Ex Parte Vaughn et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 30, 201713494757 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/494,757 06/12/2012 Tyrell Craig Vaughn 2012P10410US 7645 28524 7590 04/03/2017 SIEMENS CORPORATION INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEPARTMENT 3501 Quadrangle Blvd Ste 230 EXAMINER PARK, JOHN C Orlando, EL 32817 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2125 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/03/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipdadmin.us@siemens.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte TYRELL CRAIG VAUGHN and COLIN BESTER Appeal 2017-000778 Application 13/494,757 Technology Center 2100 Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., and ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges. MANTIS MERCADER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—24, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part. Appeal 2017-000778 Application 13/494,757 THE INVENTION Appellants’ claimed invention is directed to “virtual demand auditing of one or more devices in a building” (Spec. 11) and includes “generating an estimated energy consumption of [a] first device based on a difference between [a] first baseline and [a] second amount of energy” (Spec. 1 6). Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A method in a data processing system for estimating energy consumption, the method comprising: identifying a first amount of energy consumed by a plurality of devices in a building during a first period of time while a first device in the plurality of devices is in a first state to form a first baseline; after the first period of time, identifying a second amount of energy consumed by the plurality of devices during a second period of time while the first device is in a second state; generating an estimated energy consumption of the first device based on a difference between the first baseline and the second amount of energy consumed; after the second period of time, changing the second state of the first device back to the first state and identifying a third amount of energy consumed by the plurality of devices during a third period of time while the first device is in the first state to form a second baseline; and comparing the second baseline with the first baseline to determine whether there was a change in energy consumption of other devices than the first device 2 Appeal 2017-000778 Application 13/494,757 in the plurality of devices between the first period of time and the third period of time. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Rada US 2011/0251807 A1 Oct. 13, 2011 Boot US 2012/0123995 A1 May 17, 2012 THE REJECTION The Examiner made the following rejection: Claims 1—24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Rada in view of Boot. Final Act. 4.1 ISSUES The issues are whether the Examiner erred in finding that: 1. Boot discloses or suggests the “comparing the second baseline with the first baseline to determine whether there was a change in energy consumption of other devices than the first device in the plurality of devices between the first period of time and the third period of time,” as recited in claim 1; 2. Boot discloses or suggests “identifying average, peak and minimum values for energy consumption by the first device based on the 1 The prior rejection of claims 20-24 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, appears to have been withdrawn in response to Appellants’ amendment filed on June 9, 2015, which addressed the rejection. See Final Act. 2—3; Advisory Act. 1. 3 Appeal 2017-000778 Application 13/494,757 multiple tests,” as recited in claim 3; 3. Boot discloses or suggests “adjusting the estimated energy consumption of the first device based on changes in the energy consumption of the other devices in the plurality of devices in response to determining that the energy consumption of the other devices in the plurality of devices changed,” as recited in claim 4; and 4. Boot discloses or suggests “repeating identification of energy consumed while the first device is in the second state to determine the estimated energy consumption of the first device in response to determining that the state of the one of the other devices changed,” as recited in claim 5. ANALYSIS Claim 1 Appellants argue the Examiner erred because “Boot merely mentions subtracting out power consumption due to relatively high-power-consuming loads” (Reply Br. 5—6) and “[tjhere simply is no mention of any concern as to whether any ‘other loads changed/were used during the baseline change period’ as alleged by the Examiner” (Reply Br. 6, emphasis in original). Appellants also contend that because “Boot expressly states that the baselines are for ‘different periods prior to the start of a demand response event’” (Reply Br. 8, quoting Boot 149, and citing Fig. 11), “[u]se of baselines for overlapping periods of times before an event” does not disclose or suggest the changes “between the first period of time and third period of time” (Reply Br. 8). 4 Appeal 2017-000778 Application 13/494,757 We do not agree with Appellants’ arguments. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that “Boot teaches determining whether energy consumption of other devices [than the first device] in the plurality of devices changed between the first period of time and the third period of time (determine if other loads changed / were used during the baseline change period” (Ans. 5, citing Boot || 20, 48-49). Boot || 48 49 describe Figures 8—11; Figures 8— 10 and corresponding text clearly illustrate a method of isolating a high- power-consuming load “that represents a type of device that has been agreed not to be run” (Boot 128). The Examiner also finds, and we agree, that Rada discloses that “successive measurements report the synchronized operational state of devices and the correlated load / energy consumption of the devices to form a state / load pattern based load signature” (Ans. 4, citing Rada Fig. 3A and 28, 75—76, 123—124, 147, 168, 228). In particular, the methods of Rada Figures 7—8 disclose a determination of “load signatures” for a set of devices in which the power drawn by each device is determined by monitoring the incremental increase in the total power supply, such as for a “60 W incandescent bulb.” Rada 176, describing Fig. 8. Accordingly, Rada teaches the total load equals the sum of individual loads. Thus, both Rada and Boot teach methods of estimating a load of an individual device from a baseline and an actual total load. One of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention, would have repeated the subtractive process of Boot, in which known baselines of a set of devices in a load were each subtracted from the actual total load, in order to estimate the “change in energy consumption of other devices” that remained in the total load, because the total load equals the sum of individual loads as taught by Rada. We find such combination was not “uniquely challenging or difficult for one 5 Appeal 2017-000778 Application 13/494,757 of ordinary skill in the art.” Leapfrog Enters. Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Accordingly, we, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2 and 6—9 not separately argued (see App. Br. 13), and the rejections of independent claims 10 and 19, commensurate in scope with claim 1 and dependent claims 11, 15—18, 20, and 24 not separately argued with particularity. See App. Br. 29—37, 45—53. Claim 3 Appellants argue the Examiner erred because “Boot is silent as to any identification of average, peak and minimum values for energy consumption” and “the mere mention of [] power usage profiles and patterns of power consumption does not necessarily result in an identification of average, peak and minimum values for energy consumption by the first device” (Reply Br. 15). Appellants contend “the Examiner’s reliance on ‘common known values’ is inappropriate” (Reply Br. 15) because the reliance is made “without evidentiary support in the record” (Reply Br. 16, citing MPEP § 2144.03(A) and In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. The Examiner finds that Boot’s “power usage profiles 28 [are] received from the power meters 20 with various load profiles” (Ans. 20, citing Boot 128) and that “average, peak, and minimum values of energy consumption are inherent to power usage profile[s]” and such energy consumption values “are common known values that represent patterns of power consumption” (Ans. 20). Appellants provide no evidence to rebut the Examiner’s finding of inherency, and 6 Appeal 2017-000778 Application 13/494,757 provide only conclusory arguments. Additionally, while Appellants find the Examiner’s reliance on common known values is “inappropriate,” Appellants do not state why average, peak, and minimum values for energy consumption are not considered to be common knowledge in the art.2 Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3, and claims 12 and 21 commensurate in scope and not separately argued with particularity (see App. Br. 38—39, 54—55). Claim 4 Appellants argue the Examiner erred because “[cjlaim 4 recites to adjust the estimated energy consumption of the first device based on changes in the energy consumption of the other devices in the plurality of devices in response to determining that the energy consumption of the other devices in the plurality of devices changed” (App. Br. 25, emphasis in original). Appellants contend that “Boot merely discloses incentivizing customers to use less energy during peak periods of time. Asking a customer to not run the HVAC is not an adjustment to an estimate of energy consumption that is made based on detected changes in energy consumption of other devices” (App. Br. 25, emphasis in original). The Examiner finds that Boot “teaches adjusting the estimated energy consumption of the first device based on changes in the energy consumption of the other devices” because “automated load demand response events 2 “To adequately traverse such a finding, an applicant must specifically point out the supposed errors in the examiner’s action, which would include stating why the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art.” MPEP § 2144.03(C), see 37 CFR 1.111(b), see also Chevenard, 139 F.2d 709, 713. 7 Appeal 2017-000778 Application 13/494,757 change the state / power in response to other device[’]s demand changes” (Ans. 7, citing Boot || 20, 25, 48). While Boot’s method illustrated in Figures 8—10 disclose identifying and estimating the energy consumption used by a device during a demand response event, we agree there is no indication that the estimate is adjusted “based on detected changes in energy consumption of other devices” as argued by Appellants. Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4, and the rejections of claims 13 and 22 commensurate in scope. Claim 5 Appellants argue the Examiner erred because “Rada merely mentions to compute a load signature of a device. Rada is completely silent repeating estimated energy consumption determination in response to determining that the state of the one of the other devices changed” (App. Br. 28). Appellants further contend that “Rada fails to consider the fact that the state of the one of the other devices could change while the energy consumption of a device is being estimated” (App. Br. 28). The Examiner finds that Rada teaches “repeating identification of energy consumed” via a “manual state change of other devices to establish load signatures effects for each” (Ans. 8, citing Rada Tflf 22, 76, 203—204). While Rada’s method of “manual learning of load signatures” (Rada 176) permits the user to edit the load signature or skip a state (see Rada Fig. 8 step 840 items (1) and (3), Rada 176), the method does not appear to teach or suggest the editing or repetition of a load signature computation based on a state change of another device. Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s 8 Appeal 2017-000778 Application 13/494,757 rejection of claim 5, and the rejections of claims 14 and 23 commensurate in scope. CONCLUSION The Examiner: 1. did not err in finding that Boot discloses or suggests the “comparing the second baseline with the first baseline to determine whether there was a change in energy consumption of other devices than the first device in the plurality of devices between the first period of time and the third period of time,” as recited in claim 1; 2. did not err in finding that Boot discloses or suggests “identifying average, peak and minimum values for energy consumption by the first device based on the multiple tests,” as recited in claim 3; 3. erred in finding Boot discloses or suggests “adjusting the estimated energy consumption of the first device based on changes in the energy consumption of the other devices in the plurality of devices in response to determining that the energy consumption of the other devices in the plurality of devices changed,” as recited in claim 4; and 4. erred in finding Boot discloses or suggests “repeating identification of energy consumed while the first device is in the second state to determine the estimated energy consumption of the first device in response to determining that the state of the one of the other devices changed,” as recited in claim 5. 9 Appeal 2017-000778 Application 13/494,757 DECISION The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—3, 6—12, 15—21, and 24 is affirmed. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 4, 5, 13, 14, 22, and 23 is reversed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation