Ex Parte SherryDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 29, 201613874693 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 29, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/874,693 05/01/2013 11050 7590 08/31/2016 SEAGER, TUFTE & WICKHEM, LLP 100 South 5th Street Suite 600 Minneapolis, MN 55402 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR John Sherry UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 2001.1413103 5801 EXAMINER HIGHLAND, RACHEL S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3731 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/31/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): BSC.USPTO@stwiplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JOHN SHERRY Appeal2014-007916 Application 13/874,693 Technology Center 3700 Before MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, THOMAS F. SMEGAL, and PAUL J. KORNICZKY, Administrative Patent Judges. OSINSKI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEivIENT OF THE CASE John Sherry (Appellant) 1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner's final decision rejecting claims 1 and 3-20, which are all of the pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM and designate our affirmance as containing NEW GROUNDS OF REJECTION pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal2014-007916 Application 13/874,693 THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claims 1, 11, and 16 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter on appeal. l, A removable stent fcir providing reinforcement to a selected region of a selected body lumen including a resilient cylindrical layer) the stent is radially expandable from a first reduced diarneter configuration to an expanded configuration) the removable stent comprising: at least one bioresorbable extn1sion exterior from the resilient cylindrical layer for resisting migration of the removab1e stent when said removab1e stent is positioned in said selected region of said selected body lumen when the stent is in its expanded configuration said at least one extrusion resists migration of the removable stent when said removable stent is positioned in said selected region of said selected body lumen. EVIDENCE The Examiner relied on the following evidence in rejecting the claims on appeal: Kleshinski Chouinard Chobotov Sherry us 5,540,712 us 6,156,064 US 7,147,661 B2 US 8,444,688 B2 REJECTIONS July 30, 1996 Dec. 5, 2000 Dec. 12, 2006 May 21, 2013 I. Claims 1, 3, 4, 6-9, 11-14, 16-18, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Chobotov and Kleshinski. Final Act. 2--4. II. Claims 5, 10, 15, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Chobotov, Kleshinski, and Chouinard. Id. at 4--5. 2 Appeal2014-007916 Application 13/874,693 III. Claims 1 and 3-20 stand rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting over claims 1-12 of Sherry. Id. at 6-7. 2 OPINION Rejection I Appellants argue claims 1, 3, 4, 6-9, 11-14, 16-18, and 20 as a group. Appeal Br. 10-14. We select claim 1 as the representative claim, and claims 3, 4, 6-9, 11-14, 16-18, and 20 stand or fall therewith. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2013). The Examiner finds that Chobotov teaches all of the limitations of independent claim 1 (including, inter alia, a removable stent) except for the extrusion being bioresorbable. Final Act. 2--4. The Examiner finds that Kleshinski teaches "a stent structure having extrusions or barbs (2) that can be made ofbioresorbable material." Id. at 4 (citing Kleshinski, 4:21-24). The Examiner also finds that "[bioresorbable material] is known in the art to provide the advantage of allowing for ease in removing the stent when it is no longer needed." Id. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art "to modify the barbs of Chobotov to be made ofbioresorbable material to allow for easy removal of the stent structure." Id. 2 Even though the double patenting rejection is not reproduced in the Answer, the Answer states that "[ e ]very ground of rejection set forth in the Office [A ]ction dated December 23, 2013 from which the appeal is taken is being maintained by the Examiner except for the grounds of rejection (if any) listed under the subheading 'WITHDRAWN REJECTIONS."' Ans. 2. There are no grounds of rejection listed under such a subheading as being withdrawn. 3 Appeal2014-007916 Application 13/874,693 Appellant argues that Chobotov fails to teach a removable stent in that Chobotov teaches endovascular stent grafts that are designed to last over the life of the patient. Appeal Br. 10-11; Reply Br. 2-3. Appellant's argument appears to be premised on a narrow interpretation of "removable stent" in which removal of the stent must be contemplated at the time of its placement. The Examiner responds that the term "removable" merely "amounts to an intended use for the device" and that the claims merely require that the stent be capable of being removed because the claims as drafted do not "impose any time constraints or requirements for when and how the stent is removed." Ans. 5. The Examiner finds that "the device of Chobotov is capable of being removed" even if "Chobotov does not contemplate removal of the stent." Id. We agree with the Examiner that the claims are not limited to stents that are intended or contemplated to be removed, as opposed to stents that are merely capable of being removed. During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Although the Specification categorizes "[p ]ermanent stents" as stents that "are retained in place and incorporated into the vessel wall," and "[ r ]emovable stents" as stents that "are removed from the body vessel when the stent is no longer needed" (Spec. i-f 5), this passage does not provide evidence that a removable stent is one that must be intended to be removed at the time of placement nor provide evidence as to when a stent is no longer needed and would be removed. Appellant has not persuasively shown that the Specification requires the more narrow interpretation upon which its position is based. Additionally, Appellant has not persuasively explained how the Examiner's 4 Appeal2014-007916 Application 13/874,693 claim interpretation is overly broad and unreasonable in light of the Specification. We agree with the Examiner's finding that Chobotov's stent is capable of being removed, and thus, meets the claim under the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification. Ans. 5. Appellant further argues that Chobotov "teaches away from using barbs that are attached by methods other than integral formation because higher strength and better fatigue resistance are obtained" with integral barbs. Appeal Br. 12. We are not persuaded that Chobotov's desire for strength and fatigue resistance teaches away from non-integral barbs because Appellants have not identified where Chobotov actually criticizes or discourages non-integral barbs. See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("A reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not 'criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage' investigation into the invention claimed." (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Indeed, as recognized by the Examiner, Chobotov explicitly recognizes "other means of attachment." Final Act. 5 (citing Chobotov, 11:37--44) ("Note that although the various barbs ... discussed herein may be attached to or fixed on the stent struts ... , we have found it useful that ... they be integrally formed as part of the stent struts."). Appellant additionally argues that "[ o ]ne of ordinary skill in the art would not see the benefit of modifying the Chobotov stent-graft with bioresorbable barbs as this would not be a durable component and would reduce the strength and fatigue resistance as stated by Chobotov" such that the Examiner is relying on "impermissible hindsight reconstruction." 5 Appeal2014-007916 Application 13/874,693 Appeal Br. 13; see also id. at 11. Appellant's argument suggests that the proposed modification involves tradeoffs; however, such considerations do not necessarily prevent the proposed combination. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S. L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine"); Winner Int 'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n. 8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another."). The Examiner has identified an advantage to making the barb bioresorbable-i.e., facilitating removal of the stent. We note that Kleshinski explicitly teaches the desirability of the ability to reposition stents. See, e.g., Kleshinski, 1: 14--16, 54--60. That this advantage comes at the purported expense of durability of the barbs as argued by Appellant does not necessarily mean that the modification would not have been obvious. Moreover, Kleshinski discloses barbs alternatively comprising "Nitinol in either its memory form or superelastic form" or "other material such as biologically resorbable polymers." Kleshinski, 4:20-25. This disclosure suggests that either material is sufficiently durable for "anchoring the stent to the vessel in which it is implanted." Id. In light of the known alternatives in the art, we conclude that it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellant's invention as a matter of simple substitution to replace Chobotov's stent comprising struts and barbs made of "a shape memory alloy having superelastic properties 6 Appeal2014-007916 Application 13/874,693 such as NiTi" (Chobotov, 10:31-35) with the known alternative of biologically resorbable polymers of Kleshinski in order to achieve the same function of aiding in anchoring the stent to the vessel and to achieve a predictable result. See KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) ("when [an application] claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result") (citing United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1966)). As such, we agree with the Examiner's ultimate conclusion of obviousness of the subject matter of claim 1 based on the combined teachings of Chobotov and Kleshinski, although we consider additional reasoning beyond that articulated by the Examiner. For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and claims 3, 4, 6- 9, 11-14, 16-18, and 20 which fall with claim 1, but designate our affirmance as a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION, to afford Appellant an opportunity to address the rejection as articulated in this Decision. Rejection II Appellant's arguments in support of the patentability of claims 5, 10, 15, and 19 relate to the perceived deficiencies in the combined teachings of Chobotov and Kleshinski. Appeal Br. 15. Because we have found no such deficiencies in the combination of Chobotov and Kleshinski, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's rejection of claims 5, 10, 15, and 19. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 5, 10, 15, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Chobotov, Kleshinski, and Chouinard. By virtue of claims 5, 10, 15, and 19 encompassing the subject matter of the 7 Appeal2014-007916 Application 13/874,693 claims from which they depend, we likewise designate our affirmance of claims 5, 10, 15, and 19 as a new ground of rejection under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b ). Rejection III Appellant does not present any substantive arguments contesting the Examiner's rejection of claims 1 and 3-20 on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting. Consequently, Appellant has waived any argument of error, and we summarily sustain the rejection of claims 1 and 3-20 on the ground ofnonstatutory double patenting. See, e.g., In re Berger, 279 F.3d 975, 984--85 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Board did not err in sustaining a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, when the applicant failed to contest the rejection on appeal). DECISION The Examiner's decision to reject claims 1 and 3-20 on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-12 of Sherry is summarily affirmed. The Examiner's decision to reject claims 1 and 3-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed, and we designate the affirmance as containing NEW GROUNDS OF REJECTION pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides "[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review." Section 41.50(b) also provides: When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant, within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground 8 Appeal2014-007916 Application 13/874,693 of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart. (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection and state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing is sought. Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure§ 1214.01. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a )(1 )(iv). AFFIRMED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation