Ex Parte Thero et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 23, 201311742518 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 23, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte DANIEL THERO, MATTHEW D. HAINES, WILLIAM G. McCOLLOM, PHILIP M. WALKER, and GREGORY J. LIPINSKI ____________ Appeal 2011-000196 Application 11/742,518 Technology Center 2400 ____________ Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, HUNG H. BUI, and BARBARA A. PARVIS, Administrative Patent Judges. PARVIS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. Appeal 2011-000196 Application 11/742,518 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ invention relates to multiple clients sharing a printer through a network. Spec. ¶ [0010]. Claim 1 is illustrative: 1. A system, comprising: at least one client computer; a server computer coupled to the at least one client computer via a network; and a printer coupled to the server computer and shared by the at least one client computer, wherein the printer is perceived by each client computer to be a local printer. REJECTIONS Claims 18–22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Ans. 3. Claims 1–22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Ferlitsch (U.S. 7,190,477 B2; Mar. 13, 1997). Ans. 3-9. ISSUES 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Rejection Claims 1, 2, 5–12, 16, and 17 Did the Examiner err in finding that Ferlitsch discloses “wherein the printer is perceived by each client computer to be a local printer,” as recited in independent claim 1, and similarly recited in independent claim 10? For claim 2, Appellants argue that Ferlitsch does not disclose “to maintain each client computer’s perception that the printer is a local printer.” Appeal 2011-000196 Application 11/742,518 3 App. Br. 12. Additionally, dependent claims 5–9, 11, 12, 16, and 17 are not separately argued (App. Br. 12, 14). Thus, the issue presented for claims 2, 5–9, 11, 12, 16, and 17 is the same as the issue presented for claims 1 and 10. Claims 3, 15, and 18 Did the Examiner err in finding that Ferlitsch discloses “a virtual local printer address,” as recited in claim 3, and similarly recited in claim 15 and independent claim 18? Claim 19, 21, and 22 depend from claim 18 and are not separately argued (App. Br. 15). Thus, the issue presented for claims 19, 21, and 22 is the same as the issue presented for claims 3, 15, and 18. Claim 4 Did the Examiner err in finding that Ferlitsch discloses “the printer tunnel application is part of a Universal Serial Bus (USB) stack,” as recited in claim 4? Claims 13, 14, and 20 Did the Examiner err in finding that Ferlitsch discloses “simulating a . . . delay,” as recited in claim 13, and similarly recited in claims 14 and 20? Appeal 2011-000196 Application 11/742,518 4 35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection Claims 18–22 Did the Examiner err in finding that claims 18–22 are directed to non- statutory subject matter? ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellants’ contentions in the Appeal Brief presented in response to the Final Office Action and the Reply Brief presented in response to the Examiner’s Answer. We agree with Appellants’ conclusion that the Examiner erred in finding that Ferlitsch discloses the invention recited in claim 4. We disagree with Appellants’ remaining conclusions and highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis as follows. Claims 1, 2, 5–12, 16, and 17 We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that Ferlitsch fails to disclose the claimed local printer because the IP address of Ferlitsch’s printer is indicative of a network printer rather than a local printer (App. Br. 11). The USPTO gives claims their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Examiner’s interpretation of claim 1 is reasonable. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Ferlitsch describes a printer having characteristics of a local printer including, for example, being able to directly receive spooled print jobs (Ans. 11-12 (citing Ferlitsch col. 9, ll. 26- 33; col. 10, l. 61-col. 11, l.10; Fig. 5)). Appellants’ arguments are not Appeal 2011-000196 Application 11/742,518 5 commensurate with the scope of claim 1. Therefore, as the Examiner correctly finds, Ferlitsch discloses the claimed local printer of claim 1. With respect to Appellants’ arguments relating to claim 10, Appellants’ arguments substantially parallel those made with respect to claim 1. See generally App. Br. 13-14; compare App. Br. 11-12. Thus, Appellants have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1 and 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), and dependent claims 5–9, 11, 12, 16, and 17, not separately argued (App. Br. 12, 14). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1 and 10, and their respective dependent claims 5-9, 11, 12, 16 and 17. With respect to Appellants’ arguments relating to claim 2, Appellants’ arguments substantially parallel those made with respect to claim 1. See generally App. Br. 12; compare App. Br. 11-12. Thus, for the reasons discussed supra with respect to claim 1, Appellants have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 2. Claims 3 and 15 We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that instead of using a virtual local printer address, Ferlitsch’s system and method use a printer device’s IP address (App. Br. 13). The Examiner reasonably interprets the term “virtual local printer address,” recited in claim 3 (Ans. 12-13). Therefore, we agree with the Examiner’s finding the IP address of Ferlitsch corresponds to the claimed virtual local printer address and Ferlitsch discloses this limitation of claim 3. (Ans.12-13 (citing Ferlitsch col. 16, ll. 1-9)) Appeal 2011-000196 Application 11/742,518 6 Thus, Appellants have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 3 and 15. Claim 4 The Examiner finds that Ferlitsch describes a USB architecture to connect input components. Ans. 13. The Examiner also finds that the printer driver is inherently part of a USB stack. Ans. 13. Appellants argue that Ferlitsch simply mentions typical components with no discussion of a printer tunnel application that is part of a USB stack. App. Br. 13. We agree with the Examiner to the extent that the Examiner states that Ferlitsch describes connecting input devices via a USB (Ans. 13). However, Ferlitsch does not refer to or explicitly disclose a printer tunnel application that is part of a USB stack. We do not agree with the Examiner that a printer tunnel application that is part of a USB stack is inherent in the disclosure of Ferlitsch. Accordingly, we are constrained to reverse the rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) based on Ferlitsch. Claims 13 and 14 We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that Ferlitsch mentions a delay, but does not disclose simulating a delay or a delay message (App. Br. 14). As the Examiner correctly finds, Ferlitsch discloses simulating a delay, such as a warm-up delay, by, for example, queuing jobs in a buffer (Ans. 14 (citing Ferlitsch col. 11, ll. 38-66; col. 12, ll. 45-50)). Appeal 2011-000196 Application 11/742,518 7 Thus, Appellants have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 13 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 13 and 14. Claims 18–22 We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner’s rejection of claims 18 through 22 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter is improper (App. Br. 10-11; Reply Br. 2-3). As the Examiner correctly finds, the broadest reasonable construction of claims 18 through 22 covers both non-transitory and transitory media (Ans. 10). We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that Appellants’ Specification does not expressly state that the term “computer-readable medium” includes non-transitory subject matter, such as signals (App. Br. 10-11). We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Appellants’ Specification does not expressly limit the term “computer-readable medium” to statutory subject matter (Ans. 10). The broadest reasonable construction of a claim drawn to computer readable medium covers both non-transitory and transitory media where the specification is silent. Ex parte Mewherter, No. 20123-007692 (PTAB May 8, 2013 (precedential), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/prec/fd2012007692.pdf. Transitory, propagating signals are not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In re Nuijten, 500 F. 3d 1346, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Appeal 2011-000196 Application 11/742,518 8 A claim drawn to such a computer readable medium that covers both transitory and non-transitory embodiments may be amended to narrow the claim to cover only statutory embodiments to avoid a rejection under 35 U.S.C. §101 by adding the limitation “non-transitory” to the claim. See David J. Kappos, Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media, 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010). Thus, Appellants have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 18 and its dependent claims 19-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 18-22. With respect to the Examiner’s rejection of claim 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), for the reasons discussed supra with respect to claim 3, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that Ferlitsch fails to disclose a virtual local address (App. Br. 15). Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), and dependent claims 19, 21, and 22, not separately argued (App. Br. 15). With respect to the Examiner’s rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), for the reasons discussed supra with respect to claim 13, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that Ferlitsch fails to disclose “simulating a . . . delay” (App. Br. 15). Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). DECISION We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 1–3 and 5–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Ferlitsch. We REVERSE the rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Ferlitsch. Appeal 2011-000196 Application 11/742,518 9 We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 18–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART ELD Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation