Ex Parte Vaughn et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 30, 2017

13494757 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/494,757 06/12/2012 Tyrell Craig Vaughn 2012P10410US 7645
28524 7590 04/03/2017
SIEMENS CORPORATION
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEPARTMENT
3501 Quadrangle Blvd Ste 230
EXAMINER
PARK, JOHN C
Orlando, EL 32817 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2125
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/03/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipdadmin.us@siemens.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TYRELL CRAIG VAUGHN and COLIN BESTER
Appeal 2017-000778
Application 13/494,757
Technology Center 2100
Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., and
ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
MANTIS MERCADER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—24, which constitute all the claims pending in
this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
Appeal 2017-000778
Application 13/494,757
THE INVENTION
Appellants’ claimed invention is directed to “virtual demand auditing
of one or more devices in a building” (Spec. 11) and includes “generating
an estimated energy consumption of [a] first device based on a difference
between [a] first baseline and [a] second amount of energy” (Spec. 1 6).
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the
subject matter on appeal:
1. A method in a data processing system for estimating
energy consumption, the method comprising:
identifying a first amount of energy consumed by a
plurality of devices in a building during a first period of
time while a first device in the plurality of devices is in a
first state to form a first baseline;
after the first period of time, identifying a second
amount of energy consumed by the plurality of devices
during a second period of time while the first device is in
a second state;
generating an estimated energy consumption of the
first device based on a difference between the first baseline
and the second amount of energy consumed;
after the second period of time, changing the second
state of the first device back to the first state and
identifying a third amount of energy consumed by the
plurality of devices during a third period of time while the
first device is in the first state to form a second baseline;
and
comparing the second baseline with the first
baseline to determine whether there was a change in
energy consumption of other devices than the first device
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in the plurality of devices between the first period of time
and the third period of time.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Rada US 2011/0251807 A1 Oct. 13, 2011
Boot US 2012/0123995 A1 May 17, 2012
THE REJECTION
The Examiner made the following rejection:
Claims 1—24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Rada in view of Boot. Final Act. 4.1
ISSUES
The issues are whether the Examiner erred in finding that:
1. Boot discloses or suggests the “comparing the second baseline with
the first baseline to determine whether there was a change in energy
consumption of other devices than the first device in the plurality of
devices between the first period of time and the third period of time,”
as recited in claim 1;
2. Boot discloses or suggests “identifying average, peak and minimum
values for energy consumption by the first device based on the
1 The prior rejection of claims 20-24 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, appears to have been withdrawn in response to Appellants’
amendment filed on June 9, 2015, which addressed the rejection. See Final
Act. 2—3; Advisory Act. 1.
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Application 13/494,757
multiple tests,” as recited in claim 3;
3. Boot discloses or suggests “adjusting the estimated energy
consumption of the first device based on changes in the energy
consumption of the other devices in the plurality of devices in
response to determining that the energy consumption of the other
devices in the plurality of devices changed,” as recited in claim 4; and
4. Boot discloses or suggests “repeating identification of energy
consumed while the first device is in the second state to determine the
estimated energy consumption of the first device in response to
determining that the state of the one of the other devices changed,” as
recited in claim 5.
ANALYSIS
Claim 1
Appellants argue the Examiner erred because “Boot merely mentions
subtracting out power consumption due to relatively high-power-consuming
loads” (Reply Br. 5—6) and “[tjhere simply is no mention of any concern as
to whether any ‘other loads changed/were used during the baseline change
period’ as alleged by the Examiner” (Reply Br. 6, emphasis in original).
Appellants also contend that because “Boot expressly states that the
baselines are for ‘different periods prior to the start of a demand response
event’” (Reply Br. 8, quoting Boot 149, and citing Fig. 11), “[u]se of
baselines for overlapping periods of times before an event” does not disclose
or suggest the changes “between the first period of time and third period of
time” (Reply Br. 8).
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We do not agree with Appellants’ arguments. The Examiner finds,
and we agree, that “Boot teaches determining whether energy consumption
of other devices [than the first device] in the plurality of devices changed
between the first period of time and the third period of time (determine if
other loads changed / were used during the baseline change period” (Ans. 5,
citing Boot || 20, 48-49). Boot || 48 49 describe Figures 8—11; Figures 8—
10 and corresponding text clearly illustrate a method of isolating a high-
power-consuming load “that represents a type of device that has been agreed
not to be run” (Boot 128). The Examiner also finds, and we agree, that
Rada discloses that “successive measurements report the synchronized
operational state of devices and the correlated load / energy consumption of
the devices to form a state / load pattern based load signature” (Ans. 4, citing
Rada Fig. 3A and 28, 75—76, 123—124, 147, 168, 228). In particular, the
methods of Rada Figures 7—8 disclose a determination of “load signatures”
for a set of devices in which the power drawn by each device is determined
by monitoring the incremental increase in the total power supply, such as for
a “60 W incandescent bulb.” Rada 176, describing Fig. 8. Accordingly,
Rada teaches the total load equals the sum of individual loads.
Thus, both Rada and Boot teach methods of estimating a load of an
individual device from a baseline and an actual total load. One of ordinary
skill in the art at the time of invention, would have repeated the subtractive
process of Boot, in which known baselines of a set of devices in a load were
each subtracted from the actual total load, in order to estimate the “change in
energy consumption of other devices” that remained in the total load,
because the total load equals the sum of individual loads as taught by Rada.
We find such combination was not “uniquely challenging or difficult for one
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of ordinary skill in the art.” Leapfrog Enters. Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485
F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, we, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1 and dependent claims 2 and 6—9 not separately argued (see App. Br.
13), and the rejections of independent claims 10 and 19, commensurate in
scope with claim 1 and dependent claims 11, 15—18, 20, and 24 not
separately argued with particularity. See App. Br. 29—37, 45—53.
Claim 3
Appellants argue the Examiner erred because “Boot is silent as to any
identification of average, peak and minimum values for energy
consumption” and “the mere mention of [] power usage profiles and patterns
of power consumption does not necessarily result in an identification of
average, peak and minimum values for energy consumption by the first
device” (Reply Br. 15). Appellants contend “the Examiner’s reliance on
‘common known values’ is inappropriate” (Reply Br. 15) because the
reliance is made “without evidentiary support in the record” (Reply Br. 16,
citing MPEP § 2144.03(A) and In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1385 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. The Examiner finds
that Boot’s “power usage profiles 28 [are] received from the power meters
20 with various load profiles” (Ans. 20, citing Boot 128) and that “average,
peak, and minimum values of energy consumption are inherent to power
usage profile[s]” and such energy consumption values “are common known
values that represent patterns of power consumption” (Ans. 20). Appellants
provide no evidence to rebut the Examiner’s finding of inherency, and
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provide only conclusory arguments. Additionally, while Appellants find the
Examiner’s reliance on common known values is “inappropriate,”
Appellants do not state why average, peak, and minimum values for energy
consumption are not considered to be common knowledge in the art.2
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3, and
claims 12 and 21 commensurate in scope and not separately argued with
particularity (see App. Br. 38—39, 54—55).
Claim 4
Appellants argue the Examiner erred because “[cjlaim 4 recites to
adjust the estimated energy consumption of the first device based on changes
in the energy consumption of the other devices in the plurality of devices in
response to determining that the energy consumption of the other devices in
the plurality of devices changed” (App. Br. 25, emphasis in original).
Appellants contend that “Boot merely discloses incentivizing customers to
use less energy during peak periods of time. Asking a customer to not run
the HVAC is not an adjustment to an estimate of energy consumption that is
made based on detected changes in energy consumption of other devices”
(App. Br. 25, emphasis in original).
The Examiner finds that Boot “teaches adjusting the estimated energy
consumption of the first device based on changes in the energy consumption
of the other devices” because “automated load demand response events
2 “To adequately traverse such a finding, an applicant must specifically point
out the supposed errors in the examiner’s action, which would include
stating why the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or
well-known in the art.” MPEP § 2144.03(C), see 37 CFR 1.111(b), see
also Chevenard, 139 F.2d 709, 713.
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change the state / power in response to other device[’]s demand changes”
(Ans. 7, citing Boot || 20, 25, 48). While Boot’s method illustrated in
Figures 8—10 disclose identifying and estimating the energy consumption
used by a device during a demand response event, we agree there is no
indication that the estimate is adjusted “based on detected changes in energy
consumption of other devices” as argued by Appellants. Accordingly, we
reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4, and the rejections of claims 13
and 22 commensurate in scope.
Claim 5
Appellants argue the Examiner erred because “Rada merely mentions
to compute a load signature of a device. Rada is completely silent repeating
estimated energy consumption determination in response to determining that
the state of the one of the other devices changed” (App. Br. 28). Appellants
further contend that “Rada fails to consider the fact that the state of the one
of the other devices could change while the energy consumption of a device
is being estimated” (App. Br. 28).
The Examiner finds that Rada teaches “repeating identification of
energy consumed” via a “manual state change of other devices to establish
load signatures effects for each” (Ans. 8, citing Rada Tflf 22, 76, 203—204).
While Rada’s method of “manual learning of load signatures” (Rada 176)
permits the user to edit the load signature or skip a state (see Rada Fig. 8
step 840 items (1) and (3), Rada 176), the method does not appear to teach
or suggest the editing or repetition of a load signature computation based on
a state change of another device. Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s
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rejection of claim 5, and the rejections of claims 14 and 23 commensurate in
scope.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner:
1. did not err in finding that Boot discloses or suggests the “comparing
the second baseline with the first baseline to determine whether there
was a change in energy consumption of other devices than the first
device in the plurality of devices between the first period of time and
the third period of time,” as recited in claim 1;
2. did not err in finding that Boot discloses or suggests “identifying
average, peak and minimum values for energy consumption by the
first device based on the multiple tests,” as recited in claim 3;
3. erred in finding Boot discloses or suggests “adjusting the estimated
energy consumption of the first device based on changes in the energy
consumption of the other devices in the plurality of devices in
response to determining that the energy consumption of the other
devices in the plurality of devices changed,” as recited in claim 4; and
4. erred in finding Boot discloses or suggests “repeating identification of
energy consumed while the first device is in the second state to
determine the estimated energy consumption of the first device in
response to determining that the state of the one of the other devices
changed,” as recited in claim 5.
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DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—3, 6—12, 15—21, and 24 is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 4, 5, 13, 14, 22, and 23 is
reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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