Ex Parte Wanek et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 29, 201713107352 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/107,352 05/13/2011 James Wanek WBOT01-100US1 7237 65360 7590 John Boyd 17 Ferris Drive Old Greenwich, CT 06870 EXAMINER COPPOLA, JACOB C ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3621 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/31/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): john.boyd @ fisherbroyles.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JAMES WANEK, ARIF AYUB, and JOHN BOYD Appeal 2014-0037211 Application 13/107,3 522 Technology Center 3600 Before ANTON W. FETTING, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—6, 17, and 19-30. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“Br.,” filed September 6, 2013), the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed December 5, 2013), and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed May 16, 2013). 2 Appellants identify Weabot, Inc., as the real party in interest (Br. 1). Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 CLAIMED INVENTION Appellants’ claims relate to “methods and systems that target advertisements using real-time information including location-based, defined geolocation territory rights (e.g., GeoEstate rights) and weather-related information” (Spec. 11). Claims 1 and 19 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below with added bracketed notations, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A method for delivering a message to a mobile device, comprising[:] [a] selecting one or more messages targeted based on location-based, advertiser defined geolocation territory rights and also based on said mobile device’s location and weather conditions relating to said mobile device’s location and [b] transmitting said message to said mobile device over a network, [c] wherein said method uses one or more computer-based systems including a computer-readable medium having computer-executable components for performing said method. REJECTIONS Claims 1—6, 17, and 19-30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Claims 1—6, 17, and 19—30 are rejected under 35 USC § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite. Claims 17 and 30 are rejected under 35 USC § 112, fourth paragraph, as being of improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of a previous claim. 2 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 Claims 1—3, 17, 19-22, 24, 25, 29, and 30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Gelfand (US 2008/0268876 Al, pub. Oct. 30, 2008). Claims 1—6, 17, 19, 21, and 23—30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bishop (US 2010/0076849 Al, pub. Mar. 25, 2010) and Jablokov (US 2009/0076917 Al, pub. Mar. 19, 2009). Claims 1—6, 17, 19-22, 24, 25, and 27—30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bishop and Gelfand. ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. §101 Independent claims 1 and 19, and dependent claims 2—6, 17, and 20—30 In rejecting claims 1—6, 17, and 19-30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner finds “[bjased upon consideration of all of the relevant factors with respect to the claims as a whole, the claims are directed to abstract idea and are therefore rejected as ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101” (Final Act. 3). The Examiner concludes that independent claims 1 and 19 are directed to non-statutory subject matter because the claimed method does not satisfy the Bilski machine-or-transformation test, i.e., the method is not tied to a particular machine and does not transform the underlying subject matter to a different state or thing (id.). The Examiner also finds the “selecting” steps recited by independent claims 1 and 19 “do[] not necessarily require a machine because th[ese] steps could be performed mentally” and the “transmitting” steps recited by independent claims 1 and 19 “merely represent[] a post solution element” (id.). 3 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 Appellants argue, inter alia, that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1—6, 17, and 19-30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non- statutory subject matter because “[t]he Examiner asserts the claim is directed to an ‘abstract idea’, yet fails to describe the ‘abstract idea’ purported to be preempted by the claim” (Br. 10). We agree with Appellants. In the Response to Arguments portion of the Answer, the Examiner merely states that “[t]he Examiner has carefully considered Appellants’ arguments. See 2013 September Brief, pages 9—18. However, Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive. The Examiner maintains the rejection under 35 USC § 101 as set forth in the 2013 May Final Office Action (see paragraphs 5—15 and 56—59).” Thus, we are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner has not articulated an abstract idea. On this record, the Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case of patent-ineligibility for independent claims 1 and 19. Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—6, 17, and 19-30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph Independent claims 1 and 19, and dependent claims 2—6, 17, and 20—30 The Examiner rejected independent claims 1 and 19 and their dependent claims as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, because “[t]he limitation ‘computer-executable components for performing said method” invokes 35 [U.S.C. § 112], sixth paragraph, and the limitation is indefinite because the [Specification does not clearly link and associate sufficient structure to the function of ‘performing said method’” (Ans. 10 (emphasis omitted)). More particularly, the Examiner finds that although 4 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 claim 1 “does not recite ‘means for,’ the Examiner finds that the claimed ‘computer-executable components for’ is a non-structural term’” (Ans. 8), “the phrase recites the function of ‘performing said method’” {id.), and “the claim does not recite sufficient structure for performing the entire function of ‘performing said method’” {id. at 9). The Examiner also finds that “the original [Specification does not clearly link and associate sufficient corresponding structure to the function of ‘performing said method’” {id.). In response, Appellants do not provide any evidence to rebut the presumption that § 112, sixth paragraph, applies; but rather, simply argue that the claims do not expressly include the terms “means” or “step,” however, that alone is not a persuasive argument as to error in the rejection. Although Appellants state that “Appellants directed the Examiner’s attention to the Detailed Description of the Invention of the present application, specifically, pages 7—12 and 29-33. The claims are directed to a method performed by one or more computer-based systems” (Br. 19), this too is not a persuasive argument to show error in the Examiner’s rejection. Here, when the corresponding structure is computer components, the Specification must further disclose an algorithm for implementing the recited function of “performing said method,” i.e., “selecting one or more messages targeted based on location-based, advertiser defined geolocation territory rights and also based on said mobile device’s location and weather conditions relating to said mobile device’s location” and “transmitting said message to said mobile device.” Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd., v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) {quotingHarris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (‘“[t]he corresponding structure for a § 112^6 claim for a computer-implemented function is the 5 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 algorithm disclosed in the specification.’”). We have reviewed the Specification, but are unable to identify such an algorithm. In the absence of such an algorithm, independent claims 1 and 19 are indefinite, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Net Money IN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc. 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (‘“[A] means-plus-fimction claim element for which the only disclosed structure is a general purpose computer is invalid if the specification fails to disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function.”) See also Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding Blackboard’s means-plus- function claims indefinite because the patent describes an undefined component, i.e., a black box, that performs the recited function but does not disclose how the component performs the function). See further Ex parte Catlin, 90 USPQ2d 1603, 1605 (BPAI 2009) (precedential) (during prosecution, computer-enabled means-plus-function claims will be held unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite if a Specification fails to disclose any algorithm corresponding to the recited function in the claims). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph. 35 U.S.C. § 112, fourth paragraph Dependent claims 17 and 30 Claim 17 depends directly from independent claim 1 and claim 30 depends directly from independent claim 19 (Claims App.). Independent claims 1 and 19 are each directed to “[a] method for delivering a message to a mobile device” (id.). Independent claims 1 and 19 also each recites 6 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 “wherein said method uses one or more computer-based systems including a computer-readable medium having computer-executable components for performing said method” (id.). Dependent claim 17 recites “[a] computer based system for performing the method of claim 1, comprising one or more computer-based systems for selecting and delivering said messages to said mobile device, wherein said one or more computer-based systems include a computer- readable medium having computer-executable components for performing the method (id.). Dependent claim 30 recites “[a] computer based system for performing the method of claim 19, comprising one or more computer- based systems for delivering said messages and one or more mobile devices for receiving said messages” (id.). In rejecting claims 17 and 30, the Examiner states “[t]he test as to whether a claim is a proper dependent claim is that it shall include every limitation of the claim from which it depends or in other words that it shall not conceivably be infringed by anything which would not also infringe the basic claim” (Final Act. 9 (citing MPEP § 608.01 (n) Section III)). More particularly, the Examiner rejects claim 17 as being of improper form because claim 17 can be infringed by mere possession of the “system for performing the method of claim 1” without performing any of the steps of claim 1. Note the recitation of “for performing the method of claim 1” and the recitation of “for selecting and delivering” is part of a functional language recitation describing the capability of the system, not a recitation of actual performance resulting in active method steps. Since no active steps are recited, claim 1, drawn to a method, would not be infringed by the mere possession of the system that would 7 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 infringe claim 17. Asa result claim 17 is in improper dependent form. (Final Act. 9). The Examiner rejects claim 30 based on the same reasoning (id.). Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in determining that dependent claims 17 and 30 are in “improper dependent form” because “system claims 17 and 19 are each dependent on method claims and thus directed to a different statutory class of invention compared to the claims from which they depend” (Br. 20). We are persuaded by this argument because the statute requires that “a claim in dependent form” shall “specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed” (see 35 U.S.C. § 112, fourth paragraph). Thus, we find the Examiner does not sufficiently explain why dependent claims 17 and 30 do not properly specify “further limitations” of the methods recited in independent claims 1 and 19. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 17 and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, fourth paragraph. 35 U.S.C. § 102 Independent claims 1 and 19, and dependent claims 2, 3, 17, 19—22, 24, 25, 29, and 30 rejected as anticipated by Gelfand. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because Gelfand does not disclose “selecting one or more messages targeted based on location-based, advertiser defined geolocation territory rights and also based on said mobile device’s location and weather conditions relating to said mobile device’s location,” as recited by limitation [a] of independent claim 1 (see Br. 21—25). Independent claim 19 includes a 8 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 substantially similar limitation and is argued on the bases of independent claim 1 (see Br. 25—26). Instead, we agree with the Examiner that paragraphs 86 and 89 of Gelfand disclose the argued limitation (see Ans. 18-28). In this regard, we note that Gelfand is directed to a system “for utilizing points-of-interest (POI), locational information and images captured by a camera of a device to perform visual searching, to facilitate mobile advertising, and to associate point-of-interest data with location- tagged images” (Gelfand 12; see also id. 1 86). More particularly, Gelfand discloses that its system “provide[s] advertising based on mobile visual search systems as opposed to keyword and PC-based searching systems and enables an advertiser(s) to convey information to a consumer on a daily basis, regardless of time of day and location of the user of the mobile terminal” (id. 121). Gelfand also discloses that its “mobile terminal 10 may further include a GPS module 70 in communication with the controller 20. The GPS module 70 may be any means for locating the position of the mobile terminal 10” (id. 1 50). Gelfand further discloses that its system “provide[s] exclusive access or control to advertisers based on a particular region or through global objects/links as well as ease of use with the concept of a ‘point-through’ business model with zero input from a keyboard of a user's terminal” (id. 151 see also id. 1 89). For example, Gelfand discloses that an “advertiser can purchase the rights to advertise a specific category of product(s) (e.g., books) for a particular location or region (e.g., California)” (id. 1 89). In another example, Gelfand discloses 9 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 if the image captured by camera module 36 has information associated with it identifying its location such as New York City and a temperature or specifies the current weather where the user of the mobile terminal is located, the visual search server 54 may generate a list of candidate advertisers (e.g., PEPSI, DR. PEPPER, etc.) to choose from as well as candidate forms of advertisement media to be provided to the user (e.g., brand logo, video clip, audio message, etc.). {Id. 1 86). We also are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument Gelfand is merely providing a list of meta-information which may be associated with the images. This portion of Gelfand does not disclose basing or selecting advertisements “based on location-based, advertiser defined geolocation territory rights and also based on said mobile device’s location and weather conditions relating to said mobile device’s location” as claimed. (Br. 24). At the outset, we note that independent claims 1 and 19 are silent as to how the “mobile device’s location” and “weather conditions relating to said mobile device’s location” are determined. As such, we find the meta information in Gelfand which includes information identifying a mobile user’s location and “a temperature” or “the current weather where the user of the mobile terminal is located” (see Gelfand 1 86), and is used to provide mobile customers with advertising, to be within the scope of independent claims 1 and 19. We also note that Gelfand discloses that its system “provide[s] exclusive access or control to advertisers based on a particular region” {id. 1 89). Thus, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive to show error in the Examiner’s rejection. In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). We also sustain the 10 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 Examiner’s rejections of claims 2, 3, 17, 19, 21, 22, 25, and 30, which are not meaningfully argued separately. Dependent claim 20 Appellants argue Gelfand does not disclose a plurality of messages stored as set forth in claim 20 since the reference fails to disclose that the “stored message is associated with one or more locations linked with unique defined geolocation territory rights and weather conditions” and “a respective advertiser having a place of business within a proximity of the location associated with the message” as discussed above in relation to claim 1. (Br. 26—27). However, we agree with, and adopt the Examiner’s findings and rationale as set forth at pages 28—30 of the Answer. We also note that Gelfand discloses “transient tags such as visual tag information about products within a given store, which are only relevant when the user is in the immediate or very close proximity of those tags (Gelfand 1 69). And, as the Examiner points out (see Ans. 29-30), Gelfand discloses that an “advertiser can purchase the rights to advertise a specific category of product(s) (e.g., books) for a particular location or region (e.g., California)” (Gelfand 1 89). In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Dependent claim 24 Appellants argue that Gelfand fails to disclose “wherein said message selection is also based on an individual’s activity-related information,” as recited by claim 24 (Br. 27—28). More particularly, Appellants argue “according to ‘a further preferred embodiment, the message selection is also 11 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 based on an individual’s activity-related information (e.g., walking or driving)’” {id. 28). However, we agree with the Examiner that Gelfand discloses the argued limitation and adopt the Examiner’s findings and rationale as set forth at pages 32—33 of the Answer. In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Dependent claim 29 Appellants argue that Gelfand fails to disclose “wherein said message is time-sensitive,” as recited by claim 29 (Br. 29). More particularly, Appellants argue “[although paragraph 0098 of Gelfand mentions ‘time of day’, the reference does not disclose time-sensitive messages according to claim 29” {id.). However, we agree with the Examiner that Gelfand discloses that the advertiser may establish “time of day” meta-information with advertisement media. One of ordinary skill in this art understands that this means the advertiser can control the “time of day” the advertisement media is selected and sent to the user. This “time of day” element makes the advertisement media “time-sensitive,” as claimed. (Ans. 35 (citing Gelfand 198)). In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 35 U.S.C. § 103 Independent claims 1 and 19, and dependent claims 2—6, 17, 21, and 23—30 rejected as obvious over Bishop and Jablokov. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 12 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 because the combination of Bishop and Jablokov does not disclose or suggest “a method for delivering messaged based on (1) location-based, advertiser defined geolocation territory rights and also (2) based on said mobile device's location and (3) weather conditions relating to said mobile device's location,” as required by independent claims 1 and 19 (see Br. 30— 31). Instead, we agree with, and adopt the Examiner’s findings and rationale as set forth at pages 35—37 of the Answer. We add the following discussion for emphasis only. Bishop is directed to a system “for managing advertising services for mobile devices and users” (Bishop 115). Bishop discloses that its system “include[s] advertising servers 102, which may provide and manage advertising services for mobile devices and users within a given geographic region 104” (id. 117). More particularly, Bishop discloses that its “advertising server 102 may enable any number of advertisers or prospective advertisers ... to bid for and win the right to present advertisements to any mobile users 110 and corresponding mobile devices 112 entering” a given geographic region 104 (id. 118). In one example, Bishop discloses that “[w]hen the user 110 provides the item keyword 124 (e.g., ‘pizza’) to the mobile device 112, the mobile device 112 may present the advertising materials 114a provided by the pizzeria” (id. 123). Jablokov is directed to the “[tjargeted delivery of contextually relevant ad impressions to a mobile device . . . delivered within text messages” (Jablokov, Abstract). More particularly, Jablokov discloses that “[t]he ad impression further may indicate time-of-day, week, month, weather, seasonality, geographical proximity, and/or location of the mobile device, and the delivery and/ or presentation may be based, at least in part, 13 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 on awareness of time-of-day, week, month, weather, seasonality, geographical proximity, and/or location of the mobile device” {id. 134; see also id. ^Hf 82, 85, 103, 104, 243). We also are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that “it would not have been obvious to combine the teachings of Bishop and Jablokov to result in the presently claimed invention without the use of undue hindsight” (Br. 31). Instead, we find the Examiner provided articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the obviousness conclusion at page 14 of the Final Office Action. The Examiner’s rejection also appears clearly based on the disclosures of the Bishop and Jablokov, and not on the disclosure of the present application. Here, the Examiner reasons that “[o]ne would have been motivated to do so because ‘[s]uch additional customization of ad delivery and presentation provides advertisers additional advantages in being able to target campaigns to users when they are in the most receptive state to targeted advertisements’” (Final Act. 14 (citing Jablokov 1244)). And, absent specific, technical arguments as to why the motivation is insufficient or why the proposed combination is more than the simple substitution of one known element for another, we find Appellants’ hindsight argument unpersuasive. In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Bishop and Jablokov. We also will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2-4, 6, 17, 21, 23, 25—27, and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Bishop and Jablokov, which are not meaningfully argued separately. 14 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 Dependent claims 5 and 28 Appellants argue that the combination of Bishop and Jablokov fails to disclose or suggest “prioritizing said message for delivery based on said vendor’s proximity to the mobile device and said advertiser defined geolocation territory rights and not based on the highest bid for delivering the message,” as recited by dependent claim 5, and similarly recited by dependent claim 28 (Br. 31—32). The Examiner relies on paragraphs 102—104 of Bishop as disclosing the subject matter of dependent claims 5 and 28 (Final Act. 15, 16). However, we agree with Appellants that paragraphs 102—104 “merely describe[e] user preferences” (see Br. 32), and as such, fail to disclose or suggest the argued feature. In response to Appellants’ argument, the Examiner also relies on paragraphs 18, 23, 31, and 107 in the Answer as disclosing the subject matter of claims 5 and 28 (Ans. 45—46, 48-49). However, after reviewing the newly cited portions of Bishop, we do not see, and the Examiner does not adequately explain, where Bishop discloses “prioritizing said message for delivery based,” on the requirements of claim 5 and 28. In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 5 and 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) unpatentable over Bishop and Jablokov. Dependent claim 24 Appellants argue that the combination of Bishop and Jablokov fails to disclose or suggest “wherein said message selection is also based on an individual’s activity-related information,” as recited by claim 24 (Br. 32— 15 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 33). However, we agree with, and adopt the Examiner’s findings and rationale as set forth at pages 50-51 of the Answer. In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) unpatentable over Bishop and Jablokov. Dependent claim 29 Appellants argue that the combination of Bishop and Jablokov fails to disclose or suggest “wherein said message selection is also based on an individual’s activity-related information,” as recited by claim 24 (Br. 32— 33). However, we agree with the Examiner that Bishop discloses that “advertisers can bid on a time slot during which the advertisement (or message) will be sent, thereby making the delivered message ‘time- sensitive,’ as claimed” (Ans. 52 (citing Bishop 131)). In this regard, Bishop discloses using additional parameters which “may include discrete time slots on which advertisers may bid, such that when a given mobile user activates the keyword during the time slot while within the given area, the mobile user would receive advertisements from the advertisers” (Bishop 131). In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) unpatentable over Bishop and Jablokov. Independent claims 1 and 19, and dependent claims 2—6, 17, 19—22, 24, 25, and 27—30 rejected as obvious over Bishop and Gelfand. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because the combination of Bishop and Gelfand does not disclose or suggest “delivering messages based on (1) location-based, advertiser defined geolocation territory rights and also (2) based on said mobile device’s 16 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 location and (3) weather conditions relating to said mobile device’s location,” as required by independent claims 1 and 19 (see Br. 34—35). Instead, we agree with, and adopt the Examiner’s findings and rationale as set forth at pages 52—54 of the Answer in response to Appellants’ arguments {see Br. 36—37). In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Bishop and Jablokov. We also will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2—6, 17, 19-22, 24, 25, and 27—30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Bishop and Jablokov, which are not meaningfully argued separately. 17 Appeal 2014-003721 Application 13/107,352 DECISION We do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—6, 17, and 19- 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—6, 17, and 19-30 under 35 USC § 112, second paragraph. We do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 17 and 30 under 35 USC § 112, fourth paragraph. We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—3, 17, 19-22, 24, 25, 29, and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Gelfand. We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—4, 6, 17, 19, 21, and 23—27, 29, and 30, but do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 5 and 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Bishop and Jablokov. We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—6, 17, 19-22, 24, 25, and 27—30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Bishop and Gelfand. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 18 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation