. ll. 28-29) discloses a shared directory. As before, Appellants’ Specification fails to provide a definition of the disputed “shared directory.” In its definition of a “shared directory,” the Microsoft Computer Dictionary references the definition for a “network directory.”7 In turn, a network directory is defined as “[o]n a local area network, a directory on a disk that is located on a computer other than the 7 Microsoft Computer Dictionary, p. 477. Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 8 one the user is operating.”8 Since Ferguson’s distributed directory is accessible on client/server network 10 (see, e.g., Ferguson, Fig. 1, col. 4, ll. 28-29), it is a network directory that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand to be a “shared” directory. Therefore, we agree that Ferguson discloses the disputed limitations and Appellants’ contentions at pages 16-19 of the Appeal Brief are unpersuasive of Examiner error. In connection with Appellants’ further contentions of error in connection with claim 1 (App. Br. 19-28), we find the corresponding responses by the Examiner (Ans. 9-10) to be reasonable and we adopt them as our own. In particular we find that Ferguson discloses “configuring a password to authenticate a user requesting access to said FAT partition” (App. Br. 19-21) and “providing a level of access to said FAT partition based on said password.” (App. Br. 22-25.) We agree with the Examiner that requiring a password to access the computer resources discloses the disputed step of configuring a password to authenticate a user requesting access to said FAT partition since the FAT partition is accessible by using the computer resources secured by the password. See Ans. 9. Similarly, by teaching directory security, login security, and file system security (Ferguson col. 6, l. 42 – col. 7, l. 30) Ferguson discloses “providing a level of access to said FAT partition based on said password.” See Ans. 9. Therefore, in the absence of sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us of Examiner error, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 and, for the same reasons, dependent claims 9-11 not separately argued. 3rd Argument – Claim 2 8 Id. at 363. Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 9 Appellants contend that Ferguson fails to disclose the subject matter of claim 2 and, in particular, assigning one or more values to one or more variables. App. Br. 30. Appellants further argue that the Examiner erred in finding that “any directory must be identified by one or more variables which invariably must be stored in a non-volatile memory in order to enable access [to] the directory at the file system level.” App. Br. 31 (quoting Final Office Action of April 8, 2009 at page 11). The Examiner responds: The examiner is simply stating what is well known to anyone having an ordinary level of skill in the art, as evidenced by the attached FAT (file allocation table) NPL document of a dictionary description of what a FAT is. A file system will be stored in non-volatile memory (such as the hard disk) and will include identifiers and addresses/pointers to the files and directories in the file system. Without this basic data, the files and directories would not exist and could not be accessed. If this data was not stored in non-volatile memory, the computer system would lose all data each time it lost power or was switched off. Ans. 10. Appellants reply that “the Examiner has not precluded the case where a value could be stored in volatile memory. Therefore, the Appellants submit that the Examiner has not shown a teaching of the subject matter recited in Claim 2.” Reply Br. 19. We disagree that the Examiner has erred. Concerning the language requiring assignment of a value to a variable, Appellants fail to provide evidence that Ferguson does not assign one or more values to one or more variables. In particular, Appellants fail to provide sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us that the Examiner erred in finding that program 91 described as a stream value stored in non- volatile computer readable medium 96 (Ans. 3 citing Ferguson col. 9, ll. 25- 44) discloses the disputed limitations. Furthermore, we find that one of Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 10 ordinary skill in the art would know that variables contain values, i.e., a variable is “a named storage location capable of containing data that can be modified during program execution.”9 While we agree with Appellants that the Examiner has not precluded the case where a value could be stored in volatile memory, that does not detract from Ferguson’s teaching of storing values in non-volatile memory. Therefore, in the absence of sufficient evidence or argument, we are not persuaded of error and sustain the rejection of claim 2. 4th Argument – Claim 3 Appellants contend that “[w]hile, Ferguson, at col. 9, lines 3-44, may teach various aspects of a computer system, Ferguson, at col, 9, lines 3-44, does not teach ‘wherein said non-volatile memory is located within a data storage device,’ as recited in Claim 3. Appellants submit that a ‘nonvolatile computer readable medium’ does not teach a ‘non-volatile memory.’” App. Br. 33. Appellants argue that “as shown in Figure 5 of Ferguson, the ‘nonvolatile computer readable medium’ is not shown located within a data storage device.” Id. The Examiner responds that “first, a hard disk is a non- volatile memory within a storage device; second, a nonvolatile flash memory would clearly be coexistive in scope with both a ‘nonvolatile computer readable medium’ and a ‘nonvolatile memory.’” Ans. 10. We agree with the Examiner. “A reference anticipates a claim if it discloses the claimed invention ‘such that a skilled artisan could take its teachings in combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in possession of the invention.’” In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1152, 36 USPQ2d 1697, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 9 Microsoft Computer Dictionary, p. 547. Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 11 (quoting In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 936, 133 USPQ 365, 372 (CCPA 1962)). Anticipation “is not an ‘ipsissimis verbis’ test.” In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832-33 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Akzo N.V. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 & n.11 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “An anticipatory reference . . . need not duplicate word for word what is in the claims.” Standard Havens Prods., Inc.v. Gencor Indus., 953 F.2d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Claim 3 requires that the non-volatile memory be located within a data storage device. The Examiner has found that the non-volatile memory of claim 2 is disclosed by Ferguson’s FAT file system stored in a non- volatile computer readable medium 96 described by Ferguson as a hard disk drive. Ans. 10. Appellants fail to provide persuasive evidence or argument why a “‘nonvolatile computer readable medium’ does not teach a ‘non- volatile memory’” (App. Br. 33) or why Ferguson’s FAT file system stored on a hard disk drive fails to disclose both. As discussed supra, anticipation “is not an ‘ipsissimis verbis’ test.” In re Bond at 832-33 (Fed. Cir. 1990.) Accordingly, because Appellants provide insufficient evidence or argument that Ferguson’s non-volatile computer readable medium 96, described as a hard disk drive (Ferguson col. 9, ll. 33-34), fails to disclose a non-volatile memory located within a data storage device, i.e., hard disk drive, we sustain the rejection of claim 3. 5th Argument – Claim 4 Appellants contend that: [w]hile Ferguson, at Figure 1 may disclose “an example of interconnected nodes, a computer readable medium, and an object with several associated attributes,[”] and while Figure 2 discloses “an example of a distributed directory and several Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 12 servers accessing the distributed directory,” none of Ferguson, at Figures 1 and 2, discloses anything about “wherein said FAT partition is located in a computing device, said computing device communicatively coupled to said data storage device.” App. Br. 35-36. The Examiner responds that “FAT partition are partitions of hard drives (storage devices)), which are located within servers/computers (computing devices) - all of which are communicatively coupled [as depicted in Figs. 1 and 2.]” Ans. 11. We agree with the Examiner. As discussed supra, “[a]reference anticipates a claim if it discloses the claimed invention ‘such that a skilled artisan could take its teachings in combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in possession of the invention.’” In re Graves, 69 F.3d at 1152. We find that Ferguson’s connection 16 of clients/server 10 communicatively couples server node 12 and client nodes 14, the respective hard drives (storage devices) including FAT file systems and the FAT partitions thereby disclosing the disputed limitations of wherein said FAT partition is located in a computing device, said computing device communicatively coupled to said data storage device. See Ans. 11. Therefore we sustain the rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and, for the same reasons, the rejection of claim 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), claim 25 not separately argued. 6th –10th, 12th, and 13th Arguments – Claims 5—8, 12, 14, 15, 19, and 20 Dependent claims 5-8, 12, 14, 15, 19, and 20 recite limitations including: Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 13 “configuring of said password is performed using said one or more variables whose values are stored in said non-volatile memory of said data storage device” (claim 5); “values stored in said non-volatile memory are unaffected by interruption of power provided to said data storage device” (claim 6); “values stored in said non-volatile memory are unaffected by removal and/or replacement of one or more data storage drives of said data storage device” (claim 7); “accessing is facilitated by way of using one or more of the following protocols: NFS (i.e., Network File System), CIFS (i.e., Common Internet File System), FTP (i.e., File Transfer Protocol), and HTTP (i.e., Hypertext Transfer Protocol)” (claim 8 and similarly recited in claim 19); “said password is configured using a user interface” (claim 12 and similarly recited in claim 14); “wherein said password is used to provide a level of access to said files stored in said FAT partition” (claim 15); and “wherein a first set of values assigned to said one or more variables is used for associating said FAT partition to said shared directory” (claim 20.) While Appellants argue that Ferguson does not disclose the subject matter of these claims (App. Br. 36-47, 49-52, and 55-58), the Examiner provides support for his findings (Ans. 3-4, 11-13), which we find Appellants have failed to persuasively rebut. Furthermore, Appellants’ contentions are largely based on a failure of Ferguson to use the same language as recited in the claims or disclose aspects that are inherent and/or included by definition. For example, in connection with claim 5 Appellants argue that “Ferguson may teach that file Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 14 system security provides access control to files and directories; however, Ferguson does not teach anything about ‘using said one or more variable whose values are stored in said non-volatile memory of said data storage device’ as recited in Claim 5.” App. Br. 38. However, as found by the Examiner, “by accessing a directory, the variables that comprise its identifier must inherently be used; the variables corresponding to the identifier are stored in non-volatile memory of the file system.” Ans. 11. We find similar arguments in connection with assigning values to variables for associating a FAT partition to a shared directory (App. Br. 56-58) to be similarly unpersuasive of error (see Ans. 13). As another example, Appellants contend that the limitations of claim 6 are not disclosed because “Ferguson does not disclose anything about an ‘interruption of power provided to said data storage device,’ as recited in Claim 6.” App. Br. 40. Claim 6 adds the limitation that values stored in the non-volatile memory of claims 1 and 3 are unaffected by interruption of power provided to said data storage device. We note that nonvolatile memory is defined as “[a] storage system that does not lose data when power is removed from it.”10 Accordingly Appellants’ argument that, because Ferguson does not mention power interruption, it fails to disclose nonvolatile memory is unaffected by an interruption of power is not persuasive of error since, by definition, nonvolatile memory does not lose data (i.e., is “unaffected”) by power interruptions. Therefore, in the absence of sufficient evidence to persuade us of Examiner error, we sustain the rejections of claims 5—8, 12, 14, 15, 19, and 20 and, for the same reasons, claims 16-18, 22 and 23 not separately argued. 10 Microsoft Computer Dictionary, p. 367. Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 15 11th Argument – Claim 13 Appellants contend that while Ferguson discloses a flowchart describing a series of steps, if fails to disclose “a system for providing access to files stored in a FAT partition” including a memory, software resident in a memory, or a processor used for executing said software. App. Br. 48-49. Appellants further contend that “the Examiner has not shown a teaching [in Ferguson] of ‘wherein executing said software generates a share corresponding to said FAT partition.’” App. Br. 49. The Examiner responds that: Ferguson must implicitly if not inherently make use of the limitations that appellant has argued are missing - a computer implemented method must make use of a processor, a memory and software within the memory to direct the processor to perform the steps included in the computer-implemented method. In fact each of the computers depicted in Fig. 1 will have the limitations that appellant has argued are not explicitly disclosed. Ans. 12. We agree with the Examiner. In particular, Ferguson teaches a “[c]omputer system for storing and securing executable content.” Ferguson Abstract. A computer system is defined as “[t]he configuration that includes all functional components of a computer and its associated hardware. A basic microcomputer system includes a console, or system unit, with one or more disk drives, a monitor, and a keyboard.” Microsoft Computer Dictionary, p. 121. Furthermore Ferguson teaches that his computer system includes: i. a memory (computer readable medium 18 includes various types of memories (Ferguson col. 4, ll. 5-17)); Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 16 ii. software resident in the memory (computer readable medium 18 holds information readable by a computer including programs, data, files, etc. (Ferguson col. 4, ll. 5-7)); and iii. a processor for executing software (“[i]n general terms, a program is a sequential set of instructions from a programming language for directing a processor to perform specified operations or functions.” (Ferguson col. 1, ll. 27-30.)) Concerning the limitation “wherein executing said software generates a share corresponding to said FAT partition,” the Examiner responds that “by disclosing that the shared directory is associated with any number of partitions, Ferguson discloses the generation of a ‘share’ corresponding to said FAT partition - or the generation of a shared FAT partition which reads on the claimed limitation.” Ans. 12-13. We agree with the Examiner. Appellants’ Specification does not provide a definition for the term “share” nor do Appellants provide evidence that the Examiner’s interpretation of “a share corresponding to said FAT partition” is inconsistent with the Specification or otherwise erroneous. Other than allege that Ferguson does not disclose the disputed claim language (App. Br. 49, Reply Br. 27-28), Appellants do not explain or provide evidence in support of why the Examiner’s interpretation of Ferguson is incorrect. Accordingly, we find no reversible error. For the reasons supra, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Ferguson discloses the disputed limitations of claim 13. Ans. 3, 12-13. The Examiner’s rejection is based on a broad, but reasonable interpretation, in light of the Specification, of “generation of a ‘share’ corresponding to said FAT partitions” to mean “generation of a shared FAT partition.” See Ans. 13. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 13. Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 17 14th Argument – Claim 26 Appellants contend that while Ferguson discloses that: i. “the Final Office Action has not shown a teaching of each and every element of wherein executing said software using said processor ‘provides a level of access to said FAT partition based on said username and said password, said user requesting access by way of a user interface provided by a second computing device communicatively coupled to said data storage device’” (App. Br. 60); and ii. the Examiner’s objection to the claim language “a FAT file system for storing a FAT partition” as a misuse of technical language is improper. Id. The Examiner responds that claim 26 “is unpatentable using the same (or substantially similar) rationale, mutatis mundatis, as applied to claims 1, 5, 12 & 14 above (see also Fig. 1 & 2 and their respective descriptions).” Ans. 4. In connection with the specific limitations disputed by Appellants as absent from Ferguson, we find this contention unpersuasive of error for the reasons set forth supra in connection with claims 5, 12 and 14. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 26. In connection with the objection, the issue relates to petitionable subject matter under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181 and not to appealable subject matter. See In re Mindick, 371 F.2d 892, 894 (CCPA 1967) and MPEP §§1002.02(c)(4) and 1201. Therefore, we do not decide this issue as it is not properly before this Board. Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 18 15th Argument – Claim 21 Appellants contend that “Liebman, does not teach ‘wherein a second set of values assigned to said one or more variables is used for identifying said password and a username.’” App. Br. 65. Appellants argue that Liebman’s interface for inputting and removing a user name and password on a server does not teach or suggest the disputed language of claim 21. Id. The Examiner responds that “the input username and password can be used to identify a username and password that must be saved or otherwise present in something similar to an authentication directory which compares input values to stored username/password data.” Ans. 14. We agree with the Examiner. During examination, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, and the language should be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Amer. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Appellants provide insufficient evidence or argument that the Examiner’s position is unreasonable to persuade us of error. Assigning a value to a variable so that the variable identifies data stored in memory, such as a password or username, is a fundamental technique used in digital computing. For example, a variable is defined as “a named storage location capable of containing data that can be modified suing program execution . . . compare constant.”11 One of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood that Liebman’s password and username data must be accessed using address data referencing the storage location of the username and password (i.e., the memory address of the username and password). While we agree with the Examiner that a user inputting of a username and 11 Microsoft Computer Dictionary, p. 547. Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 19 password to be saved or is otherwise present in an authentication directory (e.g., Liebman’s Samba users list (Liebman [0055])) teaches or suggests a second set of values assigned to said one or more variables used for identifying said password and a username, we further find that Liebman’s disclosure of a username and password standing alone would teach or suggest the disputed limitation. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 21. 16th Argument – Claim 24 Appellants contend that Liebman’s disclosure of passwords in a UNIX and Samba operating systems does not teach or suggest encoding a password in a format that facilitates creating a Unix password file and a Samba password file. App. Br. 70. The Examiner responds that “by disclosing the UNIX OS [operating system] and the samba protocol, it is implicit if not also sensible that the files created within a UNIX OS and in accordance with a samba protocol would be encoded according to said OS and protocol in order to facilitate their reading and writing.” Ans. 14. In the absence of evidence or argument to the contrary, we find the Examiner’s response reasonable and find no reversible error. Appellants further argue that there is no motivation to combine Ferguson with Liebman. App. Br. 70. The Examiner responds that “[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to use a well known OS because this would simply amount to selecting among a finite and well known collection of operating systems.” Ans. 5-6. We agree with the Examiner. The Federal Circuit has “[held] that while an analysis of obviousness always depends on evidence that supports the required Graham factual Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 20 findings, it also may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion.” Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also, Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“It has long been the law that the motivation to combine need not be found in prior art references, but equally can be found ‘in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art.”’ (quoting In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 351 (Fed.Cir.1992))). The Court further instructs that: [w]hen there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). From the above- cited case law, it is clear the Examiner did not err in combining the references. For the reasons supra we sustain the rejection of claim 24. CONCLUSION We find that: (iv) Ferguson discloses the disputed limitations of claims 1-8, 12-15, 19-20, and 26; (v) The combination of Ferguson and Liebman teaches or suggests the disputed limitations of claims 21 and 24; and (vi) The combination of Ferguson and Liebman is proper in rejecting claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal 2010-011892 Application 11/339,154 21 Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 1-8, 12-15, 19-20, and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Ferguson and, for the same reasons, the rejection of claims 9-11, 16-18, 22 and 23 not separately argued. Furthermore, we sustain the rejection of claims 21 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Ferguson and Liebman and, for the same reasons, the rejection of claim 25 not separately argued. DECISION The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-26 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED tj Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation