Ex Parte Tabony et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 27, 201713449754 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/449,754 04/18/2012 Charles Joseph Tabony 110446 3707 23696 7590 03/29/2017 OTTAT mMM TNmRPORATFD EXAMINER 5775 MOREHOUSE DR. SAN DIEGO, CA 92121 GIROUX, GEORGE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2182 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/29/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): us-docketing@qualcomm.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte CHARLES JOSEPH TABONY, LUCIAN CODRESCU, and SURESH K. VENKUMAHANTI Appeal 2017-000747 Application 13/449,7541 Technology Center 2100 Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JOHN D. HAMANN, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants file this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—36. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. THE CLAIMED INVENTION Appellants’ claimed invention relates to branch prediction mechanisms in computer processors, including predicting the outcome of instructions and encoding the predictions in the instructions. Spec. 1—2. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is QUALCOMM Incorporated. App. Br. 3. Appeal 2017-000747 Application 13/449,754 Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter of the appeal and is reproduced below. 1. A method of predicting evaluation of a producer instruction comprising: encoding a prediction field in the producer instruction; and predicting evaluation of the producer instruction, in a processor, using the prediction field. REJECTIONS ON APPEAL (1) The Examiner rejected claims 1—7, 10-16, 18—21, 24—31, and 34—36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Grochowski et al. (US 2003/0126414 Al; published July 3, 2003) (hereinafter “Grochowski”) and Gschwind (US 2008/0005542 Al; published Jan. 3, 2008). (2) The Examiner rejected claims 8, 9, 22, 23, 32, and 33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Grochowski, Gschwind, and well-known practices in the art. (3) The Examiner rejected claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Grochowski, Gschwind, and Hoyt et al. (US 5,584,001; issued Dec. 10, 1996) (hereinafter “Hoyt”). ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’ contentions that the Examiner erred. In reaching our decision, we consider all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellants. We disagree with Appellants’ arguments and we incorporate herein and adopt as our own the findings, conclusions, and reasons set forth by the 2 Appeal 2017-000747 Application 13/449,754 Examiner in the (1) July 17, 2015 Final Office Action (“Final Act.” 2—15), (2) November 10, 2015 Advisory Action (“Adv. Act.” 2—3), and (3) August 26, 2016 Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.” 2—17). We highlight and address, however, specific findings and arguments below for emphasis. (1) Encoding a prediction field in the producer instruction Appellants argue the combination of Grochowski and Gschwind, and Grochowski in particular, fails to teach or suggest “predicting evaluation of the producer instruction, in a processor, using the prediction field,” as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claims 12, 26, and 34. Reply Br. 3^4. According to Appellants, Grochowski does not teach predicting a producer instruction (i.e., the compare instruction which is the producer instruction of predicate registers p3 and p4), but instead teaches predicting the value of predicate registers (e.g., p3, p4). See Reply Br. 3 (citing Grochowski || 12—13, Table 1). Appellants contend Grochowski, thus, instead teaches the opposite of claim 1. The Examiner finds, and we agree, the combination of Grochowski and Gschwind teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Ans. 12—14; Adv. Act. 2—3. As to Grochowski, the Examiner finds, and we agree, it teaches or suggests “predicting the outcome of a producer compare instruction using prediction information.” See Ans. 12—13 (citing Grochowski 113); Adv. Act. 2—3; see also Ans. 14 (citing Grochowski || 12—13). For example, Grochowski teaches “the past history of the compare instruction 011 is used to predict the value of predicate registers p3 and p4 before the instruction 011 is executed,” where compare “instruction 011 is a producer of predicate registers, p3 and p4.” Grochowski || 12—13; see also Grochowski 113 (teaching constructing a history or pattern table of past evaluations for use in 3 Appeal 2017-000747 Application 13/449,754 predicting, inter alia, values of predicate registers). We find Appellants’ purported dichotomy (i.e., predicting a producer instruction versus predicting the value of a predicate register) unpersuasive, including because the claim recites “predicting evaluation of the producer instruction” and such evaluation is what is used to set the value of the predicate register. See Spec. 16 (“Processors which adopt the use of predicate registers may include instructions to generate the values for the predicate registers, referred to herein as ‘producer instructions.’ . . . [Producer instructions . . . may be used to write or set the predicate registers.”). Predicting evaluation of a producer instruction and predicting the value of the associated predicate register are one and the same. (2) Encoding a prediction field in the producer instruction Appellants argue the combination of Grochowski and Gschwind, and Gschwind in particular, fails to teach or suggest “encoding a prediction field in the producer instruction,” as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claims 12, 26, and 34. App. Br. 5—7; Reply Br. 3^4. More specifically, Appellants argue Gschwind teaches, at best, a bimodal predictor within a consumer instruction — not a producer instruction as claimed. App. Br. 5—6 (citing Gschwind 17); see also Spec. 6 (“The one or more instructions, such as conditional branch instructions, which employ the predicate registers are referred to herein as ‘consumer instructions.’ The consumer instructions are said to be predicated on the producer instructions.”). The Examiner finds, and we agree, the combination of Grochowski and Gschwind teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Ans. 12—14; Adv. Act. 2. As discussed in more detail above, the Examiner finds, and we agree, Grochowski teaches or suggests, inter alia, predicting the outcome of 4 Appeal 2017-000747 Application 13/449,754 producer instructions using prediction information. Ans. 12—14 (citing Grochowski || 12—13); Adv. Act. 2—3. The Examiner also finds, and we agree, Grochowski teaches a history or table of past evaluations for use in making predictions concerning, inter alia, producer instructions. See, e.g., Adv. Act. 3 (citing Grochowski 113). As to Gschwind, the Examiner finds, and we agree, it teaches or suggests that a bimodal branch prediction (i.e., a prediction field) or hint bits can be stored in the instruction it is being used to predict. Ans. 14 (citing Gschwind 117). We agree with the Examiner that the combined teachings of Grochowski and Gschwind teach, or at least suggest, encoding Gschwind’s prediction field within the producer instruction being predicted, as taught by Grochowski. Id.; Adv. Act. 2—3; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (“[T]he [obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”); see also In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (“[I]t is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the references but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.”). We find Appellants’ arguments that the combination fails to teach the specific type of instruction being predicted and storing its associated prediction field unpersuasive. KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.”); see also In re Rice, 341 F.2d 309, 314 (CCPA 1965) (finding minor differences between the prior art and a claimed device may be a matter of design choice absent evidence to the contrary). 5 Appeal 2017-000747 Application 13/449,754 (3) Not clearly shown Appellants argue Gschwind does not unambiguously teach or suggest that a bimodal predictor is stored within an instruction. App. Br. 7; Reply Br. 4—5. More specifically, Appellants argue Gschwind teaches using a method “to establish a relatively static prediction for the branch, perhaps a bimodal predictor or hint bits within the branch instruction.” App. Br. 7 (citing Gschwind 117). Appellants argue that “it appears that Gschwind is describing a bimodal predictor to be one way to establish a static prediction for a branch, and alternative method is ‘hint bits within the branch instruction. ’” Id. at 7—8. Appellants further argue that Gschwind does not teach “how a bimodal predictor is stored within a branch instruction,” nor “further teach[] of this notion of hint bits.” Id. at 8. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Gschwind teaches or suggests encoding within an instruction (i) a bimodal predictor or (ii) hint bits. See Ans. 14—15 (citing Gschwind 117). More specifically, we agree with the Examiner that “Gschwind is contemplating several ways to establish a ‘relatively static prediction’ by storing the predictor/hint bits in the branch itself.” Ans. 15; see also Adv. Act. 2—3. Regardless, encoding (i.e., storing) hint bits — which in the context of the passage clearly relate to predictions, such as those that also could be stored “within the pattern history table” — within the instruction is sufficiently taught or suggested by Gschwind so as also to teach or suggest the disputed claim language. See Gschwind 117. We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments that Gschwind’s teachings are too ambiguous to support this finding. “[I]t is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw 6 Appeal 2017-000747 Application 13/449,754 therefrom.” In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that prior art references must be “considered together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art”). (4) Combining Grochowski and Gschwind Appellants argue “there is no motivation to combine Grochowski and Gschwind as suggested by the Examiner.” App. Br. 9. Appellants argue Grochowski teaches constructing a history or pattern table for predictions for a branch instruction — not a producer instruction. App. Br. 9 (citing Grochowski 113). As to Gschwind, Appellants argue it similarly teaches history-based prediction for a consumer instruction, and not a producer instruction. Id. (citing Gschwind 17). Appellants thus contend that “even if Gschwind’s alleged teaching of encoding a prediction field within a branch (consumer) instruction is used to prevent aliasing of a branch history table is applied to Grochowski, Grochowski could at best use this in preventing aliasing of its own branch history table.” Id.', see also App. Br. 10-11. The Examiner finds Grochowski and Gschwind are properly combined. Ans. 15—16; Adv. Act. 2—3. As discussed in more detail above, the Examiner finds Grochowski teaches or suggests, inter alia, that the history based branch prediction technique using a history or pattern table can be applied to predict the evaluation of producer instructions. Ans. 16 (citing Grochowski 12—13). The Examiner finds “the motivation provided by Gschwind (to reduce destructive aliasing within a pattern history based prediction table) is [properly] applied to the history based prediction of the producer instruction, taught by Grochowski.” Id.', see also Adv. Act. 2—3. 7 Appeal 2017-000747 Application 13/449,754 We find Appellants’ arguments unpersuasive. The Examiner provides “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). For example, the Examiner reasons a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Grochowski and Gschwind to reduce destructive aliasing within a history based prediction table. Ans. 16; Adv. Act. 2—3; see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”). (5) Storing the updated prediction field in memory Appellants argue the combination of Grochowski and Gschwind fails to teach or suggest “storing the producer instruction with the updated prediction field in memory,” as recited in claim 6, and similarly recited in claims 20 and 30. App. Br. 11—12. More specifically, Appellants argue “there is no requirement for the updated prediction field to be stored in memory for this alleged teaching. The comparison and accompanying update, as alleged, can be performed in entirely combinational logic without the producer instruction with the updated prediction field in memory.” App. Br. 12. The Examiner finds, and we agree, the combination of Grochowski and Gschwind teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Ans. 17; Adv. Act. 3. More specifically, the Examiner finds, and we agree, the combination teaches or suggests that the prediction values are updated (i.e., stored in memory) during execution by the processor which determines if 8 Appeal 2017-000747 Application 13/449,754 the actual values are different from that predicted. Ans. 17 (citing Grochowski || 10, 21; Gschwind 10, 17); see also In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (“[I]t is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.”); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). CONCLUSION Based on our findings above, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 6, 12, 20, 26, 30, and 34, as well as claims 2—5, 7, 10, 11, 13—16, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27—29, 31, 35, and 36, as Appellants do not provide separate arguments for their patentability. We also sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 8, 9, 17, 22, 23, 32, and 33, as Appellants rely on their arguments made with respect to independent claims 1, 12, 26, and 34. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—36. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation