Ex Parte Sullivan

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 27, 2015

11856808 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2015)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/856,808 09/18/2007 Richard Ali Sullivan BPCCR0019AS 9747 27939 7590 03/30/2015 Philip H. Burrus, IV Burrus Intellectual Property Law Group LLC 222 12th Street NE Suite 1803 Atlanta, GA 30309 EXAMINER IBRAHIM, MOHAMED ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2444 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/30/2015 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte RICHARD ALI SULLIVAN ____________ Appeal 2012-001410 Application 11/856,8081 Technology Center 2400 ____________ Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, and BART A. GERSTENBLITH, Administrative Patent Judges. ASTORINO, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 According to the Appellant, “[t]he real party in interest is Compucredit Intellectual Property Holdings Corp, II.” Br. 2. Appeal 2012-001410 Application 11/856,808 2 Claimed Subject Matter Claims 1, 11, and 17 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal 1. An interface system configured for interaction between a networked client portal and a server-based information handling system, comprising: an interaction controller configured to receive data objects from a client browser portal and to identify a predetermined workflow corresponding to the data objects, wherein the interaction controller comprises: a web step manager configured to load a workflow interaction component associated with the predetermined workflow, wherein the workflow interaction component comprises at least one executable flow step; and a flow step manager configured to execute each of the at least one executable flow steps by at least delivering extracted data from the data objects to a data interface of the server-based information handling system and to determine any next flow steps remaining from the at least one executable flow step; and a workflow processor configured to adapt the extracted data into a predetermined format recognized by the data interface of the server-based information handling system; wherein the flow step manager is configured to give temporary process control to the server-based information handling system upon delivering the extracted data and receive control one [sic once] the server-based information handling system has processed the extracted data.2 2 The Appellant writes, “Dunkley fails to teach a flow-step manager . . . configured to receive control once the server-based information handling system has processed the extracted data.” Br. 11 (emphasis added). This written statement is nearly identical to the language of claim 1, except for a Appeal 2012-001410 Application 11/856,808 3 Rejections I. Claims 1, 6–13, 16, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Dunkley (US 2006/0288222 A1, pub. Dec. 21, 2006) and Kanaya (US 6,493,675 B1, iss. Dec. 10, 2002). II. Claims 2–5, 15, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Dunkley, Kanaya, and Bobick (US 2003/0172135 A1, pub. Sept. 11, 2003). III. Claims 14 and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Dunkley, Kanaya,3 and Powell (US 2006/0265258 A1, pub. Nov. 23, 2006). ANALYSIS Rejection I The Appellant does not present any separate arguments for claims 6– 13, 16, and 17 apart from claim 1. Thus, we decide the appeal of this rejection on the basis of claim 1. The Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 includes findings that Dunkley substantially discloses the limitations of claim 1. Ans. 4–5. However, the Examiner finds Dunkley fails to disclose the “wherein” clause of claim 1, typographical error in the claim, i.e., “one” should have been written as “once.” 3 While the heading for the Examiner’s rejection does not mention Kanaya, the Examiner relies upon Kanaya (Ans. 14 (“Dunkley-Kanaya teaches . . . .”)), and the Appellant’s Brief reflects that the Appellant is aware that Kanaya is relied upon for this rejection (Br. 10 (Identifying “Ground 2” of the rejections to be reviewed on appeal as “[w]hether the remaining combinations, i.e., Dunkley, Kanaya, and Powell and Dunkley, Kanaya, and Bobick, set forth a prima facie case of obviousness . . . .” (second emphasis added)). Appeal 2012-001410 Application 11/856,808 4 i.e., “wherein the flow step manager is configured to give temporary process control to the server-based information handling system upon delivering the extracted data and receive control on[c]e the server-based information handling system has processed the extracted data.” Ans. 5. To remedy this deficiency with regard to rejection of claim 1, the Examiner finds Kanaya teaches: a system for managing workflow functions wherein workflow support management unit determines which workflow support unit to manage a workflow process. Upon receiving a new workflow process, the workflow support management unit transfers the received request to the appropriate workflow support unit to process the request. Thus, giving specific workflow support unit for a period of time, the process control for handling and executing the assigned workflow process. Final Act. 3–4 (citing Kanaya, col. 8, ll. 52–62, col. 38, ll. 19–38); Ans. 5–6. The Appellant “traverses the suggestion that Kanaya teaches a transfer of process contro1” (Br. 11), i.e., the “wherein” clause, because Kanaya’s “workflow support unit management device, upon with [sic] the [Final] Office Action relies, simply selects which workflow support unit will manage a particular workflow” (Br. 11, n.1 (citing Kanaya, col. 8, ll. 52–62, col. 38, ll. 19–38)). The Appellant’s traversal is not persuasive. In response to the Appellant’s traversal, the Examiner finds Kanaya’s management of “work flow using a main server and home server that is in communication with client terminals” corresponds to the “wherein” clause of independent claim 1. See Ans. 17. More particularly, the Examiner explains: When user system, [e.g., user system B 1112,] transmits [a] work item request, the [request] go[es] to the home server first[, e.g., home server A 1100]. The home server looks into its local Appeal 2012-001410 Application 11/856,808 5 storage unit for information and extracts user specific information then the work item is transfer[red] to the main server[, e.g., main server 1000,] for further processing. When the main server complete[s] the work item[, the work item is then] . . . return[ed] to the home server[,] which then transmits [the work item] to the user system . . . . Ans. 17 (citing Kanaya, col. 9, ll. 30–40, col. 10, ll. 41–67, col. 11, 15–46, Fig. 21); see also Ans. 17 (citing Kanaya, col. 3, ll. 48–61, col. 4, ll. 11–19, Fig. 4). The Examiner’s finding is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, the Appellant fails to explain, persuasively, using evidence or technical reasoning, why the Examiner’s finding lacks adequate support. Turning back to the Examiner’s rejection, the Examiner concludes that “[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art . . . to incorporate the teachings of Kanaya with that of Dunkley in order to improve the efficiency of the system by preventing the process load from concentrating on a specific workflow support unit.” Ans. 6; see Ans. 18. The Examiner’s conclusion articulates adequate reasoning with rational underpinning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of these references to result in the claimed subject matter. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds [require] some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”), cited with approval in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Regarding the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness, the Appellant contends, “any process control transfer feature of Kanaya, if present, would change the principle of operation found in Dunkley’s system where a single Appeal 2012-001410 Application 11/856,808 6 controller is required to retain workflow process control during operation.” Br. 17; see also Br. 14–18. The Appellant’s contention is not persuasive. The Appellant’s contention is based on an assertion that the principle of operation of Dunkley’s system requires a single controller. We disagree. Although Dunkley’s disclosure may use one controller for process control, Dunkley’s disclosure does not exclude, explicitly or implicitly, the possibility of more than one controller for process control. As such, we find Kanaya’s teaching, i.e., transfer of process contro1, compatible with Dunkley’s system. Thus, Rejection I, i.e., the rejection of claims 1, 6–13, 16, and 17 as unpatentable over Dunkley and Kanaya, is sustained. Rejections II and III For Rejections II and III, the Appellant relies on the arguments presented for Rejection I. See Br. 18. In other words, the Appellant contends that Rejection I, based on Dunkley and Kanaya, “fails to set forth a prima facie case of obviousness.” Br. 18. Further, the Appellant argues that the addition of Bobick or Powell does not correct the alleged deficiencies of Rejection I. See Br. 18. The Appellant’s argument is not persuasive because, as discussed above, the Examiner’s rejection does not suffer from the alleged deficiencies. Thus, for the same reasons we have sustained Rejection I, we likewise sustain Rejections II and III, i.e., claims 2–5, 15, 19, and 20 as unpatentable over Dunkley, Kanaya, and Bobick, and claims 14 and 18 as unpatentable over Dunkley, Kanaya, and Powell, respectively. Appeal 2012-001410 Application 11/856,808 7 DECISION We AFFIRM the rejections of claims 1–20. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Klh