Ex Parte Smith

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 5, 2018

14088352 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 5, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
14/088,352 11/23/2013
55286 7590 11/06/2018
SHARP LABORATORIES OF AMERICA, INC.
C/0 LAW OFFICE OF GERALD MALISZEWSKI
P.O. BOX 270829
SAN DIEGO, CA 92198-2829
Dana S. Smith
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
SLA3244 1022
EXAMINER
HOFFLER, RAHEEM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2155
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/06/2018 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DANAS. SMITH
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
Technology Center 2100
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, ROBERT E. NAPPI, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-30, which are all of the pending claims. App. Br. 3. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE.
1 Appellant indicates the real party in interest is Sharp Laboratories of
America, Inc. App. Br. 3.
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
SUMMARY OF THE DECISION
Appellant claims a method and devices for contextually searching on
a computer using attributes of a visual relationship between search
components entered to direct the priority and ordering of a search inquiry
submitted to a conventional search engine. See Spec. 1 :6-11.
The Examiner concludes that the claims are directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter because the claims "recite[], in part, [the] abstract
idea of selecting a first data object, adding a first and second search term
annotation to a top and bottom plane image respectively and constructing a
search inquiry, and sending the search inquiry to a search engine." We
reverse the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the Examiner fails to
provide sufficient articulated reasoning to support a conclusion that all the
specific claim limitations that the Examiner labels as included in the abstract
idea are actually an abstract idea. At best, the Examiner has shown that the
claims involve an abstract idea, but has not shown the character of any claim
as a whole is directed to an abstract idea.
Additionally, we reverse the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because
the Examiner fails to provide sufficient articulated reasoning to support a
conclusion that the claims are rendered obvious by the cited prior art.
2
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
Illustrative Claims
Illustrative claims 1 and 15 under appeal read as follows ( emphasis,
formatting, and bracketed materials added):
1. A method for formulating a search inquiry using a
computer enabled with a sequence of processor executable
instructions stored in a non-transitory medium, the method
compnsmg:
[A.] a computer user interface (UI) accepting
commands for selecting a first data object having a
top plane image and a bottom plane image;
[B.] a computer display displaying the first data object
top plane image;
[C.] the computer UI accepting commands for adding a
first search term annotation to the presentation of
the first data object top plane image;
[D.] subsequent to adding the first search term
annotation, the computer display displaying the
first data object bottom plane image;
[E.] the computer UI accepting commands for adding a
second search term annotation to the
presentation of the first data object bottom plane
image;
[F.] the computer constructing the search inquiry in
response to[:]
[i.] the first data object top and bottom plane
images,
[ii.] the first search term annotation, and
[iii.] the second search term annotation; and,
[ G.] the computer sending the search inquiry to a search
engme.
3
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
15. A search inquiry natural user interface (NUI)
enabled by a computer executing a sequence of processor
instructions stored in a non -transitory medium, the NUI
compnsmg:
[A.] a front page menu providing user interface (UI)
mechanisms for:
[i.] selecting a first data object having both a top
plane image and a bottom plane image;
[ii.] displaying the first data object top plane
image;
[iii.] adding a first search term annotation to the
display of the first data object top plane
image;
[iv.] initiating a search inquiry;
[ v.] accepting a flip command;
[B.] a flip page menu, presented in response to the flip
command[:]
[i.] displaying the first data object bottom plane
image, and
[ii.] providing UI mechanisms for:
[a.] adding a second search term
annotation to the display of the first
data object bottom plane image;
[b] initiating a search inquiry;
[ c.] accepting an unflip command for
returning to the front page menu; and,
[C.] wherein the search inquiries are responsive to[:]
[i.] the first data object top and bottom plane
images,
[ii.] the first search term annotation, and
[iii.] the second search term annotation.
4
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
Keenan et al.
Bhola et al.
Xin et al.
References2
US 2012/0198545 Al
US 2013/0031076 Al
US 2014/0129990 Al
Rejections3
A.
Aug. 2, 2012
Jan.31,2013
May 8, 2014
The Examiner rejects claims 1-30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because "the
claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more," i.e.,
because the subject matter of the claimed invention is patent-ineligible.
Ans. 4.
As to this rejection, our decision as to the § 101 rejection of claim 1 is
determinative as to the § 101 rejection of all the claims. Therefore, except
for our ultimate decision, we do not discuss further herein the § 101
rejection of claims 2-30.
B.
The Examiner rejects claims 15-19, 22-24, 26, and 28 under
35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Keenan
and Xin. Final Act. 2-11.
Appellant presents arguments for claim 15. App. Br. 9-15. As to this
rejection, our decision as to the § 103 rejection of claim 15 is determinative
2 All citations herein to these references are by reference to the first named
inventor only.
3 All citations herein to the "Final Action" are to a Final Action mailed on
June 15, 2017.
5
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
as to the§ 103 rejection of claims 16-19, 22-24, 26, and 28. Therefore,
except for our ultimate decision, we do not discuss further herein the § 103
rejection of claims 16-19, 22-24, 26, and 28.
C.
The Examiner rejects claims 1-14, 20, 21, 25, 27, 29, and 30 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Keenan,
Bhola, and Xin. Final Act. 11-30.
For this rejection, Appellant argues independent claims 1, 29, and 30
as a group. App. Br. 17-19. As to this rejection, Appellant relies on the
§ 103 arguments presented for claim 15. App. Br. 18. Thus, our decision as
to the § 103 rejection of claim 15 is determinative as to the § 103 rejection
of claims 1-14, 20, 21, 25, 27, 29, and 30. Therefore, except for our
ultimate decision, we do not discuss further herein the § 103 rejection of
claims 1-14, 20, 21, 25, 27, 29, and 30.
Issues on Appeal
Has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter?
Has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 15 as being obvious?
ANALYSIS 4
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellant's
Appeal Brief and Reply Brief arguments that the Examiner has erred.
4 All Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) citations herein are to
MPEP Rev. 08.2017, January 2018.
6
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
A. Section 101
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for "any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof." The Supreme Court has "long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice Corp. v.
CLS Bankint'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quotingAss'nfor Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
Accordingly, in applying § 101, the Supreme Court cautioned:
[W]e must distinguish between patents that claim the
"'buildin[g] block[ s]"' of human ingenuity and those that
integrate the building blocks into something more, thereby
"transform[ing]" them into a patent-eligible invention. The
former "would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the
underlying" ideas, and are therefore ineligible for patent
protection. The latter pose no comparable risk of pre-emption,
and therefore remain eligible for the monopoly granted under our
patent laws.
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354--55.
The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 82-83 (2012), "for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2355. The first step in that analysis is to "determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts," such as an
abstract idea. Id. For example, a fundamental economic practice or merely
implementing a mathematical algorithm/formula is an abstract idea. See
7
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357-58 (discussing Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593
(2010) and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)).
The Court acknowledged in Mayo that "all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas." Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We, therefore, look to whether the
claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See
Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
If the claims are not directed to an abstract idea or other patent-ineligible
concept (e.g., a law of nature), the inquiry ends. Id. at 1339. Otherwise, the
inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are
considered "individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine
whether the additional elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a
patent-eligible application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 ( quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 79, 78).
In Enfzsh, the Federal Circuit provided further guidance.
In setting up the two-stage Mayo/Alice inquiry, the
Supreme Court has declared: "We must first determine whether
the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept."
Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355. That formulation plainly contemplates
that the first step of the inquiry is a meaningful one, i.e., that a
substantial class of claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible
concept. The "directed to" inquiry, therefore, cannot simply ask
whether the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because
essentially every routinely patent-eligible claim involving
physical products and actions involves a law of nature and/or
natural phenomenon-after all, they take place in the physical
world. See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 ("For all inventions at some
level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature,
8
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.")[.] Rather, the "directed
to" inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light
of the specification, based on whether "their character as a
whole is directed to excluded subject matter."
Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335 (bold emphasis added).
B. Requirement to Provide Sufficient Articulated Reasoning
The requirement that the Examiner must provide a proper notice of
rejection is set forth by 35 U.S.C. § 132:
Whenever, on examination, any claim for a patent is rejected, ...
the Director shall notify the applicant thereof, stating the reasons
for such rejection ... together with such information and
references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of
continuing the prosecution of his application.
The Federal Circuit has held that the Office carries its procedural
burden when its rejection satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by
notifying the applicant of the reasons for rejection, "together with such
information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of
continuing the prosecution of [the] application." See In re Jung, 637 F.3d
1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (brackets in original, quoting 35 U.S.C. § 132).
Put simply, the Office is required to set forth the statutory basis of the
rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the
notice requirement of§ 132. Id.; see also Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574,
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that§ 132 "is violated when a rejection is so
uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to
counter the grounds for rejection").
9
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
C. Examiner's § 101 Rejection - Alice/Mayo - Steps 1 and 2
Applying step 1 of the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines5
claim 1 is directed to a 'judicial exception" because:
Claim 1 recites, in part, abstract idea of selecting a first data
object, adding a first and second search term annotation to a top
and bottom plane image respectively and constructing a search
inquiry, and sending the search inquiry to a search engine. The
top and bottom plane image is illustrated within Appellant's
Figures 1 & 2 and are merely front and back surface images that
have the ability to be manipulated, i.e., mere data. These
limitations describe the abstract idea of remotely accessing and
retrieving user-specified information and collecting, displaying,
and manipulating data, which corresponds to concepts identified
as abstract ideas by the courts, such as (Int. Ventures v. Erie
Indemnity '002 patent) and (Int. Ventures v. Cap One Financial)
respectively. Applicant's claim language selects a first data
object, equivalent to the collecting of information performed by
the cited case law. The limitation of, adding a first and second
search term annotation to a top and bottom plane image
respectively and constructing a search inquiry, is the mere
manipulation of data. Applicant's claim language shows a
claimed process that is not meaningfully different from practices
human beings have long performed, such as manipulating one or
more surfaces of an image using a plurality of textual/ graphical
measures in order to achieve a desired result.
Ans. 4--5 ( emphasis added).
Applying step 2 of the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines
claim 1 is "without significantly more" because:
Additional elements of Claim 1, such as a computer display for
the conventional display of objects and a computer interface (UI)
that is utilized for the input of search term annotations producing
the aggregation of additional content through Applicant's
5 We reproduce in its entirety the Examiner's analysis of Alice/Mayo step 1
for claim 1.
10
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
claimed search engine, are not considered "significantly more"
than the abstract idea presented within Claim 1 and provide the
mere search and display of data objects using input search term
annotations. Conventional search engines and user interfaces
have long been utilized to accomplish the aggregation of result
data pertaining to query terms and would not amount to
"significantly more".
Ans. 5.
D. Appellant's§ 101 Arguments6
Appellant raises the following arguments in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter because the claim satisfies step one of the Alice/Mayo
analysis.
Appellant contends:
[T]he Examiner has failed to make a prima facie case that the
subject matter of these claims is an abstract idea .... [T]he
Examiner simply asserts that the claimed invention is directed
[to] accessing, retrieving, collecting, displaying, and
manipulating data. In traverse, the Applicant submits that any
patentable invention can be seen as an abstraction if examined in
the most general fashion possible .... The Examiner has failed
to make a case that annotating the top and bottom planes of a
computer display image is simply an abstraction for the idea of
accessing, retrieving, collecting, displaying, and manipulating
data.
Reply Br. 14 ( emphasis added).
[T]he Examiner has failed to provide any evidence or otherwise
prove that the specific limitations of claims 1, 15, and 29-30 are
an abstract idea. Because the Examiner has failed to make a
6 The contentions we discuss herein are determinative as to the § 101
rejection on appeal. Therefore, we do not discuss Appellant's other§ 101
contentions herein.
11
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
prima facie argument, the Applicant is unable to present more
explicit refuting arguments.
Reply Br. 15 ( emphasis added).
E. Panel's§ 101 Analysis
Essentially, Appellant is arguing the Examiner's articulated reasoning
for Alice/Mayo step 1 is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from
recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection. We agree. To
provide sufficient articulated reasoning as to why a claim is directed to an
abstract idea or other patent-ineligible concept (e.g., a law of nature), an
Examiner must adequately address both (a) what the character of the claim
as a whole is directed to, and (b) whether that something is an abstract idea
or a patent-ineligible concept. Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335.
We address each portion of the Examiner's analysis of Alice/Mayo
step 1 for claim 1.
a.
In applying step 1 of the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner
determines:
Claim 1 recites, in part, abstract idea of selecting a first data
object, adding a first and second search term annotation to a top
and bottom plane image respectively and constructing a search
inquiry, and sending the search inquiry to a search engine. The
top and bottom plane image is illustrated within Appellant's
Figures 1 & 2 and are merely front and back surface images that
have the ability to be manipulated, i.e., mere data.
Ans. 4.
Applicant's claim language selects a first data object, equivalent
to the collecting of information performed by the cited case law.
The limitation of, adding a first and second search term
annotation to a top and bottom plane image respectively and
constructing a search inquiry, is the mere manipulation of data.
12
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
Ans. 5.
First, step 1 of the Alice/Mayo analysis is based on whether,
considered in light of the specification, the character of the claim as a whole
is directed to excluded subject matter. Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335. By
addressing claim 1 "in part," the Examiner fails to provide sufficient
articulated reasoning (i.e., notice) to Appellant of the Examiner's
determination of what the character of claim 1 as a whole is directed to.
Such an "in part" claim analysis, at best, may show that the claim involves
an abstract idea, but cannot show the character of the claim as a whole is
directed to an abstract idea.
Second, the Examiner's "in part" analysis broadly summarizes the
method of claim 1 while dismissing the search query's data structure (top
and bottom plane image with respective annotations) as "mere data" without
consideration of the particular format of the data structure used in the search
query. In claim 1, the operations are recited with greater specificity ( a lower
level of generality) than the operations recited in the claims at issue in Bilski
and Alice. We agree with Appellant that the Examiner fails to provide
sufficient articulation to show "that the specific limitations of claim[ 1] are
an abstract idea." Reply Br. 15.
b.
The Examiner also determines:
These limitations describe the abstract idea of remotely accessing
and retrieving user-specified information and collecting,
displaying, and manipulating data, which corresponds to
concepts identified as abstract ideas by the courts, such as (Int.
Ventures v. Erie Indemnity '002 patent) and (Int. Ventures v.
Cap One Financial) respectively.
Ans. 4--5.
13
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
First, from a plain reading of claim 1, it is clear that claim 1 is not
recited as the broad manipulation of data (i.e., collecting, accessing, and
displaying) as determined by the Examiner. See Ans. 4--5. Rather, as we
note supra, claim 1 includes at least a particular data format not sufficiently
addressed by the Examiner.
Second, the Examiner does not provide guidance as to the particular
relevance of the cited Intellectual Ventures v. Erie Indemnity Co., 850 F.3d
1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017) and Intellectual Ventures v. Capital One Financial
Corp., 850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017) decisions. The former decision
addresses broadly recited systems and methods for accessing a user's
remotely stored data and files. The latter decision addresses (i) utilizing
user-selected preset limits on spending that are stored in a database that
communicates a notification to the user and (ii) customizing web page
content as a function of navigation history and information known about the
user. Further, we fail to find any particular relevance as to the Examiner's
citations as the subject matter of Appellant's claim 1 is not directed to any
abstract idea of these decisions.
C.
The Examiner further determines:
Applicant's claim language shows a claimed process that is not
meaningfully different from practices human beings have long
performed, such as manipulating one or more surfaces of an
image using a plurality of textual/ graphical measures in order to
achieve a desired result.
Ans. 5.
We are unable to determine the meaning of the Examiner's statement
"such as manipulating one or more surfaces of an image using a plurality of
textual/ graphical measures in order to achieve a desired result," and the
14
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
Examiner does not provide any further analysis to explain why the claimed
process is not meaningfully different. Again, the Examiner fails to provide
sufficient articulation to show "that the specific limitations of claim[ 1] are
an abstract idea." Reply Br. 15.
d.
Appellant's arguments persuade us the Examiner fails to properly
determine what the claim is directed to. The Examiner fails to provide
sufficient articulated reasoning to support a conclusion that all the specific
claim limitations that the Examiner labels as included in the abstract idea are
actually an abstract idea. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 101 of claims 1-30.
F. Appellant's§ 103 Arguments7
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 15 under 3 5 U.S. C. § 1 0 3 (a).
[When] Keenan's glyphs are compared to the Applicant's data
object top and bottom images, it must be noted that a (single) 2D
glyph is comprised of only a single plane and, therefore, a single
image. In contrast, the claimed invention comprises two images,
one associated with the top plane and one associated with the
bottom plane.
The [Final Action] Response (page 32) also states that
Keenan discloses "toolbar commands for the display of glyphs
and their associated features/ attributes with a geometric
boundary, and to be associated with a top or bottom, as
selected.["] Examples of such commands can be "move a
selected layer to top" and "move a selected layer to bottom[]."
In traverse, Keenan defines what he means by "layer["],
stating that "(a) composite image that has been exploded into
7 The contentions we discuss are determinative as to the § 103 rejections on
appeal, so we do not discuss Appellant's other § 103 contentions herein.
15
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
multiple layers may have each layer treated as an individual
glyph 455 or design object 450" [0041]. Thus, in [0043] when
Keenan describes commands such as "move a selected layer to
top" and "move a selected layer to bottom", he is describing a
stack of multiple glyphs and a command that moves one
particular layer (i.e., glyph) to the top or bottom of the order of
layered glyphs. Moving the order in which Keenan's individual
glyphs are layered is not the same as changing the top plane
image of a glyph to the bottom plane image of a glyph, for the
simple reason that a glyph has no bottom plane or bottom plane
image. Alternatively stated, while the claimed invention recites
switching between a first (top plane) image associated with a data
object, and a second (bottom plane) image associated with the
same first data object, Ke[ e ]nan merely discloses multiple
glyphs, where each glyph comprises a single image.
App. Br. 11.
G. Panel's§ 103 Analysis
Claim 15 recites "a first data object having both a top plane image
and a bottom plane image." Emphasis added. 8 We construe "top" and
"bottom" as terms defining a positional relationship between the planes. As
to the particular relationship of the top plane and bottom plane, Appellant's
Specification describes "a first data object bottom plane" as being "opposite
of the first data object top plane." Spec. 5:9--11. Additionally, claim 15
(and claim 29) explicitly recite a "flip" operation, the functioning of which is
based on the "opposite" relationship between the top and bottom planes.
Although we do not import limitations from the Specification, nevertheless
"[i]t is axiomatic that, in proceedings before the PTO, claims in an
application are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
8 All of Appellant's independent claims require a top plane and a bottom
plane.
16
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
with the specification." In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Here, given the context of the claims and in light of the rest of the
Specification, we construe the term "bottom plane" in claim 15 as requiring
a positional relationship opposite the top plane.
We conclude, after reviewing the Examiner's rejection and consistent
with Appellant's above argument as to claim 15, there is insufficient
articulated reasoning to support the Examiner's findings that Keenan
discloses the argued "a first data object having both a top plane image and a
bottom plane image" of claim 15. Keenan's glyphs maybe layered (e.g.,
like a stack of papers), but no two glyphs are in an "opposite" positional
relationship such that they can be "flipped" (e.g., like flipping a single piece
of paper over to reveal the opposite surface). Therefore, we conclude that
there is insufficient articulated reasoning to support the Examiner's
conclusion that claim 15 is rendered obvious by Keenan and Xin based on
the Examiner's articulated reasoning.
The Examiner's rejection of independent claim 1 relies upon a similar
application of Keenan and Xin. See Final Act 12. As such, we similarly
conclude that there is insufficient articulated reasoning to support the
Examiner's conclusion that claim 1 is rendered obvious.
17
Appeal2018-005309
Application 14/088,352
CONCLUSIONS
(1) Appellant has established that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1-30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter.
(2) Appellant has established that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1-30 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
(3) Claims 1-30 have not been shown to be unpatentable.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is reversed.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-30 as being unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed.
REVERSED
18