Ex Parte WilkinsonDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJan 2, 201914052102 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 2, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 14/052,102 10/11/2013 Bruce W. Wilkinson 122573 7590 01/02/2019 Fitch, Even, Tabin & Flannery, LLP/Walmart Apollo 120 South LaSalle Street Suite 2100 Chicago, IL 60603-3406 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 8842-131456-US 1027 EXAMINER AKHTER, SHARMIN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2689 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/02/2019 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte BRUCE W. WILKINSON Appeal 2018---001453 1 Application 14/052, 102 Technology Center 2600 Before MELISSA A. RAAP ALA, Acting Vice Chief Administrative Patent Judge, and JOHNNY A. KUMAR and TERRENCE W. MCMILLIN, Administrative Patent Judges KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-20, which are all the pending claims in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM. 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. App. Br. 3. Appeal2018---001453 Application 14/052, 102 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant's disclosure relates to delivery receptacles. See Spec. ,r 1. Claim 1 is illustrative and reads as follows, with disputed elements highlighted in italics: 1. An apparatus comprising: a delivered-package vault having a selectively-lockable access portal; a radio-frequency identification (RFID)-tag reader; a control circuit operably coupled to the RFID-tag reader and the selectively-lockable access portal and configured to verify when at least one expected package RFID tag has actually been placed within the delivered-package vault, at least in part by comparing information read from the package RFID tag with previously-received information regarding the expected package, to confirm delivery of a corresponding expected package. App. Br. 14 (Claims App.). The Examiner's Rejections Claims 1-3, 6, 9, 10, 12, and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Biasi et al. (US 2005/0075989 Al, published April 7, 2005) (hereinafter "Biasi") in view of Dohrmann et al. (US 6,967,575 Bl, issued November 22, 2005) (hereinafter "Dohrmann"). Claims 4 and 5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Biasi in view of Dohrmann and further in view of Martin (US 2013/0063008 Al, published March 14, 2013). Claims 7, 8, and 15-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Biasi in view of Dohrmann and further in view of Nielsen (US 2002/0180582 Al, published December 5, 2002). 2 Appeal2018---001453 Application 14/052, 102 Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Biasi in view of Dohrmann and further in view of Mcintyre (WO 2012/174387 A2, published December 20, 2012). Claim 14 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Biasi in view of Dohrmann and further in view of Moreno (US 2002/0035515 Al, published March 21, 2002). Prior Board's Decision on Appeal In the Decision on Appeal dated March 9, 2017 ("Decision"), we affirmed the rejection of claims 1-20 as being unpatentable over Biasi, and Dohrmann alone or in combination with Martin, Nielsen, McIntyre, and Moreno. The discussion of the teachings and the combination of Biasi in view of Dohrmann, as applied to claim 1 on appeal are substantially similar to those presented for claim 1 in the prior Decision. To the extent Appellant's arguments are similar to those presented in the prior Decision, we will not repeat our analysis and will refer to the prior Decision. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellant's arguments that the Examiner has erred. We adopt as our own ( 1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner's Answer in response to Appellant's Appeal Brief. We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis as follows. Appellant contends: 3 Appeal2018---001453 Application 14/052, 102 By now placing the word "actually" in the claims as the applicant has done, the applicant's arguments of record now fully accord with the language and scope of the claims and the applicant's points regarding what distinguishes the prior art from the claims are now indisputably in play. App. Br. 12 (hereinafter the "actually been placed" disputed limitation). Regarding the "actually been placed" disputed limitation, we adopt the Examiner's findings at Ans. 5. In particular, we agree with the Examiner that changing the claim language from "is placed" ( as was set forth in claim 1 at the time of our prior Decision) to "has actually been placed" does not change the claim interpretation. Further, Appellant provides no persuasive evidence or argument regarding why the teachings of Biasi do not meet the disputed limitation of "actually been placed." We agree with the Examiner's findings that Biasi teaches the "actually been placed" disputed limitation: [T]he sender/courier places the object in the assigned box and closes the assigned door. Then, the controller 16 locks the door, sets in use indicator 19, scans the object for the object identification, i.e., package identification code 41, and captures the image of the person who placed object 42 in the assigned box. Then, the sender/courier confirms object delivery using user interface device 17 and obtains a confirmation number from controller 16. Final Act. 4 ( citing Biasi, ,r 28) ( emphasis added). It is well settled that mere attorney's arguments and conclusory statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Attorney argument is not evidence. In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). Nor can such 4 Appeal2018---001453 Application 14/052, 102 argument take the place of evidence lacking in the record. Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F.2d 775, 782 (CCPA 1977). Appellant presents no arguments for claims 2-20 and the corresponding rejections. We refer to the above discussion and further adopt the Examiner's findings and conclusion concerning the rejections of these claims. We have considered Appellant's arguments in the Reply Brief but find them unpersuasive to rebut the Examiner's responses. Consequently, we conclude there is no reversible error in the Examiner's rejections of claims 1-20. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of claims 1-20. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 5 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation