Ex Parte TAVADownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 17, 201713896883 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 17, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/896,883 05/17/2013 Marcello TAVA 080437.65555US 4336 23911 7590 10/19/2017 CROWELL & MORING LLP INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP P.O. BOX 14300 WASHINGTON, DC 20044-4300 EXAMINER KHATIB, RAMI ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3669 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/19/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): edocket @ crowell. com tche @ crowell. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MARCELLO TAYA Appeal 2017-003387 Application 13/896,883 Technology Center 3600 Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, LARRY J. HUME, and AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges. DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2017-003387 Application 13/896,883 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims 1—5, 7—9, 11—14, and 16—19. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. The claims are directed to a navigation system and method. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A navigation system comprising: an input device operatively configured to receive destination information from a user; a memory in which information concerning road sections and information concerning time-dependent traffic restrictions are stored such that, in each case, information concerning time- dependent traffic restrictions is assigned to road sections, wherein the time-dependent traffic restrictions are based on at least one of a scheduled road closure, a speed restriction imposed on one or more particular road sections, a vehicle type restriction imposed on one or more particular road sections, and a travel restriction imposed on one or more particular road sections; a route computation processor operatively configured to compute a route based on the destination information received from the user, wherein when computing a route, the memory is accessed in order to compute the route based on information concerning road sections and based on information concerning time-dependent traffic restrictions, and when computing the route, information concerning time- dependent traffic restrictions for a first portion of the road sections, to which information concerning a time-dependent traffic restriction is assigned, is taken into account only when an expected arrival time at said first portion of the road sections is within a time period in which the time-dependent traffic restriction is applicable and, information concerning time- dependent traffic restrictions for a second portion of the road 2 Appeal 2017-003387 Application 13/896,883 sections, to which information concerning a time-dependent traffic restriction is assigned, is not taken into account; and a display operatively configured to display the route computed by the route computation processor in response to receiving the destination information from the user. REFERENCE The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Myr US 2001/0029425 A1 Oct. 11, 2001 REJECTION The Examiner made the following rejection: Claims 1—5, 7—9, 11—14, and 16—19 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Myr. ANALYSIS With respect to independent claims 1 and 19, Appellant argues the claims together. (App. Br. 6). We select independent claim 1 as the representative claim for the group and will address Appellant’s arguments thereto. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Initially, we note the features argued by Appellant merely constitute non-functional descriptive material and statements of intended use of the recited applications. The claim simply recites an input device, a memory storing information, a route computation processor, and a display. The remainder of the claim is directed to the information content which does not change the operation of the “navigation system.” We further note that there is no separate and distinct step of determining a time of day for the time- dependent traffic restrictions. 3 Appeal 2017-003387 Application 13/896,883 The stored data constitutes non-functional descriptive material, which “does not lend patentability to an otherwise unpatentable computer- implemented product or process.” Ex parte Nehls, 88 USPQ2d 1883, 1889 (BPAI 2008) (precedential); see Ex parte Curry, 84 USPQ2d 1272, 1274 (BPAI 2005) (informative), aff’d, Fed. Cir. Appeal No. 2006-1003 (Rule 36) (June 12, 2006) (“wellness-related” data in databases and communicated on distributed network did not functionally change either the data storage system or the communication system used in the claimed method); see also In reNgai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Nehls, 88 USPQ2d at 1887—90 (discussing non-functional descriptive material). Similarly, “[a]n[ jintended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering- Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we need not attribute any distinguishing character to the asserted claim features. With respect to independent claim 1, Appellant’s main contention is that the Myr reference does not disclose the claimed “time-dependent traffic restrictions” and “when computing the route, information concerning time- dependent traffic restrictions for a first portion of the road sections, to which information concerning a time-dependent traffic restriction is assigned, is taken into account only when an expected arrival time at said first portion of the road sections is within a time period in which the time-dependent traffic restriction is applicable and, information concerning time-dependent traffic restrictions for a second portion of the road sections.” (App. Br. 6). Specifically, Appellant contends claim 1 recites “time-dependent traffic restrictions” be taken into account on a selective basis, corresponding 4 Appeal 2017-003387 Application 13/896,883 to when an expected arrival time falls within a time period in which the time-dependent traffic restriction is applicable. (App. Br. 7). The Examiner maintains that paragraphs 13—16 of the Myr reference disclose the time-dependent traffic restrictions. (Ans. 2—3). We agree with the Examiner. Appellant generally addresses paragraphs 14 and 123 of the Myr reference and generally contends that the time-dependent traffic restriction “based on at least one of a scheduled road closure, a speed restriction imposed on one or more particular road sections, a vehicle type restrictions imposed on one or more particular road sections, and a travel restriction imposed on one or more particular road sections” is not disclosed. (App. Br. 8—9). We disagree with Appellant, and we find that the Examiner has identified road closures, which are the time-dependent restrictions on travel. Although Appellant may intend the claimed time-dependent traffic restrictions to be merely hourly or temporary during a single day, we find the language of independent claim 1 does not distinguish the length of time dependency. Additionally, the computation of the travel route and time does not specifically claim the method to differentiate from the method of calculation disclosed by the Myr reference. Consequently, Appellant’s argument does not show error in the Examiner’s finding of anticipation of representative independent claim 1. Appellant further argues: Specifically, statistical or actual traffic information is not a “time-dependent traffic restrictions” because it is not “based on at least one of a scheduled road closure, a speed restriction imposed on one or more particular road sections, a vehicle type restriction imposed on one or more particular road sections, and a direction-of-travel restriction imposed on one or more particular road sections.” 5 Appeal 2017-003387 Application 13/896,883 (App. Br. 8—9). Appellant additionally contends: even if they could be equated, such as under an obviousness analysis as opposed to an anticipation analysis, the outstanding rejection should still be withdrawn because Myr expressly relies upon its traffic information in what would be the “second portion of the road sections” (i.e., those further away (claim 2)/closer to the destination (claim 3)). (App. Br. 9). Appellant further argues the Myr reference would seem to teach away from the above claimed feature. (App. Br. 9). We note ‘“teaching away’ is irrelevant to anticipation.” Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. VUTEk, Inc., 537 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). As a result, Appellant’s “teaching away” argument does not show error in the Examiner’s finding of anticipation. On this record, Appellant has not shown the Examiner’s claim construction is overly broad, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the Specification. Additionally, we note the Myr reference further discloses there are factors that affect travel time calculations, including “[generally stable changes in road conditions known in advance like closed roads under construction, traffic reroutes, changes in traffic arrangements because of visiting dignitaries, etc.” (Myr 1128). Consequently, we find the Myr reference discloses changes over time in roads, which discloses time- dependent route changes depending on when the routes are determined. Appellant contends dependent claims 2—5, 7—9, 11—14, and 16—18 depend either directly or indirectly from independent claims 1 and 19 and, as a result, are allowable for the same reasons as their independent claims. (App. Br. 10). We find Appellant has not set forth separate arguments for 6 Appeal 2017-003387 Application 13/896,883 patentability. Because we found no error in the Examiner’s factual findings or finding of anticipation, we group these claims as falling with their respective parent independent claim. REPLY BRIEF Appellant again presents arguments similar to those advanced in the Appeal Brief. Appellant contends Myr’s traffic jams are not time-dependent traffic restrictions. (Reply Br. 1). Appellant further contends Myr cannot reasonably be equated with the claimed ‘“time-dependent traffic restriction,’ since there is no teaching or suggestion that such traffic conditions are restrictions that pertain to certain road sections at certain times of the day.” (Reply Br. 2). We find Appellant’s argument is not commensurate in scope with the language of independent claim 1, where “certain times of the day” is not recited in the language of the claim. We find the Specification merely sets forth examples of “time- dependent traffic restrictions” as For example, a time-dependent traffic restriction may consist of the fact that a road section is closed at certain times; that a road section can be traveled only in one direction at certain times; that only certain vehicle types may travel on the road section at certain times; or that a road section may only be traveled at a predefined maximum speed at certain times, etc. (Spec. 15). Appellant further contends there is no teaching or suggestion that: Myr’s “closed roads” are time-dependent, scheduled road closures. Second, even if they are, there is no teaching as to how that information is used, let alone any suggestion that the “closed roads” information is used in a selective manner, as is the case with the claimed invention. 7 Appeal 2017-003387 Application 13/896,883 (Reply Br. 3). Appellant further argues: As more fully set forth in the Appeal Brief, the independent claims require that the particularly-recited time- dependent traffic restrictions be taken into account on a selective basis, corresponding to when an expected arrival time falls within a time period in which the time-dependent traffic restriction is applicable. In particular, restrictions in areas which are in the “second portion” of road sections, identified as being further away in dependent claim 2 or closer to the destination in claim 3, for example, are not taken into account in computing the route. Nothing in the paragraphs [0014] - [0016] teach or suggest that “closed roads” information is used in such an arrangement. (Reply Br. 3). Appellant further argues paragraph 123 does not discuss the disclosed invention with regards to the time-dependent traffic restrictions as proffered in paragraphs 14—16 of Myr. (Reply Br. 3—4). Appellant finally contends: Thus, even if the traffic Jams and/or road closures of Myr are “time-dependent traffic restrictions,” as that term is used in the claims, Myr still fails to anticipate independent claims 1 and 19 since Myr does not further teach or suggest the operations of selectively determining whether or not to take those traffic jams and/or road closures into account in computing a route based on a comparison between an “expected arrival time” at the location where the traffic jams and/or road closures actually exists and “a time period in which the time-dependent traffic restriction is applicable.” (Reply Br. 5—6). We disagree with Appellant, and we find the Myr reference discloses changes over time in the road, which discloses time-dependent route changes depending on when the routes are determined. Moreover Appellant’s Specification does not define or provide a limiting context to differentiate 8 Appeal 2017-003387 Application 13/896,883 the claimed time-dependent traffic restrictions from those disclosed in the Myr reference. CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1—5, 7—9, 11—14, and 16— 19 based upon anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102. DECISION For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claims 1—5, 7—9, 11—14, and 16—19 under 35 U.S.C. § 102. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation