Ex Parte Walter et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 30, 201612438267 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 12/438,267 0212012009 Timothy J. Walter 68242 7590 04/01/2016 FIALA & WEA VER P.L.L.C. C/O CPA GLOBAL P.O. BOX 52050 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 366.00050101 4235 EXAMINER LOUIS,LATOYAM ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3771 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/01/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): DOCKETING@CPAGLOBAL.COM docketing@fwiplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte TIMOTHY J. WALTER and UMA MARAR Appeal2013-010943 Application 12/438,267 Technology Center 3700 Before EDWARD A. BROWN, LEE L. STEPINA, and FREDERICK C. LANEY, Administrative Patent Judges. BROWN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEivIENT OF THE CASE Timothy J. Walter and Uma Marar (Appellants)1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's final rejection of claims 1, 5-9, 11-14, and 17-28, which are the pending claims. Br. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The disclosure relates "generally to systems, devices, and methods for treating restless leg syndrome and periodic limb movement disorder." Spec. 1 The Appeal Brief identifies Lotus Magnus, LLC. as the real party in interest. Br. 3. Appeal2013-010943 Application 12/438,267 1, 11. 6-7. Claims 1 and 9 are independent. Claim 1 illustrates the claimed subject matter on appeal: 1. A system for treating restless leg syndrome and periodic limb movement disorder, the system comprising: sleeve apparatus to surround a portion of a subject; vibration apparatus coupled to the sleeve to vibrate the sleeve; and electroencephalography apparatus configured to monitor neural activity of the subject to determine if the subject is about to move his/her legs and preemptively operate the vibration apparatus. REJECTIONS The appealed claims stand rejected as follows: 1. Claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 11-14, and 17-28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Burbank (US 2009/0221943 Al, published Sept. 3, 2009) and Karell (US 5,759,198, issued June 2, 1998). 2. Claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Burbank; Karell; and Branch (US 2007/0255187 Al; published Nov. 1; 2007). 3. Claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Burbank, Karell, and Bastia (US 2003/0028132 Al, published Feb. 6, 2003). 4. Claims 1, 5-7, 9, 11-14, and 17-28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Branch as evidenced by Aikman (US 2008/0222813 A 1, published Sept. 18, 2008), and Karell. 2 5. Claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Branch as evidenced by Aikman, Karell, and Bastia. 2 The heading of this rejection is corrected in the Examiner's Answer to list claims 11-14 (see Ans. 6), which are not listed in the heading in the Final Action (see Final Act. 5). 2 Appeal2013-010943 Application 12/438,267 ANALYSIS Obviousness over Burbank and Karell-Claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 11-14, and 17-28 Claims 1, 5, and 6 Appellants argue the patentability of claims 1, 5, and 6 together as a group. Br. 7-12. We select claim 1 as representative, and claims 5 and 6 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). The Examiner found that Burbank discloses sleeve apparatus 452, vibration apparatus 270, and a sensor to sense a body condition of a patient that is indicative of a restless leg syndrome (RLS) incident. Final Act. 2-3 (citing Burbank i-fi-f 180, 196, 204). The Examiner found that Burbank does not disclose an electroencephalography (EEG) apparatus, as claimed. Id. at 3. The Examiner relied on Karell for disclosing an EEG apparatus 82, 83 having the claimed features, and concluded that it would have been obvious to combine Karell's EEG sensor with Burbank's system "to provide accurate monitoring and enhanced treatment of the symptoms of RLS." Id. (citing Karell, col. 2, 11. 35-50, col. 3, 11. 10-14). Karell discloses a method and apparatus for treating and preventing leg cramps and sleep disorders. Karell describes operation of the invention as follows: Theory of operation: [(ml) and (m2) are physiologically opposing muscles] a muscle which causes night leg cramps, for example the gastrocnemus calf muscle(ml) at the back of the leg, is monitored. As this muscle begins to cramp, the monitoring device records and sends data to a microprocessor under the control of a rule-based program, which reacts at predetermined points. On proper recognition that an inappropriate muscle( ml) contraction is about to occur, a stimulating signal is then sent to the physiologically opposing muscle(m2). This stimulus causes increased tone or a contraction of the opposing muscle(m2). The 3 Appeal2013-010943 Application 12/438,267 body-mind is tricked into thinking a volitional movement is requested and a relaxing signal is sent through the nervous system to the physiologically opposing muscle( ml). Thus, the cramping muscle(ml) is relaxed, thereby preventing or stopping the cramp. Monitoring and pulsing occur without sleep arousal, and the subject is never aware of a cramp being aborted. Karell, col. 2, 11. 33-50 (emphases added). Appellants contend that Karell does not teach or suggest an EEG apparatus configured to monitor neural activity of a patient to determine if the patient is about to move its legs. Br. 8. Rather, Appellants contend that this disclosure in Karell "teaches monitoring muscles to determine when the muscles have started cramping (see, e.g., the description of muscle monitoring that begins: 'As this muscle begins to cramp .... ')[,]"and does not teach or suggest "a system that makes a determination that a patient is about to move his legs as recited in claim 1." Br. 9 (italics added). According to Appellants, Karell' s system "makes a determination that cramping occurs only after the muscles have started to cramp." Id. Appellants also contend that the portions of Karell cited by the Examiner do not teach or suggest "a system that functions to 'preemptively operate the treatment apparatus,"' as claimed. Id. at 8. Appellants assert that Karell' s "system is configured to detect muscle cramping when a 'muscle begins to cramp' - not before it cramps," and "once a muscle begins to cramp, a system provided to treat cramping cannot 'preemptively operate' to treat that cramping because the muscle has already begun to cramp." Id. at 11. Appellants' contentions are not persuasive. Even if we were to accept, arguendo, Appellants' contention that Karell's system makes the determination that a patient is about to move his legs only after the muscles have started cramping, we construe the claim limitation, "if the subject is 4 Appeal2013-010943 Application 12/438,267 about to move his/her legs," not to preclude the subject from having previously experienced cramping or moved his/her legs. Further, we agree with the Examiner that Karell meets the disputed claim limitation. Appellants acknowledge that Karell discloses sending a stimulating signal to the physiologically opposing muscle (m2) when there is a proper recognition that "an inappropriate muscle(m l) contraction is about to occur." Br. 11; see Karell, col. 2, 11. 39--42 (emphasis added). That is, the muscle contraction has not yet occurred. Appellants additionally acknowledge Karell' s explanation that "the cramping muscle( ml) is relaxed, thereby preventing or stopping the cramp." Br. 12, see Karell, col. 2, 11. 47- 49 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Karell discloses preventing a cramp that is about to occur by sending the stimulating signal to muscle (m2). As a result, the cramp does not occur in muscle (ml). Movement of the leg that is about to occur, as a consequence of the cramp, would be prevented as well. Appellants further acknowledge that Karell teaches a device that monitors brain waves. Br. 9 (citing Karell, col. 3, 11. 10-14). However, Appellants contend that this passage in Karell provides no specific guidance about how or why the information obtained from monitoring the brain waves might be used in Karell's systems and methods. Id. at 10. However, Karell does provide specific guidance relating to monitoring brain activity and use of the information obtained by the monitoring. Specifically, the Examiner finds that Figure 3 of Karell teaches an EX-Cramp monitoring device, which can be an EEG apparatus, to monitor neural activity. Ans. 9. Karell describes how this brain wave monitoring is used for cramp and sleep disorder relief. Karell, col. 4, 11. 38- 49. As shown in Figure 3, electrodes 82, 83 are placed around a subject's 5 Appeal2013-010943 Application 12/438,267 head, and sensing signals travel to monitoring means 12 and eventually reach "stimulating(22) electrodes as above detailed." Id. Stimulating electrodes 22 are provided on stocking-like positioning means 20 placed on the subject's leg. Id. at col. 3, 11. 39--46. Karell describes the methodology used in brain wave monitoring for cramp and sleep disorder relief. For example, Karell provides "[a] method for relieving a sleep disorder having muscle contractions by electrically stimulating a physiologically opposing muscle by monitoring brain activity and stimulating muscles." Karell, col. 6, 11. 66-col. 8, 1. 13. The method comprises "placing electrodes onto a subject's head for monitoring brain activation involved in muscle movement of a sleep disorder" and "monitoring brain activation and comparing parameters monitored to predetermined parameters, and sending a stimulus to an expected physiologically opposing muscle(s) to the monitored brain activation involved in muscle movement of the sleep disorder thereby relieving or preventing an inappropriate movement within the sleep disorder." Id. (emphasis added). As such, Karell suggests a reason for monitoring brain activation that is involved in muscle movement of a sleep disorder, comparing the monitored brain activation parameters to predetermined parameters, and sending the stimulus to prevent an inappropriate movement within the sleep disorder. As discussed above in relation to Figure 3, the stimulating electrodes are placed on a subject's legs. Accordingly, performance of Karell' s method would prevent an inappropriate movement of the subject's legs from occurring. In view of the above, the Examiner's findings with respect to Karell are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Appellants have not 6 Appeal2013-010943 Application 12/438,267 apprised us of any error in the Examiner's reasoning in support of the rejection of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, and claims 5 and 6, as unpatentable over Burbank and Karell. Claims 9, 11-14, and 17-28 Appellants argue the patentability of claims 9, 11-14, and 17-28 together as a group. Br. 12-17. We select claim 9 as representative; claims 11-14 and 17-28 stand or fall with claim 9. Claim 9 recites a method for treating restless leg syndrome and periodic limb movement disorder, comprising, in part, "monitoring neural activity of the subject's brain to determine if the subject is about to move his/her legs," and "preemptively vibrating the sleeve with the vibration apparatus before the subject consciously moves his/her legs and/or before the subject becomes aware of the sensations to move his/her legs." Br. (Claims App., emphasis added). In rejecting claim 9; the Examiner relies on the same findings and reasoning provided for claim 1. Final Act. 2-3. Appellants contend that Karell does not teach or suggest preemptive operation "before the subject consciously moves his/her legs and/or before the subject becomes aware of the sensations to move his/her legs." Br. 13 (emphasis omitted). In support, Appellants present contentions substantially similar to those presented for claim 1. Id. at 13-17. Appellants' contentions for claim 9 are not persuasive. First, we note that, as recited in claim 9, if it is not determined that the subject is about to move his/her legs, then there is no limitation requiring the final step of "preemptively vibrating the sleeve" to be performed. Accordingly, we 7 Appeal2013-010943 Application 12/438,267 construe claim 9 to not require performance of the final step of the method unless the "if' condition of the preceding step is satisfied. Second, for reasons similar to those discussed above in relation to claim 1, Appellants' contentions do not apprise us of any error in the Examiner's finding that Karell teaches the claimed steps of "monitoring" and "preemptively vibrating the sleeve with the vibration apparatus before the subject consciously moves his/her legs," and/or "before the subject becomes aware of the sensations to move his/her legs." We note the conjunction "and/or" does not require "preemptively vibrating the sleeve" according to both of these limitations. Appellants also do not apprise us of any error in the Examiner's reasoning for combining the teachings of Burbank and Karell. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 9, 11-14, and 17-28, as unpatentable over Burbank and Karell. Obviousness over Burbank, Karell, and Branch - Claim 7 Appellants rely on claim 7 depending ultimately from claim 1 for patentability. Br. 18. As Appellants do not apprise us of any deficiency in the rejection of claim 1, we sustain the rejection of claim 7 as unpatentable over Burbank, Karell, and Branch for the same reasons as those discussed above for claim 1. Obviousness over Burbank, Karell, and Bastia - Claim 83 Appellants rely solely on claim 8 depending ultimately from claim 1 for patentability. Br. 19. As Appellants do not apprise us of any deficiency 3 Appellants note correctly that claim 8 depends from claim 7, but claim 8 is not indicated to be rejected over Burbank, Karell, Bastia, and Branch. Br. 19. However, the Examiner discusses Branch in the statement of the rejection of claim 8. Final Act. 5. Consequently, the Examiner's omission 8 Appeal2013-010943 Application 12/438,267 in the rejection of claim 1, we sustain the rejection of claim 8 as unpatentable over Burbank, Karell, Bastia, and Branch for the same reasons as those discussed above for claim 1. Obviousness over Branch as evidenced by Aikman, and Karell - Claims 1, 5-7, 9, 11-14, and 17-28 Appellants argue the patentability of claims 1 and 5-7 together as a group (Br. 21-24), and also argue the patentability of claims 9 and 17-28 together as another group. Id. at 25-29. Appellants make no separate argument for patentability of claims 11-14. Accordingly, we select claims 1 and 9 as representative, and claims 5-7 stand or fall with claim 1, and claims 11-14, and 17-28 stand or fall with claim 9. For claims 1 and 9, Appellants present substantially the same arguments as those discussed above in relation to the rejection of claims 1 and 9 over Burbank and Karell. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 5-7, 9, 11-14, and 17-28 for substantially the same reasons as those discussed above. Obviousness over Branch as evidenced by Aikman, Karell, and Bastia- Claim 8 Appellants rely solely on claim 8 depending ultimately from claim 1 for patentability. Br. 29-30. As Appellants do not apprise us of any deficiency in the rejection of claim 1 over Branch as evidenced by Aikman and Karell, we sustain the rejection of claim 8 as unpatentable over Branch of Branch in the heading of the rejection of claim 8 was inadvertent, and we treat the rejection as being also based on Branch. 9 Appeal2013-010943 Application 12/438,267 as evidenced by Aikman, Karell, and Bastia for the same reasons as those discussed above for claim 1. DECISION The Examiner's decision to reject claims 1, 5-9, 11-14, and 17-28 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation