Ex Parte White et al

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 27, 2019

13671550 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 27, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. 13/671,550 132787 7590 Docket Clerk-GOLD P.O. Drawer 800889 Dallas, TX 75380 FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 11/07/2012 Christopher White 07/01/2019 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. GSCD11-00435 8218 EXAMINER BORLING HAUS, JASON M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3693 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/01/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patents@munckwilson.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Exparte CHRISTOPHER WHITE, JUSTIN GMELICH, DIMITER GEORGIEV, DEBRA HERSCHMANN, PAUL J. HUCHRO, WICHAR JIEMPREECHA, ROSS LEVINSKY, JOHNNY SHAFFER, STEPHANIE MIRIAM SKLAR, and PAUL WALKER Appeal2017-008482 1 Application 13/671,5502 Technology Center 3600 Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and JOHN D. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judges. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants file this appeal under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1--4, 6-10, 13-16, 19-22, 25-28, 31- 34, and 37. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 6(b). We affirm. 1 Our Decision relies upon Appellants' Appeal Brief ("Br.," filed Oct. 11, 2016) and Specification ("Spec.," filed Nov. 7, 2012), as well as the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed Mar. 1, 2017) and the Final Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed May 18, 2016). 2 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Goldman, Sachs & Co. Br. 1. Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 THE CLAIMED INVENTION Appellants' claimed invention relates to facilitating order execution at improved prices for electronic trading systems. Abstract. Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced below. 1. An electronic trading system, comprising: a memory; a processor configured to execute a plurality of modules stored in the memory, the plurality of modules comprising: a user interface module configured to provide a user interface for receiving a buy order or a sell order for execution at a bid price or an ask price; an order capture module configured to aggregate orders from a plurality of participants for execution, each of the aggregated orders being a buy order or a sell order for execution at the bid price or the ask price; a price improvement module configured to: determine from the aggregated orders, total orders on a buy side and a sell side; determine that each of an amount of the total orders in the buy side and an amount of the total orders in the sell side is at least a predefined liquidity amount, said predefined liquidity amount being specific to a trading session during which the orders are received and aggregated from the plurality of participants for execution; in response to the determining that the predefined liquidity amount is met, generate an indication to execute one or more of the orders at an improved bid price or an improved ask price; and an order execution module configured to, in response to the indication: access a lookup table establishing a correspondence between changes in price and excess liquidity, retrieve from the lookup table a change in price corresponding to an amount of liquidity generated during the session in excess of the predefined liquidity amount, 2 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 apply the retrieved change in price to the bid price by subtracting the retrieved change in price from the bid price to generate an improved bid price, apply the retrieved change in price to the ask price by adding the retrieved change in price to the ask price to generate an improved ask price, and automatically execute the one or more of the orders at the improved bid price and the improved ask price to generate a saving for each participant associated with the executed orders. REJECTIONS ON APPEAL (1) The Examiner rejected claims 1--4, 6-10, 13-16, 19-22, 25-28, 31-34, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. (2) The Examiner rejected claims 2, 14, and 26 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 112, first paragraph, for failure to comply with the written description requirement. (3) The Examiner rejected claims 1--4, 6-10, 13-16, 19-22, 25-28, 31-34, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite. (4) The Examiner rejected claims 1--4, 6-10, 13-16, 19-22, 25-28, 31-34, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Dreyer et al. (US 2009/0271291 Al; published Oct. 29, 2009) (hereinafter "Dreyer") and Mackay (US 2008/0275808 Al; published Nov. 6, 2008). 3 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants' arguments that the Examiner errs. We address the Examiner's findings and Appellants' arguments below. Â§ 101 REJECTION Claim Grouping Appellants substantively argue the pending claims as a group for the Examiner'sÂ§ 101 rejection. See Br. 36-43. Accordingly, we select independent claim 1 as representative of the pending claims, and we decide the appeal of the Â§ 101 rejection on the basis of representative claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. Â§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) (2016); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). We refer to the rejected claims collectively herein as "the claims." Principles of Law An invention is patent eligible if it claims a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101 to include implicit exceptions: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217-18 ( citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is "directed to." See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of 4 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk."). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 ); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as "molding rubber products" (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981) ); "tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267---68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 ("We view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment." Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now 5 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection."). If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 ( citation omitted). "A claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]."' Id. ( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[ s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id. The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of Â§ 101. USPTO's 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("Revised Guidance"). 3 Under this guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: ( 1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., elements that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful 3 Available at www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018- 28282.pdf. 6 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception (see MPEP4 Â§ 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h)). Id. at 54. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP Â§ 2106.05(d)); or ( 4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See id. at 54--56. The Judicial Exception ~ Prong One of Step 2A The Examiner determines that the claims recite the abstract idea of "trading and price improvement." Final Act. 2. More specifically, the Examiner finds that the claims recite "the concept of performing order execution at improved prices[, which] is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce." Id. at 11. As we discuss below, we find that Appellants' claims recite one or more abstract ideas. Generally, Appellants' claims concern facilitating order execution of financial instruments at improved prices by (i) determining the total orders on each trade side (i.e., buy and sell); (ii) determining whether the two-sided 4 All Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP") citations herein are to MPEP, 9th ed., Rev. 08.2017, January 2018. 7 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 order interest is sufficient; and (iii) if so, executing orders at improved prices. See, e.g., Br. 48 (reciting claim 1 ); Abstract. More specifically, claim 1 recites "receiving a buy order or a sell order for execution at a bid price or an ask price"; "aggregat[ing] orders from a plurality of participants for execution, each of the aggregated orders being a buy order or a sell order for execution at the bid price or the ask price"; "determin[ing] from the aggregated orders, total orders on a buy side and a sell side"; "determin[ing] that each of an amount of the total orders in the buy side and an amount of the total orders in the sell side is at least a predefined liquidity amount, said predefined liquidity amount being specific to a trading session during which the orders are received and aggregated from the plurality of participants for execution"; "in response to the determining that the predefined liquidity amount is met, generat[ing] an indication to execute one or more of the orders at an improved bid price or an improved ask price"; and "in response to the indication: access[ing] a lookup table establishing a correspondence between changes in price and excess liquidity," "retriev[ing] from the lookup table a change in price corresponding to an amount of liquidity generated during the session in excess of the predefined liquidity amount," "apply[ing] the retrieved change in price to the bid price by subtracting the retrieved change in price from the bid price to generate an improved bid price," and "apply[ing] the retrieved change in price to the ask price by adding the retrieved change in price to the ask price to generate an improved ask price." Br. 48--49. These limitations relate to optimizing prices for trading financial instruments, which is a fundamental economic practice. See OIP Tech., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that the 8 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 "concept of 'offer based pricing' is similar to other 'fundamental economic concepts' found to be abstract ideas by the Supreme Court and this court") ( citations omitted); see also Final Act. 11. Accordingly, Appellants' claims recite a fundamental economic practice, which is an abstract idea within grouping (b) under the Revised Guidance. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 ("(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity- fundamental economic principles or practices."). Alternatively, the claims recite a mental process, which is an abstract idea within grouping ( c) under the Revised Guidance. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 ("(c) Mental processes----concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)"); see also Ans. 11. More specifically, claim 1 's limitations discussed above cover performance in the mind (but for a generic computer "memory" and "processor" and software "modules"), and thus, fall within the mental processes category. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper."). For example, the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 1 's receiving orders, aggregating orders, improving prices, and ordering execution allow for them to be performed entirely in the human mind. Notably, claim 1 recites "aggregat[ing] orders from a plurality of participants," and thus, claim 1 's limitations can be applied to as few as two participants (e.g., one buy order and one sell order), which easily can be accomplished by a human mentally, or with pen and paper. See Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353----54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 9 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 ( citations omitted) (noting that the Federal Circuit has treated "analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, ... without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category"); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (footnote omitted)) ("[C]omputational methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are the types of methods that embody the 'basic tools of scientific and technological work' that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."). Integration into a Practical Application - Prong Two of Step 2A Claim 1 recites, in addition to the abstract idea discussed above, (i) a "memory" storing a "plurality of modules" and a "processor" and (ii) "automatically execut[ing] the one or more of the orders at the improved bid price and the improved ask price to generate a saving for each participant associated with the executed orders." Br. 48--49 (Claims App.). As we discuss below, these additional elements do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP Â§ 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h)). Appellants argue that "the claims are directed towards a specific technical solution for solving a specific technical problem: when to trigger price improvement, and how to determine the appropriate amount of price improvement for a particular trading session." Br. 38-39 (citing Spec. ,r,r 29, 50). Put differently, Appellants argue that the claims improve the technology in a particular technical field, which could be indicative of the additional elements integrating the abstract idea into a practical application. Id.; Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 & n.25 (citing MPEP 10 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 Â§ 2106.05(a)). This purported improvement, however, relates to the abstract idea, and does not improve a computer, technology, or a technical field. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("We ... look to whether the claims in these patents focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.") (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Notably, Appellants' claims recite only generic components (i.e., a memory, processor, software modules) and generic functions (i.e., receiving, storing, determining, accessing, retrieving, and applying). Cf buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding the invocation of computers and generic functionality adds no inventive concept); see also Spec. ,r,r 60, 62---65 ( disclosing off-the-shelf, conventional computer components). Accordingly, the additional elements do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application under MPEP Â§ 2106.05(a). Furthermore, because a particular computer is not required, the claims do not define or rely on a "particular machine." See MPEP Â§ 2106.05(b ). Nor do "the claim[s] effect[] a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing." See id. atÂ§ 2106.05(c). Instead, the claims simply concern facilitating order execution of financial instruments at improved prices. As such, the claims have no other meaningful limitations on the above identified judicial exceptions. See id. atÂ§ 2106.05(e). The claims, at best, amount to nothing more than applying the abstract ideas using generic computer components and functions, as discussed above. This 11 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 does not render the abstract idea eligible. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 222; MPEP Â§ 2106.05(Â±). In addition, we are not persuaded that the additional element of "automatically execut[ing] the one or more of the orders at the improved bid price and the improved ask price to generate a saving for each participant associated with the executed orders" renders the claims patent eligible. Rather, automatically executing the orders is insignificant post-solution activity to the abstract idea, which does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP Â§ 2106.05(g); see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610-11. We also are not persuaded by Appellants' argument (e.g., Br. 39--41) that the claims pose no risk of preempting the abstract idea itself. A lack of preemption does not make a claim patent eligible. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility."); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract."). Thus, the claims do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. On this record, we are unpersuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that the claims are directed to an abstract idea. The Inventive Concept - Step 2B Claim 1 also lacks an inventive concept. To determine whether claim 1 provides an inventive concept, we consider the additional elements, 12 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 individually and in combination, to determine whether ( 1) they add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field or (2) simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Outside of the abstract idea, the additional elements only recite generic computer components and functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional and insignificant post-solution activity. See Ans. 13-14; Spec. ,r,r 60, 62---65; Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that the claims are patent ineligible. Additionally, we are not persuaded by Appellants' argument (Br. 41- 42) that the claimed subject matter must be "significantly more" because it is not found in the prior art. A finding of novelty or nonobviousness does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that subject matter is patentable eligible. "Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the Â§ 101 inquiry." Ass 'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner'sÂ§ 101 rejection of representative claim 1, as well as claims 2--4, 6-10, 13-16, 19-22, 25-28, 31-34, and 37, grouped therewith. Â§ 112, FIRST PARAGRAPH REJECTION Appellants argue that the Examiner errs in finding that claims 2, 14, and 26 do not have written description support in Appellants' Specification. Br. 43--44. More specifically, Appellants argue that the Examiner errs in 13 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 finding that the Specification does not disclose "that the 'analytics module' determines the minimum amount of liquidity prior to a beginning of the trading session." Id. at 43 ( citing Final Act. 3). Appellants argue that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that paragraph 23 of the Specification discloses "that the guaranteed liquidity amount must be determined prior to a beginning of the trading session because the guaranteed liquidity amount is guaranteed to be available for execution in a given session." Id. (citing Spec. ,r 23). In addition, Appellants argue that paragraph 36 of the Specification discloses that "the guaranteed liquidity amount may be determined by, for example, the analytics module[, and that] ... the guaranteed liquidity amount may be a session parameter that ... may be set ahead of the scheduled trading session." Id. at 43--44 (quoting Spec. ,r 36) ( emphasis omitted). The Examiner finds that Appellants' Specification fails to provide written description support for claims 2, 14, and 26. Final Act. 3; Ans. 14-- 15. More specifically, the Examiner finds that these claims require that an analytics module compute the predefined liquidity amount that "the system will meet." Ans. 14. In other words, the Examiner finds that these claims require "that the analytics module is predicting the 'minimum notional value that is guaranteed to be available for execution in a given session."' Id. at 14--15. The Examiner finds that the Specification does not explain how this prediction is being made. Id. at 15. We agree with Appellants that the Examiner errs. The proper interpretation of the claim language "predefined liquidity amount" is supported by the Specification's disclosure that "the guaranteed liquidity amount may be a session parameter that ... may be set ahead of the 14 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 scheduled trading session." Spec. ,r 36. Rather than being a prediction, as the Examiner finds, the claimed predefined liquidity amount can be a parameter that is calculated before a session. Id. Thus, rather than predicting what will occur, the claimed "predefined liquidity amount" sets a conditional parameter that must be met for other claim limitations to occur. Br. 48. We find that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably conclude that Appellants had possession of this aspect of the claimed invention at the time the Specification was filed. See In re Gosteli, 872 F .2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Spec. ,r 36. Accordingly, we do not sustain this rejection. Â§ 112, SECOND PARAGRAPH REJECTION Appellants argue that the Examiner errs in finding that the pending claims are indefinite because they (i) are "replete with structural problems" and (iii) recite optional limitations. Br. 44. Appellants argue that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the pending claims, and that the Examiner's findings relate to the breadth of the claim, rather than indefiniteness. Id. Appellants also argue that the claims do not recite optional limitations, but instead "require a determination that each of an amount of the total orders in the buy side and an amount of the total orders in the sell side is at least a predefined liquidity amount." Id. The Examiner finds that the pending claims are indefinite. Final Act. 4--6; Ans. 16-18. The Examiner finds that "essential steps/elements were omitted from the claimed inventions, such omission amounting to a gap between the elements/steps." Ans. 17 (citing MPEP Â§ 2172.01). The Examiner finds, as an example of this omission, that claim 1 's "user 15 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 interface module configured to provide a user interface for receiving a buy order or a sell order for execution at a bid price or an ask price" does not specify whether (i) the orders are market orders wherein the bid price and the ask price are established by the market, (ii) the orders are limit orders wherein the bid price and the ask price are established by the order maker, or (iii) what occurs if there is no room for price improvement. Ans. 17. The Examiner also finds that claim 1 's "order execution module" recites optional limitations (i.e., "access a lookup table establishing a correspondence between changes in price and excess liquidity," and "retrieve from the lookup table a change in price corresponding to an amount of liquidity generated during the session in excess of the predefined liquidity amount") because "[i]f the liquidity equals 'the predefined liquidity' then there is no liquidity 'in excess of the predefined liquidity amount."' Ans. 16. The test for definiteness is whether "those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification." Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F .2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); see also Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1210-13 (BPAI 2008) (precedential) (applying the Orthokinetics standard). We are persuaded that the Examiner errs. The Examiner relies on MPEP Â§ 2172.01, which provides that "a claim which fails to interrelate essential elements of the invention as defined by applicant(s) in the [S]pecification may be rejected" as indefinite, but the Examiner does not identify where, if at all, Appellants deem elements not included in the claims as essential. See Final Act. 4---6; Ans. 16-18. Moreover, the Examiner does not explain how a market order or limit order 16 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 are essential to the claimed limitation. See Final Act. 4---6; Ans. 16-18. In addition, we agree with Appellants that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand what is claimed in light of the Specification with respect to "receiving a buy order or a sell order for execution at a bid price or an ask price." E.g., Spec. ,r 16 ("The orders for trading in a financial instrument may be a limit order that specifies an order size, a bid price or an offer (ask) price. It should be noted that price quoted is from a point of view of a trader."). Lastly, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner errs in finding certain limitations optional. For example, claim 1 requires that "at least a predefined liquidity amount" is met, which allows for zero excess liquidity. The Examiner does not explain why a zero value for excess liquidity or change in price would render the claims indefinite or limitations optional. See Ans. 16. Accordingly, we do not sustain this rejection. Â§ 103 REJECTION Aggregate amount of orders Appellants argue that the combination of Dreyer and Mackay fails to teach or suggest that "each of an amount of the total orders in the buy side and an amount of the total orders in the sell side is at least a predefined liquidity amount," as recited in independent claim 1, and similarly recited in independent claims 13, 25, and 37. Br. 45. In particular, Appellants argue that Dreyer instead teaches that "a limit [is] applied to one user's block request, not to an aggregate amount of orders." Id. In addition, Appellants argue that Dreyer teaches that "block requests are rejected if the request volume is smaller than a predetermined minimum request volume," and "is 17 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 simply silent about a determination that block requests are 'at least a predefined liquidity amount.'" Id. ( citing Dreyer ,r 37). The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Dreyer teaches the disputed limitation. See Ans. 19-20; Final Act. 7-9, 12-14. First, we agree with the Examiner that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the independent claims does not require multiple orders on the sell side and multiple orders on the buy side, but rather also covers "1 buy order and 1 sell order." Ans. 19. For example, claim 1 requires "aggregat[ing] orders from a plurality of participants for execution, each of the aggregated orders being a buy order or a sell order." Br. 48. Hence, when there are two participants, one participant can submit a buy order while the other participant can submit a sell order (i.e., 1 is the "amount of the total orders in the buy side" and 1 is the "amount of the total orders in the sell side"). Id. Second, we agree with the Examiner that Dreyer teaches the disputed limitation via Dreyer's teaching of (i) receiving a block request (a buy order or sell order) with a price limit, and (ii) determining if there is sufficient volume on the other side of the transaction (counter-party to block request) to satisfy the predefined liquidity amount- volume or price limit discloses a predefined liquidity amount. Ans. 20 ( citing Dreyer ,r,r 23-24); Final Act. 7 ( citing Dreyer ,r,r 3 6-3 7); see also Dreyer ,r 3 6 ( disclosing that the price "is determined as the price of the matching quote that allows to fill the request volume . . . . Depending on the side of the trade, this is the cheapest matching quote (for a selling request) or the most expensive matching quote (for a buying request)"). 18 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 Specific to a Trading Session Appellants argue that the combination of Dreyer and Mackay fails to teach or suggest that the "predefined liquidity amount [is] specific to a trading session during which the orders are received and aggregated from the plurality of participants for execution," as recited in independent claim 1, and similarly recited in independent claims 13, 25, and 37. Br. 45--46 ( emphasis added). In particular, Appellants argue that "Dreyer ... is simply silent with respect to the price limit or limit volume (the alleged predefined amount) being specific to a trading session." Br. 45. Appellants argue that Dreyer instead teaches "an auction phase 410 divided into time periods." Id. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Dreyer teaches the disputed limitation. Ans. 20. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Dreyer teaches that the predefined liquidity amount (limit) is specific to a block request and the block request is resolved in an auction phase, which defines the trading session. Ans. 20 ( citing Dreyer ,r,r 23-24 ). We also agree with the Examiner that Dreyer teaches that the auction phase can be divided into time periods. Id. ( citing Dreyer ,r 107); see also e.g., Spec. ,r 23 ( describing trading sessions broadly as being initiated at a predetermined date and time and "running the session for a predetermined duration"). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that "the predefined liquidity amount is specific to the trading session utilized to execute the block request." Ans. 20. For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner'sÂ§ 103 rejection of independent claims 1, 13, 25, and 37, as well as dependent claims 2--4, 6-10, 12-16, 19-22, 26-28, and 31-34, which are not separately argued. 19 Appeal2017-008482 Application 13/671,550 DECISION We affirm the Examiner'sÂ§ 101 rejection of claims 1--4, 6-10, 13-16, 19-22, 25-28, 31-34, and 37. We reverse the Examiner'sÂ§ 112, first paragraph, rejection of claims 2, 14, and 26. We reverse the Examiner'sÂ§ 112, second paragraph, rejection of claims 1--4, 6-10, 13-16, 19-22, 25-28, 31-34, and 37. We affirm the Examiner'sÂ§ 103(a) rejection of claims 1--4, 6-10, 13- 16, 19-22, 25-28, 31-34, and 37. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. Â§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 20